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Editor’s Note 
It is my honor to introduce Chapman Law Review’s first
issue of Volume 21. This issue consists of our “paper-only 
symposium,” a collection of scholarly works discussing 
“Constraining the Executive,” that features eight articles 
discussing if, and how, constraining the executive is appropriate. 
The issue opens with a thought-provoking introduction by 
Professor Tom Campbell that provides insight into the creation of 
this written symposium and the articles in the collection, 
while also challenging the propositions advanced through 
this scholarship. The articles thereafter highlight each 
author’s unique and compelling insight into, and proposals 
for, executive constraint. Mr. Paul Baumgardner begins the 
conversation by focusing on one specific way to constrain the 
executive—Thanksgiving Proclamations. Professor Randy Beck 
explains qui tam actions and how they should be expanded to 
allow Congress, when necessary, to legislate private standing in 
order to constrain the executive. Professor Neal Devins argues 
against congressional standing and argues that the judiciary’s 
role in checking the executive branch should not be expanded 
when Congress fails to check the president itself. Professors 
Andrew Hessick and William Marshall focus on creating easier 
standing requirements for states as plaintiffs to bring lawsuits 
against the president in order to check executive authority. 
Professor Gary Lawson suggests that the executive should 
constrain itself by, among other means, vetoing laws that grant 
the executive branch authority and appointing federal judges to 
return the executive branch to the limits that Professor Lawson 
believes the Framers intended. Professors Sanford Levinson and 
Mark Graber argue that rules of judicial deference to the 
executive depend on the qualities of the president currently in 
office; a president who is anti-Publian (i.e., lacking the virtues of 
Publius) should be given less deference by the judiciary, and 
justiciability constraints against the president should not apply. 
Professor Michael Ramsey focuses on Zivotofsky v. Kerry and its 
implications for constraining the executive through litigation in 
regards to foreign affairs decisions. Finally, Professor John Yoo 
wraps up our symposium by addressing Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
presidency and using it as an example of the benefits that occur 
when executive action is not constrained. 
Chapman Law Review is grateful for the continued support 
of the members of the administration and faculty that made this 
written symposium and the publication of this issue possible, 
including: Dean of Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of 
Law, Matthew Parlow; our faculty advisor, Professor Celestine 
McConville; and our faculty advisory committee, Professors 
Deepa Badrinarayana, Michael Bayzler, John Hall, Janine Kim, 
and Associate Dean of Research and Faculty Development, 
Donald Kochan. We would especially like to thank Professor Tom 
Campbell for his guidance and assistance with this issue—from 
his efforts in developing the topic and recruiting scholars, to his 
personal contribution to the discourse on “Constraining the 
Executive.” Finally, I would like to personally thank the Chapman 
Law Review editors for their tireless efforts in completing 
this volume. 
      Lauren Fitzpatrick 
Editor-in-Chief 
1Introduction to Constraining the
Executive
Tom Campbell* 
The essays in this symposium illuminate aspects of the task 
of keeping the executive branch within its constitutionally 
appointed boundaries. The symposium was conceived before the 
2016 elections, so its plan was not directed toward the current 
president. Nevertheless, it is inescapable that, writing after those 
elections, the authors took recent developments into account.1
The lessons to be learned from these essays, however, have more 
permanent application than simply for the immediate present. In 
this introduction, I review the articles of the symposium hoping 
to highlight the valuable contribution to separation of powers 
jurisprudence that each offers for the long term. 
This symposium focuses on means of constraining the 
executive. There is, of course, a vibrant recent literature on what 
constitutes the kind of executive overreach in need of being 
constrained.2 This symposium takes as given that there have 
been, and will be, instances of executive action or inaction 
needing restraint (without becoming embroiled in the specifics 
of any specific example), and turns its attention to what 
institutional remedies may be available. 
A. Constraining the Executive Through the Courts 
The courts are the logical place to seek relief when the 
executive’s action needs to be constrained. However, standing 
requirements might preclude identifying any plaintiff qualified to 
bring a case under Article III’s case or controversy requirement. 
 *  Professor of Law, Dale E. Fowler School of Law; Professor of Economics, George L. 
Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University. I am grateful for expert 
research assistance by Ms. Sherry Levsen, J.D., M.L.S., M.A., of the Hugh and Hazel 
Darling Law Library, Chapman University. 
1 In one instance, that of Levinson and Graber’s article, their entire point of 
departure deals with the specifics of President Trump, though they propose a set of 
judicial responses that would apply to future presidents with characteristics similar 
to his. 
2 See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Steven Menashi, Taking Steel Seizure Seriously: 
The Iran Nuclear Agreement and the Separation of Powers, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199 
(2017); contra Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
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Four of the articles in this symposium recommend ways to 
expand how cases challenging the president can be brought in 
federal court. 
1. Professor Randy Beck 
Drawing from historical precedent, Professor Randy Beck 
proposes a broader use of qui tam actions. Such actions are 
already available in American courts under the False Claims 
Act.3 Under that approach, when money is owed to the federal 
government, and a private party draws that fact to the 
executive’s attention but the executive fails to pursue the claim, 
the private party can proceed, keeping a portion of any funds 
recovered. It is like a whistleblower statute combined with a 
finder’s fee. 
The qui tam plaintiff has standing because she or he has a 
percentage of potential money damages to be gained. A good 
example here is the Antideficiency Act, where criminal penalties 
can be imposed on an executive officer who spends government 
money without authorization.4 If a private citizen uncovers an 
unauthorized expenditure of money by an employee of the federal 
executive branch, that private citizen can bring a qui tam action 
to collect the unauthorized payment back to the federal treasury, 
minus a share which the private plaintiff gets to keep.  
Elsewhere, I have suggested qui tam as a way to get before a 
federal judge the issue of the legality of a war carried on by the 
executive without the approval of Congress,5 where money was 
spent on expenses of such a war. Beck would allow Congress to 
go even further. In connection with any specific duty or 
prohibition imposed on the executive by statute, Congress could 
add a penalty provision, owed to the U.S. Treasury, by an 
executive officer who fails in her or his duty. Beck would thus 
allow Congress to legislate private standing in almost any 
context it might wish to constrain the executive through the 
simple expedient of specifying a sum of money an executive agent 
would owe the government, if found to be deficient in her or his 
duties under that statute. The qui tam plaintiff would thus 
distinguish herself or himself from the large mass of citizens by 
her or his interest in a share of that sum. 
I see no fault with the logic that this creates a case or 
controversy regarding the qui tam claimant that sets her or him 
3 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012). 
4 See 31 U.S.C. § 1518 (removal from office); § 1519 (fine and imprisonment); 
§ 1341 (predicate). 
5 Tom Campbell, Executive Action and Nonaction, 95 N.C. L. REV. 553, 585 (2017). 
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apart from the average citizen. Unlike qui tam actions under the 
False Claims Act, however, Beck’s expanded recourse to qui tam
does not start with a pre-existing sum of money which is, by 
hypothesis, owed to the government. That “res” constitutes the 
case or controversy for Article III purposes.6 The qui tam statute 
merely expands the number of persons with a specific interest in 
that “res.” Can Congress both create the “res” and the class of 
persons with a specific interest in it? Beck maintains from 
historical precedent that this can be done, and was done, often, in 
British jurisprudence, going back to the fourteenth century. He 
maintains that several American states have done the same, 
including when they were colonies. Legislatures essentially 
harnessed private energies to enforce duties on public officials by 
imposing a fine on failure to fulfill such duties and letting the 
private party share in the fine. 
Beck realizes other jurisprudential doctrines, especially the 
political question doctrine, might yet shield executive action or 
inaction from judicial scrutiny. He also perceives a danger in 
over-zealous use of the device he is advancing: executive agents 
might be chilled in the conscientious performance of their duty by 
the risk of personal liability. That risk, presumably, would be 
taken into account as Congress decided the set of executive 
actions or inactions in regard to which the expanded qui tam
claims could be brought. Beck suggests three, from recent public 
events: waging war without Congressional authorization, failing 
to preserve government emails as government records, and not 
spending money the Congress has appropriated. 
Is there a limit to what Beck proposes? At what point would 
the Supreme Court say Congress could not create standing where 
none existed before just by monetizing an executive duty? How to 
articulate a constraining principle is the weakness in Beck’s 
proposal—though one might view it as a strength, in that no 
action of the executive would be able to evade judicial review (at 
least on standing grounds) when the Congress put its mind to so 
subjecting it.7
2. Professors Andrew Hessick and William Marshall 
Professors Andrew Hessick and William Marshall also seek 
to constrain the executive by greater access to the judicial 
6 See United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968) (referring to the 
focus of the False Claims Act on a financial loss to the government). 
7 Of course, any Congressional bill creating the qui tam action might be vetoed, so 
Beck’s remedy would require a two-thirds consensus of both houses of Congress. While 
not a constraining substantive principle, that does constitute a practical constraint on 
over-use of Beck’s imaginative idea. 
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branch. In their article, they recommend easier standing 
requirements for states as plaintiffs. They view litigation of the 
type brought by twenty-six states against President Obama’s 
“Deferred Action for Parents of Americans” (“DAPA”) as a 
salubrious mechanism for checking executive authority (in that 
case, executive inaction)—whether a court ends up siding with 
the president or not. 
States as plaintiffs hold advantages over Congress, in 
Hessick and Marshall’s view, because Congress has declined 
markedly in its vigorous vindication of legislative prerogatives, 
becoming instead an instrument of partisanship.8 A Republican 
Congress will challenge a Democratic president, but not a 
Republican one, and vice versa. Of course, the same could be said 
of state attorneys general and governors, so Hessick and 
Marshall suggest a form of discretion in judicial rulings on 
standing that would incorporate whether a bipartisan mix of 
states’ governors or attorneys general were bringing the suit. If 
such a group of states brings suit, then Hessick and Marshall 
would ease the standing requirement of “injury in fact” to allow a 
more speculative kind of injury to be pled, as in Massachusetts v. 
Environmental Protection Agency,9 a case where, they maintain, 
a private party’s fear of rising sea levels from global warming 
would have been insufficient to establish standing. 
Are Hessick and Marshall justified in claiming that states 
have a unique kind of interest, deserving relaxed standing 
requirements? They recognize the sovereign interest of states to 
oppose being turned into instruments of the federal government. 
That was the situation in one part of the challenge to the 
Affordable Care Act/Obamacare (“ACA”) that prevailed before the 
Supreme Court.10 There is also the non-sovereign interest that 
the states have in suing on behalf of their citizens for their 
citizens’ harm, in parens patriae actions.11 What they see in 
addition to these established forms of standing is the states’ 
interest in constraining any federal action (not just presidential 
action) because federal action will preempt state authority.12
8 For an in-depth development of the same theme, see Edward G. Carmines 
& Matthew Fowler, The Temptation of Executive Authority: How Increased Polarization 
and the Decline in Legislative Capacity Have Contributed to the Expansion of Presidential 
Power, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 369 (2017). 
9 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
10 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012). 
11 See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (West 2018). 
12 In Jonathan Remy Nash, Sovereign Preemption State Standing, 112 NW. U. L.
REV. 201 (2017), Professor Nash explores the concept of a state having special standing 
when the federal government has legislatively preempted a subject area, but then the 
federal executive fails to vindicate that interest. Hessick and Marshall’s insight is a 
similar one. 
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They note states have a legitimacy that private parties do not 
because of democratic accountability; and they further applaud 
the development of expertise and judgment from the recurring 
nature of this kind of litigation involving state actors, as opposed 
to any private party in a given case. 
Yet the same might be said of Congress. Any upholding of 
presidential action in an area of shared authority cuts back what 
Congress could do absent the president’s action. That affects 
Congressional prerogatives as much as upholding a presidential 
action in an area of potential state authority does the state’s 
prerogatives. If getting many states on board confers legitimacy, 
so also might legitimacy be found for a suit by a house of 
Congress not brought just by a few members, but sanctioned by a 
resolution from the house of Congress bringing the lawsuit, as 
occurred in U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell (originally 
filed as Boehner v. Burwell) (challenging the payments to insurance 
companies under ACA as not having been appropriated).13
Also similar to Hessick and Marshall’s argument for the 
states as parties, the House or Senate, too, will develop expertise 
over the years, if permitted standing to challenge executive 
authority. Hessick and Marshall’s preference for empowering 
states, rather than Congress, to sue the executive, thus comes 
down to a reluctance to weigh in on the side of Congress in 
balance of powers issues, and a correlative willingness to weigh 
in on the side of states in federalism issues, at least where the 
group of states presenting the challenge is bipartisan. 
For many years, the D.C. Circuit applied a doctrine of 
equitable discretion to allow suits by members of Congress in 
some circumstances.14 Raines v. Byrd appeared to end that route 
for Congressional standing,15 but the Court recently opened a 
new avenue for state legislators to sue agencies of state 
government in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission,16 distinguishing suits by state 
legislatures from those by Congress.17 The Court identified the 
same concern based on separation of powers that Hessick and 
13 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 169 
(D.D.C. 2016). 
14 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Riegle 
v. Federal Open Market Committee, 656 F.2d 873, 880–81 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert denied,
454 U.S. 1082 (1981); see also Sophia C. Goodman, Note, Equitable Discretion to Dismiss 
Congressional-Plaintiff Suits: A Reassessment, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1075 (1990). 
15 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818–29 (1997). 
16 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
17 Id. at 2665 n.12. Regarding the revived standing of states to sue the federal 
executive for violations of federal legislative prerogatives, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen, 
Federalism All the Way Up: State Standing and “The New Process Federalism,” 105 CAL.
L. REV. 1739, 1745–50 (2017). 
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Marshall did about Congressional recourse to the courts, but 
noted the absence of such a concern when the state legislature 
was suing a state agency.18 The defendant was a state agency, 
not the federal executive, in Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission. Hence, the Court’s explicit distinction between state 
legislatures and Congress as plaintiffs might presage the Court’s 
willingness to take exactly the course that Hessick and Marshall 
advocate, and allow greater standing to states as plaintiffs 
to invoke the third federal branch to constrain the second 
federal branch. 
3. Professor Michael Ramsey 
Professor Michael Ramsey finds new hope for constraining 
the executive through litigation where the subject is foreign 
affairs because of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Zivotofsky
v. Kerry.19 Ramsey points out how the Zivotofsky decision 
restricts the political question doctrine as announced in Baker v. 
Carr,20 cutting back Baker’s six criteria to only two: (1) whether 
the issue was textually committed to another branch of 
government, and (2) whether manageable standards were 
available for the court to make a judgment. Eliminating the more 
open-ended of Baker’s criteria makes it more difficult for a court 
to cite the political question doctrine. In Ramsey’s view, future 
challenges to executive action in foreign affairs, including the 
exercise of war powers, would be justiciable insofar as they call 
on a court to interpret the meaning of a statute or a clause of the 
Constitution.21 If a litigant asks a court to make a factual 
judgment, however, especially one calling into question whether a 
presidential decision was justified, the political question doctrine 
would remain. 
18 Id. at 2665 n.12. 
19 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
20 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
21 Professor Julian Mortenson also sees increased likelihood for successful challenges 
of presidential action in foreign affairs as a result of Zivotofsky, but for substantive 
reasons in the opinion itself. See Julian Mortenson, Zivotofsky: The Difference Between 
Inherent and Exclusive Presidential Power, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 45 (2017).
“It is not for the president alone to determine the whole content of the nation’s 
foreign policy. That said, it is for the president alone to make the specific 
decision of which foreign power he will recognize as legitimate.” Besides taking 
every opportunity to emphasize the narrowness of its holding, the majority 
seems repeatedly to go out of its way to celebrate the role of the legislature: 
“[W]hether the realm is foreign or domestic,” the opinion urges over and over 
again, “it is still the Legislative Branch, not the Executive Branch, that makes 
the law.” There is reason for more than a little suspicion that Marbury-style jiu 
jitsu may be at work here: this decision reaches a pro-executive outcome, but 
does so through the creation of a vehicle whose analytical structure and overall 
atmosphere is strikingly pro-congressional. 
Id. at 48–49 (footnotes omitted). 
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Ramsey cannot point to any post-Zivotofsky case where a 
court abandoned the political question doctrine, but he does 
successfully identify how lower courts have, in writing their 
opinions, trimmed their reliance on the doctrine because of the 
Zivotofsky formulation. Ramsey also very helpfully traces the 
history of the political question back to Marbury v. Madison,22
through later decisions of the Marshall Court, and the Civil War 
Prize Cases,23 to demonstrate that Baker’s restrictive formulation 
of the political question doctrine was more of an aberration than 
a continuation of settled jurisprudence. (To this, I would add that 
Justice Brennan’s announcement of six principles for the political 
question doctrine in Baker was actually obiter dicta: the Court 
held the doctrine did not apply to that case, so what was said 
about when it might apply does not qualify as a holding.) 
If Professor Ramsey is correct, perhaps the most important 
consequence is that Zivotofsky will have opened up the courts to 
deciding whether the War Powers Resolution24 is constitutional.25
That is a profoundly important question that has eluded judicial 
resolution for forty-five years. Such a question would fit 
Ramsey’s formulation: it would not require analysis of the facts 
of any particular conflict. Rather, the two fundamental 
challenges to its constitutionality would be answered as matters 
of constitutional law: (1) can the president’s use of force be 
restricted to sixty days absent an affirmative vote of Congress; 
and (2) can Congress delegate to the president its right to choose 
against whom to wage war for sixty days? 
Academics, legislative leaders, and average citizens can only 
hope that Professor Ramsey’s prediction does prove true, and 
that members of the third branch take up the invitation to 
constrain the executive in the foreign affairs area, in those 
instances where a pure question of constitutional law or 
statutory interpretation is required. 
4. Professors Sanford Levinson and Mark Graber 
Professors Levinson and Graber make a tremendously 
original contribution to the academic literature on judicial review 
of executive action with their submission to this symposium.26
22 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165–66 (1803). 
23 The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).  
24 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48. 
 25 See Mortenson, supra note 21, at 45. 
26 The only recent treatment I have seen that deals with some of these same issues is 
Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L.
REV. 71 (2017). Professor Shaw largely opposes judicial cognizance of presidential 
speeches; while Professors Levinson and Graber base much of their argument for 
heightened scrutiny of President Trump on his speeches and other public 
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The entire U.S. constitutional scheme for executive authority 
rests, in their view, on a conception of the president as minimally 
qualified, not subject to conflicts of interest, and not emotionally 
immature. When a president lacks these qualities, specific rules 
of judicial deference to the executive, and justiciability 
constraints on suits against him, should no longer apply. 
Professors Levinson and Graber maintain President Trump 
does lack these qualities. Accordingly, courts should approach 
challenges to his actions with the following presumptions. 
Wholesale delegations of power from Congress to the president in 
legislation passed in an earlier era should be narrowly 
interpreted now, and explicit grants of authority should 
be required rather than allowed to be inferred. The kind of 
motive-analysis with which the Supreme Court approached the 
actions of southern legislatures in the civil rights era, but not in 
other contexts, should be revived regarding President Trump. 
Levinson and Graber invite federal courts to make use of 
President Trump’s campaign (and some subsequent) statements 
as to his own (possibly unconstitutional) motivations. They also 
encourage federal courts to accept full constitutional challenges, 
facial and as-applied, to actions by President Trump. They urge a 
narrowing of the constitutional avoidance maxim, because the 
premise that a co-equal branch did not intend to violate the 
Constitution is not true in the case of President Trump.27
Their article focuses entirely on how courts should entertain 
challenges to a president who is anti-Publian: that is, lacking the 
virtues that Publius, the pseudonymous author of the Federalist 
Papers, assumed a president would possess. Professors Levinson 
and Graber’s guiding principle in recommending this approach is 
that the Constitution has given way to exceptional powers 
granted to the president in some contexts (war and other 
national emergency), and to great skepticism of federalism in the 
face of overt racial motivation for states’ actions. So, why in the 
present context of a president less qualified than any in history, 
and who has in his own statements evidenced prejudice often and 
clearly, they ask, should we not also see a tailoring of judicial 
doctrines developed in more normal circumstances? 
pronouncements. However, Professor Shaw departs from her overall premise in her 
section “Presidential Speech as Evidence of (Constitutionally Forbidden) Government 
Purpose,” id. at 137–40, which is where Professors Levinson and Graber have put most of 
their focus. 
27 For a similar skepticism of the constitutional avoidance doctrine, see Aneil 
Kovvali, Constitutional Avoidance and Presidential Power, 35 YALE J. REG. BULL.
10 (2017). 
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It is true that the Supreme Court has evaluated motive in 
striking down state governmental action neutral on its face, but 
with a racially discriminatory effect.28 The normal deference 
owed to a state legislature was suspended when the assumption 
of their action in good faith was cast into serious doubt. Levinson 
and Graber point to New York Times v. Sullivan29 as a case 
abandoning centuries of libel and slander law to create a 
protection for the press unique in world jurisprudence, all driven 
by the specific circumstances of the civil rights era. So also, 
Professors Levinson and Graber argue, we might normally expect 
a court to ignore campaign rhetoric by a candidate in evaluating 
that candidate’s actions once in office, and even accord some 
deference to a plausibly constitutional motivation for official 
action (as in the constitutional avoidance maxim for legislative 
acts). They argue we should not do so, however, in the case of 
President Donald Trump, whose campaign (and subsequent) 
statements of an anti-immigrant nature, for example, corrupted 
his various travel-bans, thus providing a legitimate basis for 
overruling them, even though a court might have allowed an 
identical executive order to go into effect from a president not so 
tainted. This, of course, was the rationale of the Fourth Circuit in 
overturning President Trump’s exclusion orders for immigrants 
from select countries he claimed had imposed inadequate vetting, 
but which the court held were selected because of their 
Muslim populations.30
Professors Levinson and Graber’s suggestions deal with the 
doctrines of justiciability developed under the rubric of judicial 
prudence, not constitutional requirement. Adopting what the 
Professors argue, therefore, would violate no constitutional
provision. As noted above, years ago, the D.C. Circuit developed a 
doctrine of “equitable discretion” for deciding when to grant 
standing to members of Congress to challenge presidential acts.31
The approach advanced by Professors Levinson and Graber 
should be seen as no more controversial than that. 
What is more difficult, however, is to determine “neutral 
principles”32 for deciding when a president is non-Publian. 
President Donald Trump qualifies for so many reasons, in the 
Professors’ view, the conclusion is, in mathematical terms, 
28 See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 340, 340 (1960) (enjoining action by the 
Alabama legislature to redraw the boundaries of Tuskegee so as to eliminate almost all 
black residents). 
29 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
30 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 575–76 (4th Cir. 2017). 
31 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
32 Levinson and Graber’s point of departure in their article is Herbert Wechsler, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
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“overdetermined.” It is not entirely clear which characteristics 
they would consider sufficient. Among the determinants they 
cite are President Trump not having won a majority of the 
popular vote, his being roundly criticized as incompetent by other 
office-holders, silence of other office-holders who might have been 
expected to defend him, his business conflicts of interest, his 
crude speech especially on matters of race, his many factual 
misstatements, his seeming inability to admit an error, the 
manifest absence of any previous qualifying experience, and his 
many changes of position, even within the same day. 
Professors Levinson and Graber analogize treating a 
non-Publian president differently from a “normal” president to 
reforming a contract in the face of mutual mistake, improvising 
dialogue in a theater piece when an actor forgets a line, or 
running a different sports play when the originally planned move 
becomes impossible. In each such case, however, the parties act 
to re-establish what would have been done had they known a fact 
at the start that only became apparent subsequently. That is not 
the case with President Trump. Most, if not all, of the flaws 
identified were well known from the campaign. This is more a 
case of buyers’ remorse than mutual mistake. Indeed, President 
Trump would maintain there was no mistake at all. 
A suggestion I offer is that the decision to treat a president 
as Publian or not should not be binary.33 Rather, I would suggest 
that courts adopt a sliding scale, opting for higher scrutiny of 
presidential action the more non-Publian the president may be. 
This approach would allow for different decisions in different 
contexts: in the instance of President Trump, his statements 
about the federal judge being ineligible to decide the case 
involving Trump University because of his parents’ Mexican 
heritage might serve to justify a non-Publian conclusion in a 
matter involving immigration, but not, necessarily, in a matter 
of imposing offsetting tariffs for perceived trade violations by 
other nations. 
The Supreme Court will soon have the occasion to consider 
the Levinson-Graber suggestion when it rules on President 
Trump’s travel bans. Professors Levinson and Graber have 
served up to the Court a rationale for taking into account the 
33 Professors Levinson and Graber identify several other presidents whose 
qualifications for president were minimal, but whom they would not consider 
non-Publian. As a humbling note to this exercise, I might add to the presidents they 
suggest, the case of our country’s greatest president, a one-term Congressman from 
Illinois (though he had experience in the part-time state legislature), who never won a 
majority of the popular vote, and whom the intelligent critics at the time considered 
uneducated and uneducable. 
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very specific facts of this president’s behavior, qualifications, and 
public statements, should the Court be inclined to do so. 
B. Constraining the Executive by the Executive? 
1. Professor Gary Lawson 
In his article in this symposium, Professor Lawson suggests 
that an effort to constrain the executive might be launched from 
an entirely different source: the executive itself, and, especially, 
President Trump himself. Structurally, of course, Professor 
Lawson is right. A president devoted to limiting executive power 
can go far to effectuating that result. Lawson identifies several 
ways: vetoing laws that grant more power from Congress to the 
executive branch, proposing the repeal of existing laws that grant 
such delegations, failing to use the authority that has already 
been delegated, and appointing federal judges who will revive the 
nondelegation doctrine and otherwise return the executive 
branch to the limits Lawson believes the Framers intended. 
Lawson concedes the attraction of using executive power for 
“good ends” might overcome these self-constraining instincts of a 
president. President Obama’s approach to immigration reform is 
a good example. President Obama wanted to grant protected 
status to two large categories of individuals who had entered 
America illegally, but withheld doing so for almost six years, 
saying “for me to simply through executive order ignore those 
congressional mandates would not conform with my appropriate 
role as President.”34 Eventually, his desire for the policy 
outcome overcame his reservations about whether he had 
the constitutional authority to allow those groups of immigrants 
to stay. 
To have lasting effect, as the President Obama precedent 
just cited shows, President Trump would have to do more than 
simply implement his own preferred approach to administrative 
law. He has ordered his executive branch agencies to repeal two 
regulations for every one new regulation desired; but a new 
president could reverse that instantaneously.
The ACA individual mandate has now been repealed, 
thereby cutting back a huge grant of authority to the Secretary of 
U.S. Health and Human Services to specify what elements had to 
be in anyone’s health insurance. The next target of the Trump 
34 United States v. Juarez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 783 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting 
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Univision Town Hall, 
(Mar. 28, 2011, 10:37 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/ 
03/28/remarks-president-univision-town-hall [http://perma.cc/2APS-LQR5]).
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administration has already been identified: the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, created by the Dodd-Frank 
legislation, with sweeping authority to outlaw “unfair” financial 
practices, and protected from the Congressional oversight 
afforded by the appropriation process by reason of being funded 
directly by the Federal Reserve. 
For President Trump to fulfill his promise as Professor 
Lawson sees it, Trump would have to urge the repeal of more 
than just the ACA and Dodd-Frank. He would have to get 
Congress to cut back the very broad delegations of power to the 
executive enshrined in statutes such as the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, with its prohibition of “unfair methods of 
competition,”35 and the Securities Exchange Act, whose section 
78j allows the Securities Exchange Commission to promulgate 
any regulations “necessary or appropriate in the public interest 
or for the protection of investors.”36 Such a major step would 
require Congressional majorities supporting President Trump 
much larger than he now possesses and a systemic review of the 
statutory underpinnings of the administrative state that has not 
yet even been commenced. 
The way President Trump might come close to achieving the 
potential Lawson sees for him is more likely in his judicial 
appointments. Professor Lawson notes that Justice Gorsuch 
brings an interest in reviving the non-delegation doctrine to the 
Supreme Court, far beyond any such disposition by Justice Scalia 
whom he replaced. If future appointments to the Supreme Court 
and the D.C. Circuit reflect a zealous focus on restoring the 
non-delegation doctrine (as opposed to simply a commitment to 
judicial conservatism), President Trump will have constrained 
the executive more powerfully, and more permanently, than any 
of the other mechanisms discussed in this symposium. In 
Professor Lawson’s Monty Python lexicon, that would be 
“something completely different.” 
2. Mr. Paul Baumgardner 
Mr. Paul Baumgardner enlivens our symposium with one 
particular area to constrain the executive. Claiming to be neutral 
as to the policy, he nevertheless sets forth the arguments against 
the propriety of presidents issuing Thanksgiving Proclamations. 
A Jeffersonian respect for the wall of separation between church 
and state should inhibit presidents from this practice, he 
maintains, even in the absence of any such proclamation’s calling 
35 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
36 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b). 
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on citizens to undertake particular religious acts or prayers, such 
as thanking God. 
Baumgardner does not provide any constraining principle, so 
that his arguments would apply just as well to a presidential 
speech as to a Thanksgiving Proclamation. If that suggestion 
were followed, I personally would have deep regret. Perhaps the 
finest Inaugural Address in history, Lincoln’s Second Inaugural, 
places the Civil War squarely in the tradition of a vengeful God’s 
punishment to North and South alike for the offenses of slavery, 
which both parts of the nation tolerated, promoted, and from 
which they both derived benefit. Here is the soaring rhetoric 
that, under Baumgardner’s sources and reasoning, should never 
have been spoken in March of 1865: 
Both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes 
His aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should 
dare to ask a just God’s assistance in wringing their bread from the 
sweat of other men’s faces, but let us judge not, that we be not judged. 
The prayers of both could not be answered. That of neither has been 
answered fully. The Almighty has His own purposes. “Woe unto the 
world because of offenses; for it must needs be that offenses come, but 
woe to that man by whom the offense cometh.” If we shall suppose 
that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the 
providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued 
through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He 
gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to 
those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any 
departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living 
God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, 
that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God 
wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman’s two 
hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until 
every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another 
drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still 
it must be said “the judgments of the Lord are true and 
righteous altogether.”37
Since Baumgardner’s analysis is directed at presidential 
speech and not executive actions or regulations, I cannot see how 
his analysis can be made to have force—except by convincing 
individual presidents to self-censor. As a personal preference, I 
would not deprive our nation of the treasure of Lincoln’s Second 
Inaugural Address. As a constitutional matter, Baumgardner 
does not grapple with the president’s own First Amendment right 
to speak, or freely to exercise his religion. Nor, extrapolating his 
arguments to apply to Congressional speech invoking God, does 
37 President Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, BARTLEBY (Mar. 4, 1865), 
http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres32.html [http://perma.cc/2SR6-CL3H].
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his logic address the provision that any speech made in Congress 
not be “questioned in any other place.” These are also parts of the 
Constitution and need to be read in conjunction with, not to be 
decimated by, the Establishment Clause. 
As a thought piece, Baumgardner’s article provides a caution 
to politicians who might exploit religion, but that assumes that 
kind of politician is subject to shaming. I personally believe there 
is a place for religion in public discourse, short of exploitation, 
and it would be a great loss to see it end. 
C. Against Expanded Constraint of the Executive 
1. Professor Neal Devins 
Professor Neal Devins describes an almost apocalyptically 
partisan world in Congress, from which situation he derives the 
conclusion that courts should be even more reluctant to hear 
lawsuits brought by legislators against executive overreach than 
they have hitherto.38 Relying on impressive original research, 
Devins details the demise of the institutionalists in Congress: 
House members and Senators who would stand up for the 
authority of Congress even against a president of their own 
party. Now, Devins sees an urban battle zone pockmarked by 
hollowed out buildings that once stood for institutional 
principles, destroyed by their use as targets and weapons in an 
unceasing partisan divide. 
He is largely right. Bipartisanship seems reserved for former 
Congress members,39 and several current Senators who have 
formed the Common Sense Caucus,40 dedicated to overcoming the 
partisanship that has stymied legislative progress on America’s 
most pressing needs. However, the former group is significant for 
many members who found bi-partisanship only after leaving 
Congress; and the latter group, while productive in ending the 
first government shutdown of 2018, has yet to fulfill its promise 
as the critical mass able to move between the two parties to 
create a transitory majority of sixty Senators able to overcome 
filibuster by Democrats, and ideological purity from the 
38 Professor Devins is not unique in his pessimistic description of the decline of 
Congress’s ability and willingness to assert its institutional interests in a bipartisan way. 
See, e.g., David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 33–37 (2018). 
39 Over 180 former Members of Congress have formed the “ReFormers Caucus.” See
ReFormers Caucus Members, ISSUE ONE, https://www.issueone.org/reformers/#reformer-
full-list [http://perma.cc/BW74-23XH]. Just over one hundred are Democrats, and over 
eighty are Republicans. See id. 
40 See Alex Swoyer & David Sherfinski, Centrist senators form Common Sense 
Caucus, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jan/23/
centrist-senators-form-common-sense-caucus/ [http://perma.cc/LNA2-MJHA].
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Republicans. For all the reasons Professor Devins laments, we 
should wish these efforts well; but he’s right, their prospects for 
success are bleak. 
We are left with a dysfunctional Congress, incapable of 
standing up for its institutional privileges against an expanding 
executive. Professor Devins worries that allowing more legislators’ 
lawsuits will create a new forum for the partisan divide, and may, 
therefore, paint the courts also with a more partisan cast. This 
leaves Professor Devins with no specific remedy for the problem he 
has chronicled: an institutional lassitude by Congress in the face 
of executive branch encroachments. 
Professor Devins and I respectfully disagree on the value of 
expanded legislator standing.41 The value served by allowing 
legislators to sue the executive is not in the unique insight of the 
legislators’ legal arguments, but in the fact that in many cases 
they may be the only parties with standing to challenge executive 
actions. I trust courts to cut through the partisan nature of 
arguments submitted in briefs by members of one party in the 
House or Senate. What those members do, however, in getting a 
case to court could be irreplaceable. 
Consider, for instance, an executive’s failure to enforce laws: 
whether President Obama on immigration, or President Trump 
on the ACA tax. What private party would have standing to force 
a president to act?42 Or consider the challenge to a president 
spending money that was not the subject of an appropriation, as 
the U.S. Constitution requires?43 If a group of members of 
Congress, even though entirely partisan, nevertheless are held to 
have standing (as, for instance, the House did in U.S. House of 
Representatives v. Burwell44), and no one else conceivably could, 
then I would weather the risk that a judge would be drawn into a 
partisan dispute, in order to get the issue resolved. The political 
question doctrine would still be available for the judge to avoid 
ruling if there were too great a partisan divisive risk in doing so. 
2. Professor John Yoo 
Professor John Yoo presents a contrast to the majority of 
participants in this symposium by a robust defense of executive 
41 See generally Campbell, supra note 5. 
42 I grant that it is still not clear that even members of Congress would have 
standing in such situations, but their institutional interest in seeing laws passed by 
Congress be enforced is of a different kind than that of the average citizen. That is the 
gist of my article. See generally Campbell, supra note 5. 
43 “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
44 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 76 
(D.D.C. 2015). 
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action, occasionally even beyond legal limits. He provides an 
exhaustive, insightful, and largely laudatory recounting of the 
presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, as analyzed in domestic 
policy, foreign policy, and civil liberties. Yoo sees the success of 
FDR’s four terms in office as the direct result of FDR’s 
willingness to stretch the powers of the presidency to the utmost. 
In the area of domestic policy, Yoo candidly observes with 
historical hindsight that the New Deal, and tight monetary 
policy, prolonged rather than alleviated the Great Depression. He 
criticizes the expansion of the administrative state, whereby 
FDR’s legacy of federal agencies, excessive delegation of power 
from Congress, and truncating state’s reserved powers continues 
to have effects to this day—not all bad, but mostly so. 
Yet in foreign affairs, and civil liberties, Yoo finds 
redemption for FDR’s robust assertion of executive authority. Yoo 
maintains that if the president abided by the spirit (and the 
letter) of Congressional enactments consistent with the nation’s 
preference for neutrality, America might never have helped 
Britain at the time of Britain’s greatest need, and might have 
entered the European theater of war too late, if at all. 
The wartime civil liberties restrictions, including massive 
wiretapping without warrants, are similarly justified, in 
Professor Yoo’s view, by their results: An America largely 
protected from enemy sabotage throughout World War II. 
One might put Yoo’s position this way: Of what use is the 
separation of powers, the rule of law, and the Bill of Rights in 
America in a world where Nazism and fascism had triumphed in 
Europe and intimidated the United States into the status of a 
vassal state? This is a variant of Justice Jackson’s argument, 
dissenting in Terminiello v. Chicago, that our U.S. Constitution 
is not a “suicide pact.”45 The argument is that courts must not 
ignore what is necessary to protect our country’s very existence 
by an overly scrupulous regard for civil liberties or restrictions on 
executive action more suited to normal times. Professor Yoo is in 
this camp, in my view. He has good company; Justice Jackson 
knew what he was talking about, having just returned from his 
role as prosecutor in the Nuremberg trials. Terminiello dealt 
45 “There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a 
little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.” 
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also
Linda Greenhouse, The Nation; ‘Suicide Pact,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/22/weekinreview/the-nation-suicide-pact.html
(discussing other appearances of this or similar phrases in Supreme Court opinions). 
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with incitements to a mob, and Jackson detailed in his opinion 
how manipulation of mobs had allowed Hitler to come to power. 
Nevertheless, if we dull our sensitivity to violations of civil 
liberties and to encroachments by the executive upon the people’s 
representatives in the legislative branch, I believe we run 
another risk of losing our identity as a constitutional democratic 
republic of limited government powers and maximum individual 
freedom. We have already seen these tendencies developing 
rapidly in our “war on terror,” with unprecedented incursions 
into individual liberties under the Patriot Act, and reliance on ex 
parte judicial proceedings (like the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court) to issue search warrants and wiretaps that 
sweep up information about innocent Americans along with 
foreign suspects. 
Undoubtedly, presidents like FDR (and Lincoln) exceeded 
the boundaries of executive authority. Undoubtedly, they are also 
two of the most beloved presidents in our country’s history. Both 
saved our country. 
Perhaps we have, tacitly, become the Roman Republic: 
allocating exceptional powers to Consuls in time of great crisis. 
The Roman Republic set a strict time limit for their Consuls, 
with authority automatically reverting to the Senate when the 
time ran out. That historical precedent, however, is not a 
comforting one. The Roman Republic grew used to autocracy. The 
security and welfare offered by those given dictatorial power 
were favored by the people over their own freedom. The Consul 
became the Emperor, and the days of Rome as a republic came to 
an end. 
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Constraining Moses: Rethinking 
Thanksgiving Day Proclamations
Paul Baumgardner* 
INTRODUCTION
Modern American presidents enjoy an extensive reserve of 
formal and informal powers, which have developed in accordance 
with the historical, institutional, and ideological changes across 
the federal government. In recent months, many Americans have 
felt the reach and impact of one particular power—the president’s 
rhetorical power. Long before Donald Trump told the American 
people that “there is blame on both sides” in Charlottesville, 
Virginia, political scientists had begun researching the outsized 
capital that presidential discourse can marshal.1 A president’s 
words possess an unparalleled institutional power to arrange 
and rearrange the populace—to motivate action, encourage 
restraint, to assuage strife, and also to send peasants scrambling 
for pitchforks. 
Our political knowledge of a president’s rhetorical power 
ought to inform and complicate how we analyze the 
constitutionality of certain presidential practices. In this article, I 
focus on one such presidential practice: Thanksgiving Day 
Proclamations. The presidential tradition of offering Thanksgiving 
Proclamations began with our first president, George Washington, 
and it has remained a common—but not constant—oratorical 
practice of American presidents up to the present. However, 
Thanksgiving Proclamations have sustained a fair degree of legal 
and political scrutiny, even during the founding generation. 
In this article, I examine the core criticisms of Thanksgiving 
Proclamations that have connected certain Founders, such as 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, with contemporary 
Supreme Court Justices. Jeffersonian and Madisonian concerns 
about religious entanglement and endorsement align with recent 
 * Paul Baumgardner is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and the 
Humanities Council at Princeton University. During the 2017–2018 academic year, he is 
a visiting fellow in the Institute for Law and Philosophy at Rutgers Law School. 
1 Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Trump Defends Initial Remarks on 
Charlottesville; Again Blames ‘Both Sides,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-press-conference-charlottesville.html? mcubz=1&_r=0. 
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Supreme Court cases and constitutional standards concerning 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. As currently 
understood by some members of the Court, the First Amendment’s 
prohibition on government actions respecting an establishment of 
religion brings the content of Thanksgiving Proclamations under 
sharp scrutiny.  
Although the Supreme Court has not yet deemed 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations to be unconstitutional, 
it has criticized and, in some cases, struck down similar calls to 
prayer. In this article, I unpack the political, legal, and historical 
arguments against presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations and 
outline some of the advantages of “constraining Moses.” 
The reasons for selecting this particular presidential 
rhetorical practice are manifold, but one of the most intriguing 
certainly is the political preparatory work/worries that already 
have been accomplished—prematurely—in anticipation of this 
very article.2 To be clear: I do not advocate for the 
end of presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. However, it is 
important to uncover the best variations of these arguments, 
including the sort of resources that they should draw on.3 In 
the final analysis, these arguments may not supply the best 
moral or constitutional course for future Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.4 Rather, this thesis-less article is designed to 
highlight the pieces that seem best ordered for justifying this 
constitutional direction, even if such a direction proves unlikely or 
unwarranted in the current political climate.  
So let us jump in. First, an introduction to a spectrum of 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. In Section II, a brief 
2 We built this moated fortress and have had it manned for years, because we knew 
your horde would eventually come! See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100–03, 113 
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 
573, 670–71 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633–35, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Wes Barrett, God
Returns to Presidential Thanksgiving Proclamation, FOX NEWS (Nov. 25, 2010), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/11/25/god-returns-to-presidential-thanksgiving-
proclamation.html [http://perma.cc/GER5-5HXC]; Chuck Norris, Obama vs. George 
Washington on Thanksgiving, WORDNETDAILY (Nov. 23, 2014, 4:13 PM), http://www.wnd. 
com/2014/11/obama-vs-george-washington-on-thanksgiving/#6Ofv9G2XPslDYBAK.99 
[http://perma.cc/8HAB-DVAE]; Joel Siegel, Obama Leaves God out of Thanksgiving 
Speech, Riles Critics, A.B.C. NEWS (Nov. 25, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obama-
omits-god-thanksgiving-address-riles-critics/story?id=15028644 [http://perma.cc/5W5D-RBZN];
Carson Holloway, Thanksgiving and the Constitution, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/11/11618/ [http://perma.cc/9KPV-QKJM]; DONALD L.
DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT 2–3, 18–20 (2010). 
3 But why is this “uncovering” so important if you’re not advocating for the abolition 
of presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations? What do you have against Thanksgiving!?
4 Moral or constitutional? Oh dear! What would Dworkin have said to this distinction?
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political science interlude on presidential rhetoric. In Section III, 
linkages to Establishment Clause cases and considerations, old 
and new. In Section IV, cameo appearances by some 
unimpeachable Founding presidents/precedents. In Section V, 
select reservations, resignations, and Bible readings. 
I. SO WHAT ARE WE DEALING WITH HERE? SOME EXAMPLES OF 
PRESIDENTIAL THANKSGIVING PROCLAMATIONS
Many American presidents have issued Thanksgiving 
Proclamations. A central constitutional worry with this practice 
is that it exploits the station of the presidency for the purposes of 
evangelism. As directives from the country’s highest executive 
office, which generally are designed to (1) situate the country’s 
eyes on a certain god, a specific religious tradition, and/or a 
particular set of beliefs, and (2) encourage participation in 
discrete spiritual actions, these proclamations could approach the 
line of religious establishment. 
So what are we dealing with here? These executive actions 
have taken on a variety of forms over the years. Quite a few 
proclamations have served as calls to worship God—wielding 
religious symbols and Judeo-Christian rhetoric to reaffirm a 
preference for a particular belief system and a governmental 
push to embrace that belief system now—while others have 
sounded more like general statements of appreciation for 
the successes and strengths of our nation. Compare, for 
example, President Barack Obama’s 2011 Thanksgiving Day 
Proclamation to President George W. Bush’s 2008 Thanksgiving 
Day Proclamation.  
The first sentence of President Obama’s Proclamation 8755 
reads: “One of our Nation’s oldest and most cherished traditions, 
Thanksgiving Day brings us closer to our loved ones and invites 
us to reflect on the blessings that enrich our lives.”5 This opening 
line was indicative of the general tone and thesis of Obama’s 
Thanksgiving Proclamation. The President focused on the origins 
and history of the holiday. He also emphasized the cooperation 
between Native Americans and Pilgrims, the valuable 
contributions of Native Americans, and the importance of 
diversity, family, and friendship in the good times and bad.6
President Obama also mentioned that Americans “give 
thanks to each other and to God for the kindness and comforts 
5 President Barack Obama, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation 8755 (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97063 [http://perma.cc/R5T3-9QKD].
6 Id. 
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that grace our lives.”7 With the exception of one reference to 
George Washington’s praise of God in the first presidential 
Thanksgiving Proclamation, this was the only time the word 
“God” appeared in President Obama’s Proclamation.8 Instead of 
invoking a certain god or a specific religious tradition, President 
Obama exhorted: 
[T]he people of the United States to come together—whether in our 
homes, places of worship, community centers, or any place of 
fellowship for friends and neighbors—to give thanks for all we have 
received in the past year, to express appreciation to those whose lives 
enrich our own, and to share our bounty with others.9
Three years before President Obama’s Proclamation, 
President George W. Bush gave his final Thanksgiving 
Proclamation.10 In his opening paragraph, President Bush 
declared: “We recognize that all of these blessings, and life itself, 
come not from the hand of man but from Almighty God.”11 Unlike 
President Obama’s Proclamation, President Bush’s address 
centered on religion, thankfulness to God, and pronouncements 
of faith that the Christian God (that many of our Founding 
Fathers turned to) would continue to help the United States.12 He 
also counseled Americans to “let us all give thanks to God who 
blessed our Nation’s first days and who blesses us today. May He 
continue to guide and watch over our families and our 
country always.”13
President Bush’s 2008 Thanksgiving Proclamation is not an 
outlier in terms of religious rhetoric and instruction. Just look at 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Proclamation more than five 
decades earlier.14 In Proclamation 3036, President Eisenhower 
supplied a very short, priestly admonishment for citizens to 
genuflect.15 Wasting no time or ink, the Proclamation’s 
introduction dove right into a direct call to prayer: 
As a Nation much blessed, we feel impelled at harvest time to follow 
the tradition handed down by our Pilgrim fathers of pausing from our 
labors for one day to render thanks to Almighty God for His bounties. 
Now that the year is drawing to a close, once again it is fitting that we 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 President George W. Bush, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation 8322 (Nov. 21, 2008), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=84954 [http://perma.cc/PAR7-BB2B].
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation 3036 (Nov. 7, 
1953), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72469 [http://perma.cc/W7BN-25G8].
15 Id.
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incline our thoughts to His mercies and offer to Him our special 
prayers of gratitude.16
Eisenhower’s proclamation from 1953 designated the 
American population to be “a religious people,” faithful to the 
presumably Christian God but still in need of some good, 
old-fashioned kneeling.17 On Thanksgiving, he told the country to 
“bow before God in contrition for our sins, in suppliance for 
wisdom in our striving for a better world, and in gratitude for the 
manifold blessings He has bestowed upon us and upon our 
fellow men.”18
II. PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC
Although there has been remarkably little scholarly analysis 
of Thanksgiving Proclamations, recent American political 
scientific research does illuminate some of the cardinal political 
worries surrounding this governmental practice.19 For example, 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations have a breadth, 
directness, and authoritativeness that other controversial forms 
of government benediction do not possess. In fact, the president 
has unrivaled rhetorical powers in American politics. 
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See James W. Ceaser et al., The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency, 11
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 158, 159–61 (1981); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS
PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 445– 46 (1993); 
KARLYN KOHRS CAMPBELL & KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, PRESIDENTS CREATING THE 
PRESIDENCY: DEEDS DONE IN WORDS 6–9 (2008); Jeffrey E. Cohen, Presidential Rhetoric 
and the Public Agenda, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 87, 87–89 (1995); Todd Garvey, The Obama 
Administration’s Evolving Approach to the Signing Statement, 41 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 
393, 394–95, 406 (2011); Vanessa B. Beasley, Speaking at Selma: Presidential 
Commemoration and Bill Clinton’s Problem of Invention, 44 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 267, 
268–69, 286–87 (2014); Jeffrey Friedman, A “Weapon in the Hands of the People”: The 
Rhetorical Presidency in Historical and Conceptual Context, 19 CRITICAL REV. 197, 199–
200 (2007); ANDREW B. WHITFORD & JEFF YATES, PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE 
PUBLIC AGENDA: CONSTRUCTING THE WAR ON DRUGS 2–6 (2009); JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE
RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 3–4 (1987); Jeffrey K. Tulis, Revisiting the Rhetorical 
Presidency, in BEYOND THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 3–4, 13–14 (1996); Christopher S. 
Kelley et al., Assessing the Rhetorical Side of Presidential Signing Statements, 43 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 274, 274–76 (2013); Michael J. Berry, Controversially Executing 
the Law: George W. Bush and the Constitutional Signing Statement, 36 CONGRESS & THE 
PRESIDENCY 244, 244–45, 266–68 (2009); Christopher S. Kelley & Bryan W. Marshall, The
Last Word: Presidential Power and the Role of Signing Statements, 38 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 248, 248–67 (2008); Martin J. Medhurst, A Tale of Two Constructs: The 
Rhetorical Presidency versus Presidential Rhetoric, in BEYOND THE RHETORICAL
PRESIDENCY xi–xxv (1996); WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE
POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION  176–77(2003); BRANDICE CANES-WRONE, WHO
LEADS WHOM? PRESIDENTS, POLICY, AND THE PUBLIC 3–5 (2006); SAMUEL KERNELL,
GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 1–2 (3d ed. 2007). 
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According to political scientist Keith Whittington, 
presidential rhetoric has a disparate and more pronounced role 
in modern times than in the early years of American political 
history.20 Since the twentieth century, Americans have witnessed 
a different brand of president—an institutional actor more 
willing to engage with the public, by giving more speeches, 
making more proclamations, and attempting to connect directly 
with citizens.21 This rhetorical shift in the modern presidency is 
aimed at exerting political power over the citizenry—influencing 
public sentiment by rallying support or disdain, pushing certain 
policy agendas, and inculcating particular civic values and 
practices. Whittington writes, “[p]residential rhetoric not only 
persuades but also constructs a political world within which 
various political actors operate.”22
Presidency scholars take note of the disproportionate 
amount of public attention that is paid to presidential discourse 
and how this coverage creates a greater number of political 
opportunities for the chief executive.23 Presidential rhetoric can 
significantly impact public opinion and influence policy.24 When a 
president speaks to the public, his words have the power to 
increase the salience of certain issues and civic practices.25
Modern presidents rely on rhetorical performances such as 
directives, public speeches, and proclamations to set agendas and 
communicate to the American people how they prioritize 
different people, cultures, and values. 
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE: CASES,
PRECEDENTS, AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The historical scrutiny that has been leveled against 
a constellation of related governmental institutions, persons, 
and practices seriously informs the legal and normative 
considerations about presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. 
These adjacent religious figures and observances include prayers 
issued at the start of municipal meetings and state appointments 
and uses of chaplains and benedictions at public school 
graduations and athletic events. Now, although there are 
important distinctions between Thanksgiving Proclamations and 
20 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, The Rhetorical Presidency, Presidential Authority, and 
President Clinton, 26 PERSP. POL. SCI. 199, 199–201 (1997). 
21 Id.
22 Id. at 205. 
23 See generally Cohen, supra note 19; CANES-WRONE, supra note 19; KERNELL,
supra note 19. 
24 See Cohen, supra note 19, at 87–88, 101, 103. 
25 See CANES-WRONE, supra note 19, at 19–23; see also KERNELL, supra note 19, at 1–9. 
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this constellation (with many of these distinctions casting 
additional doubt on the constitutionality of presidential 
proclamations), it would be wise to first highlight the significant 
number of similarities and legal precedents involved. 
The most relevant constitutional provision to these matters 
is the Establishment Clause, which reads: “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion.”26 Located within 
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, this clause 
initially prohibited only the federal government from respecting 
an establishment of religion. 
In Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court 
incorporated the Establishment Clause, thus extending the 
prohibition to states.27 The divided Court provided important 
clarification to this short constitutional clause.28 Everson, one of 
the foundational twentieth century Establishment Clause cases, 
highlighted the guiding principles within the Clause, principles 
which—to this day—serve as a controversial set of standards for 
Establishment Clause analysis. In direct and forceful language, 
Justice Hugo Black articulated the strict separation enshrined by 
the Clause: 
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means 
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, 
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a 
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force 
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be 
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, 
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large 
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may 
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any 
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of 
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was 
intended to erect “a wall of separation between Church and State.”29
Although the Justices were divided about how to apply the 
Establishment Clause to the case before them, the Court was 
unified about the strict separation principles undergirding the 
Clause: the Government must be neutral between religions and 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
27 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
28 See id. (finding “[t]hat [the First] Amendment requires the state to be neutral in 
its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the 
state to be their adversary”). 
29 Id. at 15–16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)). 
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also between religion and non-religion; state and national 
governmental actions cannot show religious favoritism, either by 
favoring religion generally or favoring a specific religion; the 
government also would violate the Establishment Clause by 
demonstrating religious disfavor through a national or state law 
that actively harms a religion or its institutions, practices, 
and adherents.30
But, in practice, how strict must the separation be between 
church and state? How do we know when the government has not 
been neutral towards religion? Must a citizen prove that the 
government coerced her into participating in an alien religious 
practice in order for the courts to be sure that a breach of the 
Establishment Clause has occurred? In a series of cases following 
Everson, many of which explicitly dealt with the topic of 
governmentally-sanctioned prayer, the Court provided greater 
definition to the strict separation principles within the 
Establishment Clause. 
A. Prayer and Public Schools 
In Engel v. Vitale, the Supreme Court ruled that a 
governmentally approved prayer said daily in New York public 
schools represented an impermissible establishment of religion.31
In a 6-to-1 ruling, the Court outlined the manifold problems with 
this sort of religious entanglement and promotion. Using 
sweeping language, the Justices in the majority argued that it is 
problematic for the government to encourage prayer—and not 
just because of the age of the admonished audience, but because 
of the state-sanctioned nature of the religious act.32 Justice Black 
turned to James Madison’s writings for historical support. He 
asserted: “The Establishment Clause thus stands as an 
expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our 
Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to 
permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”33
The majority and concurring opinions in Engel also were 
clear that a governmental policy may violate the Establishment 
Clause even when no one is legally compelled to participate in a 
religious practice. Distinguishing the Establishment Clause from 
the Free Exercise Clause that follows in the First Amendment, 
the majority claimed the Establishment Clause “does not depend 
30 See generally Everson, 330 U.S. 1. 
31 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424–25 (1962). 
32 See id. at 424–25, 432–33. 
33 Id. at 431–32 (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against 
Religious Assessments (June 20, 1785), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1783–1787, 
at 187 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)). 
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upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is 
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official 
religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce 
nonobserving individuals or not.”34 A year later, in School District 
of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, the high court 
again struck down governmentally-approved prayers and Bible 
readings, reiterating that “a violation of the Free Exercise Clause 
is predicated on coercion, while the Establishment Clause 
violation need not be so attended.”35
Two additional Supreme Court cases offer insight into the 
constitutionality of presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. In 
Lee v. Weisman, the Court determined whether the Establishment 
Clause forbids clergy from offering non-denominational prayers at 
middle school and high school graduation ceremonies.36 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy dedicated a good deal 
of ink showcasing the “subtle coercive pressure,” “indirect 
coercion,” and “peer pressure” involved in these benedictions.37
Those individuals who would not willingly participate in such 
prayers are placed in an uncomfortable situation in which 
religious activity is either required or is costly to avoid (because of 
the incredible social pressure that comes along with abstaining 
from participation). It was clear to the majority that although a 
governmental practice does not have to be coercive to contravene 
Americans’ religious liberty, coerced participation in prayer 
certainly is unconstitutional: “[T]he Constitution guarantees that 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate 
in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way 
which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends 
to do so.’”38
As in Engel (and numerous other Establishment cases) the 
writings, speeches, and actions of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison were used authoritatively by both the majority and 
34 Id. at 430; see also id. at 438 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]here is no element of 
compulsion or coercion in New York's regulation requiring that public schools be opened 
each day with the following prayer . . . a child is free to stand or not stand, to recite or not 
recite, without fear of reprisal or even comment by the teacher or any other 
school official.”).
35 Sch. Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); see
also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59–61 (1985) (holding an Alabama law that required 
public schools to set aside a short period of class time for silence, meditation, or prayer 
violated the First Amendment). 
36 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586–87 (1992).
37 Id. at 588, 592–93. 
38 Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
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dissenting Justices in Lee.39 In fact, Justice David Souter’s 
concurrence, which was joined by Justices Stevens and O’Connor, 
relied on Thomas Jefferson’s well-documented objection to 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations to support the view 
that the Establishment Clause entails no state endorsement 
of religion.40
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court 
analyzed the constitutionality of a prayer offered by a high school 
student and broadcast before high school football games in Santa 
Fe, Texas.41 Following Lee, the Court stressed the heightened 
coercion and social pressure involved in this practice of praying 
“on school property, at school-sponsored events, over the school’s 
public address system, by a speaker representing the student 
body, under the supervision of school faculty, and pursuant to a 
school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public 
prayer.”42 Writing for the six-member majority, Justice John Paul 
Stevens found the school district improperly “invite[d] and 
encourage[d] religious messages.”43 The Establishment Clause 
cannot brook this sort of “perceived and actual endorsement 
of religion.”44
As in earlier Establishment cases, the presidential practice 
of making Thanksgiving Proclamations hovered in the 
background of Santa Fe. Whereas the majority of the Court 
claimed that “the religious liberty protected by the Constitution 
is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors the particular 
religious practice of prayer,”45 the dissenting Justices—led by 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist—rejoined: 
Neither the holding nor the tone of the opinion is faithful to the 
meaning of the Establishment Clause, when it is recalled that George 
Washington himself, at the request of the very Congress which passed 
the Bill of Rights, proclaimed a day of “public thanksgiving and 
prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the 
many and signal favors of Almighty God.”46
39 See id. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Jefferson, in his second 
inaugural address, specifically “acknowledged his need for divine guidance and invited his 
audience to join his prayer”); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1962). 
40 Id. at 623 (Souter, J., concurring). 
41 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315–17 (2000). 
42 Id. at 290. 
43 Id. at 306. 
44 Id. at 305. 
45 Id. at 313. 
46 Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting George Washington, Presidential 
Proclamation (Oct. 3, 1789), in 1 A COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 64 (J. Richardson ed., 1897)). 
2018] Rethinking Thanksgiving Day Proclamations 29 
Prayer cases such as these should bear heavily on our 
evaluation of the constitutionality of Thanksgiving Proclamations. 
For if a high school student cannot give a “nonsectarian, 
nonproselytizing” prayer before an audience of a few hundred 
people, 47 it is difficult to imagine how the President of the United 
States can give a (sometimes highly sectarian) prayer and 
encourage hundreds of millions of Americans to continue with 
more (sometimes highly sectarian) praying. If “the members of 
the listening audience must perceive the pregame message as a 
public expression of the views of the majority of the student body 
delivered with the approval of the school administration,” is it 
not reasonable to assume that the American people also perceive 
the president’s Thanksgiving Proclamation as an expression of the 
public’s view, endorsed by the United States federal government?48
B. Legislative Prayer 
Two Supreme Court cases addressed aspects of legislative 
prayer that are informative of constitutional questions and the 
specific modes of analysis that may be involved in reconsidering 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. 
The first of these cases concerns state appointments and 
uses of chaplains. In Marsh v. Chambers, the Court considered 
whether the Nebraska state government violated the 
Establishment Clause by authorizing a chaplain to conduct 
prayers before legislative sessions.49 Of added legal concern was 
the fact that “a clergyman of only one denomination has been 
selected by the Nebraska Legislature for 16 years, that the 
chaplain is paid at public expense, and that the prayers are in 
the Judeo-Christian tradition[.]”50
The Court ruled 6-to-3 that the chaplaincy position and 
legislative prayers did not constitute an establishment of 
religion. Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger penned the majority 
opinion, which gave special weight to this practice of “unique 
history” and tradition, and argued that the chaplain’s duties 
served as “a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held.”51
In a blistering dissent, Justice William Brennan rejoined 
that these government-sanctioned prayers are at odds with the 
Constitution and inconsistent with the Court’s previous 
47 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 294. 
48 Id. at 308. 
49 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983).
50 Id. at 783–84. 
51 Id. at 791–92. 
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decisions.52 The simple fact that Nebraska’s legislature—as well 
as the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, and many 
state legislatures—has a rich history of praying before sessions 
does not erase the Establishment transgression. In pointed 
response to the majority opinion, Justice Brennan noted: “Prayer 
is serious business—serious theological business—and it is not a 
mere ‘acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of 
this country’ for the State to immerse itself in that business.”53
The fact that a large number of Americans share a particular 
faith or participate in a similar religious practice only increases 
the need for a robust Establishment Clause and a “wall between 
church and state” that is “kept high and impregnable.”54
Government-sanctioned prayer, including prayer from a 
legislative chaplain, undercuts the fundamental purposes of the 
Establishment Clause and instead “forces all residents of the 
State to support a religious exercise that may be contrary to their 
own beliefs. It requires the State to commit itself on fundamental 
theological issues.”55
More than thirty years after Marsh was decided, the Court 
returned to the matter in Town of Greece v. Galloway. In Greece,
the Court evaluated the constitutionality of prayers offered at the 
start of municipal meetings.56 In the town of Greece, New York, 
the municipal council regularly invited local clergymen to deliver 
an invocation before meetings began and government business 
was conducted. Many of the prayers were Christian in nature 
and were given by Christian clergymen, for “nearly all of the 
congregations in town were Christian.”57
In one of the most anticipated Establishment Clause rulings 
handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court this decade, the Greece 
Court, divided 5-to-4, found the town council prayers to be a 
constitutional exercise.58 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy worked hard to elaborate the critically 
non-religious aspects of the pre-meeting invocations. According to 
the majority, the prayers were redeemable because they 
52 See id. at 795–96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. at 819. 
54 Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
55 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 808 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
56 See Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1815 (2014). 
57 Id. at 1816. During the more than 120 monthly meetings at which prayers were 
delivered during the record period (from 1999 to 2010), only four prayers were delivered 
by non-Christians. These four prayers occurred in 2008, shortly after the plaintiffs began 
complaining about the town’s Christian prayer practice and nearly a decade after that 
practice had commenced. Id. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. at 1813. 
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furnished a number of secular benefits.59 For instance, the 
clergyman’s invocation “lends gravity to public business, reminds 
lawmakers to transcend petty differences in pursuit of a higher 
purpose, and expresses a common aspiration to a just and 
peaceful society.”60 Justice Kennedy stressed the purely 
ceremonial and somehow innocuous nature of this form of 
government prayer, arguing it is a benign part of our heritage 
and “intended to place town board members in a solemn and 
deliberative frame of mind.”61
Offsetting his language about the ceremonial and 
significantly secular nature of the town council prayers, Justice 
Kennedy explored the setting and audience for the prayers to 
ascertain the extent to which people were being coerced into 
religious participation.62 Fortunately for Kennedy & Co., the 
critically non-religious religious oration was determined to be 
non-coercive and principally directed at lawmakers. Justice 
Kennedy was clear to point out that “[t]he analysis would be 
different if town board members directed the public to participate 
in the prayers . . . . Although board members themselves stood, 
bowed their heads, or made the sign of the cross during the 
prayer, they at no point solicited similar gestures by the 
public.”63 The majority’s logic clearly hinged on the limited 
number of citizens that attended town council meetings, citizens 
were not the intended audience for the prayers, and attendants’ 
ability to opt out of listening and participating. 
The brightest parts of Justice Elena Kagan’s dissenting 
opinion, which was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor, sharply disagreed over 
this very evaluation of the setting and audience for town council 
prayers. According to the four dissenters, many members of the 
audience during these council meetings were members of the 
general public.64 Moreover, “the prayers there [were] directed 
squarely at the citizens.”65
An especially damning characteristic of the prayers was 
their association with a single religion—Christianity. Justice 
59 Id. at 1818. 
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1816. 
62 See id. at 1825 (“It is an elemental First Amendment principle that government 
may not coerce its citizens ‘to support or participate in any religion or its exercise.’ . . . The 
inquiry remains a fact-sensitive one that considers both the setting in which the prayer 
arises and the audience to whom it is directed.”) (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civ. 
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989)). 
63 Town of Greece, N.Y., 134 S. Ct. at 1826. 
64 Id. at 1842 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
65 Id. at 1848. 
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Kagan was especially troubled by the establishment risks that 
attend to this level of sectarianism. In her dissent, Kagan 
walked through several examples of governmental actors—a 
judge, an election official, an official at a naturalization 
ceremony—engaging in public religious invocations to show how 
“prayer repeatedly invoking a single religion’s beliefs in these 
settings—crossed a constitutional line.”66 This clashes with the 
principle of full and equal citizenship guaranteed by the 
Establishment Clause. A government-sponsored prayer aligned 
with a single faith can offer the impression that they are less 
than full citizens and their equal rights and equal ownership 
over democratic government is predicated on an established 
religious orthodoxy.67 In the closing paragraph of her opinion, 
Justice Kagan reinforced this point, writing: “When the citizens 
of this country approach their government, they do so only as 
Americans, not as members of one faith or another . . . they 
should not confront government-sponsored worship that divides 
them along religious lines.”68
C. Grounds for Reconsidering Thanksgiving Proclamations 
Not coincidentally, almost every court case discussed so far 
included some judicial reference to, or sustained commentary 
on, American presidents’ practice of issuing Thanksgiving 
Proclamations. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has never 
evaluated this particular practice, it certainly has given citizens 
the resources to do so. The arguments best equipped to cast doubt 
on the constitutionality of Thanksgiving Proclamations certainly 
include materials from the aforementioned constellation of 
governmental institutions, persons, and practices. Many of the 
precedents and modes of judicial reasoning generated by the 
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, spanning 
at least from Everson to Greece, complicate our historical 
embrace of presidential prayers and executive calls to thank and 
praise God. 
For decades now, courts have turned to Everson v. Board of 
Education when explicating the strict separation principles 
undergirding the Establishment Clause. Based on these 
66 Id. at 1843. 
67 Id. at 1841 (“I think the Town of Greece’s prayer practices violate that norm of 
religious equality—the breathtakingly generous constitutional idea that our public 
institutions belong no less to the Buddhist or Hindu than to the Methodist or 
Episcopalian. . . . In my view, that practice does not square with the First Amendment’s 
promise that every citizen, irrespective of her religion, owns an equal share in 
her government.”). 
68 Id. at 1854. 
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principles, it seems that presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations 
must be neutral between religions and also between religion and 
non-religion for them to pass constitutional muster. These official 
governmental actions cannot show religious favoritism, either by 
favoring religion generally or favoring a specific religion. After 
examining the various Thanksgiving Proclamations of the past, it 
should be clear that many of these executive statements have 
favored religion generally and also favored a specific religion. 
Those who may claim that Thanksgiving Day Proclamations 
are vindicated by the fact that such Proclamations do not force 
citizens into religious observance should return to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Engel and Abington. In these cases, 
the Court communicated the State’s constitutional duty to avoid 
this exact sort of religious entanglement and promotion.69
State-sanctioned calls for prayer are constitutionally suspect, 
even when no one is legally compelled to participate in the 
religious practice. This is because a government practice does not 
have to be coercive to violate the Establishment Clause. 
Following the holdings in Lee and Santa Fe, we might 
wonder about the “subtle coercive pressure,” “indirect coercion,” 
and “peer pressure” involved in these benedictions, which flow 
from an individual who is regularly interpreted as the leader of 
the free world and the most powerful person on Earth.70 A strong 
claim could be made that the president’s words disseminate as a 
“perceived and actual endorsement of religion.”71
Although the outcomes of Marsh and Greece appear to justify 
Thanksgiving Proclamations, this is not necessarily the case. The 
United States does not have a unique and unbroken history of 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. Not every president 
has delivered this sort of religious message, and several who 
have issued Proclamations were troubled by their actions and/or 
used brief, muted, and/or secular declarations.  
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice Kagan’s 
dissenting opinion in Greece both illustrated the added 
constitutional obstacles facing presidential Thanksgiving 
addresses. Thanksgiving Proclamations are not purely 
ceremonial and innocuous words, issued by a local minister to a 
small crowd. Many of these Proclamations include religious 
exhortations, deeply theistic messages, and explicitly 
Judeo-Christian language and references. If four Justices of the 
69 See supra Section III(A). 
70 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 588, 592–93 (1992). 
71 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000). 
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Court were made queasy by the town council of Greece’s strong 
association with a single clerical background, they must surely 
shudder by the language of Thanksgiving Proclamations and 
their common religious affiliation. 
Even the majority opinion in Greece was adamant that “[t]he 
analysis would be different if town board members directed the 
public to participate in the prayers.”72 The setting and audience 
for presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations is the public at 
large—political recipients of executive orders and messages. 
These Proclamations represent official governmental statements 
and are widely reported in the media. Moreover, many of these 
Proclamations clearly direct the public to participate in prayers.  
IV. “THOU SHALT NOT MAKE RELIGIOUS PROCLAMATIONS” – JAMES
MADISON AND THOMAS JEFFERSON
In addition to the conventional political scientific wisdom on 
presidential rhetoric and the relevant First Amendment 
jurisprudence on government-sanctioned prayer, several frank 
opinions from the founding generation may prove valuable to the 
evaluation of presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. Some 
may consider this line of inquiry to be a fool’s errand, especially 
because the first two presidents—George Washington and John 
Adams—both felt comfortable in offering Thanksgiving 
Proclamations.73 Several influential leaders (and presidents) in 
the early years of our nation, however, expressed serious 
concerns over these exact practices. 
An unmistakable characteristic of the Establishment Clause 
case law is the repeated struggles between competing historian-
Justices over how best to appropriate (and pay homage to) James 
Madison and Thomas Jefferson. Madison and Jefferson wrote 
72 Id. at 1826. 
73 After he left office, however, John Adams seemed less comfortable with these 
decisions. See From John Adams to Benjamin Rush, 12 June 1812, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-5807 [http://perma.cc/DWH2-B2FE]
(last modified June 29, 2017).
The National Fast, recommended by me turned me out of Office. It was 
connected with, the general Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, which I had 
no concern in. . . . A general Suspicion prevailed that the Presbyterian Church 
was ambitious and aimed at an Establishment as a National Church. I was 
represented as a Presbyterian and at the head of this political and 
ecclesiastical Project. The Secret Whisper ran through them all the Sects ‘Let 
Us have Jefferson, Madison, Burr, any body, whether they be Philosophers, 
Deist or even Atheists, rather than a Presbyterian President.’ This Principle is 
at the Bottom of the Unpopularity of national Fasts and Thanksgivings, 
Nothing is more dreaded than the National Government meddling 
with Religion. 
Id.
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and spoke extensively on the topic of religious liberty, and both 
men were active in securing a strong separation of church and 
state while they served in governmental positions. 
On the religion clauses of the First Amendment, these 
Founders’ words have been “accepted almost as an authoritative 
declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment.”74 For 
example, the majority and dissenting opinions in Everson brim 
with dozens of references to these two men.75 The Court turned to 
Madison and Jefferson throughout, as Establishment Clause 
exponents, experts, and historical beacons.76 So if the actions and 
views of Madison and Jefferson are believed to offer “irrefutable 
confirmation of the Amendment’s sweeping content,”77 what can 
the lives of these two statesmen tell us about presidential 
Thanksgiving Proclamations? 
For at least the past 140 years, Supreme Court Justices have 
trusted Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists as a 
reliable companion text to the Free Exercise Clause and 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.78 Believing this 
letter helps to explicate the purposes and principles lying within 
our constitutionally guaranteed religious liberty protections, 
constitutional commentators have fought over the true meaning 
and history of Jefferson’s missive.79 Interestingly enough, a 
primary purpose behind President Jefferson’s letter pertains to 
Thanksgiving Day Proclamations.  
74 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).  
75 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 34 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
76 See generally id.
77 Id. at 34. 
78 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and 
his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that 
the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions,—I 
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people 
which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building 
a wall of separation between church and State. Adhering to this expression of 
the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see 
with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore 
to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to 
his social duties. 
Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
79 See generally DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT
(2010); DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE (First Harvard Univ. Press ed. 2002); VINCENT PHILLIP MUNOZ, GOD AND THE 
FOUNDERS: MADISON, WASHINGTON, AND JEFFERSON (2009); JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT (2d ed. 2000). 
36 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:1
During his eight years as President, Jefferson never 
made such a Proclamation. Understanding the controversy 
surrounding this political decision, Jefferson relied on his Letter 
to the Danbury Baptists “to explain his reasons for refusing to 
issue presidential proclamations of days for public fasting and 
thanksgiving.”80 On the same day that Jefferson sent the letter, 
he explained to then-attorney general Levi Lincoln these very 
intentions: “[T]he Baptist address now inclosed [sic] admits of a 
condemnation of the alliance between church and state, under 
the authority of the Constitution. [I]t furnishes an occasion too, 
which I have long wished to find, of saying why I do not proclaim 
fastings & thanksgivings.”81
Although Jefferson had issued a Thanksgiving Proclamation 
more than twenty years earlier, as governor of Virginia, he did 
not believe the president was constitutionally authorized to 
engage in this sort of religious practice.82 During his final term in 
office, Jefferson reiterated his constitutional view on the matter: 
I consider the government of the U.S. as interdicted by the 
constitution from intermedling with religious institutions, their 
doctrines, discipline, or exercises. [T]his results not only from the 
provision that no law shall be made respecting the establishment, or 
free exercise, of religion, but from that also which reserves to the 
states the powers not delegated to the U.S. certainly no power to 
prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume authority in religious 
discipline, has been delegated to the general government . . . but it is 
only proposed that I should recommend, not prescribe a day of fasting 
& prayer. [T]hat is that I should indirectly assume to the U.S. an 
authority over religious exercises which the constitution has directly 
precluded them from. [I]t must be meant too that this 
recommendation is to carry some authority, and to be sanctioned by 
some penalty on those who disregard it: not indeed of fine & 
imprisonment but of some degree of proscription perhaps in public 
opinion. [A]nd does the change in the nature of the penalty make the 
recommendation the less a law of conduct for those to whom it 
is directed?83
80 DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 2, 27–30 (2002).
81 Thomas Jefferson, To Levi Lincoln, 1 Jan. 1802, in 36 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON: DECEMBER 1, 1801 TO MARCH 3, 1802, at 256–57 (Barbara B. Obery ed., 2009), 
available at https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-documents/levi-lincoln-0
[http://perma.cc/CK8A-7BLQ].
82 President Thomas Jefferson, Proclamation Appointing a Day of Thanksgiving and 
Prayer (Nov. 11, 1779), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-03-02-0187 
[http://perma.cc/2CWW-5WCN].
83 From Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller, 23 January 1808, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-7257 [http://perma.cc/VVU8-WSJH]
(last modified June 29, 2017).
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Jefferson steadfastly believed it was not the responsibility of the 
president to direct a religious activity. Even if no legal 
compulsion accompanies the president’s rhetoric, these official 
Thanksgiving Proclamations have the power to produce 
social pressure, inequality, and religious division among the 
American people. 
James Madison, who played an instrumental role in the 
construction and congressional passage of the religion clauses of 
the First Amendment, shared Jefferson’s constitutional worries 
and spent decades expressing his disapprobation with 
Thanksgiving Proclamations and similar practices. In his 
Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments,
Madison expounded his belief in a meaningful separation of 
church and state.84 Madison’s petition argued a government 
could only secure religious equality for its citizens if it abstained 
from establishing a single faith or using public resources to 
support religion.85 Religious life would thrive best, Madison 
reasoned, when it was divorced from government aid and our 
political institutions would operate most effectively when they 
did not depend on religious alliances.86
Madison’s commitment to a mutually beneficial divorce 
between church and state elucidates his discomfort with 
presidential Thanksgiving Day Proclamations. Unlike Jefferson, 
Madison did make such Proclamations while President. He was, 
however, cognizant of the public concern over the constitutionality 
and propriety of “religious Proclamations” coming from the 
presidency, and he wrote quite a bit about these religious 
exercises (even to President James Monroe).87
In his Detached Memoranda, Madison deemed the 
appointment and use of legislative chaplains to be 
84 Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, [ca. 20 June] 1785,
FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163 
[http://perma.cc/2ZEU-W4Q9] (last modified June 29, 2017).
85 See id.
86 See id. (“If ‘all men are by nature equally free and independent,’ all men are to be 
considered as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more, and 
therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their natural rights. Above all are they to 
be considered as retaining an ‘equal title to the free exercise of Religion according to the 
dictates of Conscience.’ Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess 
and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an 
equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has 
convinced us.”). 
87 See From James Madison to James Monroe, 11 December 1818, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-01-02-0339 [http://perma.cc/4QTD-XTCF]
(last modified June 29, 2017).
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unconstitutional.88 Immediately following this evaluation, he 
articulated why “[r]eligious proclamations by the Executive 
recommending thanksgivings & fasts are shoots from the same 
root with the legislative acts reviewed.”89 Madison went into 
detail on this point, recounting his legal, political, and historical 
“objections” to these Proclamations. These objections include the 
national government’s lack of legal authority to instruct religious 
activities such as prayer, the Proclamation’s offering the 
impression of an established national religion, and the possibility 
that politicians and political parties would use these prayers to 
serve political ends.90
In an 1822 letter to Edward Livingston, Madison again 
identified Thanksgiving Proclamations as a practice that 
compromised “a perfect separation between ecclesiastical & Civil 
matters” in the United States.91 Madison complained: “There has 
been another deviation from the strict principle, in the Executive 
Proclamations of fasts and festivals; so far at least as they have 
spoken the language of injunction, or have lost sight of the 
equality of all Religious Sects in the eye of the Constitution.”92
Madison remained hopeful, though, about the future of religious 
liberty, telling Livingston: “I have no doubt that every new 
example will succeed, as every past one has done, in shewing 
that Religion & Govt. will both exist in greater purity, the less 
they are mixed together.”93
Madison’s optimism was not entirely misplaced. The 
presidents immediately succeeding Madison stopped the practice. 
It was not until the 1860s, more than forty years after the last 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamation was made, that Moses 
spoke again. 
V. ON NON-CONCLUSIONS AND THERMIDOR
The political power of presidential rhetoric, the development 
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and the opinions of a few, 
long-dead Founding Fathers—where does all this leave us? Some 
may think it leads to a robust constitutional claim against 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. Others may pray that 
88 Detatched Memoranda, CA. 31 January 1820, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders. 
archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-01-02-0549 [http://perma.cc/64V2-WW3R] (last modified 
June 29, 2017). 
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 From James Madison to Edward Livingston, 10 July 1822, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-02-02-0471 [http://perma.cc/WU5T-CSLA]
(last modified June 29, 2017).
92 Id.
93 Id. 
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it leads nowhere—drowned out by at least an equal number of 
political, scientific, legal, and historical materials and 
counterclaims. Let’s leave that necessary dialectic for a different 
day and another law review article. Until then, remaining 
puzzles (or excursus): 
Some Thanksgiving Proclamations have been neither as 
separationist as President Obama’s nor as catechismal as 
President Bush’s or President Eisenhower’s. The subject of 
President Jimmy Carter’s 1979 Thanksgiving Day Proclamation 
was hope and determination.94 President Carter highlighted the 
countless obstacles through which the American people have 
persevered: Pilgrims struggling on a new continent, a later 
generation maintaining faith during the Revolutionary War, and 
subsequent Americans remaining confident in the nation’s future 
even as the Civil War raged.95 This Thanksgiving Proclamation 
was dedicated to a people who always made it through, who were 
virtuous, successful, and capable of finding their way out 
of trials. 
Near the end of his Proclamation, President Carter did “ask 
all Americans to give thanks on that day for the blessings 
Almighty God has bestowed upon us, and seek to be good 
stewards of what we have received.”96 But the President’s 
broader message to the United States seems to have been one of 
collective praise and unity, encouraging citizens to “be thankful 
in proportion to that which we have received, trusting not in our 
wealth and comforts, but in the strength of our purpose.”97
. . .
“I have seen these people,” the Lord said to Moses, “and they are a 
stiff-necked people. Now leave me alone so that my anger may burn 
against them and that I may destroy them. Then I will make you into 
a great nation.” 
But Moses sought the favor of the Lord his God. “Lord,” he said, “why 
should your anger burn against your people, whom you brought out of 
Egypt with great power and a mighty hand? Why should the 
Egyptians say, ‘It was with evil intent that he brought them out, to 
kill them in the mountains and to wipe them off the face of the earth’? 
Turn from your fierce anger; relent and do not bring disaster on your 
people. Remember your servants Abraham, Isaac and Israel, to whom 
you swore by your own self: ‘I will make your descendants as 
numerous as the stars in the sky and I will give your descendants all 
94 President Jimmy Carter, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation 4693 (Sept. 28, 1979), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=31444 [http://perma.cc/BMJ2-YCTY].
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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this land I promised them, and it will be their inheritance 
forever.’” Then the Lord relented and did not bring on his people the 
disaster he had threatened. 
Moses turned and went down the mountain with the two tablets of the 
covenant law in his hands. They were inscribed on both sides, front 
and back. The tablets were the work of God; the writing was the 
writing of God, engraved on the tablets. 
When Joshua heard the noise of the people shouting, he said to Moses, 
“There is the sound of war in the camp.” 
Moses replied: “It is not the sound of victory, it is not the sound of 
defeat; it is the sound of singing that I hear.” 
When Moses approached the camp and saw the calf and the dancing, 
his anger burned and he threw the tablets out of his hands, breaking 
them to pieces at the foot of the mountain. And he took the calf the 
people had made and burned it in the fire; then he ground it to 
powder, scattered it on the water and made the Israelites drink it.98
98 Exodus 32: 9-20. 
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Promoting Executive Accountability Through 
Qui Tam Legislation 
Randy Beck* 
The United States government has experienced a profound 
rebalancing of power over the past century as authority has 
shifted from the legislative branch to the executive branch.1 In 
domestic affairs, much federal law now comes from agencies 
operating under broad statutory mandates, and the tasks of 
weighing conflicting interests, devising specific regulatory 
standards, and setting enforcement priorities often fall to the 
executive.2 In the international sphere, there has been a rapid 
expansion in the number of agreements negotiated unilaterally 
by the executive branch, without submission to the Senate for 
ratification as treaties.3 With respect to military affairs, 
presidents have become increasingly comfortable with unilateral 
decisions to initiate combat and have sometimes side-stepped 
even the post-hoc congressional review process contemplated by 
the War Powers Resolution.4
 *  Justice Thomas O. Marshall Chair of Constitutional Law, University of Georgia 
School of Law. The research for this essay was conducted while the author was a Garwood 
Visiting Fellow in the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at 
Princeton University. I would like to express my appreciation to Tom Campbell for his 
comments on a draft of this essay. 
1 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 444–45 (2012) (“The power of the modern presidency has 
been enhanced by the gradual accumulation over time of an extensive array of legislative 
delegations of power. The complexities of the modern economy and administrative state, 
along with the heightened role of the United States in foreign affairs, have necessitated 
broad delegations of authority to the executive branch.”). 
2 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L.
REV. 953, 961–62 (2016) (delegations of authority by Congress have increased the power 
of the executive branch, particularly in light of legislative gridlock); PHILIP HAMBURGER,
IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 111–28 (2014) (detailing numerous mechanisms 
through which executive branch agencies exercise legislative functions).
3 See Treaties, UNITED STATES SENATE https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ 
history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm#3 (last visited May 10, 2017) [http://perma.cc/876P-
NYLL]; Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International 
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1258–60 (2008) (375 treaties 
entered into by the U.S. from 1980–2000, compared to 2744 congressionally authorized 
executive agreements). 
4 Douglas Kriner, Accountability Without Deliberation? Separation of Powers in 
Times of War, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1284 (2015) (“Since Truman, all presidents have 
asserted the office’s unilateral authority to order American military forces abroad, absent 
explicit congressional authorization, to pursue a wide range of policy goals.”); see also Eric 
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The increasing power of the executive branch underscores 
the importance of effective mechanisms to enforce legal 
constraints on executive conduct. The Constitution imposes on 
the president the duty to “take [c]are that the laws be faithfully 
executed,”5 and affords him the ability to respond to misconduct 
by his subordinates.6 But relying on the executive branch to 
police its own members will often prove inadequate due to 
unavoidable conflicts of interest and the difficulty of managing a 
vast bureaucracy. Congress can conduct occasional oversight 
hearings to investigate the legality of executive actions, but 
cannot directly respond to executive misconduct except through 
cumbersome processes like lawmaking or impeachment.7 That 
leaves the option of judicial enforcement of the law in suits by 
persons outside the executive branch. However, this mechanism 
can be stymied through application of Article III standing 
principles and other justiciability rules like the political question 
doctrine.8 In short, there may be many instances in which 
potentially illegal executive conduct goes unaddressed due to 
limitations of the standard options for ensuring executive branch 
legal compliance. 
In a forthcoming article, I review the history of a now 
largely-abandoned method for enforcing the law against 
government officials.9 From the fourteenth-century through the 
establishment of the United States government, it was very 
common for Anglo-American legislatures to regulate government 
officials through qui tam legislation. A qui tam statute allowed 
any member of the community to collect a fine for violation of a 
legal duty, and keep part of the proceeds, even if the litigant did 
A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops, 94 TEX. L. REV. 485, 497–98 
(2016) (noting partisan invocation of constitutional and War Powers Act restrictions in 
response to unilateral executive military interventions in Grenada, Panama, Serbia and 
Libya); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 440–47 (explaining reasons it can be easier 
for the executive branch to act than the legislative branch). 
5 U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 1. 
6 See Jurisdiction of Integrity Comm. When Inspector Gen. Leaves Office After 
Referral of Allegations, 2006 WL 5779980, at 3–4 (O.L.C. Sept. 5, 2006). 
7 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951–59 (1983) 
(Congress must comply with bicameralism and presentment requirements when acting to 
change legal rights, duties or relations of persons outside the legislative branch); U.S.
CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3 (impeachment procedures), § 7 (procedures for passage of legislation). 
8 See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–78 (1992) (applying standing 
doctrine to reject case against executive branch official); Stephen I. Vladeck, War and 
Justiciability, 49 SUFFOLK L. REV. 47, 47–48 (2016) (courts avoided ruling on the merits of 
Vietnam War cases in various ways including standing and political question grounds). 
9 Randy Beck, Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials: Constitutional 
Implications of a Neglected History, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
[hereinafter Beck, Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials].
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not have a particularized injury as required by modern rules 
of standing.10
This essay will consider the possibility of selectively reviving 
the tradition of qui tam legislation to enforce particular legal 
duties of executive branch officials. By overcoming Article III 
standing concerns, qui tam legislation has the capacity to fill 
gaps left by more common methods of enforcing the law. At the 
same time, introducing a profit motive into law enforcement 
carries risks that legislators should take into account. Part I will 
briefly describe the history of qui tam regulation of government 
officials in England, the early American states and the first two 
Congresses, and discuss the Supreme Court’s conclusion that qui
tam litigation satisfies Article III standing requirements.11
Part II will consider hypothetical qui tam legislation to enforce 
executive branch legal duties in three areas: (1) expending funds 
without a supporting congressional appropriation, or refusing to 
spend funds as directed by statute; (2) pursuing military action 
in violation of the War Powers Resolution; and (3) using 
private email systems for public business.12 Part III briefly 
considers downsides of reviving qui tam legislation to regulate 
executive officials.13
I. QUI TAM REGULATION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
The fourteenth-century English Parliament faced significant 
challenges in providing for enforcement of laws governing a large 
country with a dispersed population.14 Some legislation was less 
problematic because it was designed to benefit private citizens 
individually. Violation of this kind of statute could be addressed 
through litigation pursued by the victim of illegal conduct.15 The 
more difficult problem arose when a law protected interests of 
the entire community or of the central government, rather than 
individual citizens. Today, government officials typically enforce 
such laws. In the fourteenth-century, however, there were far 
fewer government officials, and those at the local level might not 
10 Id. at 3; see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771–78 
(2000) (finding qui tam plaintiff satisfied Article III standing requirements, even though 
suing based on injury to the United States). 
11 See infra notes 14–34 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 35–73 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
14 See Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam 
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 567 (2000) [hereinafter Beck, English Eradication].
15 See, e.g., Statute of Labourers, 23 Edw. 3, ch. 1 (1349) (cause of action for party 
“damnified” by food merchant charging excessive prices, but also allowing qui tam
enforcement as a backup). 
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vigorously enforce laws designed to advance goals of the 
central government.16
Parliament developed the qui tam statute to prevent under-
enforcement of penal statutes, which could deprive laws of their 
deterrent effect.17 The typical qui tam statute imposed a legal 
obligation, specified a forfeiture for violation, and provided that 
any person could sue to collect the penalty, with the informer 
entitled to keep a percentage (usually half) if successful.18 The 
statutory authorization for anyone to sue, and the bounty offered 
to the successful informer, effectively deputized any member of 
the community to enforce the law, vastly expanding available law 
enforcement resources.19
Most English qui tam statutes regulated private conduct, 
often commercial in nature.20 Early on, however, Parliament also 
deployed qui tam statutes to enforce specified duties of 
government officials. Initially, such qui tam provisions were used 
as a supplement to regulation of private commercial conduct, 
promoting integrity and diligence among regulatory officials. For 
instance, fourteenth-century statutes permitted qui tam actions 
against officials who traded in regulated commodities or who 
were less than diligent in enforcing regulatory requirements.21
Over time, though, Parliament expanded the practice to take in 
an increasing array of officials performing a growing list of 
functions, e.g., purveyors acquiring goods for the royal household, 
ecclesiastical judges exceeding the limits on their jurisdiction, 
officials responsible for enforcing religious uniformity laws, 
revenue officers handling tax receipts, and individuals serving in 
Parliament despite a statutory disqualification.22
Regulation of government officials through qui tam
legislation was widely practiced in the American colonies and 
early states. Qui tam monitoring was used to promote statutory 
compliance by an enormous variety of state officials, particularly 
those performing decentralized functions such as road 
construction and maintenance, judicial administration, and 
16 Beck, English Eradication, supra note 14, at 567. 
17 Id. at 568 (qui tam statute increased chances statutory forfeiture would be 
enforced). The qui tam label derives from a longer Latin phrase that can be translated 
“who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.” Vt. Agency of 
Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000). 
18 Beck, English Eradication, supra note 14, at 552–53 (describing characteristics of 
qui tam statutes). 
19 Id. at 569. 
20 Id. at 570–71. 
21 See Beck, supra note 9, at 22–24. 
22 See id. at 25–29. 
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regulation of commercial activities.23 It was common for early 
states to rely on qui tam oversight to ensure lawful conduct by 
officials performing functions critical to public confidence in 
government, such as conducting elections and collecting taxes.24
The United States Constitution was ratified against the 
backdrop of over four and a half centuries in which Anglo-
American legislatures had often regulated government officials 
through qui tam legislation.25 It should come as no surprise, 
then, that the earliest Congresses extensively employed qui tam
statutes to regulate both private parties and executive branch 
officials. Statutes enacted in the first two Congresses included 
qui tam provisions applicable to federal revenue officers, census 
workers, Treasury officials, postal workers, and those regulating 
trade with Native American tribes.26 Qui tam regulation of 
executive branch officials disappeared over time as the growing 
number of government employees reduced the need for qui
tam oversight and the demand for professionalization of public 
service prompted movement away from profit-motivated law 
enforcement mechanisms.27 There can be no doubt though that 
supervising the legality of executive branch conduct through qui
tam litigation was understood as a permissible legislative option 
when the Constitution took effect. 
The case for selective qui tam monitoring of the executive 
branch rests on the Supreme Court’s understanding of 
standing principles flowing from the Article III “case or 
controversy” requirement. The Court has articulated a familiar 
injury-causation-redressability test for evaluating a litigant’s 
standing to sue: “The plaintiff must have suffered or be 
imminently threatened with a concrete and particularized ‘injury 
in fact’ that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 
decision.”28 For a quarter century, the Supreme Court has 
said that the requirement of a “particularized” injury—i.e., one 
that affects the plaintiff in a manner distinct from the public 
at large—represents part of the “irreducible constitutional 
minimum” of standing.29 This particularized injury requirement 
is often applied to deny standing in cases against the executive 
23 Id. at 29–42. 
24 Id. at 45–49. 
25 Id. at 63. 
26 See id. at 50–62. 
27 See generally NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940 (2013) (detailing the shift away from 
profit-incentivized enforcement of the laws).
28 Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014). 
29 Id. (quoting Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
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branch, with courts dismissing claims that present only 
“generalized grievances” about the legality of government conduct.30
Notwithstanding the rule that standing requires a 
particularized injury, the Court has found that qui tam litigation 
satisfies Article III requirements. In Vermont Agency of Natural 
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, the Court considered a 
False Claims Act case in which a qui tam “relator” (i.e., informer) 
alleged that a federal grant recipient submitted false claims to 
the Environmental Protection Agency in an effort to obtain 
excess grant funds.31 The Court recognized that the relator had 
no personal injury in fact; the only particularized injury was 
suffered by the government.32 The Court nevertheless found 
Article III standing on the theory that the statute’s qui tam
provision acted as a partial assignment to the relator of the 
government’s claim.33 The Court’s finding of standing for 
informers was supported by the “long tradition of qui tam actions 
in England and the American Colonies,” a history “well nigh 
conclusive with respect to the question before us here: 
whether qui tam actions were ‘cases and controversies of the sort 
traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial 
process.’”34 Since qui tam litigation allows the informer to 
challenge the legality of conduct that inflicts no particularized 
harm on the litigant, it creates the possibility of enhancing the 
legal accountability of executive officials in situations where 
private suits might easily be dismissed as generalized grievances. 
II. POSSIBLE MODERN APPLICATIONS OF QUI TAM LEGISLATION TO 
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Qui tam legislation offers a potentially appealing mechanism 
for promoting legal compliance by executive branch officers 
because it allows judicial consideration of legal challenges that 
might otherwise fail for lack of standing. Let’s consider 
three types of legal duties that might be enforceable through qui
tam monitoring. 
A. Reinforcing the Congressional Power of the Purse 
The Constitution vests in Congress broad control over the 
use of public money. Congress has the affirmative power “to pay 
the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general 
30 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–78. 
31 Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 770 (2000). 
32 See id. at 772–73. 
33 Id. at 774. 
34 Id. at 766–77 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 
102 (1998)). 
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Welfare of the United States.”35 This power is reinforced by a 
negative prohibition: “No money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law.”36
Administrations of both major political parties have sometimes 
sought to circumvent the congressional power of the purse. The 
Nixon Administration famously asserted an authority to 
“impound” public funds, refusing to spend money on grounds 
unrelated to the congressional spending program in question.37
The Obama Administration, on the other hand, was found to 
have violated the Constitution by sending money to insurance 
companies under the Affordable Care Act without a supporting 
congressional appropriation.38
Standing doctrine tends to foreclose many lawsuits 
challenging the use of public money.39 In Frothingham v. Mellon,
the Supreme Court determined that taxpayer status did not give 
an individual standing to challenge the constitutionality of a 
federal expenditure.40 An individual’s interest in money in the 
U.S. Treasury “is shared with millions of others, is comparatively 
minute and indeterminable, and the effect upon future taxation, 
of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and 
uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the 
preventive powers of a court of equity.”41 This bar to taxpayer 
standing has long been understood as one application of the 
generalized grievance principle.42 Other case law has strictly 
limited lawsuits by individual members of Congress seeking to 
protect legislative powers.43 The recent case challenging 
Affordable Care Act payments to insurers satisfied standing 
concerns only because an entire house of Congress decided to file 
suit, something that would be impossible in many cases.44
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
36 Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
37 See Train v. City of N.Y., 420 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1975) (finding the statute did not 
permit Environmental Protection Agency to allocate less funds for municipal sewage and 
treatment facilities than Congress authorized for appropriation); Adam Rozenzweig, 
The Article III Fiscal Power, 29 CONST. COMM. 127, 138–39 (2014) (discussing 
impoundment controversy). 
38 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 174–75 
(D.D.C. 2016). 
39 See, e.g., Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 265 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (plaintiff 
lacked standing to challenge Environmental Protection Agency’s withholding of funds). 
40 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).  
41 Id. at 487. 
42 See Turner v. City & Cty. of S.F., 617 Fed. Appx. 674, 677 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(claim asserted as taxpayer could not be pursued in federal court because only raised 
generalized grievance). 
43 See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997) (holding individual members of 
Congress lacked standing to challenge Line Item Veto Act). 
44 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 80–81 
(D.D.C. 2015). 
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There is precedent for using qui tam legislation to monitor 
government officials in connection with fiscal matters, as in the 
English and American statutes that regulated tax collection 
efforts.45 Caswell v. Allen46 was an early American case against 
one of the county supervisors of Cayuga County, New York. The 
New York legislature had instructed the county to raise up to 
$800 in tax revenues to build a fireproof clerk’s office near an 
anticipated new courthouse.47 The defendant joined the majority 
that voted down a proposal to comply with the legislative 
directive. A qui tam informer then sued the defendant under a 
statute imposing a $250 forfeiture on any county supervisor who 
neglected or refused to follow a law directing the county to levy 
funds for public buildings.48 The issue on appeal was whether the 
legislation concerning funds for a clerk’s office was mandatory or 
discretionary. The appellate court concluded that the legislation 
imposed a mandatory duty to raise revenue for a clerk’s office 
and therefore granted a new trial against the defendant.49
A modern qui tam statute could be used to reinforce 
Congress’ power of the purse. The statute could impose a 
forfeiture on any executive official who refused to spend funds 
where a statute made the expenditure mandatory, or who 
authorized an expenditure that was not supported by a 
congressional appropriation. The qui tam provision would 
overcome Article III objections and eliminate the barrier to 
adjudication created by the rule against taxpayer standing. 
B. Preserving the Congressional Role in Military Affairs 
The constitutional allocation to Congress of the power to 
“declare war” has proved ineffective in ensuring congressional 
control over the use of military force. Our political and legal 
institutions early on accepted the lawfulness of military 
engagements that involved no such declaration.50 In the 
aftermath of the Vietnam War, Congress sought to reinvigorate 
the legislative role in military decision-making by adopting the 
War Powers Resolution (“WPR”). The provisions are complex, but 
the key points can be outlined succinctly. The president must 
45 See supra notes 22, 24 and 26 and accompanying text. 
46 7 Johns. 63 (N.Y. 1810). 
47 Id. at 63. 
48 Id.
49 Id. at 68–69. 
50 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War 
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2059–60 (2005) (“One reason is historical practice. 
Starting with early conflicts against Indian tribes and the Quasi-War with France at the 
end of the 1700s, the United States has been involved in hundreds of military 
conflicts that have not involved declarations of war.”). 
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consult with Congress whenever possible before introducing 
military forces into actual or imminent “hostilities,”51 and must 
report such deployments to Congress.52 As a general rule, the 
resolution instructs the president to terminate the deployment of 
troops unless Congress within sixty days declares war or adopts 
“specific authorization” for the use of force.53 Authorization may 
not be inferred from a provision of an appropriation statute 
unless it “specifically authorizes the introduction of United 
States Armed Forces into hostilities” and states that it is 
intended to satisfy the WPR authorization requirement.54
Many observers argue that certain recent military operations 
have violated the letter or spirit of the WPR. President Clinton 
continued U.S. participation in the NATO bombing of Kosovo 
beyond the sixty day limit of the WPR based on the theory that 
Congress authorized the action through an appropriation 
provision, even though the statute rejects authorization by that 
means.55 President Obama claimed that extended participation 
in the NATO operation in Libya was not subject to the WPR 
because our drone and bombing attacks did not amount 
to “hostilities.”56
Qui tam legislation was used historically to regulate militia 
service, enforcing duties such as showing up for training 
exercises with the necessary equipment.57 Could qui tam
legislation potentially help Congress in the higher profile context 
of enforcing the WPR? Imagine a law imposing qui tam
forfeitures on executive branch officials for acts such as 
(1) introducing troops into hostilities (perhaps accompanied by 
further definition of the term) without consulting with Congress 
in a situation where such consultation was possible, (2) failing to 
report to Congress within a specified time period after troops 
have been introduced into hostilities, or (3) continuing 
51 50 U.S.C. § 1542. 
52 Id. § 1543(a). 
53 Id. § 1544(b). 
54 Id. § 1547(a)(1). 
55 See Jason Reed Struble & Richard A.C. Alton, The Legacy of Operation Allied 
Force: A Reflection on Its Legality Under United States and International Law, 20 MICH.
ST. INT’L L. REV. 293, 310–13 (2012). But see Abraham D. Sofaer, The War Powers 
Resolution and Kosovo, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 71, 76–77 (2000) (arguing WPR provision 
preventing appropriations from serving as approval of a military operation is 
legally ineffective). 
56 Jack Goldsmith & Matthew Waxman, Obama, Not Bush, Is the Master 
of Unilateral War, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 14, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/ 
article/119827/obamas-war-powers-legacy-he-must-seek-congressional-authorization
[http://perma.cc/R34Z-8NPC] (stating that Obama administration construction of War 
Powers Resolution in connection with Libya operations was unconvincing). 
57 See Beck, supra note 9, at 43. 
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participation in hostilities for more than 60 days without 
congressional authorization in the required form. 
A qui tam provision could remove the Article III standing 
barrier that courts have invoked to avoid adjudication of claims 
under the WPR.58 Cases seeking to enforce the resolution could 
nevertheless face other barriers to justiciability, especially the 
political question doctrine.59 The application of the political 
question doctrine depends on a variety of factors,60 but the force 
of some factors could be minimized by careful drafting. For 
instance, if Congress specified objective conditions that would 
trigger legal duties under the WPR and made clear that the 
duties are mandatory rather than discretionary, a court would be 
less likely to find a lack of “judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards” for resolving the case or the need for “an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion.”61 Dismissal on political question grounds would be 
more likely if the legal question arguably turned on the exercise 
of military or foreign affairs expertise. For instance, a court 
might find a political question if the executive branch was 
offering an intelligence-based analysis of the historical 
relationship between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State to argue 
that operations against the Islamic State come within the scope 
of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force against Al 
Qaeda.62 On the other hand, if the sole issue was whether 
Congress had authorized a military action and (as in Kosovo) 
the only arguable authorization was an appropriations bill, 
the questions presented to the court would seem more legal 
in nature.  
While a qui tam provision might help get a WPR case into 
court, it is an open question whether one should view that as a 
desirable outcome. Some people would consider it unwise to place 
58 See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20–26 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding members 
of Congress lacked standing to challenge Kosovo bombing as a violation of the War 
Powers Resolution). 
59 See Vladeck, supra note 8, at 47–48 (noting that in cases challenging the Vietnam 
War, courts avoided decisions on the merits in “every way imaginable,” including political 
question doctrine). 
60 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
61 Id.
62 See MATTHEW C. WEED, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R43760, A NEW
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE: ISSUES AND 
CURRENT PROPOSALS (2017) (“During his Administration, President Obama stated that 
the Islamic State can be targeted under the 2001 AUMF because its predecessor 
organization, Al Qaeda in Iraq, communicated and coordinated with Al Qaeda; the Islamic 
State currently has ties with Al Qaeda fighters and operatives; the Islamic State employs 
tactics similar to Al Qaeda; and the Islamic State, with its intentions of creating a new 
Islamic caliphate, is the ‘true inheritor of Osama bin Laden’s legacy.’”). 
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the president under legally enforceable constraints—even the 
loose constraints of the WPR—in dealing with rapidly changing 
international threats. Moreover, those desiring a greater 
congressional voice in decisions about the use of military force 
might find that overcoming barriers to adjudication proved a 
Pyrrhic victory. A court could resolve a case on the merits by 
reading the WPR in a manner deferential to the executive.63
C. Preserving Official Email Records 
So far, we have discussed use of qui tam legislation to allow 
adjudication of high-level legal conflicts central to the allocation 
of power between Congress and the president. Disputes over the 
congressional appropriations power or the president’s unilateral 
initiation of military action are important, but not frequent. 
Historically, qui tam legislation was more often used to monitor 
activities of lower level officials performing the mundane daily 
tasks of government. For instance, qui tam statutes were often 
used in past centuries to promote thorough and accurate record 
keeping by public officials. English law used qui tam remedies to 
regulate record keeping regarding sales of horses at fairs and 
markets.64 Early state laws deployed qui tam monitoring to 
ensure that records of a justice of the peace were preserved upon 
death or resignation.65 The first Congress adopted qui tam
legislation to govern creation and retention of census records.66
To round out our discussion of the potential use of qui tam
legislation to promote executive branch accountability, it is worth 
considering a modern record-keeping question that has been 
much in the news. The 2016 presidential election was roiled by 
disclosures that the Democratic nominee had set up a private 
email system through which she sent and received official 
electronic correspondence in her role as Secretary of State.67
Official inquiries confirmed that an earlier Republican Secretary 
of State had also conducted some government business through a 
private email account.68 Doing public business on a private email 
63 Given longstanding questions about the constitutional status of the War Powers 
Resolution, the risk of an executive-leaning interpretation might be heightened by the 
canon of constitutional avoidance. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–81 (2005) (“If 
one of [two plausible statutory constructions] would raise a multitude of constitutional 
problems, the other should prevail—whether or not those constitutional problems pertain 
to the particular litigant before the Court.”). 
64 Beck, supra note 9, at 25. 
65 Id. at 37–38. 
66 Id. at 56–57. 
67 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, ESP-16-03, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY:
EVALUATION OF EMAIL RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS 23–25 
(2016) (discussing private email use by Secretary Clinton). 
68 Id. at 21–22 (discussing private email use by Secretary Powell). 
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system can undermine laws designed to ensure preservation of 
records, promote transparency, and reduce cybersecurity risks.69
Notwithstanding campaign criticism of the Democratic nominee’s 
email practices, at least six close advisors to President Trump 
have reportedly used private email accounts since the election to 
discuss White House matters.70
A private litigant might have difficulty challenging an 
official’s practice of using a private email account for public 
business. Assuming a relevant cause of action could be identified, 
the plaintiff could be deemed to allege a generalized grievance 
widely shared by the public at large.71 One public interest 
organization did manage to secure disclosure of many of the 
Secretary of State’s emails using the Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”), presumably establishing a particularized injury based 
on the rights created by a FOIA request.72 However, since FOIA 
applies to an agency, it may not guarantee accountability of 
individual federal employees, and a significant number of agency 
records are exempt from release under the statute.73
So how might qui tam legislation address modern concerns 
about email preservation by government employees? Imagine a 
statute imposing a $1000 forfeiture for each email sent in the 
course of a government employee’s official duties using a private 
email account. Statutory definitions could be used to create 
greater certainty about when an email was subject to the statute. 
A safe harbor provision could protect a government employee 
from suit if an email sent from a private account was promptly 
archived among the government’s official email records. The 
legislation could be enforced by any qui tam informer with 
69 See id. at 2–19 (record keeping, preservation and transparency requirements), 26–
34 (cybersecurity policies). Lisa Jackson, director of the Environmental Protection Agency 
in President Obama’s first term, raised comparable transparency and record-keeping 
concerns (though not necessarily cybersecurity risks) when she sent emails on a second 
government email account registered under the alias “Richard Windsor.” Julian Hattam, 
Former EPA Chief Under Fire for New Batch of ‘Richard Windsor’ Emails, THE HILL
(May 1, 2013), http://thehill.com/regulation/energy-environment/297255-former-epa-chief-
under-fire-for-new-batch-of-richard-windsor-emails [http://perma.cc/7E5L-5FXN]; see also
Jaime Dupree, Documents Show Ex-Attorney General Lynch Used “Elizabeth Carlisle” as 
Email Alias, ATLANTA JOURNAL CONST. (Aug. 7, 2017), http://jamiedupree.blog.ajc.com/ 
2017/08/07/documents-show-ex-attorney-general-lynch-used-elizabeth-carlisle-as-email-
alias/ [http://perma.cc/864J-T3RP].
70 Matt Apuzzo & Maggie Haberman, At Least 6 White House Advisers Used Private 
Email Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/us/ 
politics/private-email-trump-kushner-bannon.html.
71 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974) (lawsuit 
challenging failure to release list of CIA expenditures presented a generalized grievance). 
72 See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Kerry, 844 F.3d 952, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (case seeking 
to recover emails from former Secretary of State’s private email accounts not moot). 
73 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c) (1976) (FOIA exemptions). 
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evidence of an email violating the prohibition, with a successful 
informer entitled to keep half (or perhaps all) of the recovery as 
a bounty. 
At this point, some readers may be thinking this sounds like 
an excellent way to ensure that executive branch employees 
comply with legal obligations flowing from their role as public 
servants. Other readers, however, may be getting nervous as 
they contemplate how the statute might work in practice. Would 
federal employees be distracted from their jobs by burdensome 
litigation? Would profit-motivated lawyers or informers develop a 
business of targeting careless federal employees? Would the 
statute be put to political use by interest groups or partisan 
warriors? Such concerns underscore some of the possible 
downsides of qui tam regulation and help explain why such 
statutes fell into disfavor in England and the United States. The 
next section discusses some of the problems with qui tam
legislation and whether those problems might be ameliorated 
through legislative drafting. 
III. POSSIBLE DRAWBACKS TO QUI TAM REGULATION OF 
EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS
England eliminated its remaining qui tam statutes in 1951.74
I have argued elsewhere that recurring problems experienced in 
the history of qui tam enforcement flowed from a conflict of 
interest built into the design of the legislation. A qui tam statute 
deputizes private citizens to represent the interests of the public 
in enforcing the law, but simultaneously offers the informer a 
private financial interest in the outcome. When these public and 
private interests pull in different directions, informers may 
pursue private gain at the expense of the public good.75
English informers sometimes negotiated secret settlements 
with those allegedly in violation of qui tam legislation, keeping 
payments that should have been shared with the government.76
They sometimes pursued fraudulent or malicious claims.77 They 
brought suit in inconvenient locations, making it burdensome for 
defendants to litigate.78 They sought to enforce statutes in ways 
that undermined the public good.79 Legislative responses to such 
abuses were only partially successful.80 Professional informers, 
74 Beck, English Eradication, supra note 14, at 548–49. 
75 Id. at 549. 
76 Id. at 580–81. 
77 Id. at 581–83.
78 Id. at 583. 
79 Id. at 583–85. 
80 Id. at 574–75, 590. 
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who made a livelihood through qui tam litigation, came to 
be despised by the public and were sometimes beaten by 
angry mobs.81
It is easy to imagine a modern informer’s conflict of interest 
producing analogous problems to those experienced in English 
history. If a statute permitted qui tam litigation against 
executive branch employees for failing to perform some legal 
duty, lawyers might be tempted to build a practice around suing 
agents of the federal government. The public interest could be 
undermined by distracting employees from their duties, or by 
applying the statute to the limits of its language. If there was a 
qui tam statute penalizing government use of private email, for 
instance, and a federal employee used a private email system to 
deal with an unanticipated emergency, a public prosecutor would 
have discretion to decline to bring a case, reasoning that the 
public interest did not warrant prosecution. The bounty provision 
of a qui tam statute, however, tends to make profit maximization 
the goal of law enforcement. Qui tam legislation can effectively 
eliminate the disinterested exercise of prosecutorial discretion for 
the benefit of the public. 
Such problems could potentially be ameliorated in the 
drafting process. Perhaps Congress could make qui tam bounties 
very low, so that such litigation would only be pursued by public 
interest firms motivated by considerations other than profit. 
Perhaps the legislation could place a cap on the amount a person 
could earn under a qui tam statute, preventing individuals from 
becoming professional informers. There could be a mechanism for 
the Department of Justice to dismiss qui tam cases it considered 
abusive or contrary to the public interest. At the very least, 
however, the problems that led England to eliminate qui tam
legislation midway through the last century suggest that 
Congress should exercise great caution, carefully weighing costs 
and benefits, before deploying this particular tool for promoting 
executive branch accountability. 
81 Id. at 576–78. 
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Congress, the Courts, and Party 
Polarization: Why Congress Rarely Checks 
the President and Why the Courts Should Not 
Take Congress’s Place 
Neal Devins
This essay will make two points about Congress-President 
relations—one is clearly right and the other is debatable. One 
point (clearly right) is that Congress is generally uninterested in 
the Constitution, especially with regard to asserting its 
institutional prerogatives and checking presidential unilateralism. 
This was largely the case before polarization set in (around 1995) 
and polarization has significantly exacerbated this phenomenon. In 
particular, lawmakers from the president’s political party no 
longer assert institutional prerogatives to resist presidential 
encroachments; consequently, Congress cannot act in a 
bipartisan way to block presidential initiatives. The second point 
(debatable) is that courts should not relax standing to sue 
limitations so that disappointed lawmakers can take their 
grievances to the judiciary when Congress is unable to stand up 
for itself. Polarization may make it harder for Congress to check 
the president, but polarization also cuts against lawmakers (or 
even institutional counsel) speaking Congress’s voice in court.1
More than that, polarization has fueled the growing perception 
that the court itself is polarized and politicized—so much so that 
the courts have good reason to steer from this political thicket. 
In making these points, I will focus my attention on how 
Congress turns to the courts to assert its institutional 
prerogatives. Section I will talk generally about structural and 
practical limits to Congress advancing a pro-Congress theory of 
either statutory or constitutional interpretation before the courts. 
 Sandra Day O’Connor Professor of Law and Professor of Government, William and 
Mary School of Law. Thanks to Tom Campbell for asking me to be a part of this 
symposium and for his insights. 
1 When a House or Senate committee seeks to enforce a subpoena in court, the 
committee is speaking its own voice and not Congress’s voice. See Tara Leigh Grove & 
Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
571, 622 (2014). For this reason, the broader point I make against lawmaker efforts to 
speak Congress’s voice in court does not apply to committee enforcement of subpoenas. 
See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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The centralization of litigation authority in the Department of 
Justice is a manifestation of these limits. Section I will also 
explain how it is that Congress sought to combat these limits in 
separation of powers disputes with the executive—giving itself 
some institutional voice in court by creating the Office of House 
Counsel and the Senate Office of Legal Counsel. Section II will 
examine how both lawmakers and institutional counsel have 
become less and less interested in separation of powers disputes 
as Congress has become more polarized. In particular, 
lawmakers have shifted away from institutional pursuits and 
toward the pursuit of social issues that divide the parties. In 
making this point, I will also highlight how party polarization 
has transformed Congress—from mildly disinclined to think 
about its institutional prerogatives under the Constitution, to 
outright uninterested in protecting its role in our system of 
divided government. Correspondingly, lawmakers of the 
president’s party no longer use their oversight authority to check 
the president; lawmakers of the opposition party see oversight 
principally as a vehicle to embarrass their political opponents. 
Section III will consider the ramifications of increasing party 
polarization on the standing of lawmakers and institutional 
counsel in disputes with the executive. These disputes are 
increasingly visible; opposition party lawmakers have strong 
incentive to discredit the president and frustrate his agenda. 
Litigation is a visible, low cost way to pursue their interests. For 
this very reason, however, litigation exacerbates polarization and 
threatens the judiciary. The judicial role in checking the 
executive should not expand to take into account Congress’s 
failure to assert its institutional prerogatives through traditional 
Article I devices, most notably, oversight and legislation.2
I. WHY CONGRESS (PRETTY MUCH) LEAVES IT TO THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO DEFEND CONGRESS’S INTERESTS
IN COURT3
The competing incentives of the president and Congress 
explain both Congress’s disinterest in asserting its institutional 
2 My argument will be limited to the question of whether polarization—as a policy 
matter—cuts in favor of more expansive standing for lawmakers and institutional 
counsel. I will not engage in constitutional analysis to ascertain the appropriate scope of 
lawmaker or institutional standing. For recent treatments of this constitutional question, 
see Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311 (2014); 
Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. L. REV.
339 (2015); and Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Legislative Exhaustion, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1253 (2017). 
3 This Section builds on and occasionally borrows from earlier writings of mine, 
most notably, Neal Devins, Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, 58 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1495 (2017). 
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prerogatives and the related dynamics of Congress’s interface 
with both the executive and the courts. To start, presidents are 
well positioned to simultaneously advance policy goals and 
expand the power of the presidency. In particular, presidents 
always claim they are constitutionally authorized to pursue 
favored policy positions and, as such, presidents are consistent 
and persistent advocates of executive power. Political scientists 
Terry Moe and William Howell put it this way: “[W]hen 
presidents feel it is in their political interests, they can 
put whatever decisions they like to strategic use, both in 
gaining policy advantage and in pushing out the boundaries of 
their power.”4
For its part, Congress possesses ample weapons to defend its 
institutional interests, but has little incentive to make use 
of these tools. While each of Congress’s 535 members have 
some stake in Congress as an institution, lawmakers regularly 
trade-off their interest in Congress as a strong, vibrant 
institution. They put aside institutional interests in favor of their 
interests in reelection, in serving on a desired committee, in 
assuming a position of leadership in their party, or in advancing 
their and their constituents’ policy goals. Lawmakers, in other 
words, are “trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma: all might benefit if 
they could cooperate in defending or advancing Congress’s power, 
but each has a strong incentive to free ride in favor of the 
local constituency.”5
This collective action problem stymies Congress in two 
distinctive ways. First (and most obviously), lawmakers have 
little interest in defending congressional prerogatives. On war 
powers, for example, lawmakers rarely assert Congress’s 
constitutional powers. In particular, today’s military is all 
volunteer and generally supportive of presidential power; 
lawmakers feel little constituent or public pressure to reign in 
presidential warmaking.6 Consequently, notwithstanding the 
clear constitutional mandate that Congress “declare war,”7
lawmakers often find it more convenient to acquiesce to 
presidential unilateralism than to face criticism that they 
obstructed a necessary military operation.8
4 Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action,
15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 138 (1999). 
5 Id. at 144. 
6 Neal Devins, Bring Back the Draft?, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1107, 1110 (2003). 
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
8 See LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING 166–68 
(2000). For this very reason, institutionally-minded members of Congress have turned to 
the courts to preserve their constitutional powers. For one prominent example, see 
Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000), which holds that members of 
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Second, the policy interests of lawmakers are not necessarily 
in sync with the institutional interests of Congress. Lawmakers 
opposed to legislation on policy grounds often embrace a narrow 
view of congressional power. Indeed, constitutional objections to 
legislation are typically raised by lawmakers and those who 
oppose legislation on policy grounds.9 Examples abound, 
including the Affordable Care Act, the Defense of Marriage Act, 
and the federal Partial Birth Abortion Act. Lawmakers opposed 
to these statutes filed briefs arguing that Congress was without 
constitutional authority to enact these measures. 10
With little interest in abstract discussions of legislative 
power, there clearly is no appetite for pursuing institutional 
goals such as enhancing pro-Congress interpretations of the 
Constitution or federal statutes. Likewise, lawmakers have little 
interest in contemplating potential judicial review of their 
handiwork—policy goals are pursued when a bill is enacted and a 
court decision striking down legislation is seen as an opportunity 
to reassert policy priorities through the enactment of new 
legislation.11 When amending legislation in the wake of a judicial 
decision, lawmakers do not engage with the courts; they rather 
“make[] clear concessions to the Court’s decision” by embracing 
the same policy through alternative means.12 As Second Circuit 
Judge Robert Katzmann put it, “Congress is largely oblivious of 
the well-being of the judiciary as an institution.”13 Consider, for 
example, issues of statutory interpretation that cut to the core of 
congressional priorities and prerogatives. The simple fact is that 
“[n]o one ever lost an election by saying ‘I’m for purposivism’”;14
Congress could not sue President Bill Clinton for alleged violations of the War Powers 
Resolution in his handling of the war in Yugoslavia. For additional discussion, see infra
Section III, which argues that institutionally-focused lawsuits are a rarity and that most 
lawmakers seek partisan advantage through litigation. 
9 See J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE
IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 143–44 (2004). 
10 See generally Neal Devins, Measuring Party Polarization in Congress: Lessons 
from Congressional Participation as Amicus Curiae, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 933 (2015). 
For reasons I will detail in Section II, polarization exacerbates this phenomenon, as 
today’s lawmakers are more apt to file briefs and make other formal declaration that 
Congress has exceeded its powers. 
11 See PICKERILL, supra note 9, at 23. 
12 Id. at 49. 
13 ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY
7 (1988). 
14 Victoria F. Nourse, Overrides: The Super-Study, 92 TEX. L. REV. 205, 214 (2014). 
In 2016, congressional Republicans pursued legislation that would eviscerate judicial 
deference to agency interpretations. See Vikram David Amar, Chevron Deference and the 
Proposed “Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016”: A Sign of the Times,
JUSTIA: VERDICT (July 26, 2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/07/26/chevron-deference-
proposed-separation-powers-restoration-act-2016-sign-times [http://perma.cc/DVG4-WFF9].
When introduced, this bill—which was never taken up in the Senate—sought to call 
attention to the “lawless” Obama administration; lawmakers were not concerned with 
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and with no constituency payoff, there is no lawmaker interest 
in thinking about statutory interpretation techniques used by 
the courts. 
A. Congress and the Department of Justice  
Another manifestation of lawmaker uninterest in 
institutional power, including judicial review of Congress’s 
handiwork, is the centralization of litigation authority in the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”). First, although the defense of 
federal statutes is an executive function,15 Congress limits its 
influence over legal arguments made in court by centralizing 
litigation authority this way. Second (and somewhat relatedly), 
the entity within Congress that oversees the Justice Department 
(the House and Senate Judiciary Committees) have incentive to 
embrace judicial supremacy—potentially at the expense of pro-
Congress theories of interpretation. Neither of these claims is 
obvious, so let me provide more details. 
First, by centralizing litigation authority in the DOJ, subject 
matter committees in Congress focus their energies on 
policymaking; for most lawmakers, what matters is direct 
influence through the writing of laws, the holding of hearings, 
and related investigations.16 Unlike legislation and oversight, 
legal arguments made in court are abstract and indirect. 
Historically, however, Congress understood that decentralized 
lawyering enhanced lawmaker power vis-à-vis the executive. 
Before 1870, there was no DOJ; before 1933, powerful agency 
solicitors controlled statutory and administrative legal 
arguments.17 These solicitors had strong ties with congressional 
oversight committees and, at this time, oversight committees 
held greater sway with executive branch legal arguments.18
Recognizing the costs of decentralization to executive power, 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt reorganized executive branch 
litigation, transferring litigation authority from agency solicitors 
congressional power, and indeed the bill sought to sift power to the courts, not Congress. 
In July 2017, the bill was reintroduced by Senate Republicans. See Press Release,
Orrin Hatch, Senate Leaders Introduce Bill to Restore Regulatory Accountability 
(July 19, 2017), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/7/senate-leaders-
introduce-bill-to-restore-regulatory-accountability [http://perma.cc/R32G-23RD].
15 For reasons why I think this is so, see Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 625. For a 
competing perspective, see Jack M. Beermann, Congress’s (Less) Limited Power to 
Represent Itself in Court: A Comment on Grove and Devins, 99 CORN. L. REV. ONLINE 166, 
168 (2014). 
16 See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That Never Was: Congress, the White 
House, and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 219 (1998). 
17 See NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789–1990, at 62–63 (1992). 
18 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 207. 
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to the DOJ.19 In so doing, presidents—through their Attorneys 
General—have greater control of the administrative state. In 
particular, unlike agency solicitors (who are more beholden to 
oversight committee chairs than to the White House), the 
Attorney General is typically a close political ally of the 
president, often involved in the president’s personal and political 
life.20 Correspondingly, since the mission of DOJ attorneys is to 
defend the interests of the United States (rather than a single 
agency whose interests may be in conflict with other agencies), 
there is less chance that either narrow constituent interests or 
congressional committees will capture the DOJ. Indeed, 
defenders of centralized litigation authority highlight the 
perceived need for the government to make consistent legal 
arguments across a range of cases.21 More to the point, “DOJ 
attorneys may well see the president as their client.”22 Indeed, as 
Sai Prakash and I have examined in our study of DOJ refusals to 
defend federal statutes, the DOJ fends off agency rivals and 
thereby enhances its status within the executive by advancing a 
pro-president legal policy agenda.23
Congress’s willingness to go along with DOJ control of 
litigation is a byproduct of the intensity of preferences within 
Congress and the executive branch. For reasons already noted, 
presidents push for centralization of litigation authority in the 
DOJ. The DOJ too is a fierce advocate for centralization; the 
power and prestige of the DOJ is tied to litigation authority, 
and the DOJ’s preference to control litigation far exceeds 
departmental and agency interests in decentralized 
arrangements. After all, agency heads have substantial power to 
advance policy preferences through their power to regulate and 
19 See Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 
256–58 (1996). 
20 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 219. 
21 For a summary of DOJ arguments in support of centralized litigation authority, 
see The Attorney General’s Role as Chief Litigator for the United States, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 
47 (1982). For a fuller presentation and critique of those arguments, see Neal Devins & 
Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558 (2003). 
22 Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 219; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Government
Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1987). 
The DOJ, however, is not simply a lackey of the president; witness, in particular, the 
battle between President Trump and his DOJ. 
23 See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 507, 537–59 (2012); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, 
Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 
1105–06 (2013). In making this point, a distinction must be drawn between DOJ efforts to 
advance the president’s legal policy agenda and possible DOJ investigations into criminal 
conduct by high-ranking executive officials. The power of the DOJ is hinged both to its 
advocacy of the executive’s legal policy agenda and its reputation for neutrality in the 
pursuit of criminal investigations. 
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their work with congressional committees in shaping federal 
law.24 More significantly, the DOJ’s overseers in Congress are 
strong supporters of centralization. The power of the House and 
Senate Judiciary Committees is significantly moored to the 
power of the DOJ and, as such, the Judiciary Committees look for 
ways to strengthen DOJ control of litigation. For example, when 
other congressional committees contemplate shifting litigation 
authority away from DOJ and to a regulatory agency, the 
Judiciary Committees fight back. Michael Herz and I recount 
several such episodes in our study of DOJ centralization of 
litigation authority, including fights between the House 
Judiciary and Energy and Commerce Committees regarding the 
enforcement of environmental laws.25
The interests of the DOJ and Judiciary Committees also 
coalesce on judicial supremacy. Both are strong advocates of 
judicial power as the power of the DOJ and Judiciary 
Committees is moored to the courts. When the federal courts play 
a significant policy-making role, the power of the DOJ to speak 
the government’s voice is at its apex, as is the power of the 
Judiciary Committees to oversee the DOJ. For this very reason, 
the DOJ embraces a duty to defend federal statutes that sees the 
Supreme Court as speaking the last word on the Constitution’s 
meaning; as a result, the Senate Judiciary Committee typically 
demands that Solicitor General and Attorney General nominees 
formally commit to the defense of federal statutes.26
Furthermore, Judiciary Committee members demonstrate 
respect for basic legal principles, “adher[ing] to formal rules 
against interfering in any way with ongoing litigation, and 
maintain[ing] a general policy that no bill should take effect 
retroactively.”27 In other words, unlike power committees who 
pay no attention to potential judicial roadblocks to favored 
policy initiatives, the Judiciary Committees are court-centric 
and conform to—rather than challenge—judicial limits on 
congressional power.28
24 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 219 (explaining why agencies do not see 
litigation authority as core to their powers); see also Devins, supra note 3, at 1528–30 
(highlighting agency role in drafting legislation). 
25 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 221–22. 
26 For a discussion of DOJ views, see The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and 
Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 275 (1980). For a 
general discussion of the incentives of the DOJ, Congress, and the White House, see 
Devins & Prakash, supra note 23, at 538–59. 
27 Mark C. Miller, Congress and the Constitution: A Tale of Two Committees, 3 
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 317, 338 (1993). 
28 See id. at 317–62 (contrasting House Judiciary Committee to Energy and 
Commerce Committee). 
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B. Congress in Court  
The fact that Congress largely leaves it to the DOJ to speak 
the government’s voice in court does not mean that lawmakers 
never turn to the courts for recourse. In Section II, I will discuss 
lawmaker amicus filings as well as the practices of institutional 
counsel for the House and Senate—analysis that will highlight 
how party polarization has contributed to declining lawmaker 
interest in Congress’s institutional authority vis-à-vis the 
president. In Section III, I will discuss court-imposed limits on 
the standing of disappointed lawmakers to defend Congress’s 
institutional prerogatives. For the balance of this section, 
I will examine the political conditions that led to the 
establishment of institutional counsel—conditions that speak to 
the circumstances when Congress will overcome the disincentives 
that typically result in lawmaker disinterest in Congress’s 
institutional authority. 
The Office of Senate Legal Counsel was created by statute in 
1978 as part of Watergate-era reforms to bolster congressional 
interests in separation of powers disputes; the Office of House 
Counsel was created by an administrative directive of the House 
Speaker Tip O’Neill in 1976.29 Differences between the two offices 
reflect differences in the chambers. The House is controlled by 
the majority party and the House counsel essentially works for 
the majority party.30 Senate norms traditionally favor 
bipartisanship and the Senate counsel acts at the behest of a 
supermajority of members from both parties.31 Indeed, Senate 
norms of bipartisanship explain the unwillingness of the House 
to sign onto a joint congressional counsel that would serve both 
29 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 608–14. In addition to creating an Office of 
Senate Legal Counsel, Congress also mandates that the DOJ notify that office when it 
would not defend federal statutes (principally so that institutional counsel could defend 
congressional interests in separation of powers disputes). See 2 U.S.C. § 288e(a) (2006) 
(allowing the Senate counsel—when authorized—to appear in legal actions regarding “the 
powers and responsibilities of Congress under the Constitution”). The House 
Bipartisanship Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”) directs the House counsel. See Grove & 
Devins, supra note 1, at 618. The BLAG is controlled by the majority party and has 
always backed majority party preferences. 
30 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 618–19. In litigation defending the Defense 
of Marriage Act, the House counsel responded to Democratic complaints that it did not 
speak the voice of the entire House by acknowledging that it represents the views of the 
majority party. Id. In lower court filings, the counsel stated that although it “seeks 
consensus whenever possible, it functions on a majoritarian basis, like the institution it 
represents.” E.g., Brief for Defendant–Appellant the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of 
the United States House of Representatives, Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (No. 12-2335), 2012 WL 3647722, at *3 n.1. 
31 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 612–21 (noting that Senate counsel action 
must be approved by two-thirds of a group made up of four members of the majority party 
and three members of the minority party). 
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chambers and serve as a bulwark against presidential power.32
Notwithstanding arguments that “[n]either House acting alone 
can assert the prerogative of representing the Congress,”33 House 
leadership feared that a nonpartisan joint office might not give 
voice to majority preferences in the House. 
The willingness of lawmakers to back the creation of an 
Office of Senate Legal Counsel to advance the Senate’s 
institutional interests in the courts is a byproduct of unique 
political circumstances—so much so that the creation of this 
office is the exception, which proves the rule of lawmaker 
disinterest in protecting their institutional prerogatives. During 
the Watergate era (1972–1978), Democrats occupied every 
ideological niche and there were several liberal Republicans.34
For this reason, George Wallace justified his third-party bid for 
the presidency by claiming that “there was not a ‘dime’s worth of 
difference’ between the two parties.”35 Senate committees, for 
example, often made use of unified staff—rather than divide staff 
by majority or minority party.36 With no meaningful ideological 
gap between the parties, bipartisanship was possible and 
Congress sometimes saw itself as an institution with a distinctive 
set of interests that set it apart from the White House. 
Nonetheless, lawmakers still needed to see personal political 
advantage in asserting Congress’s institutional interests and, as 
such, the previously discussed collective action problem typically 
stood as a roadblock to Congress’s asserting institutional 
interests, especially on matters as abstract as litigation 
authority. Watergate, however, made fears of presidential 
overreach politically salient and lawmakers rallied behind 
several significant legislative proposals designed to limit 
the president and protect Congress.37 Congress enacted the 
32 See id. at 612–13; see also Rebecca Mae Salokar, Legal Counsel for Congress: 
Protecting Institutional Interests, 20 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 131 (1993). 
33 Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977, Blind Trusts and Other Conflict of Interest 
Matters: Hearing on S. 555 Before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95TH CONG. 61 
(1977) (statement of Sen. James Abourezk, D–S.D.). 
34 See SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 27–35 (2008); see
also STEVEN S. SMITH & GERALD GAMM, The Dynamics of Party Government in 
Congress, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 147–49 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce L. Oppenheimer 
eds., 9th ed. 2009). 
35 Richard Pearson, Ex-Gov. George C. Wallace Dies at 79 in Alabama, WASH. POST
(Sept. 15, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1998/09/15/ex-gov-george-
c-wallace-dies-at-79-in-alabama/f77a36e4-0689-4086-9b96-b0d9a293cd57/?utm_term=.f39
de6268e8c [http://perma.cc/4CEW-DRM5].
36 See Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons 
from Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1543 (2005). 
37 See Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why 
Today’s Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 395, 401–06 (2009). 
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War Powers Resolution (overriding a presidential veto),38 the 
1974 Impoundment Control Act,39 and the 1978 Ethics in 
Government Act.40 All these statutes were politically popular; all 
these statutes responded to presidential overreach of core 
legislative powers. 
In Section II, I will explain why today’s Congress lacks the 
will and the way to assert institutional prerogative against the 
executive. Before doing so, let me close this section out 
by highlighting ways that institutional counsel—before 
polarization set in—defended congressional prerogatives in court. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, lawmakers were more willing to embrace 
a unified view of Congress’s institutional prerogatives. In 
particular, rather than see themselves as Democrats or 
Republicans, lawmakers were sanguine with institutional 
counsel defending the constitutionality of federal statutes or 
seeking to enforce committee subpoenas against executive 
officials. Consider, for example, Congress’s participation in two 
Reagan-era separation of powers disputes, Immigration 
and Naturalization Services v. Chadha (legislative veto) and 
Bowsher v. Synar (deficit reduction).41 In both cases, counsel for 
the House and Senate participated in oral arguments and filed 
briefs supporting Congress.42 In both cases, party identity did 
not matter—majority Democrats in Chadha initially litigated 
the dispute against the Carter administration; majority 
Senate Republicans litigated the Synar dispute against the 
Reagan administration.43
The ability and willingness of institutional counsel to 
advance Congress’s institutional interests in a bipartisan way, as 
we will see, stands in stark contrast to practices in today’s 
polarized Congress. At the same time, the participation of 
institutional counsel in earlier separation of powers disputes 
should not be seen as a departure from this section’s central 
claims about lawmaker uninterest in institutional authority 
and lawmaker acquiescence to judicial supremacy. To start, 
institutional counsel embraced separation of powers litigation 
and believed in judicial supremacy. At the time of Chadha
and Bowsher, the status of the lawyers in these offices 
38 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (1973). 
39 Impoundment Control Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 682–88 (1974). 
40 Ethics in Government Act, P.L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978). 
41 Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v. 
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
42 See Devins, supra note 10, at 950. 
43 In Chadha, no member of Congress filed an amicus brief. In Bowsher, there were 
two amicus briefs filed—one in support of the statute and one in opposition of the statute. 
These briefs were bipartisan. See id. at 1017–19. 
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hinged on their participation in marque separation of powers 
disputes—high profile cases where they were arguing against top 
DOJ lawyers, cases which often made their way to the Supreme  
Court.44 In the case of the Senate counsel, the very purpose of her 
office was to provide a bipartisan institutional voice to Senate 
interests in separation of powers disputes against the 
president.45 Likewise, the power of these lawyers derives from 
the power of the courts; institutional counsel pursue high 
visibility cases in court and embrace the Court’s power to say 
what the law is. For their part, lawmakers in the pre-polarization 
era were generally uninterested in the work of institutional 
counsel and acquiesced to a system that largely ran itself. In 
other words, after lawmakers put in place institutional counsel in 
the Watergate era, lawmakers did not see these offices as 
partisan tools and passively went along with the efforts of these 
offices to advance Congress’s institutional interests in court.46
II. HOW PARTY POLARIZATION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO GROWING
LAWMAKER DISINTEREST IN CONGRESSIONAL PREROGATIVES
Section I highlighted the collective action problem that limits 
lawmaker interest in institutional power disputes, including 
lawmaker support of DOJ control of government litigation. 
Section I also explained the creation of institutional counsel for 
Congress in the Watergate era, highlighting how the political 
salience of presidential power disputes overcame collective action 
limitations. In this section, I will focus on today’s polarized 
Congress. I will highlight how polarization exacerbates the 
collective action problem. I will also look to changing practices in 
both institutional counsel litigation and lawmaker amicus filings 
to document the diminishing salience of institutional power 
disputes to members of Congress. 
A. Polarization and the Collective Action Problem  
Polarization diminishes the ability of lawmakers to work 
together to defend Congress’s institutional prerogatives. Unlike 
the Watergate era, today’s lawmakers increasingly identify with 
party-defined messages and seek to gain power by advancing 
44 I speak from personal experience. In 1985, I had preliminary conversations with 
then-Senate counsel Mike Davidson about working in his office. 
45 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 611–13. 
46 I certainly do not mean to suggest that all lawmakers were disengaged in 
separation of powers disputes. During the pre-polarization period, there were certainly 
institutionally-minded members in the House or Senate who cared deeply about 
Congress’s constitutional prerogatives. At the same time, these members were a fairly 
small minority and most members were subject to the collective action problem discussed 
earlier in this section. 
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within their respective party.47 Correspondingly, Republicans 
and Democrats are increasingly at odds with each other and 
increasingly unlikely to find common ground. Measures of 
ideology reveal that all or nearly all Republicans are more 
conservative than the most conservative Democrats.48 Likewise, 
with the demise of Northern Rockefeller Republicans and 
Southern Democrats, there is no meaningful ideological range 
within either party.49
The rise in party-line voting exemplifies this phenomenon. 
Unlike the Nixon impeachment (where—even before the release 
of Watergate tapes—seven of seventeen Republicans joined 
House Democrats in voting for articles of impeachment),50 the 
“virtual party line votes in the House and the Senate” during the 
Clinton impeachment “reinforce[d] public perception of the 
intense partisanship underlying the proceedings.”51 The filibuster 
is another example. In November 2013, the then-Democratic 
Senate made it more likely that presidential lower court 
nominations would be approved by repealing the filibuster 
for those nominees; in April 2017, the Republican Senate 
likewise made it more likely that presidential Supreme Court 
nominations would be approved by repealing the Supreme Court 
filibuster rule.52 These examples, while striking, typify current 
practice: House Republicans vote with their party around 
47 See Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration 
of Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 756–59 (2011); see also C. LAWRENCE
EVANS, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 238 
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001). 
48 See The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTE VIEW (Jan. 18, 2013), 
web.archive.org/web/20131116022958/http://polarizedamerica.com/political_polarization.asp. 
49 See Jason M. Roberts & Steven S. Smith, Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and 
Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000, 47 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 305, 314–15 (2003). 
50 See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political 
Weapon, 34 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 161, 255 (2007). Republicans and Democrats also came 
together in subpoenaing information from the executive and going to court to seek 
enforcement of that subpoena. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign 
Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 726–27 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For additional discussion, see 
Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 600–01. 
51 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 193 (2d ed. 2000). 
52 See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013), https://nyti.ms/17Qt6DG; see also Amy Davidson Sorkin, Gorsuch
Wins, The Filibuster Loses, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/ 
news/amy-davidson/gorsuch-wins-the-filibuster-loses [http://perma.cc/3PHE-CAEJ]. In 
September 2017, Senate Republicans threatened to do away with the so-called blue slip, a 
practice which allows Senators from the state of residence of a federal judicial nominee to 
delay or potentially block a vote on the nominee. See Karoun Demirjian, McConnell Wants 
to End Practice of Allowing Senators to Block Appeals Court Judges, WASH. POST
(Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/senate-gop-leader-wants-to-
end-practice-of-allowing-senators-to-block-circuit-court-judges/2017/09/13/d10aa028-98d9-
11e7-87fc-c3f7ee4035c9_story.html?utm_term=.81217b34d9a0 [http://perma.cc/UQZ9-AR5U]. 
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ninety-two percent of the time and Senate Democrats vote with 
their party around ninety-four percent of the time.53
When it comes to oversight and hearings, party identity is 
also key. Majority and minority staff no longer work together; 
each side, instead, calls witnesses who support preexisting party 
views.54 Oversight too is contingent on party identity. When the 
majority party is the same as the president, oversight is lax; 
when the government is divided, oversight is a top priority.55
Correspondingly, the House majority is willing to seek judicial 
enforcement of subpoenas against high-ranking executive 
officials during periods of divided government. When Democrats 
controlled the House in 2007, the Bush administration’s firing of 
U.S. attorneys prompted extensive oversight and litigation.56 In 
the Fast and Furious gun running case of 2012–2013, 
Republicans targeted Obama Attorney General Eric Holder.57 In 
both these disputes, the minority filed competing briefs urging 
judicial restraint.58
Party polarization, finally and most significantly, contributes 
both to the rise of presidential unilateralism and to Congress’s 
acquiescence to judicial supremacy. Members of the president’s 
party are unlikely to check presidential priorities and, 
consequently, the opposition party is unlikely to forge a 
bipartisan coalition to check presidential power.59 Moreover, the 
53 Elahe Izadi, Congress Sets Record for Voting Along Party Lines, NAT’L. J. (Feb. 3, 
2014), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/62617 [http://perma.cc/9GLY-ND99].
54 See Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons 
from Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1544 (2005). 
55 See Devins, supra note 37, at 409. 
56 See Philip Shenon, As New ‘Cop on the Beat,’ Congressman Starts Patrol, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/06/us/politics/06waxman.html. 
57 See John Bresnahan & Seung Min Kim, Holder Held in Contempt of Congress,
POLITICO (June 28, 2012, 5:47 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/06/holder-held-in-
contempt-of-congress-077988 [http://perma.cc/8STK-YLEE]. Another manifestation of 
polarization’s impact on Executive Branch-Congress dynamics is the March 2018 decision 
of the Trump administration to turn over Obama-era documents on the Fast and Furious 
investigation to Republican-led Congress. See Sarah N. Lynch, Trump administration to 
provide records on Obama-era gun-smuggling probe, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2018, 9:21 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-justice-guns/trump-administration-to-provide-
records-on-obama-era-gun-smuggling-probe-idUSKCN1GJ2KH [http://perma.cc/DL54-VBTK].
58 See Jordy Yager, Dems File Brief Urging Court to Dismiss Issa’s Contempt Suit 
Against Holder, THE HILL (Dec. 19, 2012, 9:34 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house 
/273827-dems-file-brief-urging-court-to-dismiss-issas-contempt-suit-against-holder.com
[http://perma.cc/MN5W-KP94]. The partisan divide in these cases stands in sharp 
contrast to the bipartisan efforts of the Watergate-era Congress to go to court to enforce a 
subpoena against President Nixon. For additional discussion, see supra note 50 and 
accompanying text. 
59 I do not mean to suggest that the president’s party will never stand up to the 
president. In 2017, Republicans in Congress joined Democrats to back sanctions 
legislation against Russia for its meddling in the 2016 elections—legislation which was 
seen as a rebuke to President Trump. See Elana Schor, Congress Sends Russia 
Sanctions to Trump Desk, Daring a Veto, POLITICO (July 27, 2017, 1:55 PM), 
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prospects of both parties coming together to advance Congress’s 
institutional interests through the enactment of legislation is less 
likely in divided government (and we have had divided 
government thirty-six of the past fifty years). The result: 
presidents act unilaterally and Congress stands aside. Sometimes 
presidents advance new policies through executive orders (Clinton 
on health care; Bush on faith based initiatives; Obama on 
immigration);60 sometimes presidents take greater control of the 
administrative state through Office of Management and Budget 
regulatory review and related coordinating techniques.61
Polarization facilitates judicial supremacy for much the same 
reason. Lawmakers are increasingly at odds about preferred 
policies; on matters before the courts, lawmakers—as I will soon 
discuss—increasingly file conflicting Democrat and Republican 
amicus briefs. Consequently, courts are emboldened, as it is close 
to unimaginable that lawmakers will stand together to advance 
pro-Congress positions in ways that courts would take into 
account.62 Polarization furthers judicial supremacy in other ways. 
For example, polarization has resulted in a shift of power away 
from congressional committees and to party leaders—so much 
so that committee hearings related to constitutional and 
statutory interpretation are now dominated by the court-centric 
Judiciary Committees.63
B. Polarization and Amicus Briefs64
Lawmakers regularly file amicus briefs in federal court 
litigation, especially before the Supreme Court. From 1974–1985, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/27/russia-sanctions-bill-senate-to-pass-241034 
[http://perma.cc/TM7H-4FQH]. At the same time, my bottom line claim is valid, that is, 
today’s lawmakers rarely have incentive to check a president of their own party. Indeed, 
Congressional Republicans backed President Trump’s efforts to discredit his own 
Department of Justice and FBI by releasing memos and conducting oversight favorable to 
the president. See also infra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing Republican 
support for President Trump during the first months of his presidency). For a provocative 
argument that Congress retains its core powers to check the president and that the 
failure to act speaks more about the situational use of power (rather than the diminution 
of power tied to polarization), see JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION:
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017). 
60 See Moe and Howell, supra note 4, at 165–66 (noting that only 3 of 1000 executive 
orders from 1973–1998 were overridden by legislation). For a more complete (and current) 
inventory, see WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF 
DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 112–20 (2003). 
61 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 
2247–49 (2001). 
62 See Devins, supra note 3, at 1518–19; see also LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 14–17 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court calibrates its 
decisions to take into account the possibility of congressional disapproval). 
63 See Devins, supra note 36, at 762–63.
64 This subsection is drawn from Devins, supra note 10. 
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930 lawmakers signed onto fifty-two briefs in forty-five cases; 
from 2002–2013, those numbers skyrocketed—3807 lawmakers 
signed onto one hundred fifty briefs in eighty-six cases.65 This 
spike in filings, however, does not speak to greater lawmaker 
interest in Congress’s institutional authority, nor greater 
congressional influence before the Court. In fact, differences 
between the less polarized 1974–1985 period and the highly 
polarized 2002–2013 period speak both to the rise of partisanship 
in lawmaker briefs and a shift away from less divisive separation 
of powers cases to salient divisive issues like abortion, health 
care, and gay rights. During the 1974–1985 period, fifteen briefs 
(twenty-nine percent) were filed on social issues and twenty 
(thirty-eight percent) were filed on institutional issues.66 During 
the 2002–2013 period, fifty-two (thirty-five percent) were filed on 
social issues and forty-three (twenty-nine percent) were filed on 
institutional issues.67 Individual lawmakers were twice as likely 
to sign onto social issue briefs (1822 lawmakers; forty-eight 
percent) than institutional briefs (926 signatories; twenty-four 
percent).68 In the earlier period, lawmakers signed onto 
comparable numbers of social and institutional issue briefs (388 
lawmakers, forty-two percent for social issue briefs; 372 
lawmakers, forty percent for institutional).69
More striking, today’s lawmakers focus almost exclusively on 
the underlying policy dispute. Briefs are filed in cases that do not 
implicate congressional power (affirmative action and legislative 
prayer are two recent examples).70 The question of whether 
congressional power is expanded or limited is of secondary 
importance. Democrats backed the Affordable Care Act and 
campaign finance laws and opposed the Defense of Marriage Act; 
Republicans were on the opposite side of both issues.71
A closer look at abortion and separation of powers filings 
backs up these claims. For abortion, lawmakers did not file any 
amicus briefs in cases implicating state regulatory authority 
until 1986; in 1980, a bipartisan coalition of 238 lawmakers (104 
Democrats, 135 Republicans) filed a brief arguing that lawmaker 
control over the appropriations process extended to the decision 
not to fund abortions.72 Starting in 1986, however, lawmakers 
65 Id. at 942–43. 
66 Id. at 945–46. 
67 Id. at 946. 
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 995–96, 999–1000. 
71 Id. at 992–94, 998–99.
72 See Brief of Rep. Jim Wright et al. as Amici Curiae, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 
(1980) (No. 79-1268), 1980 WL 339672, at *1–5. 
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began to file in state as well as federal cases; partisan divisions 
also emerged. Initially, competing briefs were filed by coalitions 
dominated by Republicans or Democrats (pro-choice briefs were 
ninety percent Democrats and pro-life briefs were ninety percent 
Republicans).73 By 2014, most briefs were exclusively Democrat 
or Republican filings. In the 2014 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby case 
(involving the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act), 
four of five briefs were one party briefs.74
Abortion briefs are striking for another reason—hundreds of 
lawmakers sign onto these briefs (an average of 171 signatories 
per case).75 In other words, lawmakers see abortion briefs as an 
opportunity to register a policy preference on an issue that 
divides the party. Lawmakers no longer care whether the 
underlying issue implicates state or federal power. More striking, 
even in cases implicating federal power, lawmakers now care 
only about pro-choice or pro-life preferences and not about the 
scope of federal power. Today, it is inconceivable that a broad 
bipartisan coalition would back legislative power—as they did in 
the 1980 abortion funding case.76 Instead, Democrats will resist 
federal power to restrict abortion rights and back federal power 
to guarantee abortion access; Republican views of federal power 
are likewise contingent on whether pro-choice or pro-life policy 
outcomes are at play. In the 2007 Gonzales v. Carhart case, 
for example, Republicans uniformly backed and Democrats 
uniformly resisted congressional power to impose a federal 
partial birth abortion ban.77
Amicus filings in separation of powers cases highlight both 
the growth of partisanship and the declining importance of 
separation of powers issues to lawmakers. As noted, today’s 
lawmakers are less likely to participate in disputes implicating 
institutional power and less likely to sign onto briefs in cases 
where briefs are filed. While House and Senate counsel 
participation may deflate the number of signatories (a topic I will 
address in the next subsection), it is quite clear that there is less 
73 Devins, supra note 10, at 947. 
74 Id. at 948. 
75 Id. One hundred and seventy-one is the average number of briefs studied in my 
earlier research on congressional amici. 
76 In 2014, House Republican leadership filed a lawsuit against Obama 
administration implementation of the Affordable Care Act—claiming that the 
administration usurped Congress’s appropriations power. For their part, Democratic 
leadership filed competing briefs—advancing a narrower view of the appropriations 
power. See Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress in Support of Defendants’ Motion 
for Summary Judgment, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53 
(D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-01967-RMC), 2015 WL 10376844. 
77 Devins, supra note 10, at 1014–15. All 152 Republican signatories supported the 
law. Ninety-nine out of one hundred and one Democrat signatories opposed. 
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interest in staking out a position in a separation of powers 
dispute than a case implicating abortion or some other social 
issue. For example, throughout the enemy combatant dispute, a 
total of sixteen lawmakers signed amicus briefs and no amicus 
briefs were filed by the House or Senate counsel.78 Additionally, 
when an amicus brief is filed, there are relatively few brief 
signers—roughly nineteen per brief as compared to 171 in 
abortion cases.79
Separation of powers filings are revealing for other reasons.80
First, there is a growing trend towards partisan filings; recent 
examples include George W. Bush litigation over enemy 
combatants, Barack Obama litigation over recess appointments 
and immigration, Donald Trump litigation over immigration.81
Second, although some bipartisan briefs were filed, lawmakers 
were not motivated by a desire to preserve or expand 
congressional power. In litigation over the item veto in the 1990s, 
lawmakers defended delegating legislative power to the president 
in order to facilitate their reputations as deficit hawks.82 In 
related 2012 and 2014 litigation over the authority of Congress to 
allow individuals born in Jerusalem to list Israel as their place of 
birth, brief signers were interested in reaffirming their support 
for Israel.83
Lawmaker amicus briefs reflect growing polarization in 
Congress, including growing lawmaker disinterest in issues 
implicating Congress’s institutional power. Moreover, with 
increasing attention paid to short-term goals tied to advancing 
party policy priorities, lawmakers are increasingly apt to 
file briefs highlighting limits in legislative power. Relatedly, 
today’s amicus briefs largely cancel each other out—coalitions 
of Democrats and Republicans make competing arguments 
about constitutionality so that there are roughly as many 
briefs arguing that Congress is without authority as arguing 
that Congress has constitutional authority. And if that isn’t 
enough—these briefs are further limited by the fact that 
Republicans and Democrats are inconsistent in their positions 
78 Id. at 949. 
79 Id. at 948. Nineteen is the average number of studied briefs in my 
earlier research. 
80 The balance of this paragraph is largely lifted from id. at 949–50. 
81 Id. at 949; see also Seung Min Kim, Dem Lawmakers Back Brief Supporting 
Obama’s Immigration Action, POLITICO (Mar. 8, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/ 
2016/03/obama-immigration-action-democrats-amicus-brief-220419 [http://perma.cc/BH6G-
4L5N]; Tal Kopan, Congressional Democrats Join Court Challenge to Trump’s Travel Ban,
CABLE NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 15, 2017, 3:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/15/politics/ 
democrats-amicus-brief-trump-travel-ban/index.html [http://perma.cc/9YT3-CFG4].
82 Devins, supra note 10, at 949–50. 
83 Id. at 950.
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over time. The flashpoint in these briefs is the underlying 
policy issue and not the more abstract question regarding the 
scope of congressional power. For reasons I will now detail, 
changes in the role of institutional counsel in Congress also 
demonstrate growing partisanship and polarization in separation 
of powers disputes.  
C. Polarization and the Changing Role of Institutional Counsel 
Party polarization has reshaped the role of institutional 
counsel. Gone are the days where institutional counsel served as 
a bulwark against a too powerful executive—defending the House 
and Senate in separation of powers lawsuits, typically speaking 
the voice for both Democrats and Republicans.84 Indeed, in the 
period before polarization, lawmakers typically did not file 
amicus briefs and typically backed Congress as an institution 
when they did file amicus briefs.85 At that time, the House and 
Senate counsel often worked in tandem, participating in the 
same cases and advancing the shared institutional interests 
of the House and Senate in a strong Congress.86 Today, 
House-Senate differences are on prominent display as 
polarization has transformed the role of institutional counsel in 
ways that reflect profound differences between the House and 
Senate.  
The Senate counsel was designed to reflect Senate norms of 
bipartisanship and consensus. From 1978 (when the Office of 
Senate Legal Counsel was first created) until 1995, the Senate 
counsel regularly participated in litigation involving the 
separation of powers. However, polarization has made bipartisan 
consensus next to impossible; as a result, the Senate counsel is 
largely moribund in the very separation of powers disputes that 
were core to the creation of the office. With one notable exception 
(that I will soon discuss), the Senate counsel has not locked horns 
with the executive and defended congressional prerogatives 
before the Supreme Court in any separation of powers dispute 
since 1995.87 For example, in a 2014 dispute over the president’s 
84 See Devins, supra note 10, at 950. 
85 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 617; Devins, supra note 10, at 950. 
86 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 614–22 (discussing efforts of House and 
Senate counsel to coordinate filings in separation of powers litigation). 
87 See id. at 617; see also Neal Devins, Counsel Rests, SLATE (Jan. 13, 2014, 5:55 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/01/the_senate_s_lawy
er_doesn_t_participate_in_important_litigation_against.html [http://perma.cc/3T3R-EU3N].
In a 2015 dispute regarding a federal statute intended to facilitate the collection of money 
judgments brought by victims of terrorists acts, the Senate Counsel and Department of 
Justice both filed amicus briefs backing up congressional authority. See Brief for the U.S. 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 
(2016) (No. 14-770), 2015 WL 9412676; Brief of Amici Curiae Former Senior Officials of 
2018] Congress, the Courts, and Party Polarization 73 
purported end-running of the Senate’s confirmation power 
through the use of recess appointments, the Senate counsel stood 
on the sidelines while counsel for Senate Republicans filed briefs 
and made oral arguments before both the D.C. Circuit and 
Supreme Court.88
The one case where the Senate counsel did participate, 
Zivtofsky v. Kerry, is the exception that proves the rule. The issue 
in Zivtofsky was whether Congress could override State 
Department policy to disallow individuals born in Jerusalem to 
claim on their passports that they were born in Israel (so that 
their passports would designate their birthplace as Jerusalem 
and not Israel).89 Senate Democrats and Republicans did not 
come together to defend Senate prerogatives; they came together 
to support Israel. Lawmakers who signed amicus briefs in the 
case included some of the most liberal Democrats and some of the 
most conservative Republicans.90 These lawmakers regularly 
signed onto single party briefs in other cases, but were united in 
their support of Israel. Indeed, while 333 signatories of a pro-
Congress amicus brief signed a letter to President Obama 
affirming the “commitment to the unbreakable bond that exists 
between our country and the state of Israel,”91 no member of the 
Zivotofsky coalition spoke about the case’s separation of powers 
implications on either the House or Senate floor.92
On the House side, polarization has played out in 
fundamentally different ways, reflecting the fact that the House 
counsel speaks the voice of the House majority. During periods of 
unified government, the House typically leaves the president 
alone—seeing the president as the leader of their party and 
the Office of Legal Counsel in Support of Respondents, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. 
Ct. 1310 (2016) (No. 14-770), 2015 WL 9412677. 
88 See Devins, supra note 87. For their part, Senate Democrats too stood on the 
sidelines, not wanting to embrace a circumscribed confirmation power and not wanting to 
join Senate Republicans in their efforts to limit Obama administration efforts to fill 
judicial and administrative vacancies. Id. In Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning,
134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556–57 (2014), the Supreme Court unanimously rejected Obama 
administration arguments and backed a larger Senate role.  
89 Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2081–83 (2015). The Supreme Court ruled 
that the president has complete power of recognition and that Congress cannot override 
that power by statute. Id. at 2096. 
90 Devins, supra note 10, at 954. 
91 Letter by Representatives Steny Hoyer and Eric Cantor to Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton Reaffirming the U.S.-Israel Alliance, AIPC (Mar. 26, 2010), 
https://www.aipac.org/-/media/publications/policy-and-politics/source-materials/congress 
ional-action/2010/3_26_10__letter_to_secretary_of_state_re_us_commitment_to_israeli_ 
security_and_middle_east_peace.ashx. That letter was sent by 333 House members; a 
nearly identical letter was sent by seventy-six Senators. See Ben Smith, 76 Senators Sign 
on to Israel Letter, POLITICO (Apr. 13, 2010, 4:21 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/ben-
smith/2010/04/76-senators-sign-on-to-israel-letter-026380 [http://perma.cc/N5GN-Y4CG].
92 Devins, supra note 10, at 954. 
74 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:1
someone to shield from opposition party criticism.93 Oversight is 
lax and the president and House speaker sound similar messages 
on the issues that divide the parties. Needless to say, the House 
counsel is not engaged in litigation disputes with the White 
House during periods of unified government.94
During periods of divided government, however, the House is 
increasingly willing to challenge presidential actions in court, 
including lawsuits against presidential initiatives and subpoena 
enforcement actions. As discussed earlier, the Democratic House 
sought to enforce subpoenas against the George W. Bush 
administration and the Republican House likewise sought to 
enforce subpoenas against the Obama administration.95 More 
telling, the Republican House challenged Obama administration 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act, claiming that the 
administration “spent billions of unappropriated dollars to 
support the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” and that 
“under the guise of implementing regulations, effectively 
amended the Affordable Care Act’s employer mandate by 
delaying its effect and narrowing its scope.”96 The House too has 
pursued the defense of federal statutes that the executive refuses 
to defend. Recent examples include Miranda override legislation 
93 The Trump administration may ultimately become the exception that proves the 
rule. At least until January 2018, however, Republicans in Congress—notwithstanding 
some public criticism of the president—have largely backed President Trump and 
certainly Republican lawmakers have not gone to court to challenge the president. See
Aaron Bycoffe, Tracking Congress in the Age of Trump, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 14, 2016 
3:24 PM), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/congress-trump-score/ [http://perma.cc/ 
CG7L-YBV3]. Indeed, House Republicans backed President Trump’s efforts to discredit 
his own bureaucracy by releasing a memo critical of the FBI. See supra note 59. At the 
same time, there is reason to think that Republicans in Congress may see personal 
advantage in criticizing the president and, as such, Congress may eventually step up its 
oversight of the Trump administration. In late September 2017, for example, Republican 
House overseers joined Democrats in seeking information regarding Trump 
administration officials’ use of personal emails to conduct government business. See Mike 
DeBonis, Gowdy Joins Democrats in Probing Trump Administration’s Use of Personal 
Email, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/ 
wp/2017/09/25/gowdy-joins-democrats-in-probing-trump-administration-use-of-personal-
email/?utm_term=.174e3bea8e4a [http://perma.cc/EKE6-7ZAC].
94 The only exception is a low salience separation of powers dispute regarding the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act in 1993. See Memorandum from Jennifer Casazza, DOJ 
Decline Defense Congressional Participation 6 (on file with author) (discussing the House 
Counsel’s participation in Association of American Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton,
997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
95 See Shenon, supra note 56; Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 57. 
96 U.S. House of Representatives. v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57 (D.D.C. 2015). 
The House also appeared as amicus in backing a state challenge to Obama administration 
immigration initiatives. For additional discussion, see Brief for 172 Members of the U.S. 
House of Representatives and 40 U.S. Senators as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, infra note 106. 
2018] Congress, the Courts, and Party Polarization 75 
(Dickerson v. United States) and the Defense of Marriage Act 
(United States v. Windsor).97
Dickerson and Windsor reveal the profound impact of 
polarization on the work of the House counsel. In periods of 
divided government, the House counsel will advance majority 
party preferences. In part, this means that the House counsel 
will engage in disputes that have nothing to do with the 
separation of powers—as the focus is advancing the policy 
agenda of the House (and, for reasons discussed, separation of 
powers gives way to social issues when Congress is polarized).98
In part, this means that the minority party in Congress will 
publicly take issue with the House counsel. In both Dickerson 
and Windsor, the House minority filed a competing brief to make 
clear that the House counsel was both wrong on the merits and 
spoke only for the majority party.99 Institutional power disputes 
follow a similar script. The minority party will make competing 
filings and the House counsel will focus her energies on highly 
politicized matters, especially investigations intended to 
embarrass high-ranking Executive Branch officials. Recent 
examples include Democratic investigations of the U.S. 
Attorneys’ firings under George W. Bush and Republican 
investigations of Attorney General Eric Holder’s handling of the 
Fast and Furious gun smuggling scheme.100
In today’s polarized Congress, the House and Senate counsel 
no longer represent Congress’s institutional interests in disputes 
with the president. The Senate counsel is largely enfeebled by 
bipartisanship requirements. The House counsel represents the 
majority party and is only interested in checking the president 
during periods of divided government. Moreover, the House 
counsel largely limits her intervention to highly politicized 
disputes that divide Republicans and Democrats—so much 
so that the minority party increasingly rebuts House counsel 
filings with opposition briefs. Finally, as was true with 
lawmaker amicus filings, institutional disputes are less critical 
to institutional counsel and the social issues that divide the 
97 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 618; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428 (2000); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
98 See Shenon, supra note 56; Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 57. 
99 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the House Democratic Leadership in Support of 
Petitioner, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525), 2000 WL 
126192; Jennifer Bendery, Defense of Marriage Act: House Republicans Tie Federal Gay 
Marriage Ban to House Rules, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2013/01/02/defense-of-marriage-act_n_2399383.html [http://perma.cc/3XJR-ZC64].
100 See Shenon, supra note 56; Brian Montopoli, So Is This U.S. Attorney 
Purge Unprecedented Or Not?, CBS NEWS (Mar. 14, 2007, 5:17 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/so-is-this-us-attorney-purge-unprecedented-or-not/ 
[http://perma.cc/73UP-WEHQ]; Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 57. 
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parties are increasingly likely to spill over to the work of 
institutional counsel.  
III. CONCLUSION: WHY EXPANDING LAWMAKER STANDING IS NOT
THE SOLUTION TO CONGRESSIONAL DYSFUNCTION 
In turning back a lawsuit by members of Congress who 
challenged the Reagan administration for subverting Congress’s 
war making powers by backing the Contras, then-judge Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg claimed that “Congress has formidable weapons 
at its disposal—the power of the purse and investigative 
resources far beyond those available in the Third Branch. . . . ‘If 
the Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not our 
task to do so.’”101 This claim made sense in 1985 and even in 1993 
when Judge Ginsburg was confirmed to the Supreme Court by a 
resounding bipartisan vote of 96–3;102 at that time, the seeds of 
polarization were planted but had not yet taken hold of Congress. 
Today, the natural disinclinations of lawmakers to invest in 
Congress as an institution have metastasized. The era of 
presidential unilateralism has now taken hold as Congress lacks 
the will and way to check the president and advance its 
institutional interests.103
The question remains: Should the courts fill that void by 
providing avenues for disappointed lawmakers to challenge the 
president? After all, our system of checks and balances 
anticipates some check on presidential unilateralism and judicial 
intervention seems far more likely than Congress coming 
together in a bipartisan way to place limits on presidential 
entreaties. For institutionally minded lawmakers, court filings 
may be the only real vehicle available to check the president’s 
expansionist tendencies.  
For the balance of this essay, I will explain why 
polarization does not cut in favor of an expanded judicial 
role—notwithstanding the fact that polarization cuts against 
101 Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir 1985) (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring). 
102 Linda Greenhouse, Senate, 96-3, Easily Confirms Judge Ginsburg as a Justice,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/04/us/senate-96-3-easily-
affirms-judge-ginsburg-as-a-justice.html.
103 As noted earlier, the Trump administration may become the exception that proves 
this rule. See Moe & Howell, supra note 4, at 138. Republicans (as of January 2018) are 
generally backing the president and, consequently, reinforcing the central claims of this 
essay. That may change and that change may add nuance to the claims made in this 
paper. Nonetheless, I truly doubt that the actions of Congress during the Trump era will 
undermine my central claims regarding congressional incentives. Furthermore, a tick up 
in congressional oversight would cut in favor of my bottom line conclusions regarding 
legislator standing to challenge the executive in court.
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Congress asserting its institutional prerogatives through the 
legislative process. My argument is two-fold. First, lawmakers 
will increasingly turn to the courts for partisan ends and, 
relatedly, it is increasingly likely that there will be competing 
factions of Democratic and Republican filings. In other words, 
lawmakers will see courts as one more vehicle to articulate party 
preferences and call attention to differences between the two 
parties. These lawmakers speak for their political party; they do 
not speak Congress’s institutional voice. 
Consider four recent cases where the House of Representatives 
squared off against the Obama administration—Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform v. Holder (where the 
House sued Attorney General Holder for failing to turn over 
requested documents in its Fast and Furious investigation); 
United States House of Representatives v. Burwell (where the 
House sued the Obama administration for implementing the 
Affordable Care Act in ways that allegedly undermined House 
prerogatives); United States v. Windsor (where the House 
defended before the Supreme Court the DOMA after the Obama 
administration refused to defend); and United States v. Texas
(where the House appeared before the Supreme Court as amicus 
to challenge Obama’s immigration directive).104 In all four cases, 
Republican lawmakers sought to embarrass the Obama 
administration and/or advance favored policy priorities in the 
courts;105 in all four cases, Democratic lawmakers filed competing 
briefs defending the Obama administration.106 Needless to say, if 
Democrats controlled the House there would be a raft of lawsuits 
challenging the Trump administration.107 Indeed, Democratic 
104 See Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 
2013); U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2016); United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
105 See Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 56 (discussing Holder); see also Burwell, 130 F. 
Supp. 3d 53; Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 618–19 (discussing DOMA); Brief for 
Amicus Curiae the United States House of Representatives in Support of Respondents, 
United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-674), 2016 WL 1377718. 
106 See Yager, supra note 58; Brief of Amicus Curiae Members of Congress in Support 
of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 
130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-01967-RMC), 2015 WL 10376844; Brief of 
172 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 40 U.S. Senators as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, Urging Affirmance on the 
Merits, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 840029; 
Brief of 186 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 39 Members of the U.S. 
Senate as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134 
(5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-647), 2016 WL 891342. 
107 For this very reason, there are real costs to a regime in which institutional counsel 
for the House have standing to speak the House’s voice without allowing minority party 
lawmakers access to the courts to raise institutional power claims. Specifically, during 
periods of unified government, Congress would be mute. See Bycoffe, supra note 93. 
During periods of divided government, Congress would be active—but only presidential 
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state Attorneys Generals have launched more than a dozen 
lawsuits against the Trump administration and Democrats in 
Congress have also launched lawsuits.108 For example, almost 
200 Congressional Democrats have filed a lawsuit claiming that 
President Trump violated the Foreign Emoluments Clause by 
accepting benefits from foreign states without first seeking to 
obtain the consent of Congress.109
There is little question that opposition party lawmakers are 
now locked and loaded; they will go to court whenever possible to 
strengthen their base, advance their agenda, and—whenever 
possible—embarrass the president. None of this is to say that the 
House and Senate never have standing to defend institutional 
prerogatives. Indeed, I have previously written (with Tara Grove) 
that House and Senate counsel can seek judicial enforcement of 
subpoenas.110 In particular, the House and Senate need not act as 
a bicameral body when it comes to implementing the “rules 
of . . . proceedings” of their respective chambers;111 it therefore 
opponents would speak Congress’s voice. To the extent that the Supreme Court signaled 
potential approval of such a regime in Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2657 (2015), the Court should rethink its approach to lawmaker 
and institutional standing. For further discussion of the Arizona case, see Sant’Ambrogio, 
supra note 2, at 1540. 
108 See Michael Levenson, Maura Healey’s Top Target These Days is Donald Trump,
BOS. GLOBE (June 24, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/06/23/healey/
8C3t7IXZZWENRHKllVqbIK/story.html [http://perma.cc/R9ET-ZK63]. For a particularly 
revealing look at the efforts of New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman’s efforts to 
wage legal warfare with President Trump, see Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum, 
New York’s Attorney General in Battle with Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/26/nyregion/eric-schneiderman-attorney-general-new-
york.html?_r=0. 
109 See Blumenthal v. Trump, Complaint, No. 17-cv-01154, 2017 WL 2561946 (D.D.C. 
June 14, 2017). A related lawsuit filed by the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in 
Washington was dismissed for want of standing. See David A. Fahrenthold & Jonathan 
O’Connell, Judge dismisses lawsuit alleging Trump violated Constitution, WASH. POST,
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/judge-dismisses-lawsuit-
alleging-trump-violated-constitution/2017/12/21/31011510-e697-11e7-ab50-621fe058
8340_story.html?utm_term=.0c2df9144622 [http://perma.cc/V78R-PK6C].
110 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 597–603, 622. The House also may have 
standing in ongoing (as of fall 2017) litigation regarding the appropriations power and 
Obama-era enforcement of the Affordable Care Act. Specifically, since the Constitution 
mandates that appropriations legislation originates in the House, the House arguably 
suffers a distinct injury when presidential action allegedly undermines House 
appropriations authority. In Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 58, federal district judge 
Rosemary Collyer found standing for this reason. On December 15, 2017, Collyer’s 
standing holding was effectively ratified by a settlement between the Trump 
administration, House Republicans, and Democractic Attorneys General. See Anna Edney 
& Andrew M. Harris, Obamacare Subsidy Lawsuit Settled by White House, Democrats,
BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Dec. 15, 2017, 3:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2017-12-15/obamacare-subsidy-lawsuit-settled-by-white-house-democrats
[http://perma.cc/6WEC-X5FK].
111 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. The fact that either chamber might have authority to 
seek judicial enforcement of subpoenas does not mean that judicial resolution is superior 
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stands to reason that each chamber can pursue investigations as 
well as issue and enforce subpoenas as a unilateral body. At the 
same time, these lawsuits come at a cost in this age of polarized 
politics. Lawmakers are not motivated to use litigation to 
advance Congress’s institutional interests; the focus of litigation 
is partisan gain and Democrats and Republicans will simply use 
the courts as another field of battle to engage in partisan battles 
with each other. Again, that is not to say that lawmakers or 
institutional counsel are without standing; my concern is 
whether polarization—as a policy matter—weighs in favor or 
against congressional standing. 
My second argument against congressional lawsuits is that 
they embroil the courts in highly partisan political fights and 
that the courts pay a price for being embroiled in such overtly 
political litigation. Starting in 2010, the Supreme Court became a 
partisan Court—all of the Republican-nominated Justices are 
now to the right of all of the Democratic-nominated Justices.112
Polarization has fueled this partisan divide and Senate 
Democrats and Republicans have both exacerbated this divide by 
engaging in party-line voting on judicial nominees and, relatedly, 
by ending the filibuster.113 When Barack Obama was president 
and Democrats controlled the Senate, Democrats broke a 
Republican logjam on lower court nominees by ending the 
filibuster for such nominees.114 When Republicans gained control, 
they blocked Obama’s Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland 
by claiming that the 2016 election should decide who appoints 
the next Supreme Court Justice.115 And after Democrats 
filibustered Trump nominee Neil Gorsuch, the majority 
Republican Senate ended the filibuster of Supreme Court 
nominees and confirmed Gorsuch on a near party line vote.116
to informal political bargaining. See Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information 
Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 110, 130–32 (1996).
112 See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization 
Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 301 (2017).
113 Id. at 323–25. 
114 Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters 
on Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/ 
2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0fd2ca728e67c_story.html?utm_term=5cf247d3b95a
[http://perma.cc/GJ4F-AZDA].
115 Mitch McConnell & Chuck Grassley, McConnell and Grassley: Democrats 
Shouldn’t Rob Voters of Chance to Replace Scalia, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mcconnell-and-grassley-democrats-shouldnt-rob-
voters-of-chance-to-replace-scalia/2016/02/18/e5ae9bdc-d68a-11e5-be55-2cc3c1e4b76b_story.
html?utm_term=.b97a5e7c3539 [http://perma.cc/F6KX-9PXB].
116 Russell Berman, Republicans Abandon the Filibuster to Save Neil Gorsuch,
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/
republicans-nuke-the-filibuster-to-save-neil-gorsuch/522156/ [http://perma.cc/A4LD-9G66].
Senate Republicans also did away with the blue slip (allowing home state Senators to 
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Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that the 
courts—especially the Supreme Court—are increasingly seen 
as another political, partisan institution.117 The Court, as the 
Justices have recognized, must “speak and act in ways that allow 
people to accept its decisions.”118 Indeed, to preserve their 
reputation as a collegial court, most Supreme Court Justices 
have spoken against the politicization of the Judiciary.119
Correspondingly, after the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, the 
Justices committed themselves to deciding cases unanimously 
and to avoid partisan 4–4 deadlocks.120
Judicial resolution of congressional lawsuits cuts against 
these efforts of the Court to preserve its reputation as a court of 
law. For reasons discussed, congressional lawsuits are 
increasingly likely to be seen as partisan. And while some of these 
lawsuits will be filed by institutionalists interested in defending 
Congress’s constitutional prerogatives, it is nonetheless the case 
that judicial rulings on President Trump and the Emoluments 
Clause, or President Obama’s implementation of the Affordable 
Care Act, will both be seen as partisan and will dwarf nonpartisan 
efforts to, say, preserve Congress’s war-making authority. Again, 
it may be that lawmakers or institutional counsel already possess 
block judicial nominees) when then-Senator Al Franken sought to hold up the nomination 
of Seventh Circuit judge David Stras. See Kevin Freking, Senate confirms David Stras for 
Court of Appeals despite Al Franken withholding support, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS
(Jan. 30, 2018, 3:57 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2018/01/30/senate-confirms-david-stras-
for-court-of-appeals-despite-al-franken-withholding-support/ [http://perma.cc/S4JZ-SGYA].
117 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court is a Political Court. Republicans’ Actions 
are Proof, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-
supreme-court-is-a-political-court-republicans-actions-are-proof/2016/03/09/4c851860-e142-
11e5-8d98-4b3d9215ade1_story.html?utm_term=.c21993986959 [http://perma.cc/8B6n-Z3G2].
118 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) 
(plurality opinion). In quoting this language, I do not mean to suggest that the Court does 
or should follow public opinion. 
119 See, e.g., Robert Barnes, The Political Wars Damage Public Perception of the 
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts Says, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/the-political-wars-damage-public-
perception-of-supreme-court-chief-justice-roberts-says/2016/02/04/80e718b6-cb0c-11e5-
a7b2-5a2f824b02c9_story.html?utm_term=.1723d547a198 [http://perma.cc/725G-A48V];
Ryan Lovelace, Sonia Sotomayor Saddened by Perception of Judges as Political, WASH.
EXAMINER (Mar. 10, 2017, 10:42 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/Sonia-sotomayor-
saddened-by-perception-of-judges-as-political/article/2617019 [http://perma.cc/ZUY4-W8FE];
Catherine Lutz, Justice Elena Kagan Talks Power on the Supreme Court, ASPEN INST.
(July 18, 2017), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/ supreme-court-associate-justice-
elena-kagan-power-court/ [http://perma.cc/93MK-DPM4]; Lincoln Caplan, A Workable 
Democracy, HARV. MAG. (Mar.–Apr. 2017), http://harvardmagazine.com/2017/03/a-workable-
democracy [http://perma.cc/7LTC-2TBX].
120 See Adam Liptak, Rulings and Remarks Tell Divided Story of an 8-Member 
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/ 
us/politics/rulings-and-remarks-tell-divided-story-of-an-8-member-supreme-court.html; 
Adam Liptak, A Cautious Supreme Court Sets a Modern Record for Consensus, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/us/politics/supreme-court-
term-consensus.html.
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constitutional standing to bring such suits. Nonetheless, party 
polarization cuts against the bringing of those lawsuits and is 
reason for the courts to move cautiously before expanding 
congressional standing.121
In arguing against congressional standing, I understand full 
well that I am embracing presidential unilateralism. As Justice 
Jackson wrote in the Steel Seizure case, “[t]he tools belong to the 
man who can use them.”122 Congress is not likely to use its tools; it 
is naturally disinclined to stand up for institutional prerogatives 
and party polarization further cuts against Congress asserting its 
prerogatives. Nonetheless, the courts should not seek to prop 
Congress up by intervening in cases where standing is not clearly 
established. Today’s Congress is a cacophony of competing sound 
bites by Democrats and Republicans. Amicus curiae filings by 
lawmakers and institutional counsel provide an appropriate 
vehicle for the expression of the myriad interests of lawmakers 
and political parties. Congressional lawsuits are not such a 
vehicle; those lawsuits further expose partisan rifts in Congress 
and are potentially harmful to the courts’ institutional standing. 
121 The courts are generally reluctant to intervene and look for ways to avoid tackling 
the merits in these disputes. Indeed, federal courts often seek end-runs where they do 
not have to rule on standing. This is true of information access disputes. See
Complaint, supra note 109. It is also true of ongoing litigation regarding the 
appropriations power—where the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals is holding the case in 
abeyance (starting December 5, 2016) rather than ruling on the lower court’s standing 
determination. In this litigation, the House and Trump administration both support the 
D.C. Circuit’s action. See Timothy Jost, Parties Ask Court to Keep Cost Sharing Reduction 
Payment Litigation on Hold (Updated), HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 21, 2017), 
http://healthaffairs.org/ blog/2017/02/21/parties-ask-court-to-keep-cost-sharing-reduction-
payment-litigation-on-hold/ [http://perma.cc/2QUV-XPXE].
122 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
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State Standing to Constrain the President 
F. Andrew Hessick* and William P. Marshall** 
Ambition, as it turns out, has not been able to counteract 
ambition.1 Or at least this has been true when the ambition that 
was supposed to be countered was that of the President of the 
United States and the institution doing the countering was the 
United States Congress. Presidential ambitions now consistently 
overwhelm those of the Congress with the result that the power 
of the presidency has now become far greater than the framers 
may have imagined—both in absolute and in relative terms.2 As 
far back as 1952, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
Justice Jackson observed that the president “exerts a leverage 
upon those who are supposed to check and balance his 
power which often cancels their effectiveness.”3 Subsequent 
developments have only served to increase the president’s 
leverage since that time.  
Perhaps because it has recognized this reality, the Supreme 
Court in recent years has become notably less sympathetic to the 
notion that it should defer to the vagaries of the political 
wrangling between Congress and the Executive.4 Consequently, 
the Court has become more active in reviewing separation of 
powers disputes.5 This does not mean the Court always rules 
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. 
** Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. We’d like to thank 
Tom Campbell for his helpful suggestions. Thanks also to Josh Roquemore for his 
research assistance. 
1 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
2 See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725,
1816–18 (1996). 
3 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653–54 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
4 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196–97 (2012) (rejecting 
the argument that recognition of foreign sovereigns is a political question not subject to 
judicial review) [hereinafter Zivotofsky I]; see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) 
(per curiam) (resolving dispute about presidential electors instead of leaving the matter to 
Congress as prescribed by Article II). 
5 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015) (holding 
that the legislature cannot infringe on the president’s sole power to recognize other 
sovereigns and nations) [hereinafter Zivotofsky II]; see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. 
Ct. 2550, 2556–57 (2014) (ruling that the president exceeded his authority by appointing 
a member to the National Labor Relations Board under the Recess Appointments Clause). 
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against the Executive.6 In fact, many of the Court’s recent cases 
have upheld the exercise of federal executive power against 
separation of powers challenges.7 It does mean, however, that the 
Court has rejected the premise that political processes alone can 
protect against separation of powers encroachments. The Court, 
in short, has sent the message that it is ready to actively police 
structural constitutional issues.8
Against this background, it may not be surprising that there 
is a new sheriff in town aiming to challenge the exercise of 
federal executive power in the federal courts. Or, rather, there 
are new sheriffs. In recent years, state attorneys general have 
become increasingly more aggressive in seeking to patrol federal 
executive action. During the Obama Administration, for example, 
some state attorneys general instituted a series of cases, brought 
on behalf of their home states, challenging federal action in the 
areas of immigration9 and environmental protection.10 Since 
President Trump took office, other state attorneys general have 
filed actions against specific directives of his administration, 
most notably in the immigration area.11 All signs suggest that 
6 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488, 2495–96 (2015) (ruling in favor of the 
Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) interpretation of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), 
which would allow a tax credit for those enrolled in either a Federal Exchange or State 
Exchange, despite the ACA’s seemingly clear language limiting the tax credit for those 
enrolled in State Exchanges). 
7 See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2096 (holding that the president has the sole power 
to recognize other sovereigns); see also Dep't of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 
1225, 1233 (2015) (remanding a nondelegation challenge to Amtrak rulemaking). 
8 See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2096; Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2577; see also
Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1523 (2013) 
(criticizing the Court’s willingness to resolve structural constitutional disputes); Rachel E. 
Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the 
Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 336 (2002) (arguing the Court is 
more willing to rule on structural matters). 
9 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (twenty-
three Republican state attorneys general, three Republican governors whose attorneys 
general were Democrat, and one Republican governor filed suit against the United States 
to challenge the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent 
Residents (“DAPA”) initiative). But see Brief of the Amicus States of Wash., Cal., Conn., 
Del., Haw., Ill., Iowa, Md., Mass., N.M., N.Y., Or., R.I., and Vt., and D.C., in Support of 
Motion to Stay District Court Preliminary Injunction at 1–2, Texas v. United States, 809 
F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-40238), 2015 WL 1285125, at *2–3 (fourteen Democratic 
attorneys general for fourteen states and the District of Columbia filed briefs in support of 
the United States’ amnesty policy). 
10 See Brief for Petitioners at 1–2, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. Nov. 26, 2014) 
(No. 14-1146) , 2014 WL 6687575, at *6 (twelve Republican attorneys general filed briefs 
against the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in response to increased regulation 
of coal power plants). But see Final Brief for State Intervenors in Support of Respondent 
at 10, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. Mar. 4, 2015) (No. 14-1146), 2015 WL 926748, at 
*6–7 (eleven Democratic attorneys general and the District of Columbia filed in support of 
the EPA’s increased regulation measures). 
11 All briefs filed by state attorneys general—both in opposition and in support of the 
travel ban executive order—were done so strictly along party lines. See, e.g., Motion for 
Leave to File and Brief for N.Y. et al. as Amici Curiae in Opposition to Petitioners’ Stay 
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this trend of state attorneys general challenging exercises of 
presidential power will continue.12
These state attorneys’ general suits face a critical threshold 
barrier: standing to challenge federal executive power. Do the 
states have such standing and, if so, under what circumstances 
may they do so? This issue was central in Texas v. United States,
a case in which the Fifth Circuit found that Texas had 
standing.13 The question was ultimately left unresolved by the 
United States Supreme Court when the Fifth Circuit decision 
was affirmed by an equally divided Court.14
This essay examines the issue of state standing to constrain 
presidential power. Part I reviews why presidential power has so 
drastically expanded since the Founding. It further discusses 
why Congress has not been up to the task of checking the 
president and why expanded state standing might be a useful 
vehicle to constrain executive power. Part II canvasses the 
existing case law regarding state standing to challenge federal 
executive action and specifically includes recent cases brought 
against the Obama and Trump Administrations. Part III 
demonstrates how courts have found states to have standing to 
challenge federal executive action, but also discusses how the 
scope of that right is not yet clear. Part III(A) discusses why 
states might be appropriate parties to bring actions challenging 
federal executive power, including their role in diffusing power 
Application at 3, Trump v. Hawai’i, 138 S. Ct. 42 (2017) (No. 16-1540), 2017 WL 3049332, 
at *5 (New York, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and 
D.C. filed as amicus curiae in support of Hawaii’s action); see also Profiles in Courage,
DEMOCRATIC ATTORNEYS GENERAL ASSOCIATION, http://democraticags.org/profiles-2/ 
[http://perma.cc/MUC2-65YC] (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) (showing every state attorney 
general in the aforementioned brief who opposed both the current administration’s travel 
ban and climate change deregulation are Democrat); Motion for Leave to File and Brief 
for Tex. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners and their Stay Application at 1,
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project (2017) (No. 16-1436), 2017 WL 2533119, at *4 
(Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia, 
and the Governor of the State of Mississippi filed as amicus curiae in defense of the 
administration’s executive order); see also Meet the Attorneys General, REPUBLICAN
ATTORNEYS GENERAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.republicanags.com/meet_the_ags 
[http://perma.cc/69TD-XXFN] (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) (showing every state attorney 
general in the aforementioned brief who supported the travel ban executive order 
are Republican). 
12 See Juliet Eilperin, NYU Law Launches New Center to Help State AGs Fight 
Environmental Rollbacks, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/politics/nyu-law-launches-new-center-to-help-state-ags-fight-environmental-rollbacks/ 
2017/08/16/e4df8494-82ac-11e7-902a-2a9f2d808496_story.html?utm_term=.a7c7b3e8b7b9 
&yoyolxmi [http://perma.cc/UY2P-MQAT] (reporting that Bloomberg Philanthropies 
funded a center to help state attorneys general bring environmental actions against the 
United States). 
13 Texas, 809 F.3d at 155–56. 
14 Texas v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016). 
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within the federal system. Part III(B) offers some reservations, 
such as the fact that the states’ motivations in maintaining these 
suits may be based more on partisan interests than on structural 
concerns with constraining the federal executive. Part IV 
proposes that states should enjoy a modicum of liberalized 
standing by allowing a more generous construction of injury-in-
fact as applied to them than would be applied to other entities. It 
suggests, however, that even this modest grant of standing 
should be subject to further prudential review in light of the 
potential problems that state standing engenders. Part V offers a 
brief conclusion. 
I. THE EXPANDING POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY
As numerous participants in the Symposium have noted, 
presidential power has expanded exponentially since the 
Founding.15 There are many reasons for this expansion.16 Some 
are simply the unavoidable effects of forces inherent in modern 
government dynamics. For example, as Justice Jackson observed 
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the fact that the 
office of the president has a unique hold on public and media 
attention means that in “drama, magnitude and finality” its 
decisions far overshadow those of any other.17 In addition, the 
need for modern government to respond quickly to national crises 
necessarily invests power in the presidency because only that 
institution has the ability to act expeditiously.18 The growth of 
the administrative state19 and the power of the armed forces has 
inevitably empowered the president, who stands at the head of 
15 See Randy Beck, Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam
Legislation, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 41–42 (2018) (discussing a shift and rebalancing of power 
from the legislative to the executive branch); Gary Lawson, Representative/Senator
Trump?, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 115–19 (2018) (demonstrating how executive branch’s power 
has expanded through subdelegation of legislative authority); Sanford Levinson & 
Mark A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian Presidents: Constitutional 
Interpretation in a Broken Constitutional Order, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 168 (2018) (noting 
the large power of the “[c]ontemporary” president); see also Tom Campbell, Executive
Action and Nonaction, 95 N.C. L. REV. 553, 555–56 (2017) (noting expansions of 
executive power). 
16 See William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably 
Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 507–19 (2008); see also Flaherty, supra
note 2, at 1816–19; Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential 
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 125 (1994) (“Now, it is the President [instead of 
Congress] whose power has expanded and who therefore needs to be checked.”). 
17 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
18 See Flaherty, supra note 2, at 1806. 
19 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 587 (1984) (describing the degree to 
which administrative agencies are centrally managed by the president). 
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both the Executive Branch and the military.20 The president has 
unique access to and control over information in a world where 
information is power.21
Other factors have contributed to this expansion. Presidents, 
for example, are able to build upon the collective actions of their 
predecessors in justifying their own actions—creating a one-way 
ratchet that consistently expands presidential power from 
administration to administration.22 The legal limits on 
presidential power are defined in the first instance by the 
president’s own appointees in the Justice Department23 who, 
even if committed to providing objective legal advice, are often 
predisposed to finding ways in which the president can further 
his agenda.24 Finally, presidents are interested in building 
legacies and they well understand that history judges leaders by 
their actions and not by their forbearance. They are therefore 
constantly exploring new avenues and methods to get things 
done.25 After all, the last president celebrated for not exercising 
power may very well be George Washington and his decision not 
to run for a third term.26
Another key reason why presidential power has so 
drastically expanded rests not with the presidency but with 
20 See also Norman C. Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 83 DENV. U. L.
REV. 335, 338 (2005) (discussing presidential control of the military). 
21 See Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for 
Control of Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 737 (2002).
22 See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the 
First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1458–60 (1997); see also John Yoo, 
Jefferson and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 421, 429–30 (2008).
23 See LUTHER A. HUSTON, ARTHUR S. MILLER, SAMUEL KRISLOV & ROBERT D. DIXON,
JR., ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (1968). 
24 See GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF 
JAPANESE AMERICANS 103, 107 (2001) for a discussion about how the ability (and 
motivation) of the attorney general to challenge a president is likely to be particularly 
diminished in times of crisis. The most famous documented example of this involves 
Attorney General Francis Biddle and the evacuation of Japanese Americans during World 
War II. Although Biddle had considerable doubts as to the constitutionality of the 
evacuation order, he ended up dropping his opposition in the face of military objections 
and a president who had, nonetheless, decided to go through with the action. See id.
25 President Bush, for example, was particularly aggressive in claiming that he had 
inherent powers that justified his taking unilateral actions on key matters. See Bush Says 
He Signed NSA Wiretap Order, CNN (Dec. 17, 2005, 8:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2005/POLITICS/12/17/bush.nsa [http://perma.cc/9Y44-LF7H]. President Obama, in turn, 
relied on his expansive reading of statutes to support his unilateral decisions. See Charlie
Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us/politics/shift-on-executive-powers-let-obama-
bypass-congress.html?mcubz=3.
26 See Rufus King, Personal Memorandum (May 3, 1797), in 3 THE LIFE AND 
CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING: COMPROMISING HIS LETTERS, PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL,
HIS PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, AND HIS SPEECHES 545, 545 (Charles R. King ed., 1896). 
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Congress.27 An effective system of separation of powers requires 
Congress to protect its institutional prerogatives to check the 
Executive. Yet the relationship between Congress and the 
president has become instead, in the words of Darryl Levinson 
and Richard Pildes, separation of parties.28 Members of Congress 
see their primary role as advancing the interests of their party 
and not protecting Congress’s institutional prerogatives.29
This dynamic has reduced the power of Congress and 
increased the power of the president. When the same party holds 
Congress and the presidency, congressional majorities often 
stand behind their president even when doing so might diminish 
their own institution’s authority, a practice that directly serves to 
expand presidential power. Less obviously, even when there has 
been a divided government, the dynamic of hyper-partisanship 
has indirectly led to increased presidential power. In times of 
divided government, of course, Congress is motivated to attempt 
to check the president because it is in its partisan interests to 
do.30 Yet presidents have become adept at characterizing this 
resistance as Congress not doing its job to justify exercising 
executive power unilaterally. They have thus been able to turn 
congressional efforts to block their agenda into a mechanism for 
enhancing their own powers.31 Congress, meanwhile, has had no 
effective response. 
In contrast to Congress, one institution that has been able to 
block the president thus far is the Supreme Court. In cases such 
as Youngstown,32 United States v. Nixon,33 and the war-on-terror 
decisions,34 the Court has imposed important limits on the 
Executive. Equally important, even in cases in which the 
27 See Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of 
Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2222 (2013). 
28 Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2329–30 (2006). 
29 See Jeff Flake, My Party is in Denial About Donald Trump, POLITICO MAG. (July 
31, 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/31/my-party-is-in-denial-about-
donald-trump-215442 [http://perma.cc/UX7H-RPBY] (condemning both parties for blindly 
engaging in partisan behavior). 
30 See Franita Tolson, The Union as a Safeguard Against Faction: Congressional 
Gridlock as State Empowerment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2267, 2267–68 (2013) 
(describing an instance where Republican senators blocked a veteran jobs bill to prevent 
President Obama from signing beneficial legislation before the 2012 election). 
31 See William P. Marshall, Warning: Self-Help and the Presidency, 124 Yale Online 
L.J. F. 95 (2014); William P. Marshall, Actually We Should Wait: Evaluating the Obama 
Administration’s Commitment to Unilateral Executive-Branch Action, 2014 UTAH L. REV
773, 786 (2014). 
32 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). 
33 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).  
34 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536–37 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557, 646 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 794 (2008).
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president has prevailed, the Court has indicated it is fully willing 
to subject exercises of presidential power to judicial review.  
Courts can hear cases only when parties have requisite 
standing. This means that presidential actions may be able to 
escape judicial review because of standing limitations. For 
example, if the lower courts had not granted standing to Texas to 
challenge President Obama’s Dreamers initiative, which declared 
a policy of not enforcing immigration laws against a large class of 
immigrants, then it is likely no party would have been able to 
maintain that suit.35 To establish standing to challenge a policy, 
an individual must show he suffered an injury in fact because of 
that policy.36 The Dreamers policy of not enforcing the law does 
not obviously injure anyone; instead, it confers a benefit on the 
immigrants covered by it. Giving the states standing to sue, 
therefore, may be the only way through which a president’s 
actions can be subject to judicial scrutiny. The next sections 
accordingly examine the current law governing state standing 
and discuss whether the scope of state standing should be 
adjusted so as to provide an additional check on the expansion of 
presidential power. 
II. STATE STANDING TO SUE THE EXECUTIVE UNDER CURRENT
LAW
A. The Law of State Standing 
State suits against the president and other federal executive 
officials seeking to force compliance with the Constitution and 
federal law invariably raise questions of Article III standing.37
Standing is one of the various doctrines that implement the 
“cases” and “controversies” provision in Article III.38
Ordinarily, to have standing, a person must demonstrate 
that he has suffered, or is imminently about to suffer, an 
“injury in fact.”39 That injury must be to a “legally protected 
35 Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 781, 786 (2013). 
36 See WRIGHT, ET AL., infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
37 Although the most heavily litigated, standing is not the only obstacle states face in 
suits against federal actors. For example, states must also demonstrate their claim is ripe 
and not moot. Although the United States and its officials also enjoy sovereign immunity 
in suits by states, Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 
280 (1983), section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act waives that immunity for 
suits seeking non-monetary damages against an “officer or employee” of the United 
States. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Accordingly, so long as a suit does not seek damages, sovereign 
immunity should not be an obstacle to state suits against federal officials. 
38 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
39 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). 
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interest”—for example, the interest against unwanted physical 
harm—and it must be “concrete and particularized.”40 The injury 
must also be “fairly traceable” to the actions of the defendant, 
and it must be susceptible to “redress[] by a favorable decision.”41
Individuals who fail to satisfy these requirements cannot 
maintain suit in federal court.42
But for states, things are different. States can establish 
standing by demonstrating an injury to the same sort of interests 
held by private individuals such as the interest in holding 
property. But because they are sovereigns, states also have 
sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests, and the violation of 
those interests can also support standing.43 Thus, states have 
broader potential standing than private individuals.44
A state’s sovereign interests include its interests in enforcing 
its criminal and civil laws. States can sue to enforce these 
sovereign interests even when they do not suffer an injury in 
fact.45 A state has standing, for example, to prosecute Dan for 
assaulting Vicky in violation of state law, even though the 
assault does not hurt the state.46 For similar reasons, states have 
sovereign standing to defend their laws against challenges that 
the laws are unconstitutional or preempted,47 and they have 
standing to challenge federal laws pressuring the states to 
change their laws.48
A state’s quasi-sovereign interests are less well defined.49
They include the state’s interest “in the well-being of its 
populace,”50 such as by protecting its residents from pollution,51
reducing unemployment in the state,52 preserving wildlife in the 
state,53 and ensuring that the state is “not . . . discriminatorily 
40 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).  
41 Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61(1992). 
42 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102–03 (1998). 
43 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). 
44 Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 689, 695 (2004).
45 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 136 (1986) (finding state standing based on the 
“interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes”). 
46 See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 392
(1995) (finding there is no standing problem when a state “prosecutes criminal and civil 
actions under its own laws in its own courts”).
47 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137. 
48 See West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 868 (finding state standing to challenge 
federal regulation requiring states to adopt new standards or to accept federal standards). 
49 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 13A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3531.11 (2d ed. 1984) (describing quasi-sovereign interests as “admittedly vague”). 
50 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982). 
51 Id. at 604–05. 
52 Id. at 608 (finding parens patriae standing to reduce unemployment). 
53 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923) (noting “the quasi sovereign 
right of the State to regulate the taking of wild game within its borders”). 
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denied its rightful status within the federal system.”54 States 
have parens patriae standing—so-called because a state 
asserting these interests is seeking to protect its residents and 
resources—to vindicate these quasi-sovereign interests. 
B. State Suits against the Federal Executive 
States’ standing in suits against the federal government, 
however, is more complex. Although states have standing to 
vindicate sovereign interests and parens patriae standing to 
vindicate quasi-sovereign interests in other contexts, neither 
form of standing provides a sound basis under current doctrine to 
sue federal officials to force compliance with a federal statute or 
the Constitution. States do not have a sovereign interest in 
federal compliance with a federal statute or the Constitution.55
Federal law and the Constitution are not state law. Although 
states must enforce federal and constitutional law, it is because 
those laws trump state laws. The violation of federal law 
accordingly does not inflict injury on a state’s sovereignty. It is 
only if that violation also happens to violate, or interfere with, 
state law that a state suffers a sovereign injury supporting 
sovereign standing.56
States also likely do not have parens patriae standing to sue 
the president to force him to comply with federal law or 
the Constitution. This is not because states do not have a 
quasi-sovereign interest in ensuring that their residents are 
governed by a law abiding federal government. They do. The 
failure of the federal government to obey federal law can 
threaten a state’s property, resources, stability, and population. 
Rather, the problem is that, according to the Supreme Court, 
states cannot assert those interests of its citizens against the 
United States.57
The reason is that the point of a parens patriae suit is to 
allow a sovereign to protect its citizens, and the citizens of a state 
are also citizens of the United States.58 According to the Court, 
the United States has the primary responsibility of managing the 
federal government and ensuring its compliance with federal 
54 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 607. 
55 Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
851, 886–87 (2016). 
56 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–25 (1966) (upholding state’s 
standing to enforce state law against Attorney General).  
57 Michigan v. EPA, 581 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A] State may not use 
[parens patriae] to sue the United States.”). 
58 Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923). 
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law.59 Therefore, states cannot sue the federal government as 
parens patriae to protect state citizens from unconstitutional acts 
of the federal government.60 For example, in Massachusetts v. 
Mellon, the Court held that Massachusetts lacked parens patriae 
standing to challenge, under the Tenth Amendment, a federal 
law giving money to states that took certain measures to protect 
mothers and infants.61
Under this logic, states likely do not have parens patriae
standing to sue the president or other federal officers to force 
compliance with the Constitution or federal law. Such a suit 
seeks to protect state citizens from federal actions that violate 
federal law or the Constitution. To be sure, the suit targets 
executive actions instead of legislative ones, as in Mellon, but it 
is unclear why that distinction should matter. What matters is 
whether the suit challenges the acts of the federal government. 
One might argue the difference is that the suit is against an 
officer and not the United States. That difference, however, 
should not matter as to a state’s parens patriae standing. The 
United States acts through its officers to protect its citizens as 
parens patriae. That is especially true for the president. Article II 
explicitly tasks him with seeing that federal law is enforced.62
Given the difficulties with states establishing sovereign or 
quasi-sovereign standing against the president, it is no surprise 
that courts that have recently found that state standing to 
challenge presidential actions have avoided the sovereignty and 
quasi-sovereignty question, and have instead based standing on 
factual injuries alleged by the states.63 Consider Texas v. United 
States.64 There, the Department of Homeland Security adopted a 
policy of not enforcing immigration laws against a large swath of 
59 Id. (“[I]n respect of their relations with the [f]ederal [g]overnment[, it is] . . . the 
United States, and not the state, which represents them as parens patriae, when such 
representation becomes appropriate; and to the former, and not to the latter, they must 
look for such protective measures as flow from that status.”). 
60 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (“Nor does a State have standing as the parent of its 
citizens to invoke these constitutional provisions against the Federal Government.”); 
accord Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 18 (1927); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, at 
§ 3531.11.1 (“[I]t is settled that a state cannot appear as parens patriae to assert 
the rights of its citizens to be protected against unconstitutional acts of the 
federal government.”). 
61 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 486. 
62  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
63 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015) (basing 
standing on increased costs from issuing licenses), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. 
Ct. 2271 (2016); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1158–61 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying 
Lujan factors in analyzing state standing based on alleged harm to proprietary interests).
64 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 155–56 (basing standing on increased costs 
from issuing licenses). 
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individuals illegally in the United States,65 deeming these 
individuals to be “lawfully present in the United States.”66 Texas 
and twenty-six other states challenged the policy, claiming that 
the Department’s policy violated the Administrative Procedure 
Act. Texas argued it had parens patriae standing and that it had 
suffered an injury in fact.  
In finding Texas had standing, both the district court and 
the Fifth Circuit avoided the question whether Texas had parens
patriae standing. Instead, they concluded that Texas had 
suffered an adequate injury in fact. The courts pointed out that, 
because Texas law authorizes lawfully present individuals to 
obtain a Texas drivers license, Homeland Security’s policy 
expanded the number of individuals eligible for Texas licenses, 
and Texas would incur costs in issuing these licenses. According 
to the courts, these costs supported Texas’s standing, even 
though Texas could have eliminated those costs by amending 
Texas law to bar those immigrants from obtaining licenses.67
The Ninth Circuit took a similar approach in Washington v. 
Trump.68 There, Washington and Minnesota filed suit 
challenging President Trump’s Executive Order suspending 
entry of immigrants from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syria, and Yemen. The states argued the policy violated the 
Establishment Clause, Due Process under the Fifth Amendment, 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Foreign Affairs Reform 
and Restructuring Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Tenth Amendment.69
Washington and Minnesota asserted standing based on both a 
violation of their quasi-sovereign interests and an injury in fact 
to their proprietary interests. 
Like the Fifth Circuit in Texas v. United States, the Ninth 
Circuit avoided the question whether the states had standing 
based on their quasi-sovereign interests.70 Instead, the Circuit 
65 Id. at 147 (“In November 2014, by what is termed the ‘DAPA Memo,’ DHS 
expanded DACA by making millions more persons eligible for the program and extending 
‘[t]he period for which DACA and the accompanying employment authorization is 
granted . . . to three-year increments, rather than the current two-year increments.”) 
(citing Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leon 
Rodriguez, Dir. USCIS, et al. 3–4 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [http://perma.cc/U2NJ-2J26]).
66 Id. at 148 (emphasis omitted).
67 See id. at 155–56 (holding the “financial loss[es]” that Texas would bear, due to 
having to grant drivers licenses, constituted a concrete and immediate injury for 
standing purposes). 
68 See Trump, 847 F.3d at 1157–61. 
69 Id. at 1157. 
70 See id. at 1161 n.5; see also id. at 1157 (concluding the States had Article III 
standing based on both proprietary and quasi-sovereign interests).
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concluded the states had suffered an injury in fact. The court 
stated the executive order caused a concrete and particularized 
injury to the states’ public universities by preventing nationals of 
the designated countries from entering the country to join the 
universities as faculty and students.71
III. THE SPECIAL ROLE OF STATES IN SUING THE FEDERAL
EXECUTIVE
A. The Role of the States 
States have a special role in ensuring the federal executive’s 
compliance with the Constitution because of their interest in 
preserving federalism. Federalism defines the boundary between 
the states and the federal government.72 The federal government 
is one of limited powers.73 For example, the Constitution 
empowers Congress to legislate in only a few designated areas.74
States do not face comparable limitations. States have general 
government powers. They may broadly regulate in any area, 
including areas in which the federal government may also 
regulate,75 and they may broadly enforce those laws. 
States have an interest in protecting their domain from 
federal intrusion. That interest is most obvious when the federal 
executive takes actions that directly interfere with matters 
committed to the states.76 An example is the promulgation of 
a rule by an executive agency that regulates completely 
local matters.77
But the states’ federalism interest in ensuring that the 
Executive complies with the constitution is not limited to the 
executive actions that directly invade the province of the states. 
States have a federalism interest in preventing all unlawful 
executive actions, even if those actions do not directly touch on 
an area reserved to the states.78 That is so for two reasons. 
First, states have a political interest in ensuring that the 
president not exercise powers allocated to Congress because of 
71 Id. at 1161. 
72 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999).
73 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000). 
74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
75 But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (the prohibition on states “coin[ing] [m]oney” is an 
example of how the Constitution imposes several discrete limits on state power). 
76 See Grove, supra note 55, at 887. 
77 See id.
78 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of 
Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 462 (2012) (observing that “cooperative federalism 
schemes provide a check on federal executive power” and that “[t]he very growth of 
the federal administrative state has swept states up as necessary administrators of 
federal law”). 
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their better representation in Congress.79 Although the president 
is elected through a nationwide election, he does not represent a 
particular state; he represents the nation collectively. By 
contrast, each state has representatives in Congress who 
can defend their state’s interests. Pushing actions from the 
Executive to Congress thus gives states a larger say in federal 
policy decisions.80
Second, states have a direct regulatory interest in preventing 
unlawful executive action because a declaration that a federal 
executive action is unlawful prevents that action from 
preempting state law or from otherwise affecting how states 
conduct themselves. Consider an executive order that regulates 
interstate commerce. That order does not impermissibly touch an 
area left to the states because the Constitution authorizes the 
federal government to regulate interstate commerce.81 Instead, 
the constitutional objection is that the order violates separation 
of powers because the Constitution commits to Congress, not the 
president, the power to regulate that commerce. But states have 
a federalism interest in challenging that executive order, because 
that executive order would preempt inconsistent state laws on 
commerce. Voiding the executive order removes the possibility for 
preemption and accordingly leaves the states in a better position 
to issue regulations on commerce. 
The same argument applies to executive actions that fail to 
comply with the Administrative Procedure Act and other 
requirements imposed by statute. Those actions can preempt 
state law. Even when they do not preempt, those agency actions 
can influence the way states act—by, for example, administering 
spending programs that condition the disbursement of funds on 
the state’s meeting requirements imposed by the agency.82
Because they interfere with state autonomy, states have a 
79 See Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public Law Litigation in an Age 
of Polarization, at 19 (manuscript on file with authors) (“[I]t’s terribly important for 
federalism that Congress make the laws, not executive actors.”). 
80 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543, 547 (1954). To be sure, especially in recent times, Congress has not been particularly 
effective at policymaking because of gridlock. But that gridlock may be a function, at least 
in part, of the divergent views of states. 
81 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
82 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, When is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action 
on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 82 (2007)
(acknowledging, in the context of environment agency action, that “federal agency actions 
can . . . have preclusive effect” and that “[t]he most straightforward way to encourage 
state activity is to offer financial support for state programs that meet federal 
requirements or to otherwise confer benefits on compliant state governments”). 
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federalism interest in challenging executive actions that violate 
the APA or other statutory procedures.83
This state interest in limiting the federal government to 
protect the states’ prerogatives is a critical part of the 
constitutional design. The principal reason for dividing power 
between state and federal government is to check abuses of 
federal power and to prevent the establishment of a federal 
tyranny.84 The idea is not simply that sharing power with the 
states results in the federal government not having the complete 
authority necessary to establish a tyranny. It is also that state 
officials seeking to protect their own power “stand ready to check 
the usurpations”85 of the federal government. As Madison put it 
in Federalist No. 51, the competition for power between the state 
and federal government ensures that the “different governments 
will control each other[.]”86 The Constitution’s design thus 
contemplates that the states stand as guardians against federal 
overreach.87 All of these interests support enabling states to 
bring suits challenging unlawful executive actions. 
In addition to having these federalism interests, states are 
particularly well suited to bring challenge to executive actions 
because of their democratic accountability. One reason for the 
standing doctrine is to prevent would-be litigants from 
undermining the political process by limiting their access to the 
courts. The premise of our Constitution is that the elected 
branches make policy, and elections are the appropriate 
mechanism to seek to change government policies. Permitting 
individuals to resort to the court to challenge government policies 
short-circuits this political process. Standing seeks to avoid 
this problem by permitting individuals to go to court only if 
they have suffered direct injuries from the government’s 
83 This logic extends to federal executive actions that violate individual 
constitutional rights. A successful challenge to a federal action on the ground that it 
violates a constitutional right promotes federalism by barring federal action that 
preempts state law. To be sure, preventing the federal government from taking actions 
that violate rights would not let states take the same actions, because with only a few 
exceptions constitutional rights equally bar the federal government and the states. Still, 
removing the federal program would leave space for a state to regulate in that area. 
84 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Perhaps the principal benefit of the 
federalist system is a check on abuses of government power.”). 
85 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
86 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 87  A broad argument for state standing could be based on the premise that the 
Constitution should be viewed as a compact among the states. See John C. Calhoun, 
Rough Draft of What Is Called the South Carolina Exposition, in UNION AND LIBERTY:
THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 350 (Ross M. Lence ed., 1992) 
(advocating the state-compact theory of the Constitution). If so, states could arguably 
have standing to challenge all ultra vires federal actions as a breach of contract. Because 
the premise of this argument is so contestable and its potential implications so 
far-reaching, however, we do not advance that argument here. 
2018] State Standing to Constrain the President 97 
actions. Individuals cannot, in other words, base standing on 
generalized grievances. 
Broad state standing does not threaten the political 
processes to the same degree because states themselves are 
political entities. They are unlikely to bring suits that are 
inconsistent with the majority views of their constituency. 
Consistent with this view, states do not face the same standing 
restriction for generalized grievances. For example, unlike 
individuals, states can bring suit to enforce state criminal laws, 
even when the violation of the criminal law does not directly 
harm the state.88
There are also pragmatic reasons why states should enjoy 
broader standing than individuals. Unlike many individuals who 
might bring suit against the federal executive, states are prone to 
take a more deliberative and cautious approach to assessing 
when to bring suit. They are more likely to evaluate the merits 
more carefully to avoid spending their taxpayers’ money on a suit 
that they cannot win. Moreover, unlike many individuals, states 
have the resources to launch and maintain a significant judicial 
challenge to executive actions.89 As with any major litigation, 
pursuing a challenge to an executive action can be an expensive 
affair because of the scope of discovery, the breadth of the issues, 
and the intense motions practice. In addition, more than other 
types of suits, challenges to an executive action turn on 
sophisticated legal arguments that can be made most effectively 
by attorneys that specialize in the relevant field of law. Most 
private individuals lack the resources to maintain this type of 
litigation and to retain specialist attorneys who are more likely 
to prevail on a such a challenge. 
To be sure, states are not the only ones with the interests 
and resources to challenge the federal executive. Congress also 
plays a significant role in constraining the federal executive. Just 
as with federalism, the reason that the Constitution divides 
power between Congress and the president is to prevent either 
branch from accumulating or abusing its power.90 Conferring 
broader legislative standing on Congress to challenge federal 
executive actions would increase Congress’s ability to play 
that role.91
88 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 46, at 392.
89 See Raymond H. Brecia, On Objects and Sovereigns: The Emerging Frontiers of 
State Standing, 96 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
90 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“[T]he separation and independence of the 
coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of 
excessive power in any one branch[.]”). 
91 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 15, at 603, 605 (arguing Congress should have 
broader standing to challenge executive decisions not to enforce the law).  
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Whether Congress should have greater standing to challenge 
the president is beyond the scope of this Article; but there are 
sound reasons to be cautious before proceeding too far down this 
route. The most significant is that broader congressional 
standing could threaten the balance of powers.92 Although 
Congress has largely abdicated its function of checking the 
president, Congress has the potential to be extremely powerful, 
not only because it holds the legislative and other powers, but 
also because it has more direct popular support than the other 
branches of government.93 For this reason, the Constitution 
imposes various limits on Congress’s power. One limitation is 
that the Constitution specifically enumerates Congress’s power. 
Another limitation is that the Constitution prescribes procedures 
that Congress must follow to exercise those powers. For example, 
for Congress to create a law, the bill must pass both houses of 
Congress and be presented to the president for his approval 
before becoming a law.94 Similarly, Article I prescribes a specific 
procedure that Congress must follow to remove a federal officer 
through impeachment.95
Among the various powers given to Congress are a handful of 
tools with which Congress can respond to illegal executive action. 
The Constitution authorizes Congress to enact new legislation, 
bring impeachment proceedings, withhold appropriations, or 
refuse to confirm nominations. Conferring standing on Congress 
to challenge executive actions would add a new weapon to 
Congress’s arsenal for challenging executive action. If Congress 
one day decided to begin using all of its tools for checking 
92 The text of the Constitution does not explicitly answer whether Congress can 
bring lawsuits. On one hand, the Constitution specifically enumerates Congress’s powers, 
such as the power to enact legislation, impeach federal officials, and approve treaties and 
nominations for various federal offices. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 8, 10. One might argue 
that the enumeration of these powers implies that Congress cannot exercise powers not 
specifically enumerated, and bringing suit is not one of the powers enumerated in the 
Constitution. On the other hand, one might argue that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
authorizes Congress to enact legislation conferring standing on itself to challenge 
unlawful federal action. But cf. Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) 
Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 574 (2014) (“Congress may 
not delegate to itself the power to execute the laws.”) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
956 (1983)); see also id. at 577 (finding that “[t]he defense of federal statutes by 
[Congress]” offends the principle that “the Constitution carefully separates the enactment 
of federal law from its implementation, sharply constraining Congress’s role in and 
control over the latter”).
93 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309–10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (“The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and 
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex. . . . [The legislature’s] constitutional powers 
being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the 
greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments 
which it makes on the co-ordinate departments.”). 
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
95 Id. § 3, cl. 6–7.
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executive power, the additional tool of broad standing could 
disrupt the balance of power.96
B. Concerns with State Standing
Although there are obvious benefits in granting states 
standing to bring suits to challenge separation of powers, there 
are some serious concerns. To begin with, even if states are well 
situated as an abstract matter to challenge exercises of federal 
executive power, states, in the abstract, do not file lawsuits. A 
state officer or entity (usually the state attorney general) must 
bring such claims in the name of the states. And therein lies the 
rub. Any ideal of the states acting as platonic guardians standing 
against federal executive excesses needs to be tempered by 
political reality. 
There are often raw political reasons why state attorneys 
general pursue actions against the federal government beyond 
their having serious concerns about the scope of federal executive 
power.97 Challenging a president of the other party leads to its 
own series of rewards.98 State attorneys general can earn favor 
with their constituencies, position themselves for running for 
higher office, and enhance their leadership standing within their 
political party.99 They can raise money for their offices and their 
states in the form of damages and attorneys’ fees, and they can 
raise money for their own political campaigns in the form of 
campaign contributions from supporters pleased by their 
actions.100 They can stop, delay, harass, or hinder the 
implementation of federal policies that they ideologically oppose.
It is therefore not surprising that one must look hard and 
long to find a lawsuit brought by the states challenging the 
federal government that is motivated by deep-founded concerns 
for separation of powers rather than by partisan preference. It 
is, after all, no accident that Republican attorneys general 
led the actions against the Obama Administration and that 
96 Moreover, while the checks provided by the Constitution can be politically costly 
for Congress to use, the filing of a lawsuit is relatively low cost. Expanding congressional 
standing could very well result in members of Congress using only lawsuits, and not the 
constitutionally prescribed procedures, to challenge executive actions. 
 97  To be sure, not all suits by state attorneys general have partisan motivations. See
Lemos & Young, supra note 79, at 25–26 (arguing that business interests and other 
considerations drive some state attorney general litigation decisions). 
98 See generally Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement,
127 HARV. L. REV. 853 (2014) (arguing there are both personal and departmental 
incentives for state attorneys general to score significant legal victories, including 
political and reputational benefits, pleasing state constituencies for reelection purposes, 
and obtaining financial awards that can often be retained by enforcement agencies). 
99 Id.
100 Id.
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Democratic attorneys general prosecuted lawsuits against 
President Trump.101
It was not always this way. For many years, state attorneys 
general worked across party lines to protect state interests;102
including, on occasion, taking actions contrary to their own 
partisan interests.103 No longer. Bipartisanship has become the 
rare exception104 and institutional concerns have become 
subservient to partisan agendas.105 The same polarization forces 
that once undermined Congress’s ability to check the president 
now affect state attorneys general.106
This is not to say a suit filed for partisan reasons is somehow 
illegitimate or cannot have a substantial effect in checking 
against separation of powers abuses.107 It does suggest, however, 
the states may not have such a uniquely pristine role in 
patrolling federal executive action that they can be distinguished 
from other interested parties for the purpose of standing. It also 
suggests that even if states are granted standing, the credibility 
and gravitas of their claims may be diminished,108 thus 
undercutting one of the central reasons for granting states 
expansive standing in the first place.109
Expanded state standing may also bring to the forefront 
another difficult issue—determining who, for the purposes of 
such litigation, is the appropriate officer or entity to represent 
the state. Is it the state attorney general, the governor, the 
101 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text (showing that Republican attorneys 
general and Republican states take action against Democratic presidents, while 
Democratic attorneys general and Democratic states take action against Republican 
presidents); see also Margaret H. Lemos & Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests: 
Attorneys General As Amici, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1251–52 (2015) (showing an overall 
increase in partisan amicus briefs filed by state attorneys general beginning in 
the 2000s). 
102 Anthony Johnstone, Hearing the States, 45 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 20). 
103 Lemos & Quinn, supra note 101, at 1256.
104 See PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND 
NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (2015); see Johnstone, supra note 
102, at 23 (suggesting the turning point of this may have been when then-Alabama 
Attorney General (now Judge William Pryor) created the Republican Attorneys General 
Association).
105 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1090–92 
(2014) (noting that state objections to federal power are primarily based on partisan 
politics and not the protection of state prerogatives). 
106 Id.
107 See Lemos & Young, supra note 79, at 30 (arguing that state litigation with 
partisan motivation still plays the useful role of checking federal power); Grove, supra
note 55, at 897 (rejecting the notion that states should have expansive standing to sue the 
federal government but also noting that partisan motivations can lead “state officials to 
do a better job of representing the State in court”). 
108 Johnstone, supra note 102, at 22. 
109 See supra notes 36–71 and accompanying text. 
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leaders of the legislature, or even citizens who sponsor state 
initiatives? Should state attorneys general have the authority to 
bring such lawsuits on behalf of the state when the legislature or 
the governor opposes such actions? Should the attorneys general 
be required to bring such a claim if the governor or legislature 
presses her to do so, even if she opposes such action? And how, if 
at all, should a federal court hearing such a claim resolve this 
internal issue? Put simply, there is a Pandora’s Box of state law 
issues underlying these lawsuits,110 and federal courts will have 
to insert themselves in the thicket of intra-state divisions of 
power to be able to hear these cases. It is a project, we suspect, 
federal courts might want to avoid.111
Finally, expanded state standing to challenge federal 
executive action also means an expanded role for the courts. As 
discussed above, there are strong positive reasons why courts 
should be more involved in imposing constraints upon executive 
branch action, but also reasons to be cautious. After all, the 
theories that posit that disputes over federalism and separation 
of powers should be resolved by the political processes rather 
than the courts112 presented more than just an abstract 
110 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?: Governors, State 
Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2455–67 
(2006) (discussing cases addressing which state officer represents the state); Joseph 
Kanefield & Blake W. Rebling, Who Speaks for Arizona: The Respective Roles of the 
Governor and Attorney General When the State is Named in a Lawsuit, 53 ARIZ. L. REV.
689 (2011) (discussing the various issues surrounding which state official should 
represent a state and concluding that, for the purpose of unity and clarity, the state 
attorney general should be subservient to the governor in any case involving the state); 
but see State ex rel. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nibert, 744 S.E.2d 625, 642–45 (W. Va. 
2013) (ruling that state attorney generals have common law powers that are not specified 
by statute, despite the fact other courts and legal scholars disagree on this point); see also 
Press Release, Georgia: Governor Lifts Block Against Syrian Refugees (Jan. 4, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/us/georgia-governor-lifs-block-against-syrian-
refugees.html (describing when Georgia’s Governor Nathan Deal rescinded an executive 
order to block the placement of Syrian refugees within his state, after his attorney general 
officially announced that Governor Deal did not have the authority to issue such an order 
in the first place); Press Release, Office of Attorney General Mark Brnovich, Terry 
Goddard Declines to Join Lawsuits Against Federal Health Care Law (Mar. 24, 2010), 
https://groupwise.azag.gov/press-release/terry-goddard-declines-join-lawsuits-against-
federal-health-care-law [http://perma.cc/39PX-8U4J] (describing Democrat Attorney 
General Goddard’s refusal to join the Republican-led health care suit for its lack of merit); 
State ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., No. 3:10–cv–91–
RV/EMT, 2010 WL 2000518 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2010) (in which Republican Governor Jan 
Brewer represented Arizona in a suit when Arizona’s attorney general publicly refused 
to join). 
111 Cf. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959) (holding the 
federal court should abstain in answering the question of whether a city had the power to 
initiate eminent domain proceedings under state law). 
112 See, e.g., JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
263 (1980) (arguing the judiciary should not rule on constitutional questions regarding 
the allocation of powers between Congress and the president); Herbert Wechlsler, The
Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965) (arguing the Supreme Court 
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affirmation of the role of politics as a constitutional constraint on 
the exercise of federal power. They also offered the tangible 
advantage of extricating the judiciary from particularly difficult 
and often highly politicized determinations. Setting a standard 
for when separation of powers is violated consistently presents 
the judiciary with concerns of judicial management, as well as 
with questions of judicial enforceability and the challenge of 
maintaining political capital when issuing politically charged 
decisions. Accordingly, fashioning doctrines that could keep the 
courts out of federalism and inter-branch disputes was attractive 
on a number of counts. As Alexander Bickel taught long ago, 
there are significant benefits that may be gained from a 
modest judiciary.113
The value of avoiding the courts as the arbiters of politically-
laden issues surrounding the scope of presidential power may 
have even greater resonance in the current climate in which the 
dynamics of polarization and judicial selection have infected the 
courts as well as the other branches.114 First, if the courts’ 
decisions regarding the exercise of presidential power are 
motivated by partisan concerns, they will hardly do much to 
constrain the Executive, particularly when the president is of the 
same party. Second, to the extent that court decisions seem to 
reflect partisan preferences, they will undercut the courts’ 
legitimacy.115 Third, even if the judicial system as a whole is able 
to insulate itself against partisan decision-making, particular 
judges may not be so self-constrained. Already, the experience 
with states bringing actions challenging federal action has 
reflected a substantial amount of judge shopping, and there is no 
reason to assume that savvy attorneys general will cease using 
this tactic in later cases. But the potential costs to the national 
interest of a partisan decision by an errant judge could be 
considerable. A single judge, after all, can do significant mischief 
in interrupting presidential actions—even if that action later 
turns out to be perfectly legal. 
must exercise restraint and neutrality, and that there must be limits on its ability to bind 
other branches and the states in its constitutional interpretation).
113 See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (advocating that the Supreme Court use discretion 
to avoid deciding controversial issues); see also Flaherty, supra note 2, at 1828 
(advocating that courts revisit and incorporate Bickel’s notions of “passive virtues”). 
114 See Johnstone, supra note 102, at 3–4. 
115 Id. at 5. 
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IV. RELAXING INJURY IN FACT FOR STATES TO CHALLENGE
EXECUTIVE ACTIONS
What should be clear by this point is that states are 
particularly well positioned to constrain expanding executive 
power. States have a unique federalism interest in ensuring that 
federal executive officers comply with the Constitution and 
federal laws, and they have the resources and sophistication to 
bring successful suits of this sort. At the same time, however, 
there are concerns with granting states plenary standing to bring 
any suit against the Executive. One way to balance these benefits 
and concerns about empowering states to challenge executive 
actions is to relax the injury in fact test for states, but impose 
prudential constraints on standing. Easing the injury in fact test 
would expand the power of the state to bring suit. But it would 
still require states to demonstrate some type of actual injury that 
would ensure that states do not meddle in affairs that truly do 
not affect them. Moreover, continuing to enforce prudential 
limitations, such as third-party standing, would prevent states 
from bringing suits that others are better positioned to litigate. 
Finally, in order to further guard against hyper-partisanship, we 
also propose requiring states to show some level of bipartisan 
support to maintain their actions against the Executive. 
The injury in fact test requires that a plaintiff show he has 
suffered, or is imminently about to suffer, an “injury in fact.”116
That injury must be to a “legally protected interest,” and it must 
be “concrete and particularized.”117 Moreover, the injury must be 
traceable to the defendant and of the sort that courts could likely 
redress through a ruling in favor of the plaintiff.118 Ordinarily, a 
plaintiff satisfies this test by showing a loss of money or physical 
harm.119 However, this is not always the case. Although courts 
purport to apply the same injury in fact test in all cases, in 
practice, different tests apply to different types of cases.120
For example, courts have often relaxed the injury 
requirement for Equal Protection Clause violations.121 Thus, in 
116 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009). 
117 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). 
118 Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61(1992). 
119 But see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (defining injury in fact to 
include injuries to “[a]esthetic and environmental well-being” and “economic well-being”). 
120 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 
1065 (2015). 
121 Id. at 1075 (“[T]he Supreme Court does not always demand a redressable ‘Wallet 
Injury’ to ground standing . . . under the Equal Protection Clause.”); see also Bowen v. 
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618–19 (1988) (the Court notoriously relaxed standing for alleged 
Establishment Clause violations); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure 
of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 328 (2002) (“[T]he Court often waves litigants 
complaining of government support for religious endeavor right past the injury hurdle.”). 
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Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court held that a 
nonminority contractor had standing to challenge a government 
program that gave preference to minority businesses.122 In doing 
so, the Court dispensed with the “concrete” requirement for 
injury and the requirement of redressability because the plaintiff 
could not prove that it would have received any contracts if race 
were not considered.123 Instead, the Court explained the denial of 
the opportunity “to compete on an equal footing” constituted a 
sufficient injury for standing.124
At the other end of the spectrum, courts have been less 
willing to find standing in cases in which the plaintiff challenges 
government actions related to national security.125 In Clapper v. 
Amnesty International USA, for example, the Court explicitly 
indicated the imminence requirement is particularly rigorous in 
suits challenging actions implicating national security.126
Similarly, and more salient to this essay, federalism 
concerns appear to have led to restrictions on standing. Consider 
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.127 There, an individual who had 
previously been choked by police sued the police, alleging he 
might again be subject to a police chokehold.128 The Court denied 
standing on the ground the injury was too speculative. Given 
the Court’s willingness to find standing based on other 
low-probability injuries, one explanation for the denial of 
standing in Lyons is the Court sought to avoid interfering with 
the inner workings of state’s government.129
These decisions show that the rigor of the injury in fact test 
varies depending on certain considerations, such as separation of 
But see id. at 311 (discussing how the Court has not always been so generous with Equal 
Protection standing and listing cases as examples).  
122 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210–12 (1995). 
123 See id. at 211. 
124 Id. (“The injury in cases of this kind is that a ‘discriminatory classification 
prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on an equal footing.’”) (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter, 
Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667 (1993)). For 
other examples of the same analysis, see Ne. Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of 
Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667–68 (1993), and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 n.14 (1978). 
125 F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-of-Powers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L. REV.
673, 725 (2017) (arguing the standing test is stricter for national security cases than 
Equal Protection Clause cases). 
126 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013); see Fallon, supra note 
120, at 1079 (expanding on this point). 
127 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
128 Id. at 97–98. 
129 F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 76 (2012) (“The 
denial of standing in Lyons and the grant of standing in Laidlaw may reflect the Court's 
unwillingness to interfere in the workings of state government.”). 
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powers, federalism, and the type of right asserted.130 When a suit 
raises a challenge in an area that federal courts generally seek to 
avoid, such as national security or the military, the standing 
inquiry is more stringent.131 By contrast, when a suit seeks to 
vindicate rights that federal courts have regarded as particularly 
important, the standing test is relaxed.132
In this light, the injury in fact test should be relaxed when a 
state sues to force executive officers to comply with the law.133 As 
discussed above, states have a unique interest in preventing 
unlawful federal action. Permitting states to protect that interest 
is a fundamental component of the division of power in the 
Constitution. More pragmatically, state officials are prudent 
enough to bring only those suits that matter, that they may win, 
and that they have the resources to argue effectively. They 
accordingly should face a lower standing threshold when 
challenging unlawful executive action or inaction. 
There are a variety of ways to operationalize a relaxed 
standing requirement. One way is to expand the types of injuries 
that suffice for state standing in such suits. For example, one 
could expand state standing to injuries for which the states are 
partly responsible. Courts have said individuals should not be 
permitted to base standing on injuries that are based on 
reactions to federal actions. Thus, in Clapper, the Court held that 
the costs that private individuals incurred to avoid federal 
surveillance was insufficient to confer standing on those 
individuals to challenge the surveillance program.134 But one 
could discard this restriction when states sue the Executive. 
The Fifth Circuit arguably adopted this approach in Texas v. 
United States.135 There, the Republican Attorney General of 
Texas challenged President Obama’s policies deeming various 
types of illegal immigrants to be lawfully present in the United 
130 Id. at 77 (noting that separation of powers, federalism, and docket size affect 
standing decisions). 
131 See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 73 (1984) (“In 
fact the law of standing has become so disjointed that the danger now exists that the 
Court will come to accept it as a manipulable doctrine whose primary value lies in its 
ability to serve nonjurisdictional ends.”). 
132 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 275, 304 (2008) (“The Court has been hesitant to deny standing in cases involving 
the violation of a right that the Court deems particularly important even when the 
plaintiff has not suffered a perceptible injury.”). 
133 See Indiana v. EPA, 796 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2015) (suggesting that even 
though a state cannot sue the United States parens patriae, it should get “‘special 
solicitude’ to sue the United States . . . if a quasi-sovereign interest of the state is 
at stake”). 
134 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 417 (2013). 
135 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd by an 
equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
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States. To establish standing, Texas argued that under Texas 
law, these immigrants could obtain driver’s licenses, and Texas 
would incur costs in issuing these licenses. The Fifth Circuit held 
these costs supported Texas’s standing, even though Texas could 
have eliminated those costs by amending Texas law to bar those 
immigrants from obtaining licenses.136
This is not to say states should always be able to create an 
injury in fact. For example, Texas should not have had standing 
if it enacted its law authorizing immigrants to obtain driver’s 
licenses after President Obama adopted his policies. In that 
situation, federal law would not have forced Texas to incur the 
costs of providing licenses to immigrants because, at that time of 
the adoption of the federal policy, Texas would not have been 
required to provide licenses to immigrants. Rather, Texas would 
have incurred the cost of providing licenses to immigrants 
through its own action of enacting the Texas law against the 
backdrop of the federal policy.
Nor is it fair to say that any federal action that conflicts with 
state law creates an injury in fact sufficient for the state’s 
standing.137 The state must point to some sort of factual effect on 
the state to establish an injury in fact.  
Another way to soften the injury in fact test for state claims 
against the executive is to relax the requirement that the injury 
not be speculative,138 requiring states to show only that there is a 
realistic possibility that they might suffer the threatened harm 
instead of a high probability. This approach finds support in the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.139 There, 
Massachusetts sued the EPA for failing to regulate carbon 
dioxide. Massachusetts claimed it had standing because federal 
law conferred a cause of action on the states to challenge the 
EPA’s decision, and because the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s failure to regulate carbon dioxide would result in global 
warming, which in turn would raise sea levels and erode 
136 See id. at 155–57. 
137 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 268 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(concluding the preemption of Virginia law prohibiting individual mandates by the 
individual mandate provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act did not 
cause Virginia an injury in fact). It may be possible that federal preemption of state law 
creates standing based on the impairment of the state’s sovereign interest, as opposed to 
being based on the state suffering an injury in fact. But we leave that issue for 
another day. 
138 Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); see also Diamond v. 
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66 (1986) (rejecting standing based on “unadorned speculation”); 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975) (denying standing because the plaintiffs had not 
demonstrated a “substantial probability” of harm). 
139 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007). 
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Massachusetts’s land.140 The Court concluded these 
considerations sufficed for standing, explaining when they have 
“quasi-sovereign interests” at stake, states are entitled to “special 
solicitude” in the standing analysis.141 The Court did not explain 
what it meant by “special solicitude.” One might think from the 
reference to “quasi-sovereign interests” that the special solicitude 
referred to parens patriae standing. But that is not so. The Court 
did not base standing on Massachusetts’s role as parens patriae.
Instead, the Court pointed to the factual injury of the erosion to 
Massachusetts’s land.142
Rather than referring to parens patriae standing, it appears 
that the special solicitude the Court afforded Massachusetts was 
to relax the restriction on speculative injuries. The erosion to 
Massachusetts’s land would not occur for decades.143 That distant 
and speculative injury would likely not suffice for standing.144
The Court’s conclusion that the possible erosion did suffice 
suggests that it applied the imminence requirement less 
rigorously. Massachusetts v. EPA thus supports the idea that, 
when a state alleges a quasi-sovereign interest, the standing 
inquiry should be relaxed, even when the state seeks to 
base standing on an injury in fact instead of parens
patriae standing.145
At the same time, we also suggest that even this relatively 
modest proposal of relaxing the injury in fact requirement 
for states should be further qualified. As pointed out 
previously, expanded state standing creates its own set of 
concerns—specifically that many of these actions will be 
driven more by a motivation for political disruption than by a 
true concern with executive branch overreach.146 Some, of course, 
might suggest this is fine—that the use of highly partisan 
attorneys general as a check against highly partisan presidents 
is fully consonant with Madison’s notion of ambition 
counteracting ambition.147 Perhaps. Yet the use of excessive 
140 Id. at 518–22. 
141 Id. at 520. 
 142  Id. at 521–24. 
143 Id. at 541–42 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting the possible loss of land as one 
harm supporting standing in the next few decades). 
144 As the Court explained in Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992), 
the further off in time that an injury may occur tends to make the injury more 
speculative. See id. (stating the “purpose” of “imminence” is “to ensure that the alleged 
injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is ‘certainly 
impending’”) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). 
 145  For other instances in which federal courts have relaxed standing requirements 
for states, see Lemos & Young, supra note 79, at 11–12. 
146 See supra notes 36–71 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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partisanship as a method to reduce the effects of excessive 
partisanship does not seem to be the type of remedy that would 
help combat the polarization that lies at the heart of much of the 
dysfunction that has helped lead to the expansion of presidential 
power in the first place. More directly, the potential risk to the 
national interest engendered by overly partisan attorneys 
general bringing harassment or dilatory actions against the 
executive in front of overly partisan courts is not one that can be 
easily glossed over. 
For this reason, we propose the courts demand some indicia 
of bipartisanship as a prudential matter before relaxing the 
injury in fact requirement for states.148 To be clear, we are not 
suggesting that courts should deny standing if the state meets 
traditional injury in fact requirements.149 But in cases in which 
the injury in fact requirement needs to be relaxed to find 
standing, there should be a showing that the action has some 
measure of bipartisan support to justify the “special solicitude” 
the Supreme Court had indicated may be warranted when a 
sovereign state is bringing the claim.150 Thus, under our 
approach, both the state plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA151
and in United States v. Texas152 would have had to demonstrate 
bipartisan support, since in both cases the injury in fact 
requirement was relaxed.153 In Washington v. Trump,154 on the 
other hand, no showing would have been needed because the 
state readily satisfied injury in fact requirements.155
Anthony Johnstone and Michael Solimine, writing 
separately, have advocated for a similar approach in the context 
of amicus briefs, contending that the Supreme Court should only 
give deference to briefs from the states that reflect some level of 
bipartisan support.156 In fact, the National Association of 
Attorneys General (“NAAG”) already requires bipartisan action 
by attorneys general in order to invoke the authority of the 
states. Its constitution requires that in order for a sign-on letter 
148 This does not necessarily mean more than one state will always be necessary to 
maintain an action. But if one state goes at it alone, it should be required to assert that 
the action has some bipartisan support.
149 E.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d. 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017). 
150 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007); Indiana v. EPA, 796 F.3d 803, 
810 (7th Cir. 2015). 
151 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518.
152 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015). 
153 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518; Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 
155–56.
154 Trump, 847 F.3d at 1158–61. 
155 Id.
156 Johnstone, supra note 102, note at 29–30; Michael Solimine, Retooling the Amicus 
Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 151, 166 n.86 (2016). 
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to become NAAG policy (appearing on NAAG letterhead as a 
result), the letter must have at least the support of thirty-six 
attorneys general (a two-thirds majority of NAAG’s overall state 
and territorial membership).157
These approaches make sense. As Johnstone indicates, the 
requirement of bipartisanship works to assure that the case is “a 
reliable signal of general state interests.”158 Further, because 
such a requirement would force attorneys general to work across 
party lines, it may, in that respect, have the additional benefit of 
helping work against the tide of partisan polarization.159
We also propose the courts should not allow states to 
maintain third-party standing cases absent a showing of cross 
party support. The Court has already held that whether a party 
can sue on behalf of the rights of third parties is a matter for 
prudential consideration.160 Taking steps to assure that a lawsuit 
against the president brought by a state is more than only 
a partisan attack would seem to be a prudent exercise of 
judicial power.161
Finally, state standing should be allowed only upon a proper 
showing that the state officer or entity bringing the suit is the 
single correct party to maintain the action in the federal court. 
As noted previously, various state officials—the governor, 
attorney general, legislators, and even individuals who sponsor 
state initiatives—often dispute who has the authority to litigate 
on behalf of the state.162 Those disputes are exacerbated when 
the officers disagree on the merits of the action. Both the state 
attorney general who thinks the president has violated the 
Constitution and the state governor who thinks that the 
president’s action is lawful may each claim that he alone has the 
power to bring suit on behalf of the state. To avoid the 
embarrassment of resolving a suit against the president 
improperly brought by the wrong state official, federal courts 
should closely examine whether the official bringing the case has 
the authority to do so under state law. If state law does not 
authorize the officer who brought the suit to do so, or even if the 
law is unclear, courts exercise their discretion to deny standing. 
Dismissing on that ground would prevent unnecessary conflict 
157 CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS
GENERAL art. VIII, § 2. 
158 Johnstone, supra note 102, at 29. 
159 See id.; Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development 
of Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355, 393 (2012). 
160 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975). 
161 Cf. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004). 
162 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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with the president and avoid deciding many unnecessary 
constitutional questions.
V. CONCLUSION
The vast expansion of presidential power in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries, as well as the possibility of a runaway 
presidency, calls for new ways for thinking about how to 
constrain the Executive. Granting the states standing to 
challenge federal executive action is one avenue deserving 
exploration. Expansive state standing, however, raises its 
own set of concerns—including further exacerbating the 
over-politicization issues that are currently plaguing both the 
state offices of the attorneys general and the federal courts. 
There is thus a legitimate question as to whether liberalized 
state standing may raise more problems than it solves. 
In this essay, we offer a modest solution. We propose the 
states should not have standing to raise purely abstract issues 
but that a more generous notion of injury in fact should be 
applied to them than to other entities. Such an approach allows 
states to maintain actions against the Executive that might 
otherwise not be justiciable. We further suggest, however, even 
this limited grant of standing should be subject to prudential 
review because of the potential problems that expanded state 
standing generates.  
We end with a final word of caution from the opinion by 
Justice Jackson in Youngstown that is cited at the beginning of 
this essay. Although the Court in Youngstown found the 
president’s action in that case to be unconstitutional, Justice 
Jackson’s opinion in that case was not optimistic that the 
decision would effectively constrain the Executive. As he wrote:  
But I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power 
in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its 
problems. A crisis that challenges the President equally, or perhaps 
primarily, challenges Congress. If not good law, there was worldly 
wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that “The tools belong to 
the man who can use them.” We may say that power to legislate for 
emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself 
can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.163
Expanded state standing to challenge federal executive 
action, in short, may be warranted; but it, by itself, will not be 
sufficient to seriously constrain presidential power. The broader 
solutions lie elsewhere. 
163 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952). 
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Representative/Senator Trump? 
Gary Lawson* 
The 2016 presidential election sent many people, including 
many otherwise seemingly sensible people, completely over the 
edge. College and university campuses en masse set up 
counseling services for disappointed students, and I suspect that 
many faculty and administrators probably “used” those services 
at least vicariously. Former friends were ostracized—or, even 
worse, “unfriended” on Facebook—for the heinous sin of voting 
for Donald Trump. Ordinarily sober scholars describe President 
Trump’s election as a symptom of “constitutional rot.”1 At my 
own institution, at a post-election panel on which I participated 
as the faculty’s token knuckle-dragger, student questions 
focused largely on how President Trump could be removed from 
office—several months before he actually assumed that office. A 
list of anecdotes of this kind could go on for quite a while. 
In all fairness to my grieving colleagues and students, I feel 
their pain. A lot of us sucked it up, without any school-provided 
puppies, for the eight years of the Obama Administration, but it 
was a thoroughly miserable time for anyone concerned about 
individual freedom. And although I did not vote for George W. 
Bush in 2000—I voted for Libertarian Harry Browne—I vividly 
remember that, at one brief moment during election night, I 
actually felt physically ill when it looked like the execrable Al 
Gore might ride his fevered fantasies about feverish planets into 
the White House. Presidential elections seem to matter a great 
deal to a lot of people. 
From a constitutionalist standpoint,2 this is something of a 
puzzle. The United States Constitution simply does not appear to 
 * Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law. This article was 
prepared for a symposium sponsored by the Chapman Law Review on “Constraining the 
Executive,” and I thank the editors for inviting me to participate. I am grateful to R.J. 
Pestritto and Joe Postell for helpful suggestions, though they bear no responsibility for 
anything that I say here. 
1 Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot and Constitutional Crisis, 77 MARYLAND L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
2 By “constitutionalist” I mean nothing more linguistically complex than “by 
reference to and in accordance with the meaning of the United States Constitution.” That 
meaning was fixed—at least for the original Constitution and quite possibly for 
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make the president all that important of a figure. To be sure, in 
times of war, the president is commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces,3 but the Constitution gives Congress the powers to 
“declare War,” to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” to 
“make Rules regarding Captures,” to “raise and support Armies,” 
to “provide and maintain a Navy,” to “make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces,” and 
to provide for “calling forth” and “organizing, arming, and 
disciplining, the Militia.”4 Congress actually has most of the 
constitutional war powers–so much so that the Commander-in-
Chief Clause was necessary to foreclose an inference that 
Congress also has the un-enumerated, but implied, power to 
control troop movements.5 Furthermore, while the president’s 
“executive Power”6 gives him7 control over the law enforcement 
machinery, that power is subject to duties to “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed”8 and to carry out executive 
responsibilities in accordance with fiduciary principles.9 More 
fundamentally, executive power is, in all but a very small set of 
contexts, a purely implementational power that comes into play 
only to execute law that is provided from sources external to the 
executive.10 The president can also grant pardons,11 convene and 
adjourn Congress,12 and, with the advice and consent of the 
amendments as well—in 1788, in the sense that the criteria for determining the referents 
of the concepts in the Constitution are determined by the cognitive framework of a 
reasonable reader in 1788. See Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (or: 
Could Fleming Be Right This Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457, 1460–67 (2016); Gary Lawson 
& Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006). 
3 I believe that this authority comes from the Vesting Clause of Article I rather than 
from the more specific Commander-in-Chief Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, which 
states that “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States.” This simply confirms the president’s “executive Power” to command the 
military, but that point is incidental to the present argument. 
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–16. 
5 Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 29–30 (2006). 
6 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
7 The Constitution consistently refers to the president by a generic male pronoun. I 
therefore follow that practice, without endorsing it. 
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
9 For a book-length defense of the proposition that all constitutional powers, 
including the executive power, are fiduciary powers, see GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN,
“A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017).
For an article-length defense of a duty of care on the part of federal officials, and therefore 
of a presidential duty of care in the execution of the laws, see Gary Lawson & Guy 
Seidman, By Any Other Name: Rational Basis Inquiry and the Federal Government’s 
Fiduciary Duty of Care, 69 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
10 See Gary Lawson, Take the Fifth . . . Please! The Original Insignificance of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, 2017 BYU L. REV. 611, 631 (2018).
11 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
12 Id. § 3. 
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Senate, make appointments and treaties,13 but it is hard to see 
how powers of this kind could generate Caesarian nightmares. 
The sum total of constitutional presidential powers is far 
from trivial; the American president is—and always was—a 
formidable constitutional figure.14 But it is not necessarily a life-
altering huge sum either. Even if one believes, as I emphatically 
do, that the Article II Vesting Clause grants the president all 
power that falls within the conceptual category of “executive 
Power,”15 the conceptual lines of the power limit its scope. 
Possessing the “executive Power” does not allow the president to 
take over steel mills unilaterally in order to help a war effort,16
and it does not allow the president to order federal courts to 
dismiss pending cases in order to promote foreign policy goals.17
If one looks at the presidency through a constitutional lens, it is 
hard to see why people would get as emotionally charged as they 
do about who occupies that office. As a matter of original 
meaning, it just would not make that much of a difference in 
most people’s lives. It probably matters more who is mayor of 
one’s city—and perhaps even who is on the local zoning board. 
As a matter of political and social reality rather than original 
meaning, of course, strong reactions to presidential elections are 
more understandable. The modern presidency bears little 
relationship to the office created by the Constitution of 1788.18
Presidents today matter far more than they should if one’s 
touchstone is the Constitution. For one thing, presidents have, 
with the blessing of Congress, assumed powers of at best dubious 
constitutional lineage on everything from uses of military force19
13 Id. § 2, cl. 2. 
14 See generally SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING:
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE (2015). 
15 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 5, at 22–43. For the most powerful rebuttal to 
that position, see Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Constitution’s 
“Executive Vesting Clause”—Evidence from Eighteenth-Century Drafting Practice, 31 
WHITTIER L. REV. 1 (2009). 
16 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (correctly 
so holding). 
17 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675–76 (1981) (not doing quite as well 
as Youngstown, and indeed pretty much making a botch of everything).
18 It is conventional to use 1789 as the starting date for the United States 
Constitution. That is the correct date for when a fully functioning government under the 
Constitution, including a sworn-in Congress and president, first appeared. The 
Constitution, however, became law for the ratifying states on June 21, 1788 (or at most 
shortly thereafter), and at least some important portions of the Constitution were 
effective as of the summer of 1788. See generally Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did 
the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2001). 
19 See Gary Lawson, Inigo Montoya Goes to War, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1355, 1364–67 
(2015) (describing constitutional controversies over the scope of presidential power to 
initiate hostilities). 
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to the unilateral establishment of military governments in 
peacetime within the United States.20 For another thing, federal 
courts have routinely assumed powers far beyond those 
plausibly attributable to the “judicial Power”21 conferred by the 
Constitution. Consequently, the power to appoint federal judges 
has acquired significance beyond anything contemplated in the 
eighteenth century. But most importantly, in modern times, the 
election of the American president effectively elects the federal 
legislature as well. That is because the executive has become, for 
all practical purposes, the legislative department (at least when 
the judicial department chooses not to assume that authority). 
Modern executive action, through regulations, adjudications, and 
enforcement decisions, creates law that often has far more effect 
on people’s lives than the entire mass of congressional legislation 
does. Congress has fostered that development by delegating—or, 
more precisely, subdelegating22—much of its legislative authority 
to the executive department via open-ended statutes that 
essentially instruct executive actors to go forth and do good. A 
great many federal statutes make lawmakers, not laws. As a 
consequence, presidential elections determine far more than the 
Constitution of 1788 ever had in mind. It is no wonder that 
people get so invested in them. 
That level of investment is potentially a bad thing in several 
respects. It is constitutionally bad because it reflects a perversion 
of the constitutional design. It is socially bad if one believes that 
politics should not matter so much that people turn on each other 
for supporting different candidates and policies. And it might be 
intellectually bad because people who care too much about 
something do not always think clearly and logically about it. 
Part One of this essay very briefly catalogues the extent to 
which the American presidency has effectively become the 
American Congress through subdelegation of legislative 
authority. Part Two just as briefly explains why that is a 
constitutional perversion. Part Three suggests, contrary to the 
fears of many who are in the throes of Trump Derangement 
Syndrome, how the Trump presidency may present the best 
opportunity in generations to reverse the trend of subdelegation 
and begin the long process of reining in executive power. 
20 That happened? Yep, that happened. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The 
Hobbesian Constitution: Governing without Authority, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 581, 617–24 (2001). 
21 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
22 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 377 (2014) 
(explaining that the constitutional “delegation” problem is really a subdelegation problem 
because Congress was delegated the legislative power in the first instance). 
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Ironically, the change agent, if any change actually happens, is 
likely to be President Trump. 
In no event do I expect the presidency of 2020 to look 
anything like the presidency of 1788. But for the first time 
in a long time, there is a chance that one might see some 
movement on that front toward, rather than away from, the 
United States Constitution. 
I. “MEET THE NEW BOSS”
The American presidency has grown in power since 1788 for 
many reasons, and it would require someone better versed than I 
in both history and political science to describe and analyze them 
all.23 But one of those reasons obviously dwarfs in magnitude all 
of the others: Congress has essentially designated the president 
as its substitute legislature. The expansion of presidential power 
through subdelegation of legislative authority is so enormous 
that any attempt to restrain executive power that does not 
address the subdelegation problem head-on is like putting band-
aids on Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid after their final 
encounter with the Bolivian police. The federal executive now 
functions as the federal legislature for many, and perhaps even 
most, practical purposes. Federal law, in the modern world, is 
largely an executive construct. The observation is common 
enough to be almost mundane. As Professor Mila Sohoni aptly 
summarized the conventional wisdom: 
Due to gridlock and partisanship, Congress is less able to act as an 
effective lawmaker and hence as an institution that actually authorizes 
and controls agency action. With respect to some statutes . . . , 
Congress has conferred primary custodianship over the shape and 
structure of regulatory schemes on agencies by giving agencies the 
power to waive and alter key statutory requirements. In other 
areas . . . , the accretion of complex statutory schemes and the opacity 
of legislative intent have together produced a system of “de 
facto delegation” that effectively transfers lawmaking power to the 
executive branch.24
23 For an outstanding effort at such an account by someone better versed than I in 
both history and political science, see generally JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN 
AMERICA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
(2017). Professor Postell’s book is an indispensable supplement and, in some cases, 
antidote to Professor Jerry Mashaw’s seminal book on early administrative law. See
generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012). 
24 Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: Agencies, Spending, and Economic Rights,
66 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1701 (2017) (footnotes omitted). 
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Professor Adrian Vermeule put it even more succinctly: “[T]he 
executive and administrative sector of the state . . . often 
overshadows the classical institutions of the Constitution of 
1789 altogether.”25
There is no uniquely correct way to measure the relative 
influence of legislative and executive—and, for that matter, 
judicial—action in the creation of federal law. But even crude 
metrics tell an important story. At the end of 2012, the number of 
pages in the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) exceeded the 
number of pages in the United States Code by a factor of nearly 
four.26 Notwithstanding the numerous problems, vectoring in 
somewhat different directions, with this comparison—the 
Statutes at Large rather than the United States Code is the 
better measure of congressional lawmaking; many regulations 
simply parrot statutory language and thus add nothing to the 
legal baseline;27 gross volume numbers do not convey information 
about relative importance; and an enormous amount of federal 
law is made through executive adjudication rather than 
executive rulemaking, and thus does not show up in measures of 
the CFR—there is something striking about the raw figures 
comparing statutes and regulations. At the very least, it 
constitutes a piece of concrete evidence, if any is actually needed, 
that executive lawmaking is central to modern governance. 
Casual anecdotalism28 sheds further light on the relative 
importance of executive and legislative action in the creation of 
federal law. Two of the most important statutes enacted during 
the Obama Administration—The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act29 and the Dodd-Frank Act30—consume 
thousands of pages of text between them, but they are both 
toothless in important respects until implemented through 
significant regulatory action. As with most modern regulatory 
25 ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 3 (2016). 
26 See Tom Cummins, Code Words, 5 J. LEGAL METRICS 89, 98 (2015). 
27 Such “parroting” regulations could add to the legal baseline if they were given 
deference by courts. But regulations that simply repeat what is said in statutes do not 
receive deference. See Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257–58 (2006). To be sure, 
regulations do not seem to need to differ much from statutory language in order to avoid 
the “anti-parroting” rule of Gonzalez. See Plateau Mining Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety & 
Health Review Comm’n, 519 F.3d 1176, 1192–93 (10th Cir. 2008). 
28 Yes, it is a word. I looked it up. 
29 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
30 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
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statutes, they frequently authorize executive agencies to make 
law rather than prescribe rules of conduct for executive agencies 
to implement. 
Consider, as just one example, some interlocking provisions 
from the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).31 One of the central 
concepts underlying the ACA is the “qualified health plan,” which 
is the only kind of plan that can be sold on the ACA exchanges. It 
is therefore vital under the statute to know what makes a health 
care plan “qualified.” The basic statutory definition of a “qualified 
health plan” is one that “has in effect a certification . . . that such 
plan meets the criteria for certification described in section 
18031(c) of this title.”32 The criteria for certification prescribed 
by section 18031(c) are: “The Secretary [of Health and Human 
Services] shall, by regulation, establish criteria for the 
certification of health plans as qualified health plans.”33 In other 
words, the statute does not establish the criteria but instructs an 
executive official to provide them. To be sure, the statute then 
sets out nine considerations that must be part of that executive 
prescription, but those considerations are basically drivel,34 much 
as were the statutory “constraints” in the National Industrial 
Recovery Act35 or the directions to the United States Sentencing 
Commission in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.36 The ACA 
also makes clear that a qualified health plan must “provide[] the 
essential health benefits package described in section 18022(a).”37
It is anticlimactic to point out that section 18022(a) reads in 
relevant part: “[T]he term ‘essential health benefits package’ 
means, with respect to any health plan, coverage that . . . provides 
for the essential health benefits defined by the Secretary [of 
Health and Human Services] under subsection (b).”38
These provisions are noteworthy in modern times for being 
more specific than one has come to expect from major 
31 For an interesting discussion of subdelegation of legislative authority under the 
Dodd-Frank Act and other securities laws, see Usha R. Rodrigues, Dictation and 
Delegation in Securities Regulation, 92 IND. L. J. 435, 437 (2017). See also Tom Campbell, 
Executive Action and Nonaction, 95 N.C. L. REV. 553, 566 (2017) (noting that the Dodd-
Frank Act contains “398 specific calls in the statute for regulatory agencies, including the 
newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, to issue rules, interpreting 
vague concepts such as ‘unfairness’ by financial institutions, and ‘systemic risk’”) 
(footnote omitted). 
32 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
33 Id. § 18031(c)(1). 
34 See id. § 18031(c)(1)(A)–(I). 
35 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 534–35 (1935). 
36 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374–77 (1989). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(B). The plan must also be provided by a properly licensed 
insurer. See id. § 18021(a)(1)(C). 
38 Id. § 18022(a)(1). 
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congressional legislation. The Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008,39 one of the most famous (or infamous) legislative 
legacies to emerge from the second Bush Administration, handed 
the Secretary of the Treasury three quarters of a trillion dollars 
with which to “purchase . . . troubled assets from any financial 
institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by 
the Secretary.”40 “Troubled assets,” in case anyone wonders, are 
mortgages and “any other financial instrument that the 
Secretary . . . determines the purchase of which is necessary to 
promote financial market stability . . . .”41 Throw on such old 
standards that populate the United States Code as the 
Communications Act of 193442 and the Clean Air Act,43 and one 
can see that much modern legislation does not make law, but 
instead merely designates executive agents as lawmakers.44 The 
president, as the ultimate repository of all executive power, 
thereby becomes the de facto Congress. The president and other 
executive agents make the law. President Trump is thus also, 
over a staggeringly large range of cases, Representative Trump 
and Senator Trump to boot—with no requirements of quorums, 
cloture, or majority votes to stand in the way of his lawmaking. 
To be sure, in the real world it is “other executive agents” far 
more than it is the president who makes the law. The federal 
executive apparatus is so enormous that even the most 
39 Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 
26 U.S.C.). 
40 12 U.S.C. § 5211 (2012). 
41 Id. § 5202 (2012). The subdelegation problem was just one of many constitutional 
infirmities with the Troubled Assets Relief Program (“TARP”). See Gary Lawson, Burying
the Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 57–58 (2010). 
42 47 U.S.C. § 307 (2012) (providing that the Federal Communications Commission 
shall grant broadcast licenses to applicants “if public convenience, interest, or necessity 
will be served thereby”).  
43 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012) (providing that the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency shall set primary air quality standards, “the attainment and 
maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria and 
allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health”). 
44 For a less consequential, but no less legally significant, example, consider the law 
underlying the events in Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). Captain Yates 
threw overboard some undersized grouper that he had caught in the Gulf of Mexico, and 
he was prosecuted for concealing a “tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or 
influence” a federal investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012). The Yates Supreme Court 
decision focused on whether fish were “tangible object[s]” within the meaning of this 
statute, Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1077, but consider for a moment why Captain Yates felt the 
need to throw his fish overboard. What federal statute prescribed the maximum length of 
red grouper for American fishing vessels? There was no such statute; the only relevant 
statute made it illegal “to violate . . . any regulation or permit” issued by the National 
Marine Fisheries Services. 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(A) (2012). For a more detailed account of 
the federal “law”—all stemming from executive regulations—regarding the permissible 
size of Gulf of Mexico red grouper, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 108–09. 
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committed president can control only a tiny fraction of what 
actually goes on within it. Congressional subdelegation thus 
creates an alternative multi-member Congress within the 
executive whose institutional functioning is too complex to be 
captured by any simple analogy. Nonetheless, as a formal matter, 
all executive power is lodged in the president, even if he cannot 
always effectively exercise it in the face of a “deep state” that has 
its own agenda(s). 
Of course, there are serious limits even to this expanded 
executive power, as recent (as of July 2017) events concerning 
efforts to repeal or amend the ACA demonstrate. The president 
cannot simply wave a law into or out of existence. The legislature 
is not irrelevant. But the constitutional role of the legislature is 
not to be “not irrelevant.” It is to make the law, which is then 
executed by the president and other executive agents. Much of 
the time, that is simply not how it works. 
II. “WHY SHOULD I CARE, WHY SHOULD I CARE?”
Is it really a constitutional problem if the president makes 
the law? To ask the question is to answer it, at least as a matter 
of original meaning. Indeed, there are few propositions of 
constitutional meaning as thoroughly overdetermined as the 
unconstitutionality of subdelegations of legislative authority. I 
have spent much of the past quarter century defending that 
claim, and I will not repeat those extensive arguments here 
beyond the brief references in this section. 
One can discern a constitutional principle against 
subdelegation of legislative authority through any number of 
convergent lines of reasoning. The basic principle of enumerated 
powers reserves all “legislative powers herein granted” to 
Congress and thus denies them to executive (or judicial) agents,45
whose enumerated powers do not include the power to legislate. 
A law subdelegating legislative power to the president or an 
executive official would not be “necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution” federal powers.46 To let the president make, 
rather than execute, law would violate the principle of legality 
that has been part of the Anglo-American legal tradition since 
the Magna Carta and that underlies the constitutional idea of 
due process of law.47 And, most powerfully and fundamentally, 
45 See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 180–81 (7th ed. 2016). 
46 See Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 242–67 (2005); Gary Lawson, 
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 345–52 (2002). 
47 See Lawson, supra note 10, at 618–26.
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subdelegation violates the fiduciary principles that underlie the 
Constitution. The United States Constitution is most aptly 
characterized as a kind of fiduciary instrument,48 and the 
background principles of interpretation for the document are 
therefore at least partially defined by the background rules for 
interpretation of eighteenth-century fiduciary instruments.49 One 
of the best-established eighteenth-century fiduciary duties is the 
requirement that agents exercising delegated discretionary 
authority personally exercise rather than subdelegate that 
authority.50 Accordingly, if a fiduciary instrument is to allow the 
agent to subdelegate discretionary authority,51 the instrument 
needs specifically to provide for such authority, at least where 
authority to subdelegate is not incidental to the granted power. 
The United States Constitution contains no specific authorization 
for the subdelegation of legislative—or, for that matter, of 
executive or judicial—power. As Guy Seidman and I have said: 
There is no affirmative grant of power in the Constitution to 
subdelegate legislative authority. The necessary and proper clause, 
the only plausible source of such authority, only authorizes incidental 
powers, and the power to sub-delegate can be incidental only with 
respect to ministerial tasks, or where delegation is necessary in a 
strict sense, or where there was in the eighteenth century an 
established custom or usage of subdelegation. In other words, 
understanding the agency-law foundations of the Constitution 
confirms what textual, intratextual, and structural analysis all reveal: 
Congress may not delegate its legislative power to other actors, be 
they executive agents, judicial agents, state governments, foreign 
sovereigns, or private parties. The rule against subdelegation of 
legislative authority is among the clearest constitutional rules one 
can imagine.52
Outside of governance of occupied territory during wartime53 and 
the constitutionally specified power to make treaties,54 the 
president is not supposed to make laws. That is the job of the 
constitutionally vested legislative authority. The president is 
supposed to execute (and faithfully execute) the laws provided 
by others. 
48 See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 49–75. 
49 See id. at 8–11, 76–78. 
50 See id. at 113–17. 
51 Agents are generally free, absent specification in the governing instrument, to 
subdelegate the performance of ministerial tasks.
52 LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 117. 
53 See GARY LAWSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 47–51 (2004). 
54 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
2018] Representative/Senator Trump 121 
The real question is not whether Congress can subdelegate 
discretionary authority—the short answer is “no.” The real 
question is what constitutes an act of subdelegation. Surely 
Congress cannot subdelegate its formal Article I, Section 7 power 
to vote on bills, but suppose Congress exercises that formal 
power by enacting Article I, Section 7 laws that tell executive 
agents to go find problems and then fix them. Does the 
constitutional anti-subdelegation principle control the content of
the laws that Congress can enact? Does it forbid granting 
executive (and judicial) agents a certain kind, quantity, and 
quality of discretion, even if those grants fulfill the formal 
procedural requirements for constitutional lawmaking? 
Some say no. For example, in the early 2000s, Eric Posner 
and Adrian Vermeuele argued that Congress can only be said to 
subdelegate its power when it transfers its formal authority 
under Article I, Section 7; it can never be said to subdelegate 
when it vests substantive authority in executive agents, no 
matter how open-ended the grant of authority may be.55 I have 
an article-length response to that argument elsewhere,56 and that 
response is both supported and supplanted by subsequent work 
on the fiduciary underpinnings of the Constitution.57 Congress is 
not granted a general legislative power. It is charged with 
specific tasks and given tools with which to perform those tasks. 
Those charges call for the exercise of discretionary authority, and 
in the absence of specific authorization to subdelegate those 
authorities, Congress must exercise those powers itself. Under 
basic fiduciary principles, Congress cannot pass off the exercise 
of those discretionary acts to others, even by enactments that 
follow the form of Article I, Section 7: 
Consider just the structure of Article I, Section 8. Its first seventeen 
clauses contain provisions that give Congress power to perform such 
actions as to “lay and collect,” “borrow,” “regulate,” “establish,” 
“coin . . . , regulate . . . , and fix,” “provide,” “establish,” “promote . . . by 
securing,” “constitute,” “define and punish,” “declare . . . , grant . . . , 
and make Rules concerning,” “raise and support,” “provide and 
maintain,” “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of,” 
55 See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, 
Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331 (2003). 
56 See Lawson, Discretion as Delegation, supra note 46. 
57 See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 107–26. I would be remiss if I did not 
thank Robert Natelson for making me aware of the importance of understanding the 
fiduciary character of the Constitution. My long-time collaborator Guy Seidman saw that 
point before I did, and he pushed me a bit in that direction, but Mr. Natelson’s work is 
what really brought home to both me and Professor Seidman the need to bring fiduciary 
concepts to bear on constitutional interpretation across the board. 
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“provide for calling forth,” “provide for organizing, arming, and 
disciplining,” and “exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases 
whatsoever, over” . . . . Exactly who, in this governmental scheme, is 
supposed to be doing the lion’s share of the laying and collecting, 
borrowing, regulating, establishing, coining, regulating, fixing, 
providing, establishing, promoting by securing, constituting, defining 
and punishing, declaring, granting, making Rules concerning, raising 
and supporting, providing and maintaining, making Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of, providing for calling forth, providing 
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, and exercising exclusive 
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over?58
Just as not everything done by presidents through procedurally 
proper means is necessarily a constitutionally valid exercise of 
“executive Power,” and not everything done by courts through 
procedurally proper means is necessarily a constitutionally valid 
exercise of “judicial Power,” not everything done by Congress 
through procedurally proper means is necessarily a 
constitutionally valid exercise of the various “legislative Powers 
herein granted” with which Congress is vested. The principle 
against subdelegation is substantive, not formal. 
To be sure, the conceptual lines between the constitutionally 
vested legislative and executive powers are not always crisp. It 
does not necessarily violate the Constitution for Congress to pass 
a law that requires some measure of interpretation. Figuring out 
where the executive power ends and the legislative power begins 
“is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry,”59 and James Madison 
drily observed that “[q]uestions daily occur in the course of 
practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, 
and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.”60
That adept-puzzling obscurity, however, did not stop Madison from 
categorically declaring that various powers of government are “in 
their nature . . . legislative, executive, or judiciary.” Nor did it stop 
John Adams from stating that the “three branches of power have an 
unalterable foundation in nature; that they exist in every 
society natural and artificial . . . ; that the legislative and executive 
authorities are naturally distinct; and that liberty and the laws 
depend entirely on a separation of them in the frame of 
government . . . .” Nor did it prevent many state constitutions of the 
founding era from including separation-of-powers clauses that 
expressly distinguished, again without express definitions, the 
legislative from the executive from the judicial powers. Nor did it 
prevent the United States Constitution from basing its entire scheme 
58 Lawson, Discretion as Delegation, supra note 46, at 263. 
59 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825). 
60 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison). 
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of governance on the distinctions among those powers. However 
difficult it may be at the margins to distinguish those categories of 
power from each other, the founding generation assumed that there 
was a fact of the matter about those distinctions and that one could 
discern that fact in at least a large range of cases. The communicative 
meaning of the Constitution of 1788 cannot be ascertained without 
reference to some such distinction, even if legal scholars or political 
scientists (adept or otherwise) find the distinction unhelpful 
or confusing.61
As Chief Justice John Marshall memorably put it:  
The line has not been exactly drawn which separate those important 
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, 
from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, 
and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions 
to fill up the details.62
But wherever and however that line is properly drawn, huge 
swaths of modern law go beyond any plausible boundaries. Going 
forth and doing good pursuant to a statute that instructs the 
executive to go forth and do good is not an exercise of “executive 
Power” under any sensible eighteenth-century understanding of 
that concept, and that simple observation is enough to sweep in 
many of the statutes at the core of modern law. Nor is enactment 
of such a law a valid exercise of legislative power. Congress, 
under the Constitution, must enact laws, not empty collections 
of words. 
This is as good a place as any to respond to a recent critique 
of this argument from Adrian Vermeule. Professor Vermeule 
maintains that “the institutional innovations that appall Lawson 
[such as subdelegation of legislative authority] were themselves 
generated by the very system of lawmaking-by-separation-of-powers 
that he wants to defend. Lawson never comes to grip with the 
problem of abnegation, the brute fact that everything Lawson 
deems inconsistent with the Constitution of 1789 emerged 
through and by means of the operation of that very Constitution, 
not despite it.”63 More broadly: 
We have an administrative state that has been created and limited by 
the sustained and bipartisan action of Congress and the President 
over time; that is supervised and checked by the President as it 
operates; and that has been blessed by an enduring bipartisan 
consensus on the Supreme Court. The classical Constitution of 
separated powers, cooperating in joint lawmaking across all three 
61 Lawson, supra note 10, at 623–34(footnotes omitted). 
62 Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43. 
63 VERMEULE, supra note 25, at 42.
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branches, itself gave rise to the administrative state. When critics of 
the administrative state call for a return to the classical Constitution, 
they do not seem to realize they are asking for the butterfly to return 
to its own chrysalis. If political legitimacy is not to be found in this 
long-sustained and judicially-approved joint action of Congress and 
the President, the premier democratically elected and democratically 
legitimate bodies in our constitutional system . . . and the real complaint 
of the critics is not that the administrative state is illegitimate, but that 
our whole constitutional order is intrinsically misguided.64
This argument rests on a distressingly common error: it conflates 
arguments about textual meaning with arguments about political 
and moral legitimacy. I have in the past made, and am here 
making, no claims whatsoever about the political legitimacy vel 
non of the administrative state, the Constitution in general, or 
any form of governmental organization. As I have said elsewhere: 
I have nothing interesting to say about such matters, and so I choose 
to say nothing about them. Legitimacy is a political and moral 
concept, and I am not a political or moral theorist . . . . To be sure, 
political legitimacy is an important thing about which to think. It just 
is not the province of legal theory, and I would prefer not to venture 
outside that relatively narrow zone of comfort in professional 
academic work.65
My only claim, here and elsewhere, is that subdelegation of 
legislative authority is contrary to the meaning of the 
Constitution. I declare nothing about what any real-world person 
ought to do with that information or how any past, present, or 
future political actors should respond to it.66 And I emphatically 
make no claim that constitutional infidelity is a distinctively 
modern phenomenon. The very first statute enacted by the 
very first Congress was wildly, flagrantly, and knowingly 
unconstitutional.67 So are a great many statutes that have been 
enacted by past and present congresses, signed and enforced by 
past and present presidents, and upheld and applied by past and 
present judges. That is not “hubris.”68 That is empirical fact, as 
all claims of constitutional meaning are claims of empirical fact. 
It may or may not be an intellectually interesting empirical fact, 
depending upon one’s intellectual interests, but it is an empirical 
fact. In other words, in my professional guise, I do not see myself 
64 Id. at 46 (citation omitted). 
65 Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism 
and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1567 (2012) (footnotes omitted). 
66 For more on the oft-elided distinction between claims of constitutional meaning
and claims of political obligation, see Gary Lawson, Originalism without Obligation, 93 
B.U. L. REV. 1309 (2013). 
67 See Gary Lawson, The Constitution’s Congress, 89 B.U. L. REV. 399, 403–06 (2009). 
68 VERMEULE, supra note 25, at 45. 
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as a “critic[] of the administrative state.”69 I see myself as a 
disinterested expositor of the Constitution.70 As a straightforward 
interpretative matter, the Constitution forbids the subdelegation 
of legislative authority, no matter how socially inevitable, 
normatively desirable, or politically legitimate it may be. One can 
certainly elect to choose social inevitability, normative desirability, 
or political legitimacy over the Constitution, but that has no 
bearing on what the Constitution actually says. 
III. “YOU NEED A NEW SONG”
Assuming that one regards unconstitutional subdelegation 
as a problem,71 it is beyond pointless to look to Congress for 
solutions to that problem. Congress created the problem by 
giving away its authority in the first place. Psychologists, 
historians, and political scientists are better situated than I to 
say why this has happened, but some fairly obvious considerations 
come to mind. “By delegating the ultimate decision to an agency, 
Congress can take credit for doing something while dodging the 
blame from disappointed constituents.”72 Realistically, though, can 
this kind of transparent ploy actually work to improve legislators’ 
electoral prospects? Evidently so: “[P]olitical scientists have 
documented the value of ‘credit-claiming’ and ‘position-taking’ in 
legislators’ efforts to maximize the probability of re-election.”73
Moreover, subdelegation has efficiency benefits for legislators: 
“Legislators delegate authority in order to reduce various costs of 
legislating, which allows them to legislate more private goods. 
Stated differently, delegation reduces the legislator’s marginal 
cost of private-goods production[.]”74 It also offers efficiency of 
access for interest groups: By “unbundling” specific items (such 
as energy regulation) from everything else on the legislative 
69 Id. at 23.
70 Of course, anyone who knows me knows that, in my personal rather than 
professional guise, I am emphatically a critic of the administrative state. They also know, 
however, that in that guise I am emphatically a critic of non-administrative states as well. 
I dispute the moral legitimacy of all governments—big, small, state, federal, 
administrative, non-administrative, constitutional, and non-constitutional. That personal 
position has, I believe, no bearing whatsoever on my empirical scholarly claims regarding 
constitutional meaning, which stand or fall on the quality of the observations and 
arguments offered for them. 
71 Because I do not maintain that anyone must so assume, everything beyond this 
point is in the form of a hypothetical imperative. 
72 Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial 
and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 369–70 (2010). 
73 David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative 
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 135 (2000). 
74 Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative 
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 56 (1982). 
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agenda (such as monetary policy, drug policy, and foreign trade) 
it allows parties with concentrated interests to focus their 
attention on institutions (agencies) wholly dedicated to their 
precise area of concern. It is not surprising that Congress and 
those who seek to influence Congress would find subdelegation 
very attractive.75
To be sure, there are occasional token thrusts in Congress to 
gain some measure of legislative control over executive 
lawmaking. The Congressional Review Act, which is part of the 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996,76
provides a mechanism for fast-track legislative cancellation of 
major agency rules,77 and the statute has been employed more 
than a dozen times in 2017 after being used only once in its first 
two decades.78 A version of the so-called REINS (“Regulations 
from the Executive [I]n Need of Scrutiny”) Act, which would 
require Congress legislatively to approve major rules before they 
take effect, has made it farther through Congress in 2017 than it 
has ever gone before,79 though its prospects for ultimate passage 
are dubious. Through all of this, however, the simple expedient of 
passing real statutes instead of vague mush and/or amending the 
old enactments that are really subdelegations masquerading as 
statutes is nowhere on the congressional agenda. Hence the first 
sentence of this section.80
Nor can one plausibly rely on the courts to police legislative 
subdelegations. The Supreme Court’s complete retreat from the 
field of subdelegation is too well known to require elaborate 
summary.81 Liberal and conservative jurisprudes disagree on 
75 For more background on the positive political science literature regarding 
rationales for congressional delegation, see Rodrigues, supra note 31, at 447–49. 
76 Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 
857–74 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of Titles 5 and 15 of the United States Code). 
77 For a brief description of the statute, see LAWSON, supra note 45, at 173–74. 
78 See Stephen Dinan, GOP Rolled Back 14 of 15 Obama Rules Using Congressional 
Review Act, WASH.TIMES (July 22, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/ 
15/gop-rolled-back-14-of-15-obama-rules-using-congress/ [http://perma.cc/Z8G4-HX5A].
79 See Eric Boehm, Rand Paul’s REINS Act Finally Makes It to Senate Floor,
REASON.COM (July 17, 2017, 5:32 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2017/05/17/rand-pauls-
reins-act-finally-makes-it-to [http://perma.cc/BK83-85E8].
80 Cf. VERMEULE, supra note 25, at 9 (“Congress episodically rouses itself to enact 
framework statutes intended to constrain executive power in a global way . . . . But these 
statutes are mostly dead letters, for the spasm of congressional resolve that leads to their 
enactment is not sustained over time.”). 
81 See Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, supra note 46, at 328–29 (“After 
1935, the Court has steadfastly maintained that Congress need only provide an 
‘intelligible principle’ to guide decisionmaking [sic], and it has steadfastly found 
intelligible principles where less discerning readers find gibberish.”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (“[T]he conventional 
[delegation] doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”). To be 
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many things, but they have found common cause—or, more 
precisely, an overlapping consensus—in capitulation to 
congressional desire to subdelegate its authority. Some Justices 
fly the flag of surrender because, on policy grounds, they want to 
grease the wheels of the administrative state. As a near-
unanimous Supreme Court said with admirable candor (if 
perhaps less admirable lack of regard for law): “[I]n our 
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and 
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job[?!] 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general 
directives.”82 Others flee the battlefield because of an extra-
constitutional concern about judicial discretion: “[W]hile the 
doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a 
fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an 
element readily enforceable by the courts.”83 Although Justice 
Thomas has expressed some interest in enforcing a constitutional 
ban on subdelegations,84 and Justice Gorsuch may be more 
receptive to such arguments than was Justice Scalia,85 no one 
seriously expects the federal courts to rise up and smite major 
portions of the administrative state in the name of the 
Constitution of 1788. 
That leaves, as the last line of constitutional defense, the 
president.86 There is any number of tools available to presidents 
sure, Professor Sunstein and I may both be overstating our cases. It is surely a mistake to 
gauge the effectiveness of a principle against subdelegation by how many laws get 
overturned by courts rather than by how closely legislatures hew to that principle without 
need for judicial invalidation. See Joseph Postell & Paul D. Moreno, Not Dead Yet – or 
Never Born? The Reality of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 3 CONST. STUDIES (forthcoming 
2017). And while the subdelegation doctrine has been dead in the Supreme Court for a 
long time, it has occasional sparks of life in the lower courts (and, quite possibly, has a 
new ally on the Supreme Court). See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154 
(10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
82 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). And what, precisely, is 
Congress’s constitutional “job”? To regulate in a way and to a degree that is pleasing to 
the political sensibilities of a majority of the Supreme Court? One might think, looking at 
the Constitution, that Congress’s job is to legislate in accordance with the substantive and 
procedural norms prescribed by the Constitution. But, then again, one might think, 
looking at the Constitution, many things which are at odds with statements in Supreme 
Court opinions. The explanation, of course, is that statements in Supreme Court opinions 
almost never try to ascertain the meaning of the Constitution, so it is not at all surprising 
that they almost uniformly fail to do so. 
83 Id. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For an explanation of why this concern about 
judicial discretion is extra-constitutional, see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483 (2014). 
84 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240–52 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
85 See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153–54. 
86 Technically, the last line of constitutional defense is an armed citizenry, but 
it would surely take more than some unconstitutional subdelegations to warrant 
outright revolution. 
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to resist unconstitutional subdelegations if they are inclined to 
use those tools. Most obviously, presidents can veto proposed 
legislation that fails to make law. Congress can override those 
vetoes with a two-thirds majority in each House, but a 
presidential veto can be a serious roadblock to subdelegation. 
Moreover, the president could issue a veto message 
communicating the constitutional grounds for the action and 
thereby raise public awareness of Congress’s constitutional failure. 
The president could also recommend legislation amending or 
repealing past laws that unconstitutionally subdelegate authority. 
Appointing judges who take the Constitution seriously could also 
indirectly help in this regard. Finally, and most dramatically 
(and therefore least plausibly), the president could refuse to 
enforce laws that unconstitutionally subdelegate legislative 
power. Presidents have a power and duty of executive review 
that is equal to, and derives from the same source as, the 
collateral power of judicial review.87 If courts are allowed, and 
indeed required, to refuse to give legal effect to unconstitutional 
laws, the same is true of presidents (and everyone else in the 
constitutional order). At this point, however, the shade of Andrew 
Johnson will surely begin whispering about the possible 
consequences of presidential nonenforcement of statutes on 
constitutional grounds. A genuine constitutionalist will respond 
that the president nonetheless has an unconditional obligation to 
the Constitution, consequences be damned.88 Even if one does not 
take this extreme tack, however, there is no obvious reason why 
presidents cannot, and constitutionally should not, make use of 
the other tools at their disposal to resist subdelegation. All that 
is needed is the will to use those tools. 
At first glance, it may seem even more absurd to rely on the 
president to police subdelegations of legislative authority than to 
rely on Congress or the courts. Don’t such subdelegations by 
definition increase the power of the executive, both absolutely 
and relative to its chief institutional competitors? If Congress is 
willing to cede some, or even most, of its authority to the 
president, who would expect the president to decline the offer? 
87 For a lengthy explication of this position, see generally Gary Lawson & 
Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 1267 (1996). 
88 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (prescribing the presidential oath of office as: “I 
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the 
United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States”). 
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As with the Spanish Inquisition, no one expects it. But, as 
with the Spanish Inquisition, it just might appear anyway. To be 
sure, history is on the side of the skeptics. The Reagan 
Administration made a great fuss over constitutional fidelity, 
especially in the realm of separation of powers. In the 1980s, 
Attorney General Edwin Meese III gave voice to some 
monumental, and monumentally important, constitutional 
principles dealing with the separation of powers, such as 
departmentalism and the unitary executive.89 The Justice 
Department was filled with constitutional originalists who 
understood quite well that the Constitution does not authorize 
subdelegation of legislative authority. With all of that 
intellectual and political firepower assembled, what was the 
number of bills vetoed by President Reagan on the ground that 
they unconstitutionally subdelegated legislative power to the 
president? That would be zero. The number of bills introduced or 
supported by the Reagan Administration to repeal or replace old 
statutes that unconstitutionally subdelegate legislative power to 
the president? That would also be zero. The number of such bills 
vetoed or championed, respectively, by either of the Bush 
Administrations? Yep, zero again. (I assume that no one finds it 
necessary for me to repeat these numbers for modern Democrat 
administrations.) All conventional grounds for judgment suggest 
that the executive department is a central part of the problem of 
subdelegation of legislative authority and likely the last place 
that one should look for a solution. 
Enter Donald Trump. Exit conventional grounds for 
judgment. Whatever one thinks of Donald Trump (and I confess 
that I have a higher regard for him than do most of the people 
with whom I usually associate), one must acknowledge that the 
usual rules of politics do not apply to him. Indeed, his election 
was, at least for many who voted for him, precisely a pair of 
double-barreled middle fingers thrust into the face of political 
convention (with a loud razzberry added for good measure). The 
fact that invoking a constitutional principle against 
subdelegation of legislative authority would elicit shrieks of 
horror from the political and cultural establishment would not 
necessarily deter President Trump from doing it. Indeed, it just 
might be an added incentive. 
The question is whether there is anything substantive that 
would or could motivate President Trump to take a stand against 
89 See Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary 
Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 701 (2005). 
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legislative subdelegation, perhaps by vetoing proposed legislation 
on constitutional subdelegation grounds and issuing a stinging 
veto message. Several considerations suggest—and I emphasize 
that I deliberately use the word “suggest” in its literal and 
modest sense—that there might be. 
First, President Trump’s key appointments to legal offices 
speak to a commitment to constitutional first principles that 
exceeds that of any president in my lifetime. His first 
appointment to the Supreme Court was Neil Gorsuch, who, as a 
court of appeals judge, specifically raised the idea of reviving the 
subdelegation doctrine.90 President Trump’s nominations to the 
lower federal courts thus far also have originalists cheering and 
maybe even salivating. And both of his appointees to top 
executive department legal positions—Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions and White House Counsel Don McGahn—are long-time 
advocates (if not necessarily consistent practitioners) of 
originalism. The pairing is significant. My recollection from 
three-plus decades ago is that the Reagan Justice Department 
was more than occasionally at odds with the White House 
Counsel’s Office, which had considerably less enthusiasm than 
did Attorney General Meese and his staff for picking fights about 
broad structural principles. That kind of internal conflict reduces 
the likelihood of bold action. If the Department of Justice and 
White House Counsel’s Office are both strongly committed to 
originalism, they can speak with a united front on subdelegation. 
No originalist can defend, with a straight face, the gross 
subdelegations of legislative power that pervade modern 
government as consistent with the Constitution.91
Second, all of the foregoing considerations suggest that 
President Trump is inclined to defer, on legal and constitutional 
matters, to those who he regards as reliable experts on those 
subjects. No one seriously believes that Donald Trump entered 
the political arena in 2015 with a well-formed theory of 
constitutional interpretation in mind. Obviously, he has decided 
that originalists are the go-to folks in this area. If, hypothetically, 
President Trump’s Attorney General and White House Counsel 
both recommend a veto on constitutional grounds, it is not 
90 See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 115354.
91 At the risk of repetition: They can certainly defend those subdelegations as 
consistent with all manner of things besides the Constitution, and those other things 
might well be more important to any given person than is the meaning of the 
Constitution. I am not saying unconditionally that originalists must urge the president to 
oppose subdelegations. I am only saying that they have good reason to do so if they regard 
the meaning of the Constitution as normatively relevant, and that they must do so if they 
regard the meaning of the Constitution as normatively decisive. 
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absurd to imagine that President Trump would take that 
recommendation very seriously. 
Third, former White House strategist Steve Bannon declared 
in February 2017 that the Trump Administration was committed 
to “deconstruction of the administrative state.”92 The exact 
meaning of the phrase is not important here. The significance for 
present purposes is that the standard response to any attempt to 
revive a constitutional principle against subdelegation is to 
complain that it would be an assault on the administrative 
state.93 That certainly seemed to be an important driver of the 
decision in Mistretta,94 and I have heard something like it from 
my colleagues for decades. If Mr. Bannon truly speaks for the 
Administration on this point, it suggests that the standard 
establishment response will not resonate all that well with the 
current president. To be sure, there are nontrivial arguments to 
be made that the unbundling afforded by subdelegation increases 
democratic responsiveness in some respects,95 but these do not 
seem like arguments that will carry much weight with a 
constitutionalist who wants to deconstruct the administrative state. 
Fourth, every force in the legal universe is currently aligned 
to jump at the chance to constrain executive power. The political, 
legal, and cultural establishments all despise the current 
occupant of the White House. If there is ever going to be a time 
for limits on executive power, this is it. And if those limits come 
from the White House itself, would the establishment really find 
it within themselves to resist? 
Perhaps there never will be a time for such limits. Certainly, 
those who think of President Trump as a swaggering, 
overbearing, tin-plated dictator with delusions of godhood (or 
perhaps even as a Denebian slime devil)96 will regard as 
laughable the idea that he would turn down power. I am more 
inclined than many to think that Donald Trump cannot be 
written off as a power-mad autocrat, but maybe the many are 
92 See Tim Hains, Stephen Bannon: Core of Trump’s Platform Is “Deconstruction of 
the Administrative State,” REAL CLEAR POLITICS (July 17, 2017), https://www.realclear 
politics.com/video/2017/02/23/stephen_bannon_pillar_of_trumps_platform_is_deconstructi
on_of_the_administrative_state.html [http://perma.cc/F7RS-MWES].
93 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323,
327–28 (1987). I use this citation only because I happen to have it on hand when writing 
this footnote. I am sure that any reader will have favorite examples of their own. 
94 See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
95 See generally David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the 
Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000); Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why 
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985). 
96 With apologies to David Gerrold.
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right. Maybe Adrian Vermeuele is right about the inevitability of 
the administrative state; it certainly would not surprise me if he 
was right about that. Perhaps, as with every other modern 
president before him, Donald Trump will choose expanded 
executive power over the Constitution, and perhaps the 
establishment’s love for the administrative state is stronger than 
its hatred for President Trump. But maybe, just maybe, an odd 
combination of originalism, swamp draining, and the looming 
specter of Trump-as-Congress will lead to something that no one 
expects—maybe even something constitutionally more significant 
than a comfy chair. 
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Broken Constitutional Order*
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INTRODUCTION
Herbert Wechsler’s On Neutral Principles in Constitutional 
Law is one of the most widely cited1 and reviled essays in the legal 
literature. After declaring that judicial decisions “must be genuinely 
principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in 
reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the 
immediate result that is achieved,”2 Wechsler insisted that the most 
canonical of all twentieth century cases, Brown v. Board of 
Education, did not meet this standard.3 Wechsler first maintained 
that justices applying neutral principles would treat segregated 
schools as raising “freedom of association” issues.4 He then 
professed to be unable to discern a proper neutral principle that 
would constitutionally justify a judicial decision forcing whites who 
did not wish to associate with African-Americans to attend the 
same public schools as students of color.5 Wechsler was correctly 
chastised for what many, most notably Charles Black, 
demonstrated was a stunning obtuseness to the realities of 
American history and the role that sheer racism played (and, 
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benefitted from the responses of Aziz Huq, Keith Whittington, and Kenneth Kersch, not to 
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 ** W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, 
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 *** Regents Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law. 
1 Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All 
Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012). 
2 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1959). 
3 Id. at 22; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
4 Wechsler, supra note 2, at 34. 
5 Id. 
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for that matter, continues to play) in allocating the burdens and 
benefits of life in the United States.6 To accept Wechsler’s notion 
that constitutional law should in essence ignore self-conscious 
and public Southern-white efforts to establish racial apartheid, 
whatever might be thought to be constitutional commands to the 
contrary, is akin to writing a guide to normal everyday life for 
Londoners in 1941 that ignored the Battle of Britain.
Wechsler’s analysis of Brown has been confined to the 
dustbin of history, but his claim that constitutional decision 
makers should abstract constitutional law problems from their 
underlying constitutional politics is alive and well in the legal 
literature on executive power in the age of Donald Trump. 
Experts and pundits commonly claim that President Trump is 
constitutionally entitled to exercise the same constitutional 
authority as has been historically exercised by other presidents. 
Journalists and constitutional analysts insist that courts should 
engage in “business as usual” when evaluating President Donald 
Trump’s exercise of executive power. The Washington Post gave
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals a scolding when the judges 
quoted Trump’s bigoted remarks on the campaign trail as 
reasons for finding unconstitutional a federal order severely 
limiting immigration from seven Muslim-majority countries.7
The Post’s editorial quite correctly declared that in the past, 
“Presidents have enjoyed, and deserve, broad leeway when it 
comes to setting immigration limits.”8 Lest one dismiss the Post 
writers as lacking in the requisite legal training, leading 
constitutional experts on prominent blogs, at least some of whom 
acknowledge that President Trump is woefully unqualified for 
office, nonetheless agree with the Post that courts should declare 
unconstitutional executive orders issued by the Trump 
Administration only if that tribunal would strike down an 
identical order issued by a more competent president for the 
same reasons. Josh Blackman claims that “[t]he judiciary should 
6 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421, 427–29, 427 n.19 (1960). 
7 Editorial Board, Mr. Trump’s travel ban is offensive and imprudent. But is it really 
unconstitutional?, WASH. POST (May 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/mr-trumps-travel-ban-is-offensive-and-imprudent-but-is-it-really-unconstitutional/ 
2017/05/28/901947d0-41aa-11e7-8c25-44d09ff5a4a8_story.html?utm_term=.2952d4c6ebd8
[http://perma.cc/2RGA-U6EY].
8 Id. (emphasis added). 
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not abandon its traditional role simply because the president has 
abandoned his.”9
When judges treat this president as anything other than normal, it 
sends a signal to the public that the chief executive is not as 
legitimate as his predecessors. . . . Trump was elected through the 
same constitutional process by which judges received their lifetime 
commissions. He should be treated as such.10
Defense department experts have informed Congress that 
President Trump has the same power to begin a nuclear war as 
any other president. “If we were to change the decision-making 
process because of a distrust of this president,” former 
undersecretary for policy at the Defense Department Brian 
McKeon asserted, “that would be an unfortunate decision for the 
next president.”11
This claim that all presidents enjoy the same Article II 
prerogatives was an implicit staple of the literature on executive 
power published prior to the 2016 election. Consider a brilliant 
article, The President’s Enforcement Power, published in 2013 by
University of Michigan professor of law Kate Andrias.12 Her 
subject, the discretion a president has to determine the actual 
enforcement of the law, could hardly be a more important topic in 
light of President Obama’s bitterly contested order that many 
undocumented aliens be freed from the potential burden of 
deportation if they present no genuine threat to the United 
States,13 or Attorney General Eric Holder’s decision not to enforce 
clearly valid federal drug laws14 against various Coloradans who 
9 Josh Blackman, Why Courts Shouldn’t Try to Read Trump’s Mind, POLITCO (Mar. 
16, 2017) (emphasis added), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/why-courts-
shouldnt-try-to-read-trumps-mind-214921 [http://perma.cc/F8GB-PYB4].
10 Id.
11 Karoun Demirjian, Trump’s nuclear authority divides senators alarmed by his 
‘volatile’ behavior, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/power 
post/senators-deadlock-in-debate-over-whether-to-restrain-trumps-nuclear-launch-authority/ 
2017/11/14/491a994a-c95b-11e7-8321-481fd63f174d_story.html?utm_term=.15b6498a5436
[http://perma.cc/Z6E5-NW3C].
12 See generally Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1031 (2013). 
13 See Janet Napolitano, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to 
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND
SECURITY (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial- 
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. But see Texas v. United States, 
809 F.3d 134, 135, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (enjoining enforcement of the order). 
14 See Ryan J. Reilly & Ryan Grim, Eric Holder Says DOJ Will Let Washington, 
Colorado Marijuana Laws Go Into Effect, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2013, 1:30 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/29/eric-holder-marijuana-washington-colorado-
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were taking advantage of the legalization of marijuana 
possession and sale in that state. Professor Andrias’ article is 
extremely illuminating in many ways. What is especially striking 
from the perspective of 2017 is the essay’s unrelenting 
abstraction in the tradition of “Neutral Principles.” There are 
allusions to Washington and Obama, among many other 
presidents, but the article is very much, as promised by the title, 
about the constitutional authority of a reified president to 
determine how laws are, or are not, enforced.15 Professor 
Andrias, like other distinguished scholars of executive power,16
offers interesting proposals to govern the conduct of all possible 
occupants of the White House implementing laws passed by all 
possible Congresses.17
More fairly, we should write all “conceivable” occupants of 
the Oval Office as of 2013. No one writing about presidential 
power before the 2016 election could genuinely conceive of the 
possibility that Barack Obama would be succeeded by Donald 
Trump or a person equally as unfit for office. Staying within one, 
or even two, standard deviations of the norm is usually sufficient. 
When thinking of presidents, scholars should account for 
Franklin Pierce as well as Franklin Roosevelt, but good reason 
exists for thinking that the differences among the first forty-five 
presidents did not warrant significant variation in their formal 
legal powers. We do not usually require that scholars consider a 
wildly improbable figure, three standard deviations away, as 
would have been the case had Andrias or any other student of 
doj_n_3837034.html [http://perma.cc/LR6N-GFTX]. Attorney General Sessions has 
recently announced his decision to reverse the Holder policy. See, e.g., Jon Hill, Sessions
Reverses Obama-Era Marijuana Enforcement Policy, LAW360 (Jan. 4, 2018, 6:20 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/998871/sessions-reverses-obama-era-marijuana-
enforcement-policy. 
15 See generally Andrias, supra note 12. 
16 For a sampling, see David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in 
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding,
121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 699 n.20 (2008), citing the most influential pieces of scholarship 
on executive power over the last half century, none of which suggest that the legal power 
of presidents varies by office-holder. Substantial literature exists in political science 
pointing out that presidential capacity to exercise these fixed legal powers varies by 
officeholder and time. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT,
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM 
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (The Free Press ed., 1990); JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE
PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE (4th ed. 1972). 
17 Id. at 1078. 
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executive power considered the possibility that a bigoted, 
uninformed, serial liar would assume the powers of the oval 
office. John Hart Ely highlighted this facet of ordinary scholarship 
when his conclusion to his monumental Democracy and Distrust 
explained why his theory of representation reinforcement—and 
the concomitant rejection of the Supreme Court’s aggressively 
enforcing non-textual “fundamental rights”—did not prevent a 
hypothetical Congress from prohibiting the removal of gall 
bladders except when necessary to save the person’s life.18 Ely 
asserted that such a bill “couldn’t pass” in our actual political 
system and “refuse[d] to play the game”19 of constructing a 
constitutional theory concerned with what in context are the 
equivalent of science-fiction hypotheticals dealing with invasions 
by space aliens. 
The flying saucers have landed. Donald J. Trump is now 
President of the United States. We are often informed that 
elections have consequences. What this means, of course, is that 
at least on occasion, the specific identity of those who win 
elections and are empowered to make decisions can have 
significant consequences, for good and for ill. As of January 2018 
when we completed our revisions of this essay, one can discern 
an ever-growing consensus among at least a solid majority of the 
American public and probably at least ninety percent of the 
politically informed public that Trump is manifestly unfit to be 
president. That he is president is the consequence of a severe 
malfunction in the constitutional system for electing presidents, 
whether one assigns the failure to the constitutional text, the 
constitutional culture, or, as is almost certainly the case, both.20
The question we must now ask is whether this constitutional 
failure is a subject only for political science or whether 
constitutional decision-makers, when interpreting Article II, 
18 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
182–83 (1980). 
19 Id. at 183. 
20 Donald Trump’s election was also the consequence of a presidential primary 
system not imagined by those who designed the Constitution. He was immeasurably 
aided by having more than a dozen rivals at the beginning of the process and half a dozen 
until the last few primaries. This enabled him to prevail, especially in first-past-the-post 
states, with considerably less than a majority of the vote. Trump’s failure to obtain a 
plurality of the final national vote made him the first president in history to have lost 
both the majority of his party’s primary vote and the popular vote in the ensuing national 
election.
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ought to take into account that Americans have elected a chief 
executive manifestly unfit to exercise the longstanding powers of 
the presidency. When Justice Joseph Story in Martin v. Mott
spoke of “the high qualities which the Executive must be 
presumed to possess, of public virtue, and honest devotion to the 
public interests,”21 was he speaking of a conclusive or a 
rebuttable presumption? 
As readers may already have guessed, we challenge this 
almost unexamined assumption that the constitutional powers of 
the president can be blithely abstracted from the occupant of the 
White House. We insist that constitutional decision makers must 
take into account (assuming they realize) whether they are 
making decisions for a constitutional order functioning within 
normal parameters or, on the contrary, a constitutional order 
reeling from the collapse of crucial assumptions underlying the 
constitutional text and ordinary constitutional practice. We 
maintain that the Article II powers of a president manifestly 
unfit for office are different from the Article II powers of a 
president who has the character and capabilities appropriate for 
exercising those powers. Common sense, The Federalist Papers,
other interpretive activities, and Brown v. Board of Education 
provide strong reasons for not vesting the anti-Publian president 
with Publian powers. 
Our argument proceeds as follows. We begin by briefly 
elaborating the consensus that Donald Trump lacks the 
constitutional, even if not the “legal,” qualifications to be 
President of the United States. The next section discusses how 
Publius in The Federalist Papers closely yoked presidential 
powers to the character of the office-holder. We then note how 
such other interpretive exercises as plays, athletics, and contract 
law routinely make adjustments when events undermine the 
assumptions underlying the authoritative text, whether that text 
be instantiated in a script, play, or bargain. American 
constitutional practice, we continue, has been historically far 
more responsive to Publian failures than contemporary claims 
about executive power under President Trump acknowledge. 
Such decisions as Brown v. Board of Education22 and New York 
21 Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 32 (1827). 
22 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Times Co. v. Sullivan23 are far better explained as judicial 
responses to constitutional frauds perpetrated by the Jim Crow 
South than the more abstracted reasons given by the justices in 
their opinions. Brown, in fact, provides a model for thinking 
about limiting the power of an anti-Publian president. Such 
judicial strategies include focusing on actual motives for 
executive action, taking rationality standards seriously, and 
limiting, wherever possible, official powers when the officeholder 
or officeholders demonstrate that they are incapable of using or 
unwilling to use those powers responsibly or consistently with 
established constitutional norms.  
Given our ostensible 5000-word limit, very generously 
interpreted to mean 5000 words per author, our essay is 
necessarily provocative. We hope to initiate an important—and 
overdue—conversation rather than provide anything in the way 
of definitive answers (even assuming such things exist with 
regard to complex legal and political dilemmas). Both of us 
believe the American constitutional order is broken, even as we 
dispute the nature of the malady and the remedy.24 We also 
agree that the remedy for a broken constitutional order is not 
constitutional interpretation as usual. Doing so, we think, is 
analogous to telling a quarterback to throw a long pass because 
that was the called-for play, even though the receiver has fallen 
down. At the very least, we hope to convince readers that 
the Constitution of the United States might not be 
officeholder-indifferent, and that constitutional politics as usual 
is not the remedy for the Trump presidency or, for that matter, 
the severe crisis of American constitutional democracy. The 
pages below provide one, but hardly the exclusive, path for 
constitutional decision makers and American citizens to begin 
thinking about presidential power in light of the actual 
officeholder and, more generally, to think about constitutional 
practice in a time of severe constitutional failure. 
23 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
24 See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS
OF GOVERNANCE (2012) (arguing the American constitutional order is broken); Mark A. 
Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on Identifying and Mending a 
Dysfunction Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 617–18 (2014). 
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I. DONALD TRUMP AS THE ANTI-PUBLIAN PRESIDENT
President Donald Trump lacks every constitutional 
qualification for office save that he was elected consistently with 
the rules set out in Article II of the Constitution of the United 
States, including, obviously, the Electoral College. Trump is 
known to be proudly ignorant, uninterested in constitutional 
limits on his power, a probable sex offender, a likely associate of 
Russian mobsters eager to launder their money by lending to 
someone who cannot procure loans from almost any leading 
American bank given his demonstrated record in refusing to 
honor his debts,25 a bully, and a bigot who professes to see no real 
difference between George Washington and Robert E. Lee. 
James Clapper, the former Director of National Intelligence, 
told CNN following an August 2017 Trump campaign rally in 
Phoenix, Arizona that he “really question[s] [Trump’s] ability to 
be—his fitness to be—in this office.”26 After labeling Trump’s 
remarks and demeanor “downright scary and disturbing,”27
Clapper, who served in the Clinton, Bush II, and Obama 
Administrations, denounced Trump’s “behavior and divisiveness 
and complete intellectual, moral and ethical void,”28 describing 
his presidency as “this nightmare[.]”29 Clapper was particularly 
disturbed about presidential access to, and power to put into 
operation, America’s nuclear codes. “In a fit of pique he decides to 
do something about Kim Jong Un, there’s actually very little to 
stop him,” Clapper said. “The whole system is built to ensure 
rapid response if necessary. So there’s very little in the way 
of controls over exercising a nuclear option, which is pretty 
damn scary.”30
That most Democrats or political liberals might readily agree 
with Clapper is hardly surprising. What is remarkable, though, 
is the extent to which Donald Trump’s gross unfitness for office 
25 We cannot, of course, supply sufficient proof of this assertion because of his 
resolute refusal to release any of his tax returns that might well indicate significant 
interaction with Russian moguls. 
26 Leinz Vales, James Clapper calls Trump speech ‘downright scary and disturbing’,
CNN (Aug. 24, 2017, 5:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/23/politics/james-clapper-
trump-phoenix-rally-don-lemon-cnntv/index.html [http://perma.cc/9KL7-WPD8].
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. 
30 Id.
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has become the conventional wisdom among conservative 
commentators. Washington Post columnist Michael Gerson, who 
loyally served George W. Bush as a speechwriter and a conduit to 
the Christian community, describes Trump as “willfully blind to 
history” with “a shriveled emptiness where [his] soul once 
resided.”31 Gerson is not alone among conservatives in his 
contempt for Trump. George Will, who re-registered as an 
independent after Trump’s nomination, observed that Trump has 
“an untrained mind bereft of information and married to 
stratospheric self-confidence.”32 Jack Goldsmith, a lawyer who 
headed the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush II administration, 
describes Trump as a “President of the United States who does 
not at all grasp the Office he occupies, and who thus entirely 
lacks the proper situation sense, or contextual knowledge, in 
which a President should exercise judgment or act.”33 Benjamin 
Wittes, the editor of Lawfare who is associated with both the 
Brookings Institution and the Hoover Institution, declared that 
Trump “does not enter office with a presumption that as 
President he will pursue a vision of what national security 
means . . . or that he will do so in a rational fashion[.]”34 “What 
does it even mean,” he asked, “for a person who contradicts 
himself constantly, who says all kinds of crazy things, who has 
unknown but extensive financial dealings that could be affected 
by his actions, and who makes up facts as needed in the moment 
to swear an oath to faithfully execute the office?”35 Peter Wehner, 
who served Republican Presidents Reagan, George H. W. Bush, 
and George W. Bush, recently referred, approvingly, to “a 
Republican member of Congress [he] spoke with [who] called the 
31 Michael Gerson, There is a shriveled emptiness where Trump’s soul once resided,
WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/there-is-a-shriveled-
emptiness-where-trumps-soul-once-resided/2017/08/17/bb9edd22-8370-11e7-b359-15a3617 
c767b_story.html?utm_term=.aaa9527e2dd8 [http://perma.cc/BN78-B936].
32 George F. Will, Trump has a dangerous disability, WASH. POST (May 3, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-has-a-dangerous-disability/2017/
05/03/56ca6118-2f6b-11e7-9534-00e4656c22aa_story.html?utm_term=.43785bf8d842
[http://perma.cc/ZQE4-LQW6].
33 Jack Goldsmith, Two Reflections on the Comey Statement, LAWFARE
(June 7, 2017, 8:56 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/two-reflections-comey-statement
[http://perma.cc/Z2WA-NEJQ].
34 Benjamin Wittes & Quinta Jurecic, What Happens When We Don’t Believe the 
President’s Oath, LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-
happens-when-we-dont-believe-presidents-oath [http://perma.cc/YZ8T-F9FH].
35 Id.
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president a ‘child king,’ and a ‘self-pitying fool.’”36 Continued 
hopes that Trump as president will prove significantly different 
from what he had revealed about himself during the campaign 
are naïve. Doyle McManus of the Los Angeles Times notes that 
“[l]ast November, 63 million voters gave Trump a chance to grow 
into the office he won . . . Instead, he seems intent on proving 
that he’s either unable or unwilling to grow.”37 Daniel Drezner 
answers the question, “Can Donald Trump Grow up in office?” by 
responding, “toddlers are gonna toddler.”38
The above sources are all prior to September 2017, when this 
essay was initially drafted and submitted to the editors of the 
Chapman Law Review. The ensuing months have provided an 
abundance of additional sources. Consider an October 26, 2017 
column by Mr. Gerson praising Republican senators John 
McCain and Bob Corker for their criticisms of Donald Trump. 
McCain and Corker pointed to the undoubted truth that 
“Americans have elected a president who is dangerously 
unstable, divisive, childish, nasty, deceptive, self-deluded, 
morally unfit, deeply unconservative and thus badly wrong on 
some of the largest issues of our time.”39 Arizona Senator Jeff 
Flake, who recently denounced Trump—and, by implication, the 
contemporary Republican Party—while announcing his own 
decision to retire from the Senate rather than face almost certain 
defeat in the Republican primary, describes the 
[M]oral vandalism that has been set loose in our culture, as well as 
the seeming disregard for the institutions of American democracy. The 
damage to our democracy seems to come daily now, most recently with 
the president’s venting late last week that if he had his way, he 
would hijack the American justice system to conduct political 
prosecutions—a practice that happens only in the very worst places on 
36 Peter Wehner, Behold Our ‘Child King,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/opinion/sunday/trump-our-child-king.html?ref= 
opinion&_r=0.
37 Doyle McManus, Another day, another vulgar Trump tweet. The president clearly 
isn’t learning on the job., L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2017, 9:45 AM), http://www.latimes. 
com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-trump-tweet-mike-20170629-story.html
[http://perma.cc/CV7H-TSZV].
38 Daniel W. Drezner, Can Donald Trump grow up in office?, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/03/can-donald-trump-grow-
up-in-office/?utm_term=.bb6933cad2bb [http://perma.cc/3C4S-RFZ2].
39 Michael Gerson, God bless all the anti-Trump Republicans, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/god-bless-all-the-anti-trump-republicans/ 
2017/10/26/14f45b9a-ba80-11e7-be94-fabb0f1e9ffb_story.html?utm_term=. c452e623f3db
[http://perma.cc/GGR9-RHC7].
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earth. And as this behavior continues, it is not just our politics being 
disfigured, but the American sense of well-being and time-honored 
notions of the common good.40
Michael Wolff’s Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House 
dominated the news in early January 2018. Wolff quoted 
numerous White House insiders who referred to the President as 
an “idiot” or the equivalent of a “child” with an insatiable need for 
loyalty and approval. These observations, the above paragraphs 
demonstrate, are neither new nor surprising. What may be most 
striking is Wolff’s conclusion to an article he published in The
Hollywood Reporter, which maintained Trump may be exhibiting 
signs of dementia. “Hoping for the best,” Wolff wrote: 
[W]ith their personal futures as well as the country’s future depending 
on it, my indelible impression of talking to [Trump’s associations in 
the White House] and observing them through much of the first year 
of his presidency . . . came to believe he was incapable of functioning 
in his job. 
At Mar-a-Lago, just before the new year, a heavily made-up Trump 
failed to recognize a succession of old friends.41
That Donald Trump is no George Washington is of less 
constitutional concern to contemporary Americans than to the 
framers. Publius imagined presidents in the image of 
Washington, who rise above the partisan strife of their day. Such 
characters were recognized as being “pre-eminent for ability and 
virtue”42 across the political spectrum. The two-party system that 
developed almost immediately after the Constitution was ratified 
(and which developed in part because of the structure of 
presidential elections)43 obviated the possibility of a universally 
esteemed president. Partisan presidents in a Publian system can 
at best lay claim to having the qualifications their party believes 
necessary to be a successful president. Parties have nevertheless 
remained within what might be called a “zone of acceptability” 
40 Jeff Flake, In a Democracy, There Can Be No Bystanders, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/opinion/jeff-flake-speech-letters-democracy.html.  
41 Michael Wolff, “You Can’t Make this S--- Up”: My Year Inside Trump’s Insane 
White House, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 4, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.hollywood 
reporter.com/news/michael-wolff-my-insane-year-inside-trumps-white-house-1071504
[http://perma.cc/YJ6M-ME7T]; MICHAEL WOLFF, FIRE AND FURY: INSIDE THE TRUMP
WHITE HOUSE (2018).
42 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
43 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON,
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005). 
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with regard to the candidates they present for the White House, 
with presidential nominees perhaps deficient in one qualification 
possessing other prerequisites for the oval office. 
Even within this context, Donald Trump appears to be no 
Rutherford B. Hayes, James Earl Carter, or even Warren G. 
Harding who, unlike the vindictive Woodrow Wilson, pardoned 
Eugene Debs and even invited him to visit Harding at the White 
House (which Debs did).44 These less distinguished presidents 
were thought competent to hold office by a substantial segment of 
their party, including, crucially, experienced political leaders and 
office-holders, even as members of the rival party and rival 
factions of their party frequently jeered at their qualifications. 
Moreover, commentators often exaggerate formal qualifications. 
The most formally qualified presidents in our history, in terms of 
the multiplicity of offices they occupied before moving to the 
White House, were John Quincy Adams, James Buchanan, and 
George H. W. Bush. Abraham Lincoln was among the least 
qualified. Barack Obama scarcely teemed with obvious 
qualifications for the office he sought. (His predecessor, George 
W. Bush, had at least been governor for six years of a major 
state.) What makes Donald Trump historically unique is his lack 
of any serious qualification for public office and the ever-growing 
consensus among informed members of his party that he is, in 
addition, a menace to American constitutional institutions. 
Republican members of Congress, unaware that their microphones 
are on, have been caught describing Trump as “crazy” and have 
not retracted such comments.45 Tennessee Republican Senator 
Bob Corker stated on the record that “[t]he president has not yet 
been able to demonstrate the stability, nor some of the 
competence, that he needs to demonstrate in order to be 
successful.”46 Texas Senator Ted Cruz, when speaking of Trump 
prior to his nomination, stated: “This man is a pathological liar” 
44 Peter Richardson, ‘Democracy’s Prisoner: Eugene V. Debs, the Great War, and the 
Right to Dissent’ by Ernest Freeberg, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2008), http://www.latimes. 
com/style/la-bk-richardson15-2008jun15-story.html [http://perma.cc/44EB-UTNP].
45 Philip Bump, Senators on hot mic: Trump is ‘crazy,’ ‘I’m worried,’ WASH. POST
(July 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/07/25/senators-on-hot-
mic-trump-is-crazy-im-worried/?utm_term=.3c36f79061e6 [http://perma.cc/X6MJ-6XKD].
46 Richard Cowan, Republican senator says Trump yet to demonstrate needed 
stability, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-corker/
republican-senator-says-trump-yet-to-demonstrate-needed-stability-idUSKCN1AX2DW 
[http://perma.cc/KB95-FWSW].
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who “doesn’t know the difference between truth and lies.”47 Many 
congressional Republicans, of course, have remained relatively 
silent, but as Sherlock Holmes noted long ago, dogs that do not 
bark in the night can provide central clues. In this case, what is 
striking is the nearly complete absence of Republican office-
holders who are willing to counter Senator Corker, Senator Cruz, 
Senator Flake, leading conservative columnists, and Admiral 
Clapper by praising Trump’s capacity for sober judgment and 
ability to be an adroit Commander-in-Chief.48
II. PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER AND PRESIDENTIAL POWERS
So what, one might ask. Shouldn’t constitutional decision 
makers—most importantly inhabitants of judicial office, but also 
academics who play a vital role in socializing young would-be 
lawyers—be committed to upholding universal and neutral 
constitutional norms? Shouldn’t they suppress their “private” 
(and therefore legally irrelevant) reluctance to do so and instead 
permit President Trump to exercise the same presidential powers 
as any other occupant of the Oval Office?49 Article II is facially 
indifferent to the character of the office-holder. The Qualifications 
Clause requires only that the President meet the age requirement, 
be a “natural-born” citizen, and reside within the United States for 
at least fourteen years before taking office.50 Lawyers, doctors, 
47 David Wright et al., Cruz unloads with epic takedown of ‘pathological liar,’ 
‘narcissist’ Donald Trump, CNN (May 3, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/03/politics/
donald-trump-rafael-cruz-indiana/index.html [http://perma.cc/Q22F-YSGD].
48 Perhaps the most notable exception is Alabama Senator Lucius Strange, at a time 
when he was desperately (and, it turned out, unsuccessfully) trying to hold on to the seat 
to which he was appointed to succeed now-Attorney General Jeff Sessions. “President 
Trump is the greatest thing that has happened to this country,” Strange has said. “I 
consider it a biblical miracle that he’s there.” Not to be out-Trumped, but as it were, his 
principal (and ultimately successful) opponent in the Republican primary, former state 
Chief Justice Roy Moore proclaimed, “God puts people in positions he wants. I believe he 
sent Donald Trump in there to do what Donald Trump can do.” Ben Jacobs, ‘A biblical 
miracle’: Alabama GOP Senate primary set to test Trump’s reach, THE GUARDIAN
(Aug. 15, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/15/alabama-
gop-senate-primary-donald-trump-mitch-mcconnell [http://perma.cc/L49R-EB6V].
49 See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
50 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. Had Ted Cruz been elected, we might have 
considered the “true” meaning of “natural born citizen.” Should a Puerto Rican citizen 
who moved to the mainland when he was thirty decide to run for the presidency ten years 
later, we could mull over whether Puerto Rico, though not a state, is now “within the 
United States.” See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 251 (1901). Chief Justice Fuller, in 
his Downes dissent, asks if “a native-born citizen of Massachusetts [would] be ineligible if 
he had taken up his residence and resided in one of the territories for so many years that 
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other professionals, and many applicants for ordinary, minimum 
wage positions must meet rigorous educational standards and 
less rigorous character tests, but not the President of the United 
States. The text states that “[t]he President shall be Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,”51 not that
“the President shall be Commander in Chief, provided that he is 
a mature adult.” The impersonal language of the text seemingly 
compels a court considering the constitutionality of presidential 
decrees that determine who is fit to enter the United States to 
follow the same interpretive practices judges would follow if the 
ban on entry was issued by Barack Obama, George W. Bush, 
Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, or, were they eligible to 
hold the office, St. Francis of Assisi or Adolf Hitler. That the 
president in question is unfit to hold the office is not relevant 
because “equal protection of presidents” requires that all be 
treated as identical to one another. 
We think this consensus is tragically mistaken, not only as a 
matter of intellectual analysis, but, quite possibly, with regard to 
the actual future of what Burke might have referred to as the 
living and the yet unborn. We agree with the major premise. 
Constitutional decision makers, when assessing President 
Trump’s actions, should be guided by constitutional norms. We 
disagree, however, with the near universal view that those norms 
are indifferent to the particular office-holder. The Constitution 
presupposes at least some version of what we call “Publian 
presidents,” presidents with the character and capacity necessary 
to exercise the vast powers conferred by Article II. 
The term “Publian presidents” is drawn from The Federalist 
Papers. Although we are not “originalists” as that term is used in 
intra-mural debates among constitutional interpreters, we do 
believe that understanding the knowable presuppositions 
underlying the constitutional text is important. Americans do not 
have a rigid duty to adhere to past norms or empirical 
assumptions as to how institutions would work to achieve those 
norms, but constitutional fidelity entails an intellectual duty to 
examine how those responsible for the Constitution of the United 
he had not resided altogether fourteen years in the states?” Id. at 357. Fortunately, these 
speculations are beyond the scope of this article. 
51 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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States thought constitutional institutions would work to achieve 
constitutional norms, as well as to understand the back-up 
systems they did (or did not) put in place, should particular 
constitutional institutions fail. A wooden esteem for the 
Founders’ parchment ignores their repeated emphasis on the 
importance of learning from the “lessons of experience.” John 
Marshall proclaimed in McCulloch v. Maryland that a 
“constitution[] intended to endure for ages to come” must “be 
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”52 We break faith 
with the framers and the American constitutional tradition when 
we treat the Constitution as a mere set of rules that must be 
followed even when following the letter of the rules subverts 
more fundamental constitutional purposes. 
The presidency of Donald Trump is one such “crisis of human 
affairs” calling for constitutional adaptation. The framers, we 
shall see, anticipated the possibility of such a constitutional 
failure and provided constitutional decision makers with special 
tools for constraining the anti-Publian president. They regarded 
as only a rebuttable presumption that the President of the 
United States would be a mature adult. Unlike Justice Antonin 
Scalia, who regarded as a conclusive presumption that any child 
born within a marriage was fathered by the husband, whatever 
the demonstrable impossibility of that assertion,53 the framers 
were empiricists committed to an evidence-based constitutional 
politics and constitutional law.54
The selection process set out in the Constitution with regard 
to presidents exhibits both the framing commitment to 
republican leadership and their insistence that Americans be 
empirically minded when determining how to obtain republic 
leaders. As is well known, Americans were not (and are not 
today) given the opportunity directly to elect their presidents. 
That task is assigned to presidential electors. Not surprisingly, 
immediately after assuring his readers that the president would 
not enjoy the powers of a monarch in Federalist No. 67,55 Publius 
immediately turns in Federalist No. 68 to elaborate how the 
52 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis removed). 
53 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989). 
54 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION xv (1996).
55 THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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constitutional scheme for a presidential election is designed to 
guarantee, as far as is humanly possible, the selection of persons 
with exceptional capacities and virtuous character.56
This process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of 
president, will seldom fall to the lot of any man, who is not in an 
eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for 
low intrigue and the little arts of popularity may alone suffice to 
elevate a man to the first honors in a single state; but it will require 
other talents and a different kind of merit to establish him in the 
esteem and confidence of the whole union, or of so considerable a 
portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate 
for the distinguished office of president of the United States. It will 
not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability 
of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability 
and virtue.57
Publius hedged when asserting that the electoral college will 
assure that only “seldom” will the president be less than a 
sterling individual. That suggests the importance of other, 
“auxiliary precautions” to which we will turn presently. But one 
cannot read this paragraph without believing that the electors 
will be faithful trustees for the public in preventing the rise of a 
scoundrel to our highest office. That this no longer describes the 
actual role of electors, who are now viewed simply as “delegates” 
of the voters who formally placed them in power, increases the 
importance of other institutional mechanisms that secure the 
election of a president with the character and capacity to operate 
the constitutional order. If such mechanisms no longer exist, 
then this raises fundamental questions about the relevance of 
“originalism” in a constitutional universe bereft of the 
institutions the framers thought vital to maintaining the 
constitutional order they fashioned. 
Publius discusses the character of the president before 
discussing presidential powers. One can reasonably infer that the 
scope of presidential powers is a function of the character of the 
office-holder. Consider in this context the pardon power, 
discussed in Federalist No. 74.58 A president must know when 
mercy is required to rectify the inevitable errors in a system of 
56 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 460–61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961). 
57 Id.
58 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 500–03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961). 
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procedural justice; but he must also know when service to the 
republic requires pardoning even those who might validly be 
accused of insurrection, like the participants in the Whiskey 
Rebellion who were wisely pardoned by George Washington. 
Publius tightly connects presidential power and presidential 
character when stating, “a single man of prudence and good 
sense, is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the 
motives, which may plead for and against the remission of the 
punishment, than any numerous body whatever.”59 Prior to 
Donald Trump and his pardon of “Sheriff Joe” Arpaio, one could 
only speculate about what a president lacking in “prudence and 
good sense” might make of the plenary power to pardon. 
The theme of virtuous leadership runs through The
Federalist Papers, including the most canonical of all, Federalist 
No. 10.60 Although some political scientists interpret Federalist 
No. 10 as the first statement of what would come to be known as 
interest-group pluralism,61 any close reading reveals the 
likelihood of an “expanded republic” producing the election of 
more virtuous leaders disposed to seek the public good or 
“common interest,” rather than simply reflect the preferences of 
their constituents.62 Other papers elaborate on the importance of 
the character of the officials who will be exercising constitutional 
powers. Federalist No. 57 declares that every political 
Constitution should strike above all “to obtain for rulers, men 
who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue 
the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the 
most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they 
continue to hold their public trust.”63
Federalist No. 31 makes intimate the connection between the 
character of an official and official powers. The text states that 
“all observations founded upon the danger of usurpation, ought to 
be referred to the composition and structure of the government, 
59 Id. at 501–02. 
60 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
61 See, e.g., Martin Diamond, Democracy and the Federalist: A Reconsideration of the 
Framer’s Intent, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 52, 56 (1959). 
62 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59, 63 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(noting that elections in the extended republic “will be more likely to centre on men who 
possess the most attractive merit”). 
63 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 384 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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not to the nature or extent of its powers.”64 Good government, 
Publius repeatedly insists, needs broad powers.65 For this reason, 
Americans then and now should not be obsessed with the powers 
of the national government or with the powers of any individual 
within the government. Rather, Publius would concentrate our 
constitutional focus on whether the schemes for staffing 
a government privilege the selection of persons able to 
wisely exercise government powers. Presidential power is 
constitutionally justified when the process for staffing the 
presidency has generated “characters pre-eminent for ability and 
virtue.”66 Contrary to one popular view of the Constitution as a 
“machine that will run by itself,”67 independent of the actual 
office-holders, Publius was more than aware that character was 
important even if he certainly did pay attention to the 
importance of well-designed institutional structures. Indeed, The
Federalist Papers integrates character and institutions. The 
machine would “run by itself” only if the institutional structures 
privileged the establishment of a republican leadership class and 
provided incentives for maintaining their republican character 
when in office. 
These observations cast new light on Publius’s claim in 
Federalist No. 51 that the separation of powers is an “auxiliary 
precaution.”68 A back-up generator is an auxiliary precaution, not 
the main power supply. A crucial feature of an auxiliary 
precaution is that the system functions differently in times of 
emergency. The back-up generator comes on only when the main 
power fails. “Checks and balances” function similarly; other 
institutions must step up more vigorously when constitutional 
institutions, designed to ensure virtuous leadership, malfunction 
and produce persons who lack the capacities that justify the 
powers of their office and consequent respect from other officials. 
This should not be viewed as “civil disobedience” or any other 
extra-constitutional assertions of power, but instead, as the 
64 THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
65 This is the central theme of Federalist No. 23. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 
(Alexander Hamilton). 
66 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
67 See, e.g., MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. ed., 1986). 
68 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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generation of a “legal-constitutional opposition”69 contemplated 
by the drafters themselves and instantiated in the institutions 
they created. 
If presidential powers are justified by the anticipated 
character of the president, and if the separation of powers exists 
in part to prevent leadership by unfit officials, then contrary to 
much received wisdom, the persons responsible for the 
Constitution did not intend for constitutional decision makers 
charged with maintaining it to be indifferent to the character of 
the president when assessing at any given time how much 
executive power a particular president should wield. Publius 
would not have constitutional interpreters be president-
indifferent. The Federalist Papers point to an important auxiliary 
precaution in the original Constitution when emphasizing the 
capacity for federal legislative and judicial officials to afford less 
deference to an anti-Publian president.  
III. GOING OFF-SCRIPT AND BROKEN PLAYS
Our claim that interpretation responds to breakdowns in 
underlying assumptions is more ordinary than extraordinary. 
Contract law and contract practice make adjustments when 
background conditions that structured the bargain change in 
ways not anticipated by the parties. Actors go off-script when 
props malfunction or other actors forget previous lines. Athletes 
improvise when the play called in the huddle breaks down 
because of unforeseen developments. Conventional constitutional 
wisdom that paradoxically is labeled “textualism” from the 
perspective of these activities is both extraordinary and perverse 
in insisting that constitutional decision makers not take into 
account failings that any person with common sense would 
recognize compel changing planned behaviors that have become 
either impossible to perform or counterproductive. 
The long tradition in American constitutionalism that 
regards the Constitution of the United States70 as a collective 
contract provides powerful support for interpreting constitutional 
69 We owe this phrase to Ken Kersch, who provided very helpful comments to an 
earlier draft. 
70 See Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV.
1, 2–4 (1999).
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provisions in light of their background assumptions. Contract 
law does not interpret every provision of a contract as having a 
“no matter what” clause. Charles Fried, when analyzing the 
famous case of Krell v. Henry,71 points out that the contract for 
rooms to watch the coronation procession of Edward VII 
contained neither the clause “unless there is no procession to 
view” nor the clause “whether or not the coronation is 
subsequently canceled.”72 Because the decision to enforce the 
literal terms of the bargain was just as much an interpretation as 
a decision to interpret the contract as not covering a cancellation, 
Fried maintains that contract authorities had to consider which 
interpretation best expressed the promises the parties made to 
each other in light of a circumstance neither anticipated. Krell,
he concluded, correctly recognized that the contract between the 
parties made sense only on the assumption that the coronation 
would take place as planned, and that no damages should be paid 
when events falsified that mutual assumption.73
Contract law in practice is even less committed to the 
wooden textualism that would insert “no matter what” clauses 
into all provisions in Article II. Stewart Macaulay’s study of 
contractual relationships among businesspersons observes: 
Disputes are frequently settled without reference to the contract or 
potential or actual legal sanctions. There is a hesitancy to speak of 
legal rights or to threaten to sue in these negotiations. Even where 
the parties have a detailed and carefully planned agreement which 
indicates what is to happen if, say, the seller fails to deliver on time, 
often they will never refer to the agreement but will negotiate a 
solution when the problem arises apparently as if there had never 
been any original contract. One purchasing agent expressed a common 
business attitude when he said, “if something comes up, you get the 
other man on the telephone and deal with the problem. You don’t read 
legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want to do 
business again.”74
A constitution “intended to endure for ages to come,” a good 
businessperson would recognize, should be interpreted in 
71 Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 KB 740 (Eng.). 
72 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
64 (1981). 
73 See id. at 60–61, 67.
74 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963).
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ways that are responsive to failures in the functioning of 
basic institutions. 
Actors engage in similar improvisations as businesspersons 
when faced with what contract law might call “frustration” of 
script.75 The swan in Lohengrin fails to show up. The pulley 
taking Don Juan to the underworld fails. A phone rings off cue. A 
nervous performer completely misses crucial lines.76 When these 
events occur, experienced, and most inexperienced, actors 
respond. Sometimes a bon mot seems appropriate. “Does anyone 
know when the next swan is leaving?” “It seems Hell has no 
vacancies.” An apocryphal story relates that one actor picked up 
the phone and promptly handed the receiver to the other, saying, 
“It’s for you.” In other circumstances, actors adjust their lines to 
the circumstances. They do not woodenly repeat the next line in 
the script when the failure to say an earlier line makes their 
planned line incomprehensible. Instead, actors think about what 
they might say to enable the cast to perform the play as close to 
as originally intended under the new, unanticipated circumstances. 
Athletes respond the same way as businesspersons and 
actors to failures in the assumptions underlying their texts. 
Gifted sportspersons improvise when a play breaks down, as 
when a baseball batter misses a hit-and-run signal or a football 
receiver runs the wrong route. Faced with circumstances in 
which following the letter of the plan will defeat the purpose of 
the plan, athletes attempt to figure out alternatives for achieving 
the purpose of the plan, knowing that while some members of 
their team have failed, others are performing their expected 
tasks. The runner scrambles back to first base. The quarterback 
throws the ball to whatever receiver appears open. 
The routine practices of businesspersons, actors, and 
athletes illustrate how texts are routinely interpreted differently 
when crucial background conditions fail. To be sure, the reasons 
for going off-script must usually be plain.77 Strong presumptions 
75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265–69 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
76 For some of these and related mishaps discussed in this paragraph, see ANDREW
FOLDI, OPERA: AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN (40 YEARS OF MUSICAL MISHAPS) (1999); 
Dick Cavett, Oh, No! Live Drama and Unwritten Humor, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/opinion/oh-no-live-drama-and-unwritten-humor.html.
77 We might trust an experienced actor or athlete to make judgments to go off-script 
that we would deny to their less experienced peers. 
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exist in most interpretive practices that background conditions 
are functioning smoothly. Nevertheless, improvisation plays an 
important role in text-bound activities. When systematic 
malfunctions occur, businesspersons, actors, and athletes engage 
in a Dworkinian effort to make the text “the best it can be.”78 If a 
contract to purchase weapons for a third party should be 
interpreted on the assumption that the third party has not joined 
a terrorist cell or indicated a strong desire to murder an 
estranged spouse, a script should be interpreted on the 
assumption that the phone will ring on cue, and a play should be 
interpreted on the assumption that crucial participants have not 
suffered serious injuries, then the constitutional clause “the 
President shall be Commander-in-Chief”79 should be interpreted 
in light of the assumption that the president is a mature adult 
whom one would, at the bare minimum, feel comfortable hiring to 
watch over one’s own children. 
IV. JUDICIAL IMPROVISATION IN TIMES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
FAILURE
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently 
adjusted constitutional doctrine when responding to breakdowns 
in the fundamental assumptions underlying the constitutional 
order. That tribunal for more than two-hundred years has been 
Marshallian, with judicial “adaptation” a regular feature of the 
attempt to resolve perceived crises. Some crises are external. 
Supreme Court Justices have adjusted existing constitutional 
doctrine in light of wars and economic depressions. Other crises 
are internal. Much constitutional law, most notably the 
constitutional law fashioned by mid-twentieth century judicial 
liberals and the civil rights movement, has been a consequence of 
adjustments made when constitutional institutions have not 
functioned as expected. 
Much constitutional doctrine that takes circumstances into 
account reflects framing understandings that crisis would shake 
the American constitutional regime and constitutional law would 
adjust accordingly. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Schenck v. 
United States refrained from wooden textualism when asserting 
78 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 62 (1986). 
79 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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that “[w]hen a nation is at war,” the speech entitled to 
constitutional protection shifts.80 In other cases, Justices have 
adjusted constitutional doctrine to take into account crises no one 
anticipated in 1789 or 1868. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes 
in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell held that 
constitutional protections for contracts had to be interpreted in 
light of an economic collapse unforeseen by the framers.81 His 
opinion insisted that constitutional decision makers committed to 
“preserv[ing] the essential content and the spirit of the 
Constitution”82 could not “confine[]” themselves “to the 
interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook 
of their time, would have placed upon” various clauses.83 No 
universal agreement exists about the validity or desirability of 
these and numerous other “adaptations.” Prigg v. Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania,84 which one of us (Levinson) believes to be the 
most execrable decision in our history, was arguably a “necessary 
adaption” designed to maintain a constitutional order designed to 
create, in Don Fehrenbacher’s words, a “slaveholding republic.”85
We are nevertheless confident that Americans cannot understand 
their constitutional order by ignoring how decision makers, 
including judges, treat what they believe to be genuine crises as 
matters that must be addressed by the constitutional doctrine 
rather than matters beneath the purview of fundamental law that 
should be simply ignored. 
The Supreme Court has been as creative when adapting 
constitutional doctrine to internal constitutional crises. The most 
famous footnote in the canon, footnote four of United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.,86 exemplifies the judicial response to what 
came to be perceived as the constitutional failure of governing 
80 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919) (“When a nation is at war 
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that 
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight[.]”). 
81 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934). 
82 Id. at 443. 
83 Id. 
84 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
85 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001). For 
an account of Prigg as an unfortunate constitutional adaption, see Paul Finkelman, Story
Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial 
Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247 (1994). For a more sympathetic treatment, see generally 
MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006).
86 See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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institutions adequately to protect the rights of vulnerable 
minorities granted by the post-Civil War Amendments. The 
Court, when announcing a program of remarkable deference to 
legislatures when litigators challenged state and federal 
commercial regulations, emphasized that stricter scrutiny might 
be merited when courts had greater reasons to believe ordinary 
legislative processes had malfunctioned.87 The Supreme Court’s 
“double standard” of rights protection that emerged in the 
mid-twentieth century was rooted in theories about the strength 
and weaknesses of evolving constitutional institutions, rather 
than on claims that some constitutional rights were more 
important than others. The consensual greatest series of 
decisions in Supreme Court history, Brown v. Board of 
Education88 and the subsequent judicial rulings dismantling the 
constitutional foundations for the Jim Crow state, required the 
justices to modify longstanding judicial rules and practices to 
prevent former Confederate states from getting away with what 
they now deemed to be the equivalent of constitutional fraud, 
instead of accepting the anodyne and remarkably obtuse 
“neutrality” and deferential stance of such earlier decisions as 
Pace v. Alabama and Plessy v. Ferguson.89
Louis Lusky, the law clerk generally considered responsible 
for the Carolene Products footnote,90 maintained that justices 
should normally sustain legislative outputs when political 
processes were functioning as constitutionally expected. His 1942 
essay in the Yale Law Review asserted: 
[I]f every person has an equal opportunity to take part in controlling 
the government which in turn controls him, there will be a general 
confidence that the laws are designed to serve the needs of the entire 
community, by making a fair adjustment between the conflicting 
interests of groups within the community and advancing as far as 
possible the welfare of the community as a whole.91
Race discrimination merited stricter judicial scrutiny because 
constitutional institutions repeatedly malfunctioned when 
87 Id. 
88 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
89 See Pace v. Alabama, 545 U.S. 1108 (2005); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537 (1896). 
90 David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: 
Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 765 (1981). 
91 Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1942). 
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elected officials considered racial issues. “A government from 
which [African-Americans] are largely excluded,” Lusky pointed 
out, is not “properly responsible to their needs” with the end 
result being that “general confidence in the just enactment of 
laws will be greatly weakened.”92 The text of footnote four is a bit 
confusing because two distinctive Carolene Products footnotes
exist. Paragraph 1, which was inserted at the request of Chief 
Justice Hughes,93 maintains “certain rights deserve particular 
judicial solicitude.”94 The far more influential paragraphs 2 and 
3, providing the foundation for judicial protection of rights to free 
speech and racial equality, are rooted in the “dynamics of 
government,”95 a “corrective” for faulty “political processes.”96
 The Carolene Products double standard was a judicial 
attempt to adjust to two fundamental changes in the American 
constitutional regime. The first was the constitutional 
commitment to some version of interest-group pluralism as 
opposed to the original constitutional commitment to some version 
of republicanism. Lusky, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, and 
other constitutional decision makers in the mid-twentieth century 
assumed that constitutional institutions should be designed in 
ways that accommodated various social interests as opposed to 
the Madisonian vision of government institutions designed to 
transcend various social interests.97 The second was the 
increased recognition that “prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities”98 prevented most elected officials from 
accommodating the interests of persons of color to remotely the 
same degree as white persons. Hence, in contrast to the original 
understanding of the post-Civil War Amendments,99 courts 
92 Id. at 5–6. 
93 See Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1093, 1097–98 (1982). 
94 Id. at 1100 (emphasis removed). 
95 Id. at 1097–98. 
96 Id. at 1103. 
97 For the classic expression of interest group pluralism, see DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (Alfred A. Knopf 
eds., 1951). Federalist No. 10 is the classic expression of constitutional republicanism. See
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961). For the classic account (and critique) of the transition from 
republicanism to interest-group liberalism, see THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF 
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (1st ed. 2009). 
98 United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
99 See Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEXAS
L. REV. 1361, 1363 (2016). 
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rather than legislatures took primary responsibility for securing 
African-Americans and other racial minorities the “equal 
protection of the law.” 
In “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,” 
Professor Wechsler unwittingly detailed how the Supreme Court 
in Brown engaged in the constitutional improvisation called for 
by Carolene Products to correct what were now deemed the 
constitutional failures responsible for Jim Crow segregation.100
Wechsler insisted that the “question posed by state-enforced 
segregation is not one of discrimination at all,” but concerned 
“the denial by the state of freedom to associate, a denial that 
impinges in the same way on any groups or races that may be 
involved.”101 He reached the remarkable conclusion that Brown
was a freedom of association case by denying that judicial 
authorities could know the crucial facts that might make Brown
a discrimination case. Such an approach was warranted on 
matters on which courts should trust state officials. What Chief 
Justice Warren understood, and Wechsler failed to acknowledge, 
is that no reason existed in 1954 (or, for that matter, in 1896 
when Plessy was decided) to trust a state legislative judgment 
that separate schools promoted racial equality. The 
“reconciliation” between Northern and Southern whites that 
placed African-Americans both literally and metaphorically at 
the back of the railway left neither Congress nor the courts 
willing to implement the post-Civil War Amendments. 
Fortunately, in ways “neutral principles” could not detect, 
American politics had changed, particularly after World War II, 
as well as the role of the Court. 
Wechsler’s analysis of Brown presented an accurate picture 
of how courts should function in normal constitutional times in a 
regime committed to interest group pluralism. He began by 
noting that justices have legal obligations to defer to legislative 
fact-findings.102 Wechsler then denied that the evidence was 
sufficient “to sustain a finding that the separation harms the 
Negro children who may be involved[.]”103 Nor, apparently, could 
courts ask about what actually motivated state legislatures to 
100 See Wechsler, supra note 2, at 22–23. 
101 Id. at 34. 
102 Id. at 6. 
103 Id. at 32–33. 
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impose segregation. To inquire into the actual justification for 
segregation would “involve an inquiry into the motive of the 
legislature, which is generally foreclosed to the courts[.]”104
These claims that courts should normally defer to legislative 
fact-findings and not inquire into legislative motives make sense 
when, as Lusky noted, political processes are fair and open to all 
so that political victors at any particular time might be fearful of 
being displaced in the next election should they prove captive 
simply to factional interests. This is the basis of John Hart Ely’s 
aforementioned book that defends a vigorous concern by the 
Court for “representation reinforcement,” but condemns judicial 
intervention when representative government is thought to be 
working reasonably well.105 Elected officials can then be trusted 
to make good faith interpretations of the Constitution and take 
rational steps to pursue the public good. Aggressive judicial 
inquiry into facts and motives is counter-constitutional in times 
of normal constitutional politics. The system for staffing the 
national government and process for making laws are the 
main devices for ensuring that elected officials make accurate 
fact-findings and do not deliberately violate the Constitution. No 
good reason exists for thinking courts will do any better than the 
rest of the political system, especially if we are willing to accept 
what may well be the legal fiction that Publian institutions are 
generating Publian or quasi-Publian rulers and laws. This is why 
the Supreme Court in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma106
subordinated suspicions that the Oklahoma legislature might 
have been influenced by campaign donations of optometrists and 
ophthalmologists when applying what is known as a “minimum 
rationality test” that makes such suspicions irrelevant if a 
possibly sane person could believe that the legislature was 
genuinely motivated by a desire to safeguard the health, safety, 
and welfare of Oklahomans. Perhaps eye-doctors did better with 
respect to this law than the general public, but no good reason 
existed to think that optometrists and ophthalmologists were 
“special favorite[s] of the law”107 in post-World War II Oklahoma. 
104 Id. at 33. 
105 See ELY, supra note 18, at 182–83. 
106 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955). 
107 United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
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The Southern white political actors who imposed 
state-mandated segregation were not attempting to do what was 
best for all races or acting on a good faith interpretation of the 
post-Civil War Amendments. White elected officials in the former 
Confederacy did not fear electoral displacement by aroused 
African-American voters because they had taken care, by the 
beginning of the twentieth century, to eliminate as much as 
possible the reality of an African-American vote. Rather, as 
speaker after speaker declared in the southern constitutional 
conventions that provided the legal foundations for the Jim Crow 
state,108 members of former Confederate states were trying to 
find every constitutional loophole in order to subvert the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s constitutional commitment to racial 
equality and, most importantly, the ostensibly unequivocal 
commitment of the Fifteenth Amendment to the suffrage on a 
non-racial basis. They were openly committing what Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes described as “a fraud upon the 
Constitution of the United States.”109 In sharp contrast to 
Wechsler, Holmes did not deny the presence of the fraud. 
Instead, he said judges were without the practical power to 
reinstate the kind of Reconstruction-era monitoring that would 
be necessary to obviate the fraud.110
Brown makes sense only in light of a judicial commitment to 
eradicate frauds upon the Constitution. Chief Justice Warren in 
judicial conference had no difficulty basing his vote on motives 
and facts the court had ruled out-of-bounds in ordinary cases. He 
bluntly informed other justices that segregation was based solely 
on white supremacy. “The doctrine of ‘separate but equal,’” he 
stated when leading off the judicial conference on Brown, “rested 
108 See PAUL E. HERRON, FRAMING THE SOLID SOUTH 217–25 (2017).
109 Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903); see also Richard H. Pildes, Democracy,
Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 205, 297, 301–02 (2000) (describing
a full examination of this truly perfidious episode in our judicial history). 
110 See Giles, 189 U.S. at 488. There was no nonsense about “neutral principles” 
compelling the outcome in Giles. The Court’s decision in Brown II was quite Holmesian 
inasmuch as the decision to settle for “all deliberate speed” was based on pragmatic 
institutional considerations that were inattentive to facts on the ground. What made 
Wechsler’s views distinctive was his utter indifference to pragmatic actualities and the 
ascent into a thoroughly abstract analysis reminiscent of Anatole France’s famous 
suggestion that the rich and poor alike would enjoy the opportunity to spend their nights 
under the bridges of Paris when it snowed. 
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upon the concept[ion] of the inferiority of the colored race.”111
Other justices agreed. Justice Robert Jackson, who more than 
any other justice recognized that Brown could not be resolved by 
the appropriate norms for resolving ordinary cases, determined 
to vote to constitutionally prohibit segregated schools because “in 
the South the Negro suffers from racial suspicions and 
antagonisms” and “has suffered great prejudice from the 
aftermath of the great American white conflict.”112 Jackson 
recognized how the original constitutional mechanisms for 
enforcing racial equality had malfunctioned when asserting in 
oral argument, “I suppose that realistically the reason this case 
is here is that action couldn’t be obtained from Congress.”113
Charles Black best captured the contemporary sense of why 
Brown was correctly decided when he maintained: 
[I]f a whole race of people finds itself confined within a system which 
is set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an 
inferior station, and if the question is then solemnly propounded 
whether such a race is being treated “equally,” I think we ought to 
exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers—that 
of laughter.114
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the case in which the 
Supreme Court abandoned almost 200 years of precedent when 
declaring that the First Amendment prohibited libel suits by 
public officials unless they could prove the speech was either 
intentionally false, or false and made with reckless disregard of 
the truth, is another example of constitutional law bending in 
response to the breakdown of constitutional norms in the Jim 
Crow South.115 This strong and unprecedented116 holding was 
motivated by commitments to racial equality as much as 
111 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICAN’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 679 (1976).
112 Id. at 688 (quoting Memorandum from Robert H. Jackson on Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ. (Feb. 15, 1954) (on file with Library of Congress)). 
113 Joel K. Goldstein, Approaches to Brown v. Board of Education: Some Notes on 
Teaching a Seminal Case, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777, 806 (2004) (quoting ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 7 (1970)). 
114 Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 422, 
424 (1960). 
115 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
116 Not quite. A few state courts had reached a similar result in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. See, e.g., Coleman v. McLennan, 98 P. 281, 292 (Kan. 
1908); Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press, 9 N.W. 501, 524 (Mich. 1881). For the origins of 
actual malice, see MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS
LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 41–44 (1991).
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commitments to the First Amendment. The Sullivan litigation 
was part of the southern strategy to prevent media coverage of 
the civil rights movement by imposing huge libel damages for 
minor misstatements.117 In the trial court, Lester Sullivan 
obtained the largest damages award in Alabama history. Had 
racial concerns been absent, everyone knew Sullivan probably 
would have received nominal damages at most. The Supreme 
Court decision overturning that ruling permitted The New York 
Times, as well as major television networks, to remain in the 
South and continue providing shocked Americans with stories of 
police dogs attacking children on peaceful protest marches.  
The Supreme Court in Sullivan also improvised when 
issuing final judgment. The Court in an ordinary case would 
have remanded the case back to the Alabama courts for 
reconsideration in light of the new constitutional standard for 
determining libel. The Justices knew, however, that Alabama 
legal authorities would not determine in good faith whether 
Sullivan was a victim of actual malice. Rather, Chief Justice 
Warren could be confident that the courts in Alabama would 
award damages no matter what the judicial standard. For this 
reason, the Justices broke from routine practice, made a fact 
finding that actual malice could not be found, and entered a final 
judgment for The New York Times.118
Numerous other Warren Court decisions are best understood 
as the judges altering rules of normal practice to account for 
constitutional breakdowns in the Jim Crow South. Many of these 
cases were resolved on grounds other than racial equality. 
Michael Seidman details how the Justices conceptualized such 
cases as Miranda v. Arizona as responses to racist law 
enforcement practices rather than as efforts to construct neutral 
rules of constitutional criminal procedure that would apply in all 
times and places.119 A similar analysis could be offered of the 
motivation behind the Supreme Court’s decision to enter what 
117 See KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL
RIGHTS, LIBEL LAW AND THE FREE PRESS 69–70 (2011). The national press could have lost 
millions of dollars in potential liability if they lost lawsuits filed throughout the South by 
purportedly aggrieved white segregationists. Id. at 84–85. 
118 See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 285–86. 
119 Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673 (1992); see
also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Justice Felix Frankfurter called the “political thicket” of 
legislative districting120 in Baker v. Carr and then far more 
dramatically in Reynolds v. Sims, which upended the political 
systems of almost all the states.121 Earl Warren viewed these 
decisions as part of the “civil rights docket” of the Court, as 
means to ensure urban African-American votes counted as much 
as rural white votes.122 That Baker arose in Tennessee and 
Reynolds in Alabama was not coincidental, even if the doctrinal 
consequences, as in Sullivan, were national. “[T]he dominant 
motif of the Warren Court,” Lucas Powe details, was “an assault 
on the South as a unique legal and cultural region.”123
The Supreme Court during the civil rights era was 
responding to the constitutional failure to protect the rights of 
African Americans rather than engaging in ordinary 
constitutional decision-making. Brown might be regarded as 
implementing the constitutional commitment to racial equality,124 
although when making that decision the Supreme Court did not 
take seriously the original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,125 ignored evidence that Congress was primarily 
responsible for implementing the Fourteenth Amendment,126
implicitly engaged in forbidden motive analysis, and did not give 
elected officials the deference appropriate when a constitutional 
order is functioning within normal parameters.127 Sullivan,
Reynolds, Miranda, Morgan v. Virginia,128 and related cases 
however, belie constitutional politics as usual. The Supreme 
Court would not have dramatically changed the constitutional 
law of free speech, voting rights, constitutional criminal 
procedure, and the Dormant Commerce Clause had the Justices 
not regarded those cases as race cases and made rules to correct 
120 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
121 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 279–89 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590–625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
122 See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 381 (1997). 
123 LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 490 (2000).
124 See JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 230–31 (2011); Michael W. McConnell, 
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 952 (1995). 
125 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A 
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1884 (1995). 
126 See Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 1361 (2016). 
127 See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text. 
128 328 U.S. 373, 374, 386 (1946) (striking down on Dormant Commerce Clause 
grounds a Virginia law mandating segregation on interstate and intra-state motor cars). 
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both the breakdown of constitutional norms in the Jim Crow 
South and the constitutional failure of the elected branches of 
the national government to respond to that breakdown.129
Contemporary constitutional civil rights law was forged in failure. 
The Supreme Court has adjusted constitutional law when 
responding to acute constitutional failures, as well as the chronic 
failure of national, state, and local institutions to protect the 
rights of persons of color. During the Civil War, the Justices 
invented procedural mechanisms for avoiding ruling 
on the constitutional measures judicial majorities thought 
unconstitutional.130 Most notably, in Roosevelt v. Meyer, the 
Justices when holding no jurisdiction existed to determine 
whether the Legal Tender Act of 1863 was constitutional, ignored 
the provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789 giving the Supreme 
Court jurisdiction whenever a state court denied a claim of 
federal right.131 When peace was restored and normal 
constitutional operations returned, the Justices immediately 
overruled Roosevelt.132 The justices did not need decades to assess 
whether a constitutional breakdown had occurred. The Civil War 
Court abandoned precedent shortly after a constitutional crisis 
began and restored the status quo shortly after the constitutional 
crisis ended. 
V. FROM JIM CROW TO THE ANTI-PUBLIAN PRESIDENT
Brown, Sullivan, and other seminal decisions dismantling 
the segregated state provide the road map for constitutional 
responses to the Anti-Publian presidency of Donald Trump. Both 
Jim Crow and Trump’s election occurred because constitutional 
institutions failed, whether the failure was inherent in the 
institutions themselves or in the people operating the 
constitutional institutions. Constitutional decision makers faced 
with constitutional failures, American history teaches, jettison 
rules of constitutional practice and constitutional interpretation 
rooted in assumptions that constitutional institutions are 
functioning normally. The Warren Court, when dismantling Jim 
129 See supra notes 115–123 and accompanying text. 
130 This paragraph summarizes Mark A. Graber, Legal, Strategic or Legal Strategy: 
Deciding to Decide During the Civil War and Reconstruction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND 
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 33–66 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006). 
131 See Roosevelt v. Myers, 68 U.S. 512, 517 (1863). 
132 See Trebilcock v. Wilson, 79 U.S. 687, 687 (1871). 
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Crow, abandoned presumptions that former Confederate states 
were making good faith interpretations of the Equal Protection 
Clause. The Justices on that tribunal refused to defer to decisions 
made by white supremacists in circumstances that justified 
substantial deference to elected officials committed to 
constitutional norms. They did not assume good motives or 
rational decision making when segregationists claimed that 
separate but equal benefited persons of all races. While Donald 
Trump remains president, judges and other governing officials, 
when interpreting such exercises of executive power as the travel 
ban, the ban on transgendered persons in the armed forces, the 
withholding of federal funds from sanctuary cities and orders to 
prosecute Trump’s political rivals should be similarly wary. They 
should assume that Trump is far more devoted to pandering to 
his base by keeping unconstitutional campaign promises rather 
than defer to post hoc accounts of the underlying facts invented 
by administration lawyers for litigation purposes only. No one 
should assume Trump is engaged in rational decision making in 
the public interest when he makes decisions that seem better 
explained by his family’s financial interests or his desire to avoid 
criminal prosecution. 
When an anti-Publian president runs for office repeatedly 
promising flagrant constitutional violations, courts should adopt 
the presumption that the efforts to implement that platform 
violate the Constitution until the program is redesigned in ways 
that eliminate unconstitutional features “root and branch.”133
Donald Trump on the campaign trail declared he would prevent 
Muslims from immigrating to the United States.134 His first 
travel ban looked suspiciously like a Muslim ban. President 
Trump declared the executive order a travel ban.135 Lower courts 
were therefore correct in taking the President at his word rather 
than taking seriously the novel arguments administrative 
lawyers made in court when defending the constitutionality of 
the travel ban (“EO-2”). The Fourth Circuit, after pointing to 
133 Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968). 
134 These campaign statements are summarized in Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 575–76 (4th Cir. 2017). 
135 Eugene Scott & Ariane de Vogue, Trump says he’s calling it a ‘travel ban,’ CNN 
(June 5, 2017, 2:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/05/politics/trump-travel-ban-
courts/index.html [http://perma.cc/LNL3-TUHH].
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Donald Trump’s “numerous campaign statements expressing 
animus towards the Islamic faith” and “his proposal to ban 
Muslims from entering the United States,” concluded: 
Plaintiffs have more than plausibly alleged that EO-2’s stated 
national security interest was provided in bad faith, as a pretext for 
its religious purpose. And having concluded that the “facially 
legitimate” reason proffered by the government is not “bona fide,” we 
no longer defer to that reason and instead may “look behind” EO-2.136
Constitutional decision makers have no more reason to 
assume that Donald Trump’s executive orders are based on 
rational policy judgments than the Warren Court had to believe 
that segregated schools were grounded in reasonable pedagogy. 
The “minimum rationality” (or “rational basis”) test assumes a 
president (or other elected official) makes good faith efforts to 
pursue the common good or a plausible constitutional vision 
underlying the dominant political party.137 A president who has 
demonstrated a fondness for white supremacists138—more so 
than any other president since Woodrow Wilson left the White 
House—does not satisfy the conditions for deference on racial 
issues. A president who consistently puts his business interests 
ahead of the national interest139 does not meet the standard for 
deference when a potential conflict of interest is present. When 
Trump issues an executive order on matters that trench on race 
or Trump family business interests, other constitutional decision 
makers ought to demand a set of probable facts that clearly 
support the order, and not be satisfied with rationales developed 
for litigation purposes by the White House legal staff that bear 
little resemblance to the actual justifications for the announced 
policy. Members of the White House legal staff may have a 
lawyer’s duty to be “zealous” in presenting all conceivable 
arguments in favor of their client, although whether lawyers who 
collect their paychecks from the United States instead of from 
136 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 591–92. For a similar argument, see 
Vicki Jackson & Judith Resnik, Against Deference: Considering the Trump Travel Ban, 
Take Care (Dec. 8, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/against-deference-considering-the-
trump-travel-ban [http://perma.cc/YED5-63L7].
137 See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text. 
138 See Bret Stephens, President Jabberwock and the Jewish Right, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
19, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2v9MUnk. 
139 See Keith Whittington, Possibly Impeachable Offenses: The Need for Congressional 
Investigation, NISKANEN CENTER (Aug. 2, 2017), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/possibly-
impeachable-offenses/ [http://perma.cc/DG7L-79NK].
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Donald Trump personally can be singularly devoted to their 
individual client instead of the interests of the American people 
is debatable. Those on the receiving end of such argument labor 
more clearly under no such duty. 
Constitutional decision makers have no more reason for 
empowering Donald Trump to make complex policy decisions 
than they had to empower white supremacists to make decisions 
about race. The present delegation doctrine assumes a president 
has expertise or, more often, access to expertise on complex 
empirical and scientific questions.140 A president who does not 
care to be informed on and routinely lies about basic domestic 
and foreign policy matters141 does not meet this standard for 
open-ended delegations. Courts should therefore require clear 
statements from Congress that the Trump administration is 
authorized to make a policy before permitting the administration 
to make that policy. 
Many devices for disempowering the Trump administration 
apply standard judicial canons for avoiding constitutional 
litigation. Courts are expected to interpret statutes as not raising 
difficult constitutional problems, such as the scope of presidential 
authority, whenever possible. Justice Louis Brandeis, in 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, famously declared: 
“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although 
properly presented by the record, if there is also some other 
ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”142 Given the 
probability that Donald Trump’s executive orders are based on 
unconstitutional motives, engage in unconstitutional self-dealing, 
or do not meet constitutional standards for rational policy 
making, the judicial obligation to refrain from making 
unnecessary constitutional decisions should compel courts to 
require Congress to delegate clearly when Congress wishes to 
empower Donald Trump. 
140 See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405 (1928). 
141 See David Leonhardt & Stuart A. Thompson, Trump’s Lies, N.Y. TIMES
(July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/23/opinion/trumps-lies.
html?mcubz=0; see also David Brooks, Getting Trump Out of My Brain, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/opinion/getting-trump-out-of-my-
brain.html?mcubz=0 (“There’s nothing more to be learned about Trump’s mixture of 
ignorance, insecurity and narcissism. Every second spent on his bluster is more 
degrading than informative.”). 
142 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936). 
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The constitutional universe will hardly fall apart should 
courts and other constitutional decision makers, explicitly or 
implicitly, engage in motive analysis, up the standard of scrutiny, 
and interpret statutes as not delegating power when adjudicating 
Trump Administration efforts to exercise Article II powers. The 
constitutional universe did not fall apart when the Supreme 
Court abandoned inherited practices in order to repair the 
constitutional breakdown caused when southern (and many 
northern) governing officials committed to white supremacy 
refused to make good faith interpretations of the Equal 
Protection Clause. The innocuous Brown opinion generated a 
healthy debate over what policies are entailed by a constitutional 
commitment to racial equality.143 On some doctrinal matters, 
most notably free speech, courts have largely retained precedents 
that supported civil rights protestors and media coverage of the 
civil rights movement.144 On other doctrinal matters, most 
notably state action, courts largely abandoned precedents that 
struck down Jim Crow practices when litigants sought to extend 
those decisions to non-racial matters.145 On still other doctrinal 
matters, most notably constitutional criminal procedure, liberals 
and conservatives dispute whether rules put in force to prevent 
official racial abuses should remain in place today.146
The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County, Alabama 
v. Holder147 illustrates how Supreme Court Justices debate the 
status of precedents that respond to constitutional failures. All 
parties to that case agreed that “[t]he Voting Rights Act of 1965 
employed extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary 
problem.”148 Chief Justice John Roberts began his opinion by 
recognizing that “racial discrimination in voting” was “an 
insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in 
certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious 
defiance of the Constitution,” and that “exceptional conditions 
143 See Mark A. Graber, The Price of Fame: Brown as Celebrity, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 939,
1004–08 (2008). 
144 See, e.g., Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852 (2014). 
145 See Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 273, 276–77 (2010). 
146 See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting). 
147 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
148 Id. at 2618. 
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can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”149
Roberts then announced that the test originally adopted by 
Congress when passing the seminal Voting Rights Act of 1965 
that triggered what might well be called “strict scrutiny” by the 
Justice Department over any changes in voting laws by states 
was no longer needed in 2013, and therefore had become 
unconstitutional as an unnecessary incursion on state 
autonomy.150 Justice Ginsburg insisted that the prophylactic 
rules adopted by Congress in 1965 still made sense and that the 
judicial policy of deferring to Congressional judgment as to the 
remedies for voting discrimination should be maintained.151 Both 
Roberts and Ginsburg endorsed judicial decisions that adjusted 
constitutional doctrine in response to failures within the 
constitutional order. They disputed only whether those failures 
had been corrected and whether doctrine forged in constitutional 
failure ought to be maintained for the foreseeable future.152
The dispute between Roberts and Ginsburg in Shelby County 
highlights how the present question is not whether limits on the 
singular presidency of Donald Trump should apply forever to all 
future presidents. Future constitutional decision makers may 
conclude that both Trump and the rules used to constrain Trump 
were temporary aberrations or they may conclude that Trump 
represented a more enduring change in the American 
constitutional order that requires more enduring doctrinal 
adjustments. “Adaptation” by definition must be responsive to 
circumstances, but what those circumstances are and whether 
they warrant adaption is always controversial. The question is 
when what appears to be “settled doctrines” warrant some degree 
of “unsettlement” in light of what may be temporary aberrations 
or enduring changes in a constitutional order. If judicial decisions 
limiting the power of the Trump Administration unsettle 
constitutional law a bit, that may be a good thing,153 reminding 
us of the continuing wisdom of Justice Holmes’s placement of 
149 Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309, 334 (1966)). 
150 Id. at 2631. 
151 Id. at 2652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
152 Compare id. at 2625 (“Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.”), 
with id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting ongoing “‘second generation barriers’ to 
minority voting”). 
153 See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 6–8 (2001). 
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“experience” over “logic” as the most important motivating force 
for an effective legal order.154
CONCLUSION
Clinton Rossiter some seventy years ago published a truly 
important and disturbing book on the phenomenon of what he 
called “constitutional dictatorship.”155 Drawing in his American 
chapter primarily on Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt, he argued 
that in times of crisis, the United States, like Great Britain, 
France, and Germany (and ancient Rome), placed near-plenary 
power in their leaders to confront perceived crises.156 Rossiter 
dismissed any argument that we could in fact eliminate the 
need for “constitutional dictatorship.”157 That would require 
eliminating the presence of emergencies or crises that elicited 
displays of what could, under ordinary times, be described as 
presidential overreaching. Contemporary presidential power is 
here to stay, even if modified to some degree. More than ever, we 
have good reason to ask about the trustworthiness of presidents 
in whose hands we necessarily place immense powers that quite 
literally touch on national and world survival.  
Problems with presidential impeachments, as well as the 
enormous power of the president, further support our claims that 
non-Publian presidents ought not be trusted with Publian 
powers. An August poll revealed that forty-three percent of those 
surveyed support Trump’s impeachment, with twelve percent 
supporting censure by Congress.158 By October 31st, according to 
Public Policy Polling, the number had climbed to forty-nine 
percent, with only forty-one percent opposed.159 Still, this 
solution is close to a fantasy. Whether one believes that the 
framers in Philadelphia explicitly rejected making 
154 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n ed. 1881). 
155 See generally CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS
GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1979); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, 
Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2010). 
156 ROSSITER, supra note 155, at 207–314. 
157 Id. 
158 Tom O’Connor, Trump Impeachment Is Most Popular Solution Among Americans, 
Poll Says, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 26, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-
impeachment-most-popular-solution-americans-655556 [http://perma.cc/ZY36-SSVX].
159 See Support for Impeachment at Record High, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING
(Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.publicpolicypolling.com/polls/support-impeachment-record-
high/ [http://perma.cc/YU4N-2TYA].
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administrative “malfeasance” a ground for impeachment,160 or 
instead simply thinks Republicans in Congress—out of party 
loyalty or fear of their base—will not impeach for political 
malfeasance,161 advocating impeachment or invoking the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment at present is a form of expressive 
politics unresponsive to the constitutional problems presented by 
a lawless chief law enforcement officer of the land and a 
Commander-in-Chief who lacks the emotional maturity to toss off 
even trivial slights. 
One possible argument against our claim that the 
constitutional powers of the president are not indifferent to the 
officeholder is the possibility that the Framers of the 
Constitution, fearing human infallibility, drew firm lines in the 
sand. This constitution is one of fixed rules because human 
beings are tempted to abuse power otherwise.162 The Constitution 
of the United States “view[s] the abuse of power as the 
paramount evil,” Frederick Schauer maintains, and “thus 
choose[s] to minimize the occasions on which the abuse of power 
is not blocked, even at the cost of . . . imped[ing] the pursuit of 
the Good.”163 Those who take this view believe that even if acting 
on the consensual view that President Trump is unfit to hold 
office will have good short-term consequences, constitutional 
rules should be woodenly followed because in the long run, 
constitutional decision makers are more likely to misuse, rather 
than properly use, authority to constrain a president they believe 
a menace to constitutional government and perhaps to regime 
and human survival.164
160 See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 114–15 (2006).
161 For an argument that Congress may impeach for political malfeasance, see 
Whittington, supra note 139. 
162 See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED 21 (2012). 
163 Frederick Schauer, The Constitution as Text and Rule, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41,
50 (1987). 
164 See Jonathan Turley, What’s worse than leaving Trump in office? 
Impeaching him., WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
posteverything/wp/2017/08/24/whats-worse-than-leaving-trump-in-office-impeaching-him/? 
utm_term=.10c28cfcdf40 [http://perma.cc/8T96-H3RC] for a fine example of such 
woodenness. Turley fears that impeaching Trump, at least on the basis of what is known 
about him as of late August 2017, “would fundamentally alter the presidency, potentially 
setting up future presidents to face impeachment inquiries or even removal whenever the 
political winds shifted against them.” Id. Turley does not provide any reason for thinking 
Trump is fit to hold office. He does not deny, for example, that the Constitution of the 
United States presently entrusts a president who cannot ignore the most trivial insult 
with the power to begin a nuclear war. Turley’s argument, an example of neutral 
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The problem with interpreting constitutional powers as 
officeholder-indifferent is that The Federalist Papers make clear 
that the Constitution of fixed rules is not the Constitution of the 
United States. The fixed rules that comprise what Levinson 
terms the “Constitution of Settlement” concern the rules for 
staffing offices and making laws.165 The powers of each branch of 
the national government are as much a part of what Levinson 
terms the “Constitution of Conversation” as the “majestic 
generalities” of the Fourteenth Amendment.166 Some constitutional 
rules explain why presidents are elected like clockwork every four 
years.167 Other constitutional provisions explain why presidential 
power varies considerably over time and with each president; 
Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan were given far more 
deference by other officeholders than Herbert Hoover or Andrew 
Johnson.168 Treating Donald Trump as a normal president 
exercising normal Article II powers would be a far greater break 
from this historical practice than recognizing that a bigoted, 
ignorant liar should not be accorded the same deference as a 
president who might plausibly claim to be “pre-eminent for 
ability and virtue.”169
The obvious question in 2018 is whether realists committed 
to an experience-based politics should expect highly partisan 
members of Congress—and judges who are increasingly 
themselves identify with a single political party—to play their 
Publian role. That the answer may be no speaks to what Jack 
Balkin has termed “constitutional rot,”170 not to the underlying 
presuppositions of the Publian constitutional order that, 
paradoxically or not, most Americans profess to respect. The 
strongest response to our argument is that (almost) no one today 
principles run riot, is equivalent to the claim that Congress should not ban human 
sacrifices for fear of creating a precedent that might empower the national legislature in 
the future to ban religion. 
165 Levinson, supra note 162, at 19. 
166 Id. at 278. 
167 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
168 For studies demonstrating variance in presidential power over time and between 
presidents, see generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993); JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE
PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE (1972).
169 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 460–61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961). 
170 Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, 77 MD. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018). 
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takes truly seriously the notion of civic virtue and organizing our 
polity around it. That idea, associated with “civic republicanism,” 
was replaced by a much more “liberal” notion of politics that 
accepts the basic reality that all of us are motivated primarily by 
self-interest and unable (or, at least, unlikely) genuinely to tame 
those impulses in behalf of some evanescent idea of the “public 
interest” when the common good conflicts with our interests.171
One can find strong hints of this view in Federalist No. 10, 
perhaps the most canonical of all of the eighty-five Federalist 
essays. Down that road lies the Holmesian “bad man,” who looks 
at law simply as a price system that announces the costs of legal 
non-compliance, which assumes, of course, that the law will in 
fact be enforced.172 From one perspective, Trump is simply the 
latest exemplar of the “bad man” who in effect now constitutes 
our political order. 
Recent events nevertheless suggest that, outside of 
Congress, other government officials are implicitly recognizing 
that Trump is not entitled to the same Article II prerogatives as 
presidents constitutionally fit for office. Military officials have 
not blindly followed presidential orders or have suggested they 
may refuse when they doubt presidential authority. Secretary of 
Defense James Mathis and other military leaders dragged their 
feet or flatly refused to implement Trump’s Twitter order 
banning transgendered patriots from serving in the armed 
forces.173 General John Hyten, the head of the U.S. Strategic 
Command, declared that he will not automatically obey a 
presidential order to use nuclear weapons.174 Lower federal 
courts have been unusually stingy with presidential authority. 
Within weeks of Trump’s taking office, Benjamin Wittes and 
171 The seminal work on classical republicanism is JOHN GREVILLE AGARD POCOCK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC
REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975). For discussions of the differences between constitutional 
republicanism and constitutional liberalism, see Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 
YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539 (1988). 
172 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
459 (1897). 
173 See Travis J. Tritten, Coast Guard commandant signals he will resist Trump’s 
military transgender ban, WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.washington 
examiner.com/coast-guard-commandant-signals-he-will-resist-trumps-military-transgender- 
ban/article/2630294 [http://perma.cc/N4PV-UW8G].
174 Daniella Diaz, Top general says he’d push back against “illegal” nuclear strike 
order, CNN (Nov. 20, 2017, 5:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/18/politics/air-force-
general-john-hyten-nuclear-strike-donald-trump/index.html [http://perma.cc/Q774-RNU6].
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Quinta Jurecic observed “a large number of judges around the 
country behav[ing] in a fashion untouched by deference or any 
kind of presumption of regularity in the President’s behavior[.]”175
Federal courts have repeatedly found constitutional fault with 
Trump’s travel bans.176 Federal District Court Judge William 
Orrick recently granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the 
Trump Administration’s efforts from denying federal funding to 
sanctuary cities.177 Wittes and Jurecic suggest the “unprecedented 
barrage of leaks that has plagued the Trump administration” 
reflects common understandings that Trump is unfit for office.178
“[W]hen the bureaucracy doubts the president’s oath,” they write, 
“that fact gravely frays the executive’s ordinary comparative unity. 
The people who work for the president no longer connect loyalty to 
the executive branch with the lofty goals to which the oath seeks 
to bind the president, so they become much more likely to act on 
their own.”179 No military officer, judge, or leaker has justified his 
or her actions by claiming that Trump lacks the executive powers 
of previous presidents.180 Nevertheless, the lack of deference to 
presidential authority that persons outside of Congress have 
demonstrated in Trump’s first year seems unprecedented. 
Perhaps we are wrong about Donald Trump. Perhaps we are 
wrong about whether constitutional powers are indifferent to the 
officeholder. We are not wrong in thinking that the political order 
in the United States is in a severe state of constitutional rot.181
We hope with this paper to provoke specific constitutional 
conversations about the powers of an anti-Publian president, 
more general conversations about constitutional practice and 
interpretation during times of severe constitutional failures, and 
even more general conversations about whether the path to a 
more functional constitutional order lies in fixing our 
175 Benjamin Wittes & Quinta Jurecic, What Happens When We Don’t Believe the 
President’s Oath, LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-
happens-when-we-dont-believe-presidents-oath [http://perma.cc/YZ8T-F9FH].
176 See supra notes 134–136 and accompanying text. 
177 See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d. 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
178 Wittes & Jurecic, supra note 175. 
179 Id. Wittes and Jurecic further observe that when a “large number of people in the 
press cannot start with the presumption that the president is making a good faith effort 
to do his job . . . the press no longer presumes that any presidential statement is true.” Id.
180 Or, alas, cited a draft of this essay! 
181 See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, U. MD. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 5–9, 11–13). 
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constitutional order through better interpretations of 
constitutional provisions, changes in the constitutional culture 
responsible for the anti-Publian president, or changes in the 
constitutional text that generated the anti-Publian president. 
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War Powers Litigation After 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton
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INTRODUCTION
In modern times, judicial opinions have been largely absent 
from the debate over constitutional war powers. Among other 
things, it is widely assumed—especially in light of the courts’ 
avoidance of the issue during the Vietnam War—that the 
political question doctrine would preclude judicial determination 
of war-initiation powers. In Zivotofsky v. Clinton,1 however, the 
Supreme Court appeared to re-characterize and limit the political 
question doctrine in a way that might allow wider litigation of 
war powers issues. According to Zivotofsky, the doctrine does not 
preclude courts from determining the meaning of statutes and 
the Constitution in separation of powers disputes, even when 
substantial foreign affairs issues are at stake.2
The actual subject of the Zivotofsky litigation was, however, 
relatively modest as foreign affairs controversies go. The courts’ 
willingness to retreat from the political question doctrine will be 
more severely tested in matters of greater foreign affairs 
significance, such as war powers. This essay considers the 
implications of Zivotofsky for war powers litigation, including by 
revisiting the Vietnam-era decisions. It first asks whether 
Zivotofsky, if taken at face value, does indeed suggest a renewed 
viability of war powers litigation. Second, it asks whether, as a 
practical matter, courts can comfortably undertake the task of 
war powers adjudication. Third, it considers the value of more 
aggressive war powers adjudication, including whether a 
Zivotofsky-inspired approach to war powers disputes is consistent 
with the courts’ constitutional role. 
 * Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Professor of Law and Faculty Director of 
International and Comparative Law Programs, University of San Diego Law School. 
Thanks to Curtis Bradley, Tom Campbell, Michael Glennon, Martin Lederman, 
Saikrishna Prakash, Lisa Ramsey, Michael Rappaport, Stephen Vladeck, Ingrid 
Wuerth, and participants in the Yale-Duke Foreign Relations Law Roundtable for 
helpful comments. 
1 566 U.S. 189 (2012). 
2 Id. at 194–96. 
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I. ZIVOTOFSKY AS DOCTRINAL CHANGE
Zivotofsky v. Clinton appears to signal a major shift in 
thinking about justiciability in separation of powers disputes.3
Briefly, the case concerned a statute allowing U.S. citizens born 
in Jerusalem to request passports reflecting birth in “Jerusalem, 
Israel.”4 The U.S. executive branch refused to apply the statute, 
invoking the president’s supposedly exclusive control of foreign 
affairs and the diplomatically sensitive nature of Jerusalem’s 
political status. In a suit to enforce the statute, brought by the 
parents of Zivotofsky, a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem, the D.C. 
Circuit found the case to be a non-justiciable political question.5
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for six Justices reversed, 
emphasizing the central role of the judiciary in determining the 
meaning of the Constitution.6 Roberts’ opinion acknowledged 
that a political question might exist (a) if the Constitution’s text 
committed the decision to another branch or (b) if there were no 
judicially manageable standards by which to decide. But it found 
neither circumstance to exist in the passport dispute; to the 
contrary, the opinion emphasized that the case involved 
determining the constitutionality of a statute, which is “what 
courts do.”7
Prior to Zivotofsky, political question analysis had been 
dominated by Justice Brennan’s six-factor test in Baker v. Carr.8
Baker had been cited repeatedly by lower courts in political 
question cases9 (including the lower courts in Zivotofsky), and by 
then-Justice Rehnquist’s influential concurring opinion in 
Goldwater v. Carter, an opinion that seemed strongly to disfavor 
justiciability in separation of powers cases.10 But Zivotofsky
3 See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations 
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1925–26 (2015) (describing Zivotofsky as having “far-
reaching significance” for justiciability of foreign relations law cases). 
4 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107–228, 
§ 213(d), 116 Stat. 1350, 1366, § 214(d) (2002). 
5 See Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1232–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(principally concluding that decisions regarding recognition are textually committed to 
the executive branch); see also id. at 1240, 1244–45 (Judge Edwards, concurring) (finding 
on the merits that Section 214(d) unconstitutionally interfered with the president’s 
executive power). 
6 Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 191. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and 
Kagan joined Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion. Justice Sotomayor concurred in part and in 
the result, and Justice Alito concurred in the result. Justice Breyer was the sole dissenter. 
7 Id. at 201. 
8 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
9 See, e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 544, 549–58 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(sequentially applying each of Baker’s six factors). 
10 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., joined by 
Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., & Stevens, J., concurring). 
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barely mentioned Baker, citing it only in passing.11 More 
importantly, Zivotofsky—although rejecting a political question 
challenge—mentioned only two of Baker’s six factors (the ones 
noted above); it did not at any point describe the political 
question doctrine as resting on a six-factor test or acknowledge 
that Baker had suggested a six-factor test.12 And even more 
notably, the Baker factors Zivotofsky failed to mention were the 
most open-ended, the most easily invoked to defeat justiciability, 
and the most apparently relevant to Zivotofsky itself 
in particular: “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect 
due coordinate branches of government”; “an unusual need 
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made”; or “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.”13
Also of note, the Zivotofsky majority opinion did not discuss 
Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Goldwater—and Rehnquist’s 
analysis in Goldwater seems inconsistent with it. Goldwater
involved the question whether the president had to obtain the 
Senate’s approval before terminating a treaty in accordance with 
the treaty’s terms.14 Although it involved the constitutionality of 
an executive action rather than the constitutionality of a statute, 
in other respects the dispute in Goldwater fit with Roberts’ 
description of a question of constitutional law directed to the 
courts. As in Zivotofsky, Goldwater did not question the merits of 
the president’s policy; the question was not what decision 
should be made, but which branch, constitutionally, should make 
the decision. 
In sum, Zivotofsky appears to reaffirm and extend the 
view that foreign affairs controversies involving only the 
interpretation of statutes or the Constitution are not 
qualitatively different from ordinary statutory and constitutional 
questions. In disregarding Goldwater and much of Baker, it 
appears substantially to narrow the grounds upon which a 
11 See Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 195, 197, 201 (citing Baker directly only once, and 
indirectly only as quoted—incompletely—in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 
228 (1993)). 
12 Compare Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 195, 197, with id. at 202 (Sotomayor J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“In Baker, this Court identified six circumstances in which 
an issue might present a political question . . . .”). 
13 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
14 See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996. There was no opinion of the Court in Goldwater,
so Zivotofsky was under no obligation to cite it—but the Zivotofsky majority’s decision not 
to discuss Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence, which attracted four votes and had been seen 
as an important statement of the political question doctrine, seems significant. 
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political question can be found, and thus to open more separation 
of powers controversies to judicial resolution. 
The question remains, however, whether Zivotofsky is an 
isolated decision or a meaningful shift. Zivotofsky involved a 
relatively minor—even obscure—dispute about the wording of 
the passports of (one assumes) a very small number of people. 
Little evidence existed of major foreign policy disruption.15
Zivotofsky’s viability when the Court confronts more momentous 
matters seems open to doubt. 
To think about that question, consider the justiciability of 
war powers disputes. Under the Baker formulation—especially as 
applied in Goldwater—conventional wisdom has been that 
questions of the president’s unilateral ability to use military force 
are likely non-justiciable. But Zivotofsky calls that assumption 
into doubt, first by suggesting that constitutional disputes in 
foreign affairs are matters granted to the judiciary for resolution, 
and second by apparently dispensing with Baker’s concern for 
“respect due coordinate branches” and “embarrassment” arising 
from “multifarious pronouncements” on foreign affairs.16
Zivotofsky’s viability, however, may itself depend on the ability to 
construct a framework of justiciability for war powers disputes 
that is manageable and plausible. 
II. POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND VIETNAM-ERA WAR POWERS
LITIGATION
To make more concrete the questions posed above, this 
section considers the most extensive modern litigation of 
constitutional war powers. During the Vietnam War era, from 
1967 through 1974, lower courts heard multiple challenges to the 
war’s constitutionality. None of these challenges was successful 
in limiting the war, and none reached the Supreme Court apart 
from a single unexplained affirmance of a three-judge district 
court.17 Nonetheless, these cases provide a concrete historical 
example of war powers litigation. 
To begin, there is something of a myth that the Vietnam-era 
cases declared all war powers questions to be political questions. 
Some cases did, but others found some war powers issues to be 
political questions and others not to be. The diversity of 
questions and answers in the Vietnam-era thus offers a way to 
15 Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 191–94. 
16 Baker, 369 U.S. at 216–17, 225. These were the principal Baker factors not 
discussed in Zivotofsky.
17 Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). 
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start thinking about what a post-Zivotofsky war powers 
justiciability analysis might involve. 
Courts in the Vietnam era pursued at least three different 
approaches. Two major cases found war powers litigation broadly 
to be political questions. The D.C. Circuit, in one of the early 
cases, reached this conclusion almost without analysis, resting 
principally on the proposition that foreign affairs matters were 
for the president to determine.18 Somewhat later, a three-judge 
district court in Pennsylvania reached a similar conclusion after 
much more extended analysis; the Supreme Court affirmed this 
decision without opinion.19
The Second Circuit pursued an intermediate course in a 
series of cases. It found the basic question whether congressional 
authorization was needed for war initiation to be justiciable; on 
the merits, it found that congressional authorization was 
constitutionally required and had been given.20 However, 
ostensibly on political question grounds, it held that the method 
of authorization was up to Congress (thus rejecting, for example, 
the proposition that an actual formal declaration was required 
and accepting congressional authorization via the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution and appropriations in support of the military effort).21
In further litigation, the Second Circuit invoked the political 
question doctrine to avoid deciding two specific challenges. First, 
plaintiffs contended that the president’s decision to bomb North 
Vietnam and mine North Vietnamese harbors after a ceasefire 
lacked congressional approval.22 At this point, Congress had 
repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and indicated that the 
war should be wound down. Plaintiffs argued that the president’s 
actions were unapproved escalations, while the president argued 
that renewed bombing to enforce the ceasefire was the best way 
to achieve Congress’s goals.23 The court, on political question 
grounds, refused to second-guess the President’s strategic 
18 Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665–66 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“The fundamental 
division of authority and power established by the Constitution precludes judges from 
overseeing the conduct of foreign policy or the use and disposition of military power; these 
matters are plainly the exclusive province of Congress and the Executive.”). 
19 Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 698–707 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (relying heavily on 
Baker v. Carr), aff’d without opinion sub nom., Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973); 
see also Commonwealth of Mass. v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 32–33 (1st Cir. 1971) (finding the 
whole matter of war powers to be a political question, at least in the absence of an 
objection by Congress to the president’s actions). 
20 Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042–43 (2d Cir. 1971). 
21 Id. at 1043; accord DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971); Berk v. 
Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir. 1970). 
22 Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1041. 
23 Id.
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assessment.24 In a subsequent case, plaintiffs argued that 
the President’s bombing of Cambodia—ostensibly a neutral 
country—was not authorized by Congress. The President 
similarly claimed that the bombing was the best way to wind 
down U.S. involvement, and the court (this time over a dissent by 
Judge Oakes) refused to decide on political question grounds.25
A third group of opinions showed greater willingness to 
reach the merits. In a subsequent case in the D.C. Circuit, a 
divided panel followed the Second Circuit in finding that 
congressional authorization for the war was constitutionally 
required, and then, rejecting the Second Circuit’s analysis, 
concluded that Congress’s authorization could not be found 
merely from appropriations and other statutes passed to support 
the war effort.26 (Like most of the Second Circuit opinions, this 
case came after Congress’s repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution.) As a remedy, however, the court found injunctive 
relief inappropriate because at that point, the president (at 
Congress’s direction) appeared to be ending the U.S. involvement 
in any event.27 In addition, two dissenting opinions from the 
cases mentioned above argued for reaching the merits. Judge 
Lord dissented at length from the three-judge panel’s political 
question conclusion.28 In the Second Circuit, Judge Oakes would 
have found the Cambodian bombing unauthorized (at least after 
24 DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1152–53 (2d Cir. 1973). 
25 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973). The district court ruled on 
the merits that the Cambodia bombing was unconstitutional and directed that it cease. In 
a once-famous flurry of motions, the court of appeals stayed the district court order, and 
the plaintiffs asked Justice Thurgood Marshall, as circuit justice, to vacate the stay. 
When Marshall refused, plaintiffs asked Justice Douglas to lift the stay, and he did. See
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973) (Justice Marshall); id. at 1320 (Justice 
Douglas). On a motion from the government, Justice Marshall, with the concurrence of 
the full Court apart from Justice Douglas, overturned Justice Douglas’s order. See 
Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321, 1322 (1973). Ultimately, as noted in the text, the 
Second Circuit reversed the district court on political question grounds and the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari. See Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1315, cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). 
26 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615–16 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (concluding that “none of 
the legislation drawn to the court's attention [including appropriations and extension of 
the military draft] may serve as a valid assent to the Vietnam war”). As noted in the 
opinion, Judge Tamm would have found appropriations an adequate authorization. Id. at 
615. Four judges, including Judge Tamm, favored rehearing the case en banc on the 
grounds that appropriations were a proper mode of authorization. Id. at 616 (statement of 
Judge MacKinnon, joined by Judges Tamm, Robb, and Wilkey). 
27 Id. at 616 (finding it to be a political question whether the president was 
proceeding appropriately to end the war). 
28 Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 709, 712 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Judge Lord, dissenting) 
(“This case does not involve second guessing the wisdom of the Executive in a matter 
committed by the Constitution to that branch of the Government. It is rather a 
constitutional question concerning the division of power within our system, involving a 
determination of whether the executive branch has exceeded the scope of its 
constitutional power.”). 
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repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) because it had been secret 
and because it constituted a fundamental change in the scope of 
the war by involving an additional country in hostilities.29
These cases suggest at least three types of questions in war 
powers litigation: (1) whether Congress’s authorization of military 
action is required; (2) if so, whether Congress has authorized it; 
and (3) the scope of Congress’s authorization. They further 
suggest, as developed in the next section, that some of these 
questions are more susceptible to judicial resolution than others. 
III. WAR POWERS LITIGATION AFTER ZIVOTOFSKY
This section considers the extent to which Zivotofsky
vindicates the stronger view of war powers litigation in the 
Vietnam era. I conclude that it does, with significant limitations. 
A. Standing 
At the outset, it is worth noting that narrower modern views 
of standing would change the dynamics of the Vietnam-era 
litigation. Several of the major cases depended on theories of 
standing that are likely no longer viable: citizen suits, suits 
based on remote possibilities, and suits based on the standing of 
members of Congress.30 However, the litigation also reflected at 
least one theory of standing likely still available: suit by a 
member of the military challenging deployment into combat.31 It 
is also possible that people overseas affected by the conflict might 
have standing if U.S. citizens are in the war zone32 or if the Court 
recognizes the ability of non-citizens abroad to sue to enforce 
constitutional provisions.33 Further, it remains an open question 
whether Congress as a whole or one of its Houses (as opposed to 
individual members) can bring suit to protect congressional 
powers.34 Thus, modern standing law is likely to limit, but not 
foreclose, the possibility of war powers litigation. 
29 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315–18 (2d Cir. 1973) (Judge 
Oakes, dissenting). 
30 See, e.g., id. at 1307, 1315 (congressional standing); Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 613–14 
(congressional standing); Atlee, 347 F. Supp. at 691 (taxpayer standing). 
31 See, e.g., Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306–07 (2d Cir. 1970). 
32 See Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1515–21 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(finding U.S. citizen had standing to challenge U.S. military actions on his land in 
Honduras), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Weinberger v. Ramirez de Arellano, 
471 U.S. 1113 (1985). 
33 A possibility suggested by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795–98 (2008). 
34 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 66–77 (D.D.C. 
2015) (generally finding the question of the standing of the House of Representatives to be 
unresolved by prior cases, and concluding in the particular case that the House as an 
institution had standing to challenge some actions of the president); see also Ariz. State 
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B. Questions Involving Congressional Approval 
Whether Congress must authorize a military action has two 
components: (1) whether the declare war clause gives Congress 
exclusive authority over initiating war; and (2) if so, whether the 
conflict at issue is a “war” that requires Congress’s authorization. 
In Zivotofsky’s terms, the first question seems clearly one for the 
courts. It is a question of the Constitution’s meaning in the 
abstract; it does not require attention to any particular factors of 
any particular conflict. It is not meaningfully different from the 
question, for example, whether the president has authority to 
seize steel mills to avert a strike, or whether the president has 
authority to terminate treaties without Senate approval. True, it 
might lead to a decision that a particular executive-initiated 
conflict is unauthorized—quite possibly running afoul of the Baker
factors of embarrassment and multifarious pronouncements—but 
Zivotofsky appears to discount those factors, at least where a pure 
question of law is presented. True also, the constitutional 
question may be a hard one (at least for some types of conflicts), 
but Zivotofsky makes clear that even a difficult question of 
constitutional meaning is for the courts to decide.35
As a result, a post-Zivotofsky analysis confirms the view of 
the Second and D.C. Circuits in the Vietnam era that the need 
for congressional authorization is (or at least can be) a judicial 
question. The decisions that instead found a political question on 
this point rested on the proposition that the scope of the 
president’s foreign affairs powers is broadly nonjusticiable36—a 
proposition rejected in Zivotofsky. Nor is it clear that judicial 
engagement with the question is problematic: courts managed it 
in the Vietnam era37 as well as in earlier times.38
The second part of the authorization question is more 
problematic. Hostilities exist on a scale from minor skirmishes to 
total war. Some line must be drawn unless one thinks 
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663, 2665 n.12 (2015) 
(finding that Arizona legislature had standing to contest allegedly unconstitutional 
diminution of its powers, but expressly reserving the question of whether the U.S. 
Congress would have standing to challenge actions of the president). 
35 See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012) (acknowledging difficulty of the 
case but finding it to “demand[] careful examination of the textual, structural, and 
historical evidence put forward by the parties regarding the nature of the statute and of 
the passport and recognition powers”). 
36 See, e.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665–66 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
37 See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1369–70 (2d Cir. 1971). 
38 See The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 665–67 
(1863) (deciding on the merits whether President Lincoln’s naval blockade of the South 
during the Civil War was constitutional); see also infra Part IV (discussing 
additional cases). 
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(implausibly) that either all military actions must be authorized 
by Congress or none must be. The difficulty of drawing the line in 
some circumstances should not preclude adjudication when the 
line is clear, however, as the Second Circuit found in the 
Vietnam-era cases.39 Further, the issue can be made more 
manageable if courts approach it categorically, finding that the 
presence of certain circumstances do or do not bring a conflict 
within the need for approval. For example, in the 2011 Libya 
conflict, the President argued that congressional approval was 
not required because U.S. military actions consisted wholly of 
airstrikes, were of limited duration, and did not involve major 
threats to U.S. personnel.40 With these descriptions being largely 
uncontested as a factual matter, a court could decide as a matter 
of constitutional interpretation whether a conflict so described 
requires congressional authorization. 
On the other hand, some situations may resist categorical 
assessment because they depend on disputed or uncertain facts 
or subjective characterizations. For example, the U.S. military 
action in Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State seems 
challenging to describe categorically: the nature of the Islamic 
State, the extent of the U.S. role, and the U.S. objectives seem 
sufficiently unsettled that judicial assessment would be, at 
minimum, a qualitatively different task than the one envisioned 
in Zivotofsky.41
C. Questions Involving the Type of Congressional Approval 
A second major issue in the Vietnam era was whether 
Congress could authorize hostilities either by appropriations or 
by the vaguely worded Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Courts divided 
on whether that question was justiciable.42 Zivotofsky suggests 
that it should be. A court’s analysis here would not seem to 
depend on factual assessments or subjective characterizations. 
For example, the D.C. Circuit held that appropriations do not 
39 E.g., DaCosta, 448 F.2d at 1369 (concluding that the Vietnam conflict was a war 
for constitutional purposes). 
40 Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 6–14 (2011); see also
Michael D. Ramsey, Constitutional War Initiation and the Obama Presidency, 110 AMER.
J. INT’L L. 701, 701–07, 711–13 (2016) (discussing the constitutional debate over the Libya 
action). Compare Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention,
53 HOUS. L. REV. 971, 980–98 (2016) (defending the constitutionality of the U.S. military 
action), with Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Military Force and Violence but Neither War 
nor Hostilities, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 995, 998–1005 (2016) (finding the Libya action 
unconstitutional).
41 See infra Part VI (discussing post-Zivotofsky litigation challenging U.S. military 
action against the Islamic State). 
42 See supra Part II. 
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count as approval for constitutional purposes.43 Whether this is 
correct or not is a question of constitutional interpretation 
separate from the facts, policies, and descriptions of any 
particular conflict; the analysis would be analogous to the way 
the Court described Zivotofsky as requiring “careful examination 
of the textual, structural, and historical evidence put forward by 
the parties regarding the nature of the statute and of the 
passport and recognition powers.”44
One might conclude—as the Second Circuit did—that the 
Constitution delegates to Congress the decision how to authorize 
military conflict. Perhaps that makes it a political question 
(textually committed to another branch), as the Second Circuit 
described it.45 But Zivotofsky indicates that it is better 
understood as a decision on the merits: if the Constitution does 
not require any particular method of authorization, plaintiffs’ 
challenge to Congress’s method of authorization fails on the 
merits. Similarly, one might say in Zivotofsky that the 
president’s recognition power is exclusive and gives the president 
power to decide how to describe the status of Jerusalem. But as 
the decision in Zivotofsky (and the subsequent litigation)46
indicates, that is a question on the merits—whether the 
Constitution (as interpreted by the judiciary) gives the president 
that exclusive authority. 
In sum, courts should be able to decide, post-Zivotofsky,
whether the Constitution requires Congress’s authorization to be 
given in particular ways. 
D. Questions Involving the Scope of Congressional Approval 
The most difficult of the Vietnam-era cases appear to be 
challenges to the scope of congressional approval. These are 
almost necessarily fact-intensive—both what Congress approved 
and what is going on in a particular conflict. For example, if one 
concluded that after repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 
Congress had approved only actions designed to wind down the 
war, it is (as the Second Circuit found) hard to say what 
activities are designed to wind down the war.47 The decision of 
43 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In doing so, the court 
famously relied on “what every schoolboy knows”: that once hostilities begin, Congress 
will feel an obligation to fund them. Id.
44 Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 200 (2012). 
45 See DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971). 
46 See Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197, 204–05, 219–20 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (on 
remand, finding Section 214(d) unconstitutional as infringing the president’s recognition 
power), aff’d, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015). 
47 See DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1147–48 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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how to wind down the war seems within the category of 
presidential discretion Chief Justice Marshall identified in 
Marbury v. Madison, in the earliest formulation of the political 
question doctrine.48 And it calls for a political solution: if 
Congress wanted to narrow presidential discretion, it could write 
a narrower statute. 
The modern example of the conflict against the Islamic State 
is also illustrative. Arguably, Congress authorized U.S. military 
action against the Islamic State, either through the 2001 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force against the 
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, or the 2003 Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force in Iraq. But reaching either conclusion 
requires inquiry into difficult facts: to what extent the Islamic 
State was connected to al Qaeda, or to what extent the Islamic 
State was connected to prior Iraqi insurgent groups against 
whom military action was clearly authorized.49 Adjudication of 
these questions seems problematic and beyond Zivotofsky’s
direction. The inquiry would involve not merely the ordinary 
tools of constitutional interpretation, but also resolution 
of factual disputes and characterizations that may be less 
judicially manageable. 
Of course, often there will be no arguable congressional 
authorization of a military conflict—as with the U.S. action in 
Libya in 2011.50 And sometimes no plausible argument will 
stretch an authorization to cover a remote conflict. Judge Oakes’ 
opinion in the Cambodian bombing case51 may be an example of 
this: as the bombing was secret (and indeed the war had been 
fought on the premise that Cambodia was neutral), Congress’s 
appropriations for winding down the war it knew about seem 
inadequate to approve the Cambodian bombing, without 
requiring any inquiry into disputed facts or characterizations.52
Nonetheless, it seems likely that some disputes over the 
scope of congressional authorization will depend on how one 
characterizes the nature and purpose of the hostilities. 
Adjudication thus runs substantial risk of infringing the 
48 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–67 (1803); see also infra Part 
IV (discussing Marbury).
49 See generally Prakash, supra note 40 (considering these issues); see also infra Part 
VI (discussing litigation related to military action against the Islamic State). 
50 See Prakash, supra note 40, at 999. 
51 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315–18 (2d Cir. 1973) (Judge 
Oakes, dissenting). 
52 See John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part II: The 
Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1137–38, 
1147–48 (1990). 
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president’s war-fighting discretion or of involving the judiciary in 
the finding or characterization of facts for which it is manifestly 
unsuited. Both of these lines of the political question doctrine 
remain viable after Zivotofsky and should foreclose some aspects 
of war powers adjudication. 
E. Implications 
In sum, real and hypothetical war powers litigation indicate 
that the issues sometimes are largely questions of constitutional 
or statutory meaning and sometimes turn on disputed facts 
or subjective characterizations. A Zivotofsky-inspired approach 
suggests that the former are not political questions while the 
latter may be. Interpretation of statutes and the Constitution as 
a general matter is, Zivotofsky said, entrusted to the courts,53 and 
courts do not lack standards to decide such cases even where 
finding the right answer may be difficult or pose potential 
embarrassment to the president. The second category of cases, 
however, raises difficulties on both prongs of the political 
question doctrine that Zivotofsky left intact. Where there are 
conflicting views as to how to fight a war or how to characterize 
an enemy or a U.S. objective, the Constitution commits the 
discretion to the president, and the president should not be 
second-guessed by the courts (per Marbury).54 Situations where 
the facts are disputed, rapidly evolving, and difficult to 
characterize, suggest a lack of judicially manageable standards 
(or, to put it another way, a practical need to defer to the 
president’s assessment of the hostile situation). 
IV. ZIVOTOFSKY AND THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE COURTS
This section considers whether an expanded role for courts in 
war powers adjudication is consistent with the Constitution’s 
original meaning and the Constitution’s implementation in 
the early post-ratification era. It finds that Zivotofsky’s
distinction between interpreting legal texts, on one hand, and 
second-guessing the exercise of executive discretion, on the other, 
has strong roots in post-ratification practice and is supported by 
the Constitution’s text. 
To begin with the text, the Constitution does not suggest any 
difference in the courts’ role in war powers adjudication (and 
other foreign affairs-related adjudication) as compared to 
53 See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 200–02 (2012).
54 See generally Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV.
941 (2004). 
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ordinary constitutional litigation.55 The judiciary’s powers and 
duties with respect to adjudication are conveyed in general 
terms, without reservation as to war or foreign affairs powers.56
The grants of war and military powers to other branches of 
government are intermingled within the Constitution’s text with 
other grants of—and limits on—governmental powers without 
singling them out for special nonjusticiability. In contrast, some 
particular subjects may seem to be textually reserved to other 
branches. For example, “[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the 
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members;”57
“[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, 
punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the 
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member”;58 and “[t]he Senate 
shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”59 But there is 
no similar language relating to war powers controversies. 
Further, leading contemporaneous assessments of the text do not 
indicate any war-related exception to the courts’ decisional 
authority. Most notably, Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78, setting out 
the theory of judicial review later substantially adopted by 
Marbury v. Madison, does not refer to non-justiciability of war 
powers controversies.60
Modern assessments of the political question doctrine 
typically associate its origins with Chief Justice Marshall’s 
opinion in Marbury.61 An examination of Marbury and its 
subsequent applications indicate that Zivotofsky is consistent 
with early practice. Marbury’s discussion of the issue was 
as follows: 
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested 
with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is 
to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his 
political character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the 
performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain 
officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders. 
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be 
entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, 
55 See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
321–41 (2007). 
56 See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
57 Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
58 Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
59 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
60 See RAMSEY, supra note 55, at 330–31. 
61 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political 
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 
239 (2002). 
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still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. 
The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual 
rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the 
executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be 
perceived by adverting to the act of congress for establishing the 
department of foreign affairs. This officer, as his duties were 
prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the 
President. He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated. 
The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by 
the courts. 
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other 
duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when 
the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those 
acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his 
conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights 
of others. 
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of 
departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, 
merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in 
which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, 
nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only 
politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, 
and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it 
seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, 
has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.62
Marshall then gave as an example: “The power of nominating to 
the senate, and the power of appointing the person nominated, 
are political powers, to be exercised by the President according to 
his own discretion.”63 In contrast, he said, once the appointment 
is made, the president lacks discretion to revoke it (in the case of 
an officer not removable at will by the president).64
One might conclude from this discussion that Marshall’s idea 
of political questions was tautological: that is, where the 
president had discretion unbounded by law, courts—whose power 
is to “say what the law is”65—had no role. (This would be the 
case, for example, in the nomination/appointment illustration 
Marshall invoked.) But Marshall might also have had in mind 
situations in which the president exercised discretion bounded by 
law; for example, where the president made factual assessments 
or military judgments in support of the president’s constitutional 
powers. In any event, Marbury’s concept of political questions 
62 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803). 
63 Id. at 167. 
64 Id. at 162. 
65 Id. at 177. 
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arising from executive discretion would not displace the judicial 
role in interpreting legal texts, even where those texts relate to 
the extent of executive discretion. As Zivotofsky explained, there 
is a difference between asking whom the Constitution empowers 
to make a decision and asking whether the correct decision 
was made. 
This distinction runs implicitly through post-Marbury cases 
in the war and foreign affairs areas. Little v. Barreme, decided 
the next year, challenged the legality of the president’s order to 
seize ships sailing to or from French possessions during the naval 
hostilities with France.66 A statute authorized seizure of ships 
sailing “to”—but not “from”—French possessions; the Court read 
the statute literally and exclusively, finding the challenged 
seizure to be unlawful.67 The Court did not consider whether the 
case presented a political question. Similarly, in Murray 
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, the Court considered whether 
the U.S. Navy’s seizure of a ship was authorized by the 
Non-Intercourse Act; the Court found it was not authorized 
because the ship was not American-owned (in doing so, giving 
rise to the “Charming Betsy canon” that statutes should, if 
possible, be construed not to violate international law).68 As in 
Little, the Court did not consider whether the issue was a 
political question. Finally, in Brown v. United States, the Court 
again found a seizure unconstitutional—in that case, the 
executive branch’s seizure of British-owned timber during the 
War of 1812.69 Writing for the Court, Marshall found the seizure 
unconstitutional because it was not authorized by Congress’s 
declaration of war and therefore it was beyond the president’s 
constitutional powers.70 Thus, all three cases found executive 
branch action in wartime to be illegal without expressing any 
reservations about justiciability. That view is consistent with 
Marbury because in each case, the question was not whether the 
president or the executive branch had properly exercised 
discretion, but whether the president or the executive branch had 
66 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178 (1804). 
67 Id. at 178–79. 
68 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117–18 (1804). 
69 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 150–52 (1814). 
70 See id. at 122–25; see also David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, 
International Law in the Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 7, 40–41 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey 
& William S. Dodge eds., 2011). Specifically, Brown was an application of the Charming
Betsy canon: the Court found that international law generally allowed enemy aliens a 
period after a declaration of war to withdraw their property to avoid confiscation, and 
that the 1812 declaration of war, because it lacked language to the contrary, should be 
read not to violate this practice. Id.
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been granted discretionary power by the Constitution or 
applicable statutes. 
In contrast, the Court did appear to invoke a form of the 
political question doctrine in its early cases to avoid reviewing 
executive branch factual determinations or other discretionary 
determinations, or to avoid making such determinations for 
itself. In United States v. Palmer, for example, the Court refused 
to assess the legitimacy of a rebellious government in the 
Spanish colonies.71 Marshall wrote for the Court: 
Those questions which respect the rights of a part of a foreign empire, 
which asserts, and is contending for its independence, and the conduct 
which must be observed by the courts of the union towards the 
subjects of such section of an empire who may be brought before the 
tribunals of this country, are equally delicate and difficult. 
As it is understood that the construction which has been given to the 
act of congress, will render a particular answer to them unnecessary, 
the court will only observe, that such questions are generally rather 
political than legal in their character. They belong more properly to 
those who can declare what the law shall be; who can place the nation 
in such a position with respect to foreign powers as to their own 
judgment shall appear wise; to whom are entrusted all its foreign 
relations; than to that tribunal whose power as well as duty is 
confined to the application of the rule which the legislature may 
prescribe for it. In such contests a nation may engage itself with the 
one party or the other—may observe absolute neutrality—may 
recognize the new state absolutely—or may make a limited 
recognition of it. The proceeding in courts must depend so entirely on 
the course of the government, that it is difficult to give a precise 
answer to questions which do not refer to a particular nation. It may 
be said, generally, that if the government remains neutral, and 
recognizes the existence of a civil war, its courts cannot consider as 
criminal those acts of hostility which war authorizes, and which the 
new government may direct against its enemy. To decide otherwise, 
would be to determine that the war prosecuted by one of the parties 
was unlawful, and would be to arrange the nation to which the court 
belongs against that party. This would transcend the limits prescribed 
to the judicial department.72
Similarly, in Rose v. Himely, Marshall wrote for the 
Court: “It is for governments to decide whether they will consider 
St. Domingo as an independent nation, and until such decision 
shall be made, or France shall relinquish her claim, courts of 
justice must consider the ancient state of things as remaining 
71 United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634–35 (1818). 
72 Id.
2018] War Powers Litigation After Zivotofsky v. Clinton 193 
unaltered . . . .”73 Notably, none of these cases involved a question 
of executive or congressional authority under the Constitution or 
a statute, and thus they did not involve pure questions of 
interpretation of legal texts as emphasized in Zivotofsky.74
The historical litigation most similar to potential modern 
war powers litigation is The Prize Cases, decided in 1863. The 
issue was whether President Lincoln’s naval blockade of the 
South during the Civil War was unconstitutional as beyond 
presidential power.75 Despite the wartime setting, the Court 
decided the case on the merits. As a co-author and I previously 
described it: 
The most immediately striking aspect of the Prize Cases is that the 
Court considered a constitutional challenge to the President’s military 
actions during wartime and very nearly ruled against the President. 
And this attention came despite strong arguments by the President’s 
counsel for judicial abstention (including, apparently, the suggestion 
that deciding the merits would make the Court “an ally of 
the enemy”). . . . 
But although the Court made a show of deciding the cases on their 
merits, the majority opinion contained language of substantial 
deference to the executive. The Court was quite willing to accept the 
President’s characterization of the situation as war (even though, at 
the time the blockade was proclaimed, shots had been fired only at a 
single fort, and no one had been killed by hostile fire). Indeed, 
[Justice] Grier [in the majority opinion] asserted that the President’s 
determination on this ground was conclusive on the Court . . . . 
73 Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 272 (1808). For later cases, see Foster v. 
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829) (“In a controversy between two nations 
concerning national boundary . . . the Court [must] conform its decisions to the will of the 
legislature . . . .”); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 419–20 (1839) 
(finding that the executive determination that Falkland Islands were not part of the 
territory of Buenos Aires was conclusive on the judiciary); Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. 
(14 How.) 38, 51 (1852) (finding that executive determination regarding status of Texas 
after the Texas revolution was conclusive on judiciary); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 
635, 635 (1854) (holding that whether the King of Spain had authority to annul land 
grants made to Spanish citizens was not a judicial question); and Jones v. United States,
137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (“Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a 
judicial, but a political question, the determination of which by the legislative and 
executive departments . . . conclusively binds the judges . . . .”). See also Tara Leigh 
Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 
1909–15 (2015) (reviewing cases); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 592 (2007) (“[A]n important branch of [the political question] 
doctrine [in the nineteenth century] operated to identify factual questions on which courts 
would accept the political branches’ determinations as binding.”). 
74 See Grove, supra note 73, at 1918 n.41 (concluding that “the traditional [political 
question] doctrine did not encompass constitutional questions (that is, the determination 
whether a statute or other governmental action complied with the Constitution)”).  
75 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 640–41 (1863). 
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On the other hand, notwithstanding the language of deference, on the 
crucial question whether the insurrection had progressed to the level 
of a full-blown civil war the Court also referred to contemporaneous 
recognition of a state of war by foreign nations, the comparatively 
amorphous and evolving nature of civil war, the disruption of the 
courts, and the commonsense obviousness of its conclusion before 
making the point about deference. Indeed, one could easily argue that 
the executive deference point . . . was a throwaway claim of little 
consequence placed late in the opinion.76
Thus, while the decision can be read to support varying 
levels of deference to executive factual determinations, it strongly 
supports the basic justiciability of war powers claims. To be sure, 
the decision came long after the immediate post-ratification 
period, and so may not be strongly indicative of the original view 
of the courts’ role in such controversies. But it indicates that, at 
least in the nineteenth century, constitutional war powers 
questions were not regarded as categorically beyond the reach 
of courts. 
V. POLICY
The foregoing discussion suggests that Zivotofsky can be 
applied to war powers litigation to produce a manageable but not 
excessive role for courts. This section briefly considers whether it 
should be as a matter of contemporary policy. 
To begin, I assume courts—if they reach the merits—might 
plausibly find significant instances where congressional approval 
of hostilities is constitutionally required. The most obvious 
concern is that this conclusion would interfere with national 
security by preventing necessary U.S. military action. This 
concern might arise from at least three circumstances: (1) courts 
might require the president to desist from needed action; (2) the 
president might not take action after concluding that Congress 
would not approve or when Congress in fact refuses to approve; 
and (3) the president might not take action because it appears 
Congress would not be able to approve in time to make the 
action meaningful.  
As to the first category, the president’s most evident recourse 
in the event of an adverse judicial decision is not to stop 
hostilities, but to gain Congress’s approval. If the military action 
is truly necessary, Congress can be expected to approve. If 
76 Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cases: Executive 
Action and Judicial Review in Wartime, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 86–87 
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
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Congress does not approve, that at least raises the possibility 
that the action is not necessary (so the president’s inability to 
pursue it would not be a material downside to adjudication). 
Whether Congress is, in the general case, likely to mis-assess the 
need for military action seems speculative. The second category 
involves similar analysis. The president’s inability to act due to 
Congress’s actual or anticipated failure to approve is problematic 
only if one thinks Congress is systematically likely to disapprove 
military actions the president favors and are needed.77 It is not 
clear that is the case. As to the third category, Congress has 
shown—for example, in approving the post-9/11 Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”)78—that it can act relatively 
quickly. In any event, in the face of a time-sensitive emergency, 
the president has the option of acting quickly and seeking 
retroactive approval—a course followed by presidents in 
various circumstances.79
A related concern is that if courts find an ongoing war 
unconstitutional, it may be difficult and dangerous for the United 
States to disengage. Of course, Congress can solve the problem by 
authorizing the war, but suppose Congress does not approve of 
the war. Arguments for finding a political question in the 
Vietnam-era cases in part reflect this concern: even if Congress 
did not approve the war, the war could not be easily discontinued 
at judicial direction. 
This concern, while substantial, may be overstated. First, 
many conflicts may be relatively easy to discontinue.80 Second, 
even without a broad political question doctrine, courts will have 
various methods of restraint. For example, the D.C. Circuit in the 
Vietnam-era litigation found the war’s initiation to have been 
unconstitutional due to lack of congressional authorization, but 
refused to order any remedy.81 Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, if courts begin more active adjudication of war 
77 For example, in 2013 President Obama considered military action against Syria in 
response to the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons against rebel forces. 
However, the U.S. Congress appeared unlikely to approve, and the President decided not 
to proceed without Congress’s approval. See Ramsey, supra note 40, at 714–15 (discussing 
this episode). It is not clear whether this is an example of Congress impeding a needed 
military action or constraining an unwise one. 
78 The 2001 AUMF was approved on September 18, 2001, seven days after the 9/11 
attack. See Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. Law No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001). 
79 For example, by President Lincoln at the start of the Civil War. See Lee & 
Ramsey, supra note 76, at 53. 
80 One could easily imagine prompt U.S. disengagement from a conflict such as the 
2011 Libya intervention. 
81 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
196 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:1
powers disputes, presidents would be less likely to undertake 
substantial commitments without Congress’s approval. 
Relatedly, courts can use situations in which they uphold 
presidential action to establish a framework for when Congress’s 
approval is required. For example, in The Prize Cases, decided 
during the Civil War, the Court upheld the challenged 
presidential action (imposing a blockade on the South); the 
majority emphasized that the blockade was a defensive response 
to hostilities begun by the other side, while noting that the 
president could not begin offensive hostilities without Congress’s 
approval.82 Similarly, the Second Circuit in the Vietnam-era 
cases found that Congress’s approval was required, but that 
approval had been given.83
A further potential problem with enhanced adjudication is 
that courts, nervous about the downsides discussed above, might 
give the president more authority than the Constitution allows, 
and thus license greater presidential adventurism by giving it 
formal judicial approval. This concern cannot be entirely 
discounted, but seems speculative in light of the remedy of 
subsequent congressional authorization (that is, in most cases, 
courts would be able to ascribe any bad consequences to 
Congress’s failure to authorize the military action). 
On the other hand, some material advantages seem to arise 
from more aggressive war powers adjudication. First, as 
discussed above,84 a Zivotofsky-inspired approach seems most 
consistent with the judiciary’s original constitutional role. 
Marbury—echoing Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78—called for the 
judiciary to say what the law is, without exception for 
cases affecting foreign affairs or cases that might involve 
embarrassment or multifarious pronouncements.85 The 
expansive Baker factors were a modern invention. In the early 
post-ratification period86 (and throughout the nineteenth 
century87) courts adjudicated the legality of military force 
without invoking political question concerns. It is true, of course, 
that Marbury acknowledged a category of political questions 
82 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668–69 (1863); Lee & Ramsey, supra note 
76, at 72–78, 85. 
83 See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1369–70 (2d Cir. 1971). 
84 See supra Part IV. 
85 See RAMSEY, supra note 55, at 321, 329–34. 
86 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 176–79 (1804); RAMSEY, supra
note 55, at 332–33 (listing further examples). 
87 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 668–69; see also Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 
How.) 115, 115 (1851) (allowing a claim against military officer for seizure of property in 
Mexico in connection with war effort despite claims of military necessity). 
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outside judicial competence.88 But that category does not extend 
to matters of constitutional and statutory interpretation. 
Second, enhanced judicial involvement would likely provide 
a greater check on the president. Currently it is largely left to 
Congress to provide a political check. However, Congress’s 
practical ability to check the president in war powers matters 
seems open to doubt. Congress may lack the incentives and 
political will to contest the president in war powers controversies 
except in extreme circumstances. Although one may debate 
whether more checks upon the president in war powers are 
desirable, they seem consistent with the Constitution’s original 
design. Multiple framers argued that the president’s excessive 
tendency to war required congressional involvement in the 
war-initiation decision.89
Third, modern war powers authority suffers from the 
perception that it lacks a rule of law. That is, with regard to any 
presidential military action, there is debate in commentary (and 
sometimes in Congress) whether it is constitutional, often with 
multiple voices claiming the president is acting illegally.90
However, without an authoritative decision maker to resolve 
these claims, the law remains unsettled and contested. Even if 
(as was likely true in the Vietnam conflict) the president acts 
with adequate approval, constitutional questions may cloud his 
authority. The president (and the country) likely would have 
benefitted from a clear, prompt judicial ruling that the Vietnam 
conflict was constitutional. 
Finally, the likely result of greater judicial involvement 
would be greater cooperation between the president and 
Congress in war powers matters. In many modern conflicts in 
which congressional approval was not sought, approval likely 
would have been forthcoming: the president might choose not to 
seek approval because there might seem no immediate gain from 
doing so, not because there is a major disagreement between the 
president and Congress. It seems plausible, for example, that 
Congress would have approved military strikes in Libya, and it 
88 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803); see also United States 
v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634–35 (1818) (referring to “questions [that] are 
generally rather political than legal in their character”); Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 
112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (finding that the president had constitutional power to protect 
U.S. citizens abroad, and that whether the use of force was necessary in the particular 
circumstances was a matter of executive discretion and thus was a “public political 
question” unreviewable under Marbury).
89 See RAMSEY, supra note 55, at 235–37. 
90 See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 40. 
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seems likely Congress would approve continuing military action 
against the Islamic State. In the long term, the president would 
be in a stronger position directing a unified rather than a 
unilateral military action. 
VI. POST-ZIVOTOFSKY WAR POWERS LITIGATION IN THE LOWER
COURTS
This section reviews post-Zivotofsky war powers litigation in 
the lower courts, focusing on two leading cases: Jaber v. United 
States91 and Smith v. Obama.92 Although both decisions found a 
political question barrier to the particular dispute, their 
application of Zivotofsky follows the discussion above and 
confirms the justiciability of some war powers disputes. 
In Jaber, the plaintiffs’ relatives were killed by a U.S. drone 
strike in Yemen.93 The relatives were not targets of the strike but 
unfortunately were in the vicinity of al Qaeda members who were 
targeted. The plaintiffs made various claims under two U.S. 
statutes, the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and the Torture Victim 
Protection Act (“TVPA”), that the strike violated international 
law.94 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 
the claim on political question grounds, with this assessment 
of Zivotofsky:
Zivotofsky confirms no per se rule renders a claim nonjusticiable solely 
because it implicates foreign relations. Rather, it recognizes that, in 
foreign policy cases, courts must first ascertain if “[t]he federal courts 
are . . . being asked to supplant a foreign policy decision of the 
political branches with the courts’ own unmoored determination” or, 
instead, merely tasked with, for instance, the “familiar judicial 
exercise” of determining how a statute should be interpreted or 
whether it is constitutional. In the latter case, the claim is justiciable. 
Therefore, if the court is called upon to serve as “a forum for 
reconsidering the wisdom of discretionary decisions made by the 
political branches in the realm of foreign policy or national security[,]” 
then the political question doctrine is implicated, and the court 
cannot proceed.
Zivotofsky sought only to enforce a statute alleged to directly regulate 
the Executive, and the reviewing court needed to determine only “if 
Zivotofsky’s interpretation of the statute [was] correct, and whether 
the statute [was] constitutional.” The Court was not called upon 
91 861 F.3d 241 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
92 217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016). 
93 Jaber, 861 F.3d at 243. 
94 Id. The plaintiffs did not claim that the strike was unconstitutional, presumably 
because they thought the 2001 AUMF had authorized hostilities against al Qaeda 
personnel in Yemen. 
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to impose its own foreign policy judgment on the political branches, 
only to say whether the congressional statute encroached on the 
Executive’s constitutional authority. This is the wheelhouse of the 
Judiciary, and accordingly, it does not constitute a nonjusticiable 
political question. Here, however, Plaintiffs assert claims under the 
TVPA and the ATS that would require the Court to second-guess the 
wisdom of the Executive’s decision to employ lethal force against a 
national security target—to determine, among other things, whether 
“an urgent military purpose or other emergency justified” a particular 
drone strike. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ request is more analogous to an action 
challenging the Secretary of State’s independent refusal to recognize 
Israel as the rightful sovereign of the city of Jerusalem, a decision 
clearly committed to executive discretion.95
This assessment seems correct and consistent with some 
justiciability of war powers claims. The key is the court’s 
characterization of the claims as “requir[ing] the Court to 
second-guess the wisdom of the Executive’s decision to employ 
lethal force against a national security target—to determine, 
among other things, whether an ‘urgent military purpose or 
other emergency justified’ a particular drone strike.”96 This 
situation-specific analysis, which does seem to render 
justiciability problematic even under a broad view of Zivotofsky,
would not be present in the more typical constitutional dispute 
over presidential war initiation. Where the question is simply 
whether the president has independent constitutional authority 
to act in response to a set of undisputed events, the situation is 
analogous to the one described by the court as justiciable: where 
the court is “tasked with, for instance, the ‘familiar judicial 
exercise’ of determining how a statute should be interpreted or 
whether it is constitutional.”97 In the war powers situation, 
typically the court would be assessing whether an executive 
action (rather than a statute) is unconstitutional, but that should 
not be a material distinction in many cases. As in Zivotofsky (and 
in contrast to Jaber), the question for the court would be which 
branch has decision-making authority under the Constitution, 
not what decision should be made. 
Smith v. Obama involved a service member’s constitutional 
challenge to the president’s use of force against the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria.98 The central claim was that neither the 2001 
AUMF nor the 2002 authorization of the action against Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq provided congressional authorization for military 
95 Id. at 248–49 (citations omitted). 
96 Id. at 249 (citation omitted). 
97 Id. at 248 (quoting Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)). 
98 See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 284 (D.D.C. 2016). 
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action against the Islamic State.99 The district court dismissed 
the claim on political question grounds after a careful assessment 
of Zivotofsky.100 Acknowledging that not all questions relating to 
war are nonjusticiable, the court stated: 
[T]he Court begins by clarifying the precise questions posed by 
Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s claims are premised on the notion that 
Congress has not previously authorized the use of force against [the 
Islamic State]. Defendant disputes this. Resolving this dispute would 
require the Court to determine whether the legal authorizations for 
the use of military force relied on by President Obama—the 2001 and 
2002 AUMFs—in fact authorize the use of force against [the Islamic 
State]. With regard to the 2001 AUMF, the Court would have to 
determine whether the President is correct that [the Islamic State] is 
among “those nations, organizations, or persons” that “planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons,” and 
that Operation Inherent Resolve represents “necessary and 
appropriate force” against that group. With regard to the 2002 AUMF, 
the Court would have to determine whether the President is correct 
that operations against [the Islamic State] are “necessary and 
appropriate in order to . . . defend the national security of the United 
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.” For the reasons 
set out below, the Court finds that these are political questions under 
the first two Baker factors: the issues raised are primarily ones 
committed to the political branches of government, and the Court 
lacks judicially manageable standards, and is otherwise ill-equipped, 
to resolve them.101
The court then elaborated: 
Plaintiff’s attempts to analogize his case to Zivotofsky are strained. 
Although, as in Zivotofsky, statutes are involved in this case—in 
particular, the War Powers Resolution, the 2001 AUMF and the 2002 
AUMF—this case does not present nearly the same fundamental legal 
issues as were at issue in Zivotofsky. The questions posed in this case 
go significantly beyond interpreting statutes and determining whether 
99 See Charlie Savage, An Army Captain Takes Obama to Court Over ISIS Fight,
N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/us/islamic-state-war-
powers-lawsuit-obama.html?mcubz=0; Bruce Ackerman, Is America’s War on ISIS 
Illegal?, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/opinion/is-
americas-war-on-isis-illegal.html?mcubz=0. The statutes, rather than independent 
presidential power, were the president’s principal bases for authority to take military 
action against the Islamic State. See Ramsey, supra note 40, at 710–11. 
100 See Smith, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 297. The court also found that Smith lacked 
standing as an independent ground for dismissal. Id. at 285. The case is currently on 
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, where the standing issue has taken a 
central role after the plaintiff’s departure from active service in the military. See Brief for 
Appellee at 17–25, Smith v. Obama (No. 16-5377), https://www.scribd.com/document/ 
351181196/DOJ-Response-to-Nathan-Michael-Smith-Appeal [http://perma.cc/3G5S-LSDK].
101 Smith, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 298 (citations omitted). 
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they are constitutional. Plaintiff asks the Court to second-guess the 
Executive’s application of these statutes to specific facts on the ground 
in an ongoing combat mission halfway around the world. For example, 
the Court is not asked simply to “interpret” the 2001 AUMF, or to 
determine its constitutionality. It is asked to determine whether the 
President is correct that [the Islamic State], as it exists today, is an 
appropriate target under that resolution based on the nature and 
extent of [the Islamic State]’s relationship and connections with the 
terrorist organization that the President has determined was 
responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks. The Court would also 
have to go further than simply “interpreting” the 2002 AUMF. It 
would have to determine whether the President is correct that the 
ongoing military action against [the Islamic State] is in fact 
“necessary and appropriate in order to . . . defend the national 
security of the United States against the continuing threat posed 
by Iraq.” 
The reality, then, is more nuanced than Plaintiff suggests. Plaintiff’s 
claims raise mixed questions of both discretionary military 
judgment and statutory interpretation. The Court does not read 
Zivotofsky as foreclosing the application of the political question 
doctrine under this scenario.102
Again, the court’s emphasis is on the claim involving “mixed 
questions of both discretionary military judgment and statutory 
interpretation.”103 As discussed above, one can imagine many 
situations in which war-initiation disputes are such mixed 
questions; but one can also imagine many situations in which 
such disputes are not mixed questions and involve only questions 
of constitutional interpretation. Consistent with Zivotofsky, the 
Smith court’s analysis suggests that the latter disputes might 
be justiciable. 
The court then focused on the key Zivotofsky factors: textual 
commitment and judicially manageable standards: 
First, certain aspects of the questions posed by this case are 
indisputably and completely committed to the political branches of 
government. Both the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs authorize only that force 
that the President determines is “necessary and appropriate.” The 
necessity and appropriateness of military action is precisely the type 
of discretionary military determination that is committed to the 
political branches and which the Court has no judicially manageable 
standards to adjudicate. 
Second, . . . [b]ased on the pleadings thus far alone, the Court can 
easily discern that this case raises factual questions that are not of a 
type the Court is equipped to handle with traditional judicially 
102 Id. at 299–300 (citations omitted). 
103 Id. at 300. 
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manageable standards. The President and Department of Defense 
officials apparently believe that [the Islamic State] is connected with 
al Qaeda and that, despite public rifts, some allegiances between the 
groups persist and [the Islamic State] continues to pursue the same 
mission today as it did before allegedly splintering from al Qaeda. 
Plaintiff disputes these factual assertions, relying on an affidavit from 
scholars of Islamic Law that argue that as of today, the groups are in 
fact sufficiently distinct, and potentially even antagonistic, that they 
can no longer be viewed as the same terrorist organization. Resolving 
this dispute would require inquiries into sensitive military 
determinations, presumably made based on intelligence collected on 
the ground in a live theatre of combat, and potentially changing and 
developing on an ongoing basis. See Al–Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 
F.Supp.2d 1, 45 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The difficulty that U.S. courts would 
encounter if they were tasked with ‘ascertaining the ‘facts’ of military 
decisions exercised thousands of miles from the forum, lies at the 
heart of the determination whether the question [posed] is a 
‘political’ one.’”) (quoting DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1148 
(2d Cir. 1973)).104
Thus, if a war powers claim did not involve such factual 
determinations (and some plausibly might not), this reasoning 
suggests that the claim would be justiciable.105 As a result, the 
104 Id. at 300–01 (some citations omitted). 
105 The court added a further consideration that might pose a broader barrier to 
war powers litigation, but that also seems unsupported by either Zivotofsky or 
the Constitution: 
Finally, an additional factor makes judicial intervention particularly 
inappropriate on the specific facts of this case. Unlike the situation presented 
in Zivotofsky, the Court in this case is not presented with a dispute between 
the two political branches regarding the challenged action. In fact, Congress 
has repeatedly provided funding for the effort against [the Islamic State]. For 
example, on November 10, 2014, President Obama sent a letter to the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives requesting that Congress consider proposed 
amendments to the 2015 Budget to provide funding for Operation Inherent 
Resolve. The letter explained that “[t]hese amendments would provide $5.6 
billion for OCO activities to degrade and ultimately defeat the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—including military operations as part of Operation 
Inherent Resolve.” President Obama also attached a letter from the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, which explained in some detail the 
military operations that the additional budget would be used to fund. In 
December 2014, Congress passed the Consolidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriations Acts of 2015, in which it appropriated the funds the President 
had sought. . . . 
The Congressional budget activity cited above by Defendant, and relied on by 
the Court, demonstrates that the Court can discern no impasse or conflict 
between the political branches on the question of whether [the Islamic State] is 
an appropriate target under the AUMFs cited by the President as authority for 
Operation Inherent Resolve. 
This lack of conflict is relevant to the justiciability of Plaintiff's claims under 
the political question doctrine because judicial intervention into military 
affairs is particularly inappropriate when the two political branches to whom 
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leading post-Zivotofsky war powers cases indicate that not all 
war powers questions are political questions even though some of 
them are. 
CONCLUSION
In sum, a post-Zivotofsky analysis in separation of powers 
cases implies a distinction between, on the one hand, cases that 
involve legal interpretation, resting on traditional textual and 
historical materials, and on the other hand, cases that involve 
disputed facts, policies or characterizations. Applied to war 
powers litigation, this distinction seems both manageable and 
useful; it suggests that some war powers disputes are justiciable 
while others are not. More generally, the viability of Zivotofsky-
inspired analysis in the especially difficult area of war powers 
suggests its broad potential for lasting influence in separation of 
powers and foreign affairs disputes. 
war-making powers are committed are not in dispute as to the military action 
at issue. 
Id. at 301–02 (footnotes and citations omitted). For this conclusion, the court cited only 
pre-Zivotofsky cases and Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Zivotofsky. Id. at 302–03. 
Although it is true that Zivotofsky involved a conflict between Congress and the president, 
the majority opinion did not suggest that such a conflict was essential to its finding of 
justiciability (and no other Justice joined Justice Sotomayor’s suggestion that it should 
be). Further, as the Court has emphasized elsewhere, the structural provisions of the 
Constitution exist not merely to protect the powers of particular branches of government, 
but principally to protect individual liberty by assuring checked and divided powers 
among all the branches. See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 223 (2011). 
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Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power 
John Yoo
Along with George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt is considered by most scholars to be one of 
our nation’s greatest presidents. FDR confronted challenges 
simultaneously that his predecessors had faced individually. 
Washington guided the nation’s founding when doubts arose as 
to whether Americans could establish an effective government. 
FDR radically re-engineered the government into the modern 
administrative state when Americans doubted whether their 
government could provide them with economic security. Lincoln 
saved the country from the greatest threat to its national 
security, leading it through a war that cost more American lives 
than any other. FDR led a reluctant nation against perhaps its 
most dangerous foreign foe—an alliance of fascist powers that 
threatened to place Europe and Asia under totalitarian 
dictatorships. To bring the nation through both crises, FDR drew 
deeply upon the reservoir of executive power unlike any 
president before or since—reflected in his unique status as the 
only chief executive to break the two-term tradition.1
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1 There are a great number of works on Roosevelt, with more appearing all the 
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FDR came to office in the midst of the gravest challenges to 
the nation since the Civil War. The most obvious and immediate 
crisis was the Great Depression. FDR placed the president in the 
role of a legislative leader and produced a dramatic restructuring 
of the national government, even though the Depression, as a 
breakdown of the domestic (and global) economy, fell within the 
constitutional authority of Congress. Large Democratic majorities 
in Congress expanded federal regulation of the economy beyond 
anything before seen in peacetime. Regulation of prices and 
supply, product quality, wages and working conditions, the 
securities markets, and pensions became commonplace where they 
had once been rare. Social Security was not just one of the 
New Deal’s most important planks, but an expression of the 
whole platform. 
The federal government would declare responsibility to 
coordinate and regulate economic activity to provide stability. It 
had always exercised broad economic powers during wartime, but 
FDR made management of the economy by a bureaucracy of 
experts a permanent feature of American life. While the 
Republican presidents who had dominated elections since the 
Civil War had left economic decisions to the market, FDR pushed 
the federal government to provide for economic as well as 
national security. 
FDR’s revolution radically shifted the balance of power 
among the three branches of government, as well as between the 
nation and the states. Under the New Deal, Congress delegated 
to the executive branch the discretion to make the many 
decisions necessary to regulate the economy. Congress did not 
have the time, organization, or expertise to make the minute 
decisions required. The New Deal did not just produce a federal 
government of broad power—it gave birth to a president whose 
influence over domestic affairs would expand to match his role in 
foreign affairs. When the Supreme Court stood in the way of the 
new administrative state, FDR launched a campaign to increase 
the membership of the Court to change the meaning of the 
Constitution. When political parties challenged the New Deal, 
FDR concentrated power in the executive branch, which 
undermined their ability to channel benefits to their members. 
The New Deal produced a presidency that was more 
institutionally independent of Congress and more politically free 
of the parties than ever before.2
PARTIES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM SINCE THE NEW DEAL
(1993); and G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000). 
2 See, e.g., MILKIS, supra note 1, at 98–124; THEODORE J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL
PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED (1985). 
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The Great Depression spawned foreign threats, too. 
Economic instability in Europe set the conditions for the rise of 
fascism first in Italy, then in Germany and Japan. Roosevelt 
realized early that American interests would be best served by 
supporting the democracies against the Axis powers, but he was 
confronted by a nation wary of another foreign war and a 
Congress determined to impose strict neutrality. FDR used every 
last inch of presidential power to bring the nation into the war on 
the side of the Allies, including secretly coordinating military 
activities with Britain, attempting to force an incident with 
Germany in the North Atlantic, and pressuring Japan until it 
lashed out in the Pacific. FDR’s steady leadership in the face of 
stiff congressional resistance stands as one of the greatest 
examples of presidential leadership in the last century, one that 
redounded to the benefit of the United States and the free world. 
This Article will review FDR’s approach to executive power 
by examining three dimensions of his presidency: domestic 
policy, foreign policy, and civil liberties in wartime. First, it will 
examine FDR’s expansion of presidential power by leading 
Congress, in the throes of the Great Depression, to create a vast 
administrative state. He followed with a claim of presidential 
independence in interpreting the Constitution, which he enforced 
with a Court-packing plan that eventually forced the Justices to 
agree. As the administrative state grew in leaps and bounds, 
FDR expanded the power of the White House in a failing effort to 
maintain centralized, rational control of the bureaucracy. Second, 
it will examine FDR’s aggressive use of executive authority to 
face the rise of Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. FDR 
stretched existing laws barring U.S. involvement in World War II 
to the breaking point, and then went even further with claims of 
sole executive power to assist the Allies. Third, this Article will 
examine FDR’s attitude toward civil liberties in wartime by 
focusing on three decisions: the use of military commissions to try 
Nazi saboteurs, the internment of Japanese-American citizens, 
and the widespread interception of electronic communications. 
FDR had a vision of the office in keeping with his great 
predecessors, Washington and Jefferson. He took full advantage 
of the independence of the presidency and vigorously exercised 
its constitutional authorities. In order to respond to crises, both 
in peace and war, he contested the Constitution’s meaning with 
the other branches of government. He challenged the Supreme 
Court’s effort to stop the New Deal with his Court-packing plan. 
To meet the rise of Germany and Japan, he relied on a robust 
reading of the Commander-in-Chief power—even if it meant 
ignoring the Neutrality Acts—to bring the United States into the 
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war. FDR understood Berlin and Tokyo’s existential threat. He 
would set the example for the Cold War presidents to follow in 
both managing the vast regulatory state at home and meeting 
the challenges of dire threats abroad. 
I. THE NEW DEAL AND THE COURTS
FDR entered office in the midst of the worst economic 
contraction in American history. Between the summer of 1929 
and the spring of 1933, nominal gross national product dropped 
by fifty percent.3 Prices for all goods fell by about a third; income 
from agriculture collapsed from $6 billion to $2 billion; industrial 
production declined by thirty-seven percent;4 and business 
investment plummeted from $24 billion to $3 billion. About one-
quarter of the workforce, thirteen million Americans, remained 
consistently unemployed, and the unemployment rate would 
remain above fifteen percent for the rest of the decade.5 More 
than 5000 banks failed, with a loss of $7 billion in deposits.6
From the time of the crash in October 1929 to its low in 
July 1932, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell more than 
seventy-five percent.7 It was not a problem caused by famine or 
drought, dwindling natural resources, or crippled production; 
crops spoiled and livestock were destroyed because market prices 
were too low. 
Americans were losing faith in their political institutions to 
solve the crisis. Though the causes of the Depression were 
complex, some (FDR included) blamed “economic royalists,” 
financiers and speculators, and the rich. Economists and 
historians have argued ever since over the causes of the 
Depression. Little evidence seems to support the claim that the 
stock market crash triggered the Depression—stock markets 
have sharply declined since then, most recently in 1987, with no 
underlying change in economic growth. 
3 See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES 1867–1960, at 299–301 (1963). 
4 Id. at 301. 
5 Id.
6 Id. at 317, 330. 
7 To understand the economics of the Great Depression and the New Deal, see 1 
ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, 1913–1951 (2003); Peter 
Temin, The Great Depression, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 301 (Stanley Engerman & Robert Gallman, eds., 2000); THOMAS E. HALL & J.
DAVID FERGUSON, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AN INTERNATIONAL DISASTER OF PERVERSE
ECONOMIC POLICIES (1998); RICHARD K. VEDDER & LOWELL E. GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK:
UNEMPLOYMENT AND GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (N.Y. Univ. Press 
rev. ed. 1997); BARRY EICHENGREEN, GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE 
GREAT DEPRESSION, 1919–1939 (1995); and FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 299–
301. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 (2d ed. 1988), remains a classic 
treatment, but one that has been surpassed by more recent work. 
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In their classic Monetary History of the United States, Milton 
Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued that a normal recession 
deepened into the Great Depression because the Federal Reserve 
mistakenly responded to the banking panic by restricting the 
money supply.8 A deflation in prices followed, which led to a 
steep drop in economic activity. Ben Bernanke, the current 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, elaborated on this theme by 
arguing that the Fed’s deflationary banking policies tightened 
the credit available to businesses and households, further 
suppressing economic activity.9 Others argue that the Great 
Depression must be understood within the context of the 
international economy, which witnessed bank failures and 
recession in Germany and France, defaults on World War I loan 
and reparation payments, abandonment of the gold standard, 
and the dumping of agricultural products on world markets. 
While our understanding of the Great Depression has 
improved thanks to the scholarship of the last forty years, a clear 
consensus of its causes has yet to emerge. Unsurprisingly then, 
to the Americans who lived through it, the collapse of the 
economy was bewildering, confusing, and without precedent. The 
Hoover administration’s policies did not help and might have 
made matters even worse. As historians have realized, Hoover 
did not adopt the aloof, hands-off attitude that his political 
opponents charged. During his administration, Congress doubled 
public works spending, and the federal budget deficit rose to $2.7 
billion, at that time the largest in American peacetime history. 
He pressed business executives to maintain employment and 
wages, and experimented with policies, such as the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation’s emergency loans to businesses, which 
would set important examples for the New Dealers.10
But Hoover’s initiatives were mere stopgaps that were 
swamped by other policy mistakes. Though he had initially asked 
for tariff reductions, Hoover signed the notorious Smoot-Hawley 
Act, which raised rates and killed international trade flows. 
Following the conventional economic wisdom of the day, Hoover 
sought to balance the budget with tax increases at a time when 
the economy needed fiscal stimulus. As Milton Friedman and 
Allan Meltzer have separately argued, the Federal Reserve 
pursued a deflationary strategy, cutting off the economy’s 
oxygen, when increases in the money supply were called for.11
8 FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 240–42. 
9 BEN S. BERNANKE, ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION 51 (2000). 
10 KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 164–65. 
11 See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 299–301; MELTZER, supra note 7, 
at 271. 
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Some of Hoover’s failure stems from his vision of the 
presidency. As president, he refused to assume the role of 
legislative leader, resisted the expansion of the federal agencies, 
and opposed national welfare legislation—all on constitutional 
grounds.12 FDR’s vision of the office could not have created a 
sharper contrast. FDR led the nation through a frenzy of 
experimentation in policies and government structure without 
parallel in American history. There appeared to be no 
comprehensive philosophy behind the New Deal, which comes as 
little surprise, given the confusion that prevailed at the time over 
the causes of the Depression.  
Without any true understanding of the reasons for the 
collapse, the New Dealers tried anything and everything. 
Thinking that overproduction was the culprit, some 
recommended the cartelization of industries to reduce supply and 
increase prices. Others who blamed under-consumption 
advocated public jobs programs and welfare relief. Some believed 
that the budget deficit was the problem, and urged an increase in 
taxes and cuts in spending. Some thought international trade 
was a cause, and advocated both more flexibility in trade 
negotiations and the dumping of excess agricultural production 
overseas. Pragmatic and political (he had been a professional 
politician for most of his life), and unsure about the true causes 
of the Depression, Roosevelt flittered from idea to idea. Some had 
the effect of canceling each other out—public works projects 
sponsored by the National Recovery Administration had to buy 
raw materials at prices inflated by controls imposed by the 
Department of Agriculture. 
Throughout all the experimentation and expansion of 
government, the one thing that did not change was the focus on 
the presidency. FDR became the father of the modern presidency 
by moving the chief executive to the center of the American 
political universe. FDR drafted the executive’s wartime powers 
into peacetime service, but without calling for any formal change 
in the Constitution. In his First Inaugural Address, he declared 
that “our Constitution is so simple and practical that it is 
possible always to meet extraordinary needs by changes in 
emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form.”13
What FDR wanted was access to the constitutional powers 
granted to the president during time of emergency. He promised 
12 Ellis W. Hawley, The Constitution of the Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt 
Presidency During the Depression Era, 1930–1939, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 83, 90–91 (Martin Fausold & Alan Shank eds., 1991).
13 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 15 (Samuel I. 
Rosenman ed., 1938). 
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to seek from Congress “broad executive power to wage a war 
against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given 
me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”14 FDR’s expansion 
of the powers of the presidency, both political and constitutional, 
would grow from this basic theme—the economy and society 
would henceforth be regulated in ways that were once considered 
suitable only for war. 
The nation got a taste of what FDR meant when, on his 
second day in office, he issued the second emergency 
proclamation in American history. During the period between 
FDR’s election and his inauguration, a massive run on banks had 
forced many to close their doors or stop lending. Invoking the 
Trading with the Enemy Act,15 FDR imposed a national banking 
holiday and prohibited all gold transactions.16 Roosevelt’s use of 
the Act was questionable, to say the least. Congress had passed 
the Act in 1917 to give the president broad economic powers 
during wartime or national emergency, but not to regulate the 
domestic economy in the absence of a foreign threat. Without the 
statute, FDR was left to act under an unspecified presidential 
emergency power. At the end of the banking moratorium, 
Congress convened in special session and passed the Emergency 
Banking Act, which gave the federal government powers to 
control gold and currency transactions, to own stock in banks, 
and to regulate the re-opening of the banks.17 Because the 
Roosevelt administration had only finished drafting the 
legislation the night before, a rolled-up newspaper substituted as 
a prop for an actual copy of the bill’s text, and the House spent 
only thirty minutes discussing the legislation. 
Roosevelt set a precedent for his successors by rushing a 
torrent of legislation through Congress in his first 100 days. The 
National Industrial Recovery Act (“NRA”), the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (“AAA”), the Emergency Banking Act, the 
Emergency Railroad Transportation Act (“ERTA”), and the Home 
Owners Loan Act (“HOLA”) all granted FDR extraordinary 
economic powers to fight the Depression. Their enactment 
signaled the breakdown of the previously sharp distinction 
between the executive and legislative branches. The executive 
branch took the primary responsibility for drafting bills, 
Congress passed them quickly with minimum deliberation 
14 Id.
15 Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. §5 (2000). 
16 Robert Jabaily, Bank Holiday of 1933, FEDERAL RESERVE HISTORY
(Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/bank_holiday_of_1933
[http://perma.cc/PQN4-UDFU].
17 Emergency Banking Relief Act of 1933, Pub. L. 1, 48 Stat. 1. 
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(sometimes sight unseen), and the laws themselves delegated 
broad authority to the president or the administrative agencies.18
Through the agencies, the executive branch would impose an 
unprecedented level of centralized planning over the peacetime 
economy. The AAA, for example, gave the executive the power to 
dictate which crops were to be planted.19 Under the NRA, 
agencies enacted industry-wide codes of conduct, usually drafted 
by the industries themselves, to govern production and 
employment.20 New Dealers sought to address falling prices for 
commodities by setting higher prices, reducing competition, and 
limiting production.21
Little attention was given to constitutional problems with 
the legislation, which threatened to exceed the Supreme Court’s 
limitations on federal power. Laws like the NRA or the AAA 
pressed the Constitution’s grant of authority to Congress to make 
laws “to regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”22
Other laws, such as the new public employment and 
unemployment relief programs, raised constitutional issues 
about the national government’s taxing and spending authority, 
but again these were only problems of federalism, not of 
presidential power. They mirrored the steps that the national 
government had taken to mobilize the economy for military 
production while reducing domestic consumption—many of the 
early programs of the New Deal were modeled on World War I 
efforts. As William Leuchtenburg has observed, war became a 
metaphor for the calamity brought on by the Depression, and 
FDR and his advisers turned to their wartime experience for 
solutions.23 “Almost every New Deal act or agency derived, to 
some extent, from the experience of World War I.”24
FDR’s legislative whirlwind set in motion a series of events 
that culminated in confrontation with the Supreme Court. Even 
though the President would suffer politically and 
constitutionally, he would eventually prevail. The roots of the 
conflict stretched back to the Progressive Era, when the Justices 
held that the Interstate Commerce Clause did not allow 
regulation of manufacturing or agriculture within a state. Under 
the theory of dual federalism, the Court blocked antitrust 
18 HAWLEY, supra note 12, at 92. 
19 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 7 U.S.C. ch. 26, § 601 et seq.
20 HALL & FERGUSON, supra note 7, at 124. 
21 Id. at 124–26. 
22 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
23 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE FDR YEARS: ON ROOSEVELT AND HIS LEGACY
41–53 (1995). 
24 Id. at 53. 
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enforcement against a sugar-refining monopoly in 1895 because 
the refining itself did not cross interstate lines.25 In 1918, it held 
unconstitutional a federal law that prohibited the interstate 
transportation of goods made with child labor.26 Even though the 
federal ban applied only when the product moved across state 
lines, the Court held that “the production of articles, intended for 
interstate commerce, is a matter of local regulation.”27 When 
Congress attacked child labor again with a ten percent excise tax, 
the Court blocked that too, on the ground that Congress could not 
use a tax to achieve a prohibited end.28
The Court matched its limits on federal authority to regulate 
the economy with similar restrictions on the states. Where 
Congress could only exercise the powers carefully enumerated in 
Article I, states enjoyed a general “police power” over all conduct 
within their borders. The courts, however, read the Fourteenth 
Amendment—which forbids states from depriving individuals of 
life, liberty, or property without due process29—to block a great 
deal of state business regulation. In Lochner v. New York, the 
Court struck down a state law that prohibited bakers from 
working more than sixty hours a week or ten hours per day.30
According to the majority, the Constitution protected the bakers’ 
individual right to contract to work as much as they liked.31 The 
state could not adopt economic legislation to redistribute income 
within the industry (the law favored established bakeries at the 
expense of immigrant bakers), or infringe the rights of free 
labor.32 In dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously 
accused the majority of following its preferences rather than the 
law.33 “[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular 
economic theory, whether of paternalism . . . or of laissez faire,”
Holmes memorably wrote.34 “The Fourteenth Amendment does 
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”35 From the time 
of Lochner to the New Deal, the Court invalidated 184 state laws 
governing working hours and wages, organized labor, commodity 
prices, and entry into business.36
25 See United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1895).
26 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918). 
27 Id. at 272, 276. 
28 See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 35–36, 43–44 (1922). 
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
30 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
31 Id. at 64. 
32 Id. at 62. 
33 Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 271, 311 (1932) (striking 
down a state legislative bar requiring a demonstration of necessity for licensing and 
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Legislation enacted during FDR’s first 100 days in office 
virtually dared the Justices to block the New Deal. The NRA did 
not just attempt to ban a single product or manufacturing 
process—it placed all industrial production in the nation under 
federal regulation. The AAA did the same with agriculture, and 
another law with coal mining. Laws passed later in FDR’s term, 
such as the National Labor Relations Act and the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act, set nationwide rules on unions and 
utilities, while the Social Security Act created a universal system 
of unemployment compensation and old age pension.37
FDR was following in the footsteps of presidents who dared 
to interpret the Constitution at odds with the other branches. 
FDR himself appeared to have held few constitutional doubts. 
New Deal theorists believed, for example, that the Interstate 
Commerce Clause pertained to almost all economic activity in the 
nation because all goods manufactured or grown within a state 
traveled through the channels of interstate commerce to reach 
the market.38 While the federal government might usually defer 
to the states on many matters, the Depression was so grave that 
the states were powerless to control a nationwide problem. 
Roosevelt recognized early on that his program risked 
antagonizing the federal courts, which were filled with 
Republican judges.39 He could count on the opposition of Justices 
James McReynolds, Willis Van Devanter, George Sutherland, 
and Pierce Butler, known as “The Four Horsemen,”40 for their 
skepticism toward government regulation of the economy and 
their defense of individual economic rights. But FDR believed he 
could expect the general support of progressives Justices Louis 
Brandeis, Harlan Fiske Stone, and Benjamin Cardozo. Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Owen Roberts held 
the swing votes. FDR hoped that the Court would grant the 
political branches more constitutional leeway to respond to the 
business entry); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 239 (1929) (finding 
legislature may not authorize state agencies to set gasoline prices sold in the state); 
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 560 (1923) (finding state mandated minimum 
wages, for women and children, interfered with an individual’s constitutional liberty to 
contract); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (holding a federal labor law 
prohibiting employee termination or discrimination based on labor organization 
membership unconstitutional); JESSE H. CHOPER, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – CASES,
COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 292 (9th ed. 2001). 
37 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (1935); Public Utility Holding 
Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1935); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7 (1935).
38 Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933–1946, 59 
HARV. L. REV. 645, 683 (1946). 
39 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 83–84 (1995). 
40 Id. at 3. 
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national crisis of the Great Depression. In previous national 
security emergencies, the courts had allowed the federal 
government to mobilize the economy with little objection. FDR 
had reason for these hopes in early 1934, after 5–4 majorities of 
the Court upheld state laws setting milk prices and delaying 
mortgage payments.41
Those hopes were dashed with the opening of the Court’s 
business in January 1935. In its first case examining a New Deal 
law, an 8–1 majority of the Court invalidated the NRA’s “hot oil” 
provision, which allowed the executive branch to prohibit the 
interstate transportation of petroleum produced in violation of 
quotas.42 Chief Justice Hughes wrote that the provision 
unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the president.43
That decision was only a preview to May 27, 1935—known as 
“Black Monday” to New Dealers44—when the Court struck down 
three New Deal laws. The centerpiece was the Court’s 
unanimous rejection of the NRA in the “Sick Chicken” case, 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United States, in which the owners of 
a chicken slaughterhouse were prosecuted for violating industrial 
codes of conduct.45
In finding the NRA unconstitutional, the Justices threatened 
the two core features of the New Deal. Schechter Poultry held 
that the Constitution prohibited Congress from delegating 
legislative power to the president, especially when rulemaking 
authority was then sub-delegated to private industry groups.46
The NRA also violated the Constitution’s limits on the reach of 
federal economic power.47 The owners of the slaughterhouse sold 
their chickens into a local market, which did not directly impact 
interstate commerce, even though a high percentage of chickens 
came from out of state. If the Court were to keep to its precedent 
that intra-state manufacturing and agriculture lay outside 
federal authority, more pillars of the New Deal—perhaps even 
the whole program itself—might collapse. In pointed language, 
the Court specifically rejected the Roosevelt administration’s 
overarching approach to the Great Depression: “Extraordinary 
conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power.”48
41 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425–28 (1934); see also 
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934). 
42 Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405, 433 (1935). 
43 Id. at 431–33. 
44 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 39, at 89. 
45 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 508 (1935). 
46 Id. at 550. 
47 Id.
48 Id. at 528. 
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FDR responded with a political attack on the Court. In a 
ninety-minute press conference, the President declared Schechter
Poultry to be the most significant judicial decision since Dred 
Scott.49 While critical of the Court’s ruling on executive power, he 
believed that those problems could be fixed by re-writing the 
statutes to give more direction and less delegation.50 It was 
Schechter’s narrow view of the Commerce Clause that posed the 
real threat to the New Deal. If Congress could not regulate the 
activities of the butchers because they were local in nature, it 
would be unable to police most other manufacturing or 
agricultural enterprises. “The whole tendency over these years 
has been to view the interstate commerce clause in the light of 
present-day civilization,” Roosevelt told the press. “We are 
interdependent—we are tied together.”51 To Roosevelt, the Justices’ 
way of thinking failed to take account of the national character of 
the economy. “We have been relegated to a horse-and-buggy 
definition of interstate commerce.”52
FDR considered a variety of proposals if the Court were to 
continue ruling against the New Deal: increasing the number of 
Justices (giving the president enough new appointments to 
change the balance on the Court), reducing the Court’s 
jurisdiction, or requiring a supermajority of Justices to declare a 
federal law unconstitutional. He rejected them all as premature, 
but he had been prepared to respond to a potential rejection of 
the prohibition on gold transactions with a declaration of a 
national emergency, a fixed price for gold, and an attack on the 
Court for “imperil[ing] the economic and political security of this 
nation.”53 But the Court upheld the gold regulations, causing 
Roosevelt to shelve his plans.54
The administration continued to work with Congress to 
expand federal intervention in the economy. Known as the 
Second New Deal, these laws went beyond the simple, sweeping 
delegations of authority to the president in the NRA or the AAA. 
New laws such as the National Labor Relations Act and the 
Social Security Act created specialized bureaucracies to handle 
discrete areas of economic regulation. While the First New Deal 
vested the president with emergency powers to handle the 
Depression, the Second New Deal of 1935–1936 promised 
49 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 13, 
at 221.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's “Court-Packing”
Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 351–54 (1966). 
54 See Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 316 (1935). 
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permanent government intervention in the economy. One of 
FDR’s political achievements was to transform the social contract 
so that government benefits became understood as rights—rights 
just as real to many Americans as those in the Constitution 
itself. But they did nothing to avoid the constitutional problems 
of the First New Deal: Their very success depended on their 
ability to regulate all economic activity, rather than just trade 
that crossed interstate borders. 
The Court, however, stuck to its guns. Rather than cower 
before this second outburst of lawmaking, in the spring of 1936, 
it declared unconstitutional more elements of the New Deal. In 
United States v. Butler, the Court held unconstitutional the 
AAA’s use of taxes and grants to regulate agricultural 
production, which lay within the reserved powers of the states.55
Butler threatened the Social Security Act, which used a 
combination of taxes and spending to provide relief and pensions 
to the unemployed and elderly. 
In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., a 5–4 majority struck down a 
1935 law that set prices, wages, hours, and collective bargaining 
rules for the coal industry.56 The Court found that the production 
of coal did not amount to interstate commerce, but instead fell 
within the reserved powers of the states.57 “[T]he effect of the 
labor provisions . . . primarily falls upon production and not upon 
commerce,” Justice Sutherland wrote for the majority.58
“Production is a purely local activity.”59 Carter made clear that 
the sick chicken case was not a fluke; any federal regulation of 
intra-state industrial production or agriculture was now in 
constitutional doubt. In Jones v. SEC, the Justices attacked the 
proceedings of the Securities and Exchange Commission as 
“odious” and “pernicious” and compared it to the “intolerable 
abuses of the Star Chamber.”60 Morehead v. Tipaldo held that 
New York’s minimum wage law violated the Due Process Clause, 
just as it had earlier found that such laws interfered with the 
right to contract.61 As the Court had already found a federal 
minimum wage in the District of Columbia unconstitutional 
in the 1920s, it had made the regulation of wages, in FDR’s 
words, a “no-man’s land” forbidden to both the federal and 
state governments. 
55 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936). 
56 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 316–17 (1936). 
57 Id. at 303. 
58 Id. at 304. 
59 Id.
60 Jones v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 298 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1936). 
61 Morehead v. N.Y. ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936). 
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In the space of just two years, the Court had ripped apart the 
central features of the First New Deal and was promising the 
same for the Second. Roosevelt stopped discussing the Court’s 
decisions publicly and did not make any proposals about the 
Court during his re-election campaign. He attacked business and 
the rich as “economic royalists” and the “privileged princes of 
these new economic dynasties.”62 Roosevelt proposed a new 
economic order that would provide stability and security through 
new forms of government-provided rights. FDR reconceived 
rights from the negative—preventing the state from intruding on 
an individual liberty—to the positive—a minimum wage, the 
right to organize, national working standards, and old-age 
pensions. Running against the lackluster Republican Alf Landon, 
FDR secured one of the great electoral victories in American 
history: 523 electoral votes to Landon’s eight (the largest 
advantage ever recorded in a contested two-party election in 
American history), every state but Maine and Vermont, more 
than sixty percent of the popular vote, and a Democratic 
Congress with two-thirds majorities in both Houses, including 
seventy-five of the ninety-six seats in the Senate.63 Observers 
could legitimately question whether the Republican Party would 
shortly disappear as a political force. 
Fresh off his victory, FDR proposed a restructuring of the 
Court that would eliminate it as an opponent of the New Deal. 
On February 5, 1937, he sent Congress a judiciary “reform” bill 
that would add a new Justice to the Court for every one over the 
age of seventy. Because of the advanced age of several Justices, 
Roosevelt’s proposal would have allowed him to appoint six new 
Court members. Rather than criticize the Court for its opposition 
to the New Deal, Roosevelt disingenuously claimed that the 
elderly Justices were delaying the efficient administration of 
justice.64 In his message to Congress, FDR pointed out that the 
Court had denied review in 695 out of 803 cases.65 How can it be 
“that full justice is achieved when a court is forced by the sheer 
necessity of keeping up with its business to decline, without even 
an explanation, to hear 87 percent of the cases presented to it by 
private litigants?”66
62 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance Speech for the Renomination for the 
Presidency, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 27, 1936), http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15314 [http://perma.cc/L5AP-L8NL].
63 Election of 1936, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=1936 [http://perma.cc/XQ93-MFHY].
64 81 Cong. Rec. 878 (1937) (reprinting FDR’s message to Congress). 
65 Id.
66 Id.
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Only indirectly did FDR imply a link between the advanced 
age of the Justices and their opposition to the New Deal. “Modern 
complexities call also for a constant infusion of new blood in the 
courts,” FDR wrote.67 “A lowered mental or physical vigor leads 
men to avoid an examination of complicated and changed 
conditions. Little by little, new facts become blurred through old 
glasses fitted, as it were, for the needs of another generation.”68
FDR declared that the remedy would bring a “constant and 
systematic addition of younger blood” that would “vitalize the 
courts and better equip them to recognize and apply the essential 
concepts of justice in the light of the needs and the facts of an 
ever-changing world.”69 The President’s purpose could not have 
been clearer. He submitted the plan on the Friday before the 
Court would hear Monday arguments challenging the 
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act, one of the 
pillars of the Second New Deal. 
Despite his electoral success, FDR’s court-packing plan—the 
first domestic initiative of his second term—suffered a humiliating 
defeat. Mail and telegrams to Congress went nine-to-one against 
the plan, and polling showed a majority of the country opposed.70
Elements of the New Deal coalition, such as farmers and some 
unions, attacked the plan early. Senate Republicans unified in 
opposition shortly after the President announced his proposal, 
and conservative Senate Democrats came out against the plan 
within days. Several liberal supporters of the New Deal followed. 
Hatton Sumners, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, 
organized a majority of his committee against the bill, saying 
“[b]oys . . . here’s where I cash in my chips.”71 Various college and 
university presidents, academics, and the American Bar 
Association opposed the plan. The coup de grace was delivered by 
none other than Chief Justice Hughes, in a letter made public 
during Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, who rebutted point 
by point FDR’s claims that the Court was overworked and that 
the older Justices could not perform their duties. Both Brandeis 
and Van Devanter approved the letter, which most historians 
believe ended the court-packing plan for good. Upon its release, 
Vice President Garner called FDR in Georgia to tell him, 
“We’re licked.”72
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 212 (1994). 
71 Id. at 214. 
72 Id. at 220. 
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Historians and political scientists have argued ever since 
over how, or even whether, FDR still won the war. On March 29, 
1937, a week after the release of the Hughes letter, the 
Court handed down a 5–4 decision upholding a Washington 
state minimum wage law for women.73 In West Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish, the lineup of votes for and against New York’s 
minimum wage, which had been struck down in Tipaldo the year 
before, remained the same—except for Justice Roberts, who 
switched sides to uphold the law.74 Overruling the earlier bans on 
minimum wage laws, Parrish made clear that the Due Process 
Clause would no longer stand in the way of government 
regulation of wages or hours. 
Two weeks later, the Court upheld the National Labor 
Relations Act, which had been challenged on the same grounds 
raised in the Sick Chicken and Carter cases.75 In NLRB v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp., Chief Justice Hughes led a 5–4 majority 
in rejecting the doctrine that manufacturing did not constitute 
interstate commerce. Jones & Laughlin Steel was the fourth-
largest steel company in the nation, with operations in multiple 
states. As the Court observed, “the stoppage of those operations 
by industrial strife would have a most serious effect upon 
interstate commerce.”76 “It is obvious,” the Court found, that the 
effect “would be immediate and might be catastrophic.”77
Henceforth, the Court would allow federal regulation of the 
economy, even of wholly intrastate activity, because of the 
interconnectedness of the national market. To do otherwise 
would be to “shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national 
life” and to judge questions of interstate commerce “in an 
intellectual vacuum.”78 Justice Roberts again switched positions 
to make the 5–4 majority possible. 
The Court’s about-face sapped the strength from FDR’s 
court-packing campaign. By May 1937, it appeared that an 
outright majority of the Senate opposed the proposal, and opinion 
polls showed that only one third of the public supported it.79 At 
the end of the month, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported 
73 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). 
74 Id. at 379. 
75 See generally NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); 
NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks 
Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); Assoc. Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); Wash., Va. & 
Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937). 
76 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 41. 
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 TOM S. CLARK, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: COURTS, POLITICS, AND 
THE PUBLIC 140 (Bruce Peabody eds., 2011). 
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the bill out with an unfavorable recommendation.80 Two more 
events finished things. Justice Van Devanter announced his 
retirement, timed for the same day as the Judiciary Committee 
vote, giving Roosevelt his first Supreme Court appointment. His 
departure would give the New Deal a secure majority on the 
Court. The Court also upheld the Social Security Act from attack 
as an unconstitutional spending measure or an invasion of state 
sovereignty.81 The court-packing bill lost all momentum, never 
emerged from the House Judiciary Committee, and never 
reached a floor vote. 
While FDR lost in Congress, he had won his larger objective. 
The Court would not strike down another regulation of interstate 
commerce for almost sixty years. Journalists and political 
scientists immediately attributed the “switch in time that saved 
nine” to FDR’s threat to pack the Court.82 Even today, a few 
creative scholars like Bruce Ackerman defend the sweeping 
constitutional changes of the New Deal—which, unlike 
Reconstruction, were never written into a constitutional 
amendment—with the 1936 electoral landslide and the attack on 
the Court.83 More recent work claims that the Court’s 
jurisprudence was evolving in a more generous direction toward 
federal power anyway.84 The Court, this work points out, had 
confidentially voted to uphold the minimum wage in West Coast 
Hotel on December 19, 1936, six weeks before FDR sprung his 
proposal on the nation.85 The court-packing legislation could not 
have pressured the Court because it obviously had little chance of 
passage. The argument that the 1936 elections prodded the 
Justices to switch positions on the New Deal also suffers from the 
absence of the Court as an issue during the campaign.86 If 
anything, FDR suffered politically from his confrontation with 
the Court. A growing bipartisan coalition against the New Deal 
and another sharp recession in 1938 stalled FDR’s domestic 
agenda for the rest of his presidency. 
Nonetheless, if FDR is considered a great president because 
of the New Deal, critical to his success was his willingness to 
80 Cushman, supra note 70, at 222–23. 
81 See, e.g., Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937); 
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937). 
82 See, e.g., JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938); MERLO J.
PUSEY, THE SUPREME COURT CRISIS (1937). 
83 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105–30 (First Harv. Univ. 
Press 1993). 
84 See generally CUSHMAN, supra note 1. 
85 Id. at 18.
86 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1154, 1159 (2005–2006); Leuchtenburg, supra note 53, at 379. 
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advance his own understanding of the Constitution. FDR never 
accepted the Court’s right to define the powers of the federal 
government to regulate the economy. While FDR did not join 
Lincoln’s blatant defiance in declining to obey a judicial order, his 
administration regularly proposed laws that ran counter to 
Supreme Court precedent, and FDR openly questioned the 
competence of the judiciary to review the New Deal.87 He sought 
to change the Court’s composition and size as a means to 
pressure it to change its rulings. With the retirement of the Four 
Horsemen, Roosevelt would appoint Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, 
Felix Frankfurter, and William O. Douglas to the Court, and by 
1941, eight of the nine Justices were his appointees. While they 
would fight about the application of the Bill of Rights against 
the states, among other issues, they would unanimously agree 
that Congress’s powers to regulate the economy were almost 
without limit.88
In its call for a peacetime state of emergency, the New Deal 
went beyond changes to the balance of powers between the 
federal and state governments. Times of war inevitably shift 
Constitutional power and responsibility to the president as 
commander and chief. FDR and the New Deal Congress created 
an administrative state that had the same effect in times of 
peace, but which would be permanent, rather than temporary. 
Laws enacted in the first 100 days and in the years after vested 
sweeping legislative powers in the executive branch. The 
executive branch, in turn, became the fount of legislative 
proposals. FDR’s bills to cut federal spending and veterans’ 
benefits to balance the budget passed with alacrity. 
The effort to engage in rational administration made the 
executive branch the locus of regulation—issued through agency 
rulemaking, rather than acts of Congress—as the federal 
government took on the job of regulating the securities markets, 
banks, labor unions, industrial working conditions, and 
production standards. Victory, in the context of the Depression, 
was all the more difficult because, whereas war requires the 
rationing of scarce resources in favor of military production, 
ending the Depression required stimulating demand and 
production of all manner of goods, essentially altering millions of 
market decisions made every day. 
 87 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 46 – Fireside Chat, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Mar. 9, 1937), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15381 [http://perma.cc/ 
9SVA-LHFJ].
88 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
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The New Deal’s resemblance to mobilization relied upon a 
government bureaucracy more typical of wartime. America’s 
administrative state had grown in ebbs and flows, with the early 
Hamiltonian vision of a state centered around the Treasury 
Department and the Bank, Jefferson’s embargo machinery, and 
the massive departments of the Civil War representing the 
high-water marks. With the creation of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in 1887, the American administrative state started 
to grow in earnest. Progressive-era efforts to create national 
administration to manage discrete economic and social issues 
culminated in the World War I mobilization effort, which 
included everything from production quotas to press censorship.89
Between 1887 and 1932, Congress created a few new agencies to 
oversee aspects of the economy, such as railroad rates, business 
competition, and the money supply.90 These early examples set 
the precedent of delegating lawmaking authority to the executive 
branch to set the actual rules governing private conduct. 
FDR supplemented the New Deal’s delegation of legislative 
authority to the executive branch by further enshrining the 
presidency as the focal point of political life. Even before his 
election, FDR had made clear that the candidate, not the party, 
would be the center of the campaign by renting a small plane to 
fly to Chicago to accept his nomination in person—the first 
nominee of either major party to do so.91 Once in office, he used 
new technology to reach over the heads of Congress and the 
media. Radio allowed the President to forge a direct relationship 
with the American electorate that went unfiltered by the 
newspapers. His famous “fireside chats,” the first delivered on 
the day before the government reopened the banks on March 13, 
1933, allowed FDR to campaign for his policies directly with 
the people. Roosevelt did not neglect the press either; he held 
twice-a-week, off-the-record press conferences in the Oval Office, 
where reporters could ask him any question they liked.92 He 
89 See, e.g., DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY (1980); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–1920 (1982); ROBERT H. 
WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877–1920 (1966). 
 90  Following the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, Congress 
authorized the creation of the Department of Labor and Commerce, the Food and Drug 
Administration, The Bureau of Investigation (later the Federal Bureau of Investigation), 
the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Trade Commission. 
91 Thomas Hardy, FDR’s Nomination, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, http://www.chicago 
tribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/chi-chicagodays-fdrnomination-story-story.html
[http://perma.cc/5ZAE-JFC2] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
92 Jean Edward Smith, Obama, F.D.R. and Taming the Press, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 2, 2009, 6:15 PM), https://100days.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/02/obama-fdr-and-
taming-the-press/.
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employed his ample charm to win over the reporters, who burst 
out in applause after the first press conference on March 8, 1933.93
FDR used these tools to marshal support for his legislative 
program and to change the political culture. Under Roosevelt, the 
president became the driving force for positive government, 
rather than the leader of a political system where power was 
dispersed among the branches of government, the states, and the 
political parties.94 If the presidency were to play this leading role, 
it had to strengthen its control over the executive branch itself. 
In order to fulfill the promise of economic stability, the President 
wanted full command over the varied programs and policies of 
the government. This challenge was compounded by the New 
Deal’s blizzard of new commissions and agencies, such as the 
National Recovery Administration, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the Federal Communications Commission, as 
well as the lack of a rational government structure that matched 
form to function. When Congress enacted New Deal legislation, it 
rarely reduced the size or shape of federal agencies, often simply 
creating an additional agency or layer of bureaucracy on top of 
the existing ones.
Roosevelt sought to master the executive branch in various 
ways, with limited success. He expanded the use of aides 
attached to the White House to develop and implement policy 
instead of governing through the cabinet. FDR brought in a 
“Brain Trust,” many of them academics who had advised him 
during the 1932 campaign to develop legislation, draft speeches, 
and manage policy. Some were located in the White House, and 
others were spread in appointed positions in the agencies, but 
they all worked for the President. 
Cabinet meetings became primarily ceremonial occasions. 
Rather, policy development evolved into the form familiar today, 
with meetings between the president and chosen advisors—be 
they White House staff, cabinet officers, agency staff, or special 
committees including some combination of the former—assuming 
a central role.95 The cabinet as a whole no longer represented 
leaders of important factions within the president’s party, nor did 
there seem to be a guiding principle behind individual 
appointments. As James MacGregor Burns has observed, “[t]he 
real significance of the cabinet lay in Roosevelt’s leadership role. 
He could count on loyalty from his associates; almost everyone 
was ‘FRBC’—for Roosevelt before Chicago” (where the Democratic 
93 Id.
94 MARC LANDY & SIDNEY MILKIS, PRESIDENTIAL GREATNESS 153–54 (2000). 
95 BURNS, supra note 1, at 174. 
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Party nominated FDR in 1932).96 The declining importance of the 
cabinet, both in its corporeal form and in its individual members, 
naturally enhanced the control of the White House over 
the government. 
FDR used his removal power to direct policy, following the 
examples set by Lincoln, Jackson, and Washington. He fired the 
head of the Federal Power Commission, whom Hoover had 
appointed, and replaced him with his own man, even though 
legislation appeared to give the Commission itself the authority 
to choose the chairman.97 As the United States came closer to 
entry into World War II, he summarily dismissed his Secretaries 
of War and Navy and replaced them with internationalist 
Republicans without serious opposition from Congress or his 
own party.  
FDR also used his removal power to seek control over the 
independent agencies. Unlike the core departments, such as 
State, War, Treasury, and Justice, independent agencies were 
designed by Congress to be less amenable to presidential 
direction.98 Their organizing statutes usually create a 
multi-member commission at the top with a required balance 
between the political parties. In some cases, Congress shields the 
commission members from presidential removal except for cause 
(for malfeasance in office or for violating the law). Congress uses 
these devices to delegate the power to make legislative rules, 
while keeping the ability to influence its exercise and preventing 
its direct transfer to presidential control. Until FDR, presidents 
were generally understood to have the constitutional ability to 
freely remove commissioners even in the presence of these “for 
cause” protections against removal, though it is unclear to what 
extent previous presidents, in fact, used this authority.99
Upon taking office, FDR decided to replace the head of the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), William Humphrey, a 
Hoover administration appointee. The FTC had a potential role 
in overseeing important New Deal programs due to its 
responsibility to investigate “unfair methods of competition in 
96 Id. at 150. 
97 Christopher Yoo, Steven Calabresi & Laurence Nee, The Unitary Executive During 
the Third Half-Century, 1889–1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 83–84 (2004). 
98 The classic work on the origins of the independent agencies remains ROBERT E.
CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1941). For more recent 
analysis, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41 (1986); 
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the 
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); and Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of 
Independent Agencies after Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779 (1986). 
99 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 284–88 (2008). 
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commerce,”100 a broad jurisdictional grant of authority that 
allowed it to sue companies for monopolistic activity. The statute 
establishing the FTC allowed removal of a commissioner only in 
cases of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”101
FDR decided to remove Humphrey only because he wanted to 
have his own man in the job. FDR wrote Humphrey: “You will, I 
know, realize that I do not feel that your mind and my mind go 
along together on either the policies or the administering of the 
Federal Trade Commission[.]”102 When Humphrey refused to 
leave, FDR fired him. Congress did not complain, and instead 
promptly confirmed FDR’s nomination of a new FTC chairman. 
Humphrey, however, remained undaunted and sued to recover 
his pay for the rest of his term. 
Four years later, Humphrey’s estate eventually took his case 
to the Supreme Court, which dealt Roosevelt and the presidency 
a serious blow.103 The Justice Department argued that the FTC 
statute was an unconstitutional infringement on the president’s 
removal power and his constitutional duty to faithfully execute 
the laws.104 Roosevelt’s lawyers relied on Myers v. United States,
a nine-year-old case that had struck down a law requiring Senate 
consent before a president could fire a postmaster.105 In Myers,
Chief Justice (and former president) William Howard Taft wrote: 
“The vesting of the executive power in the President was 
essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the 
President alone and unaided could not execute the laws. He must 
execute them by the assistance of subordinates.”106 Taft concluded 
that the president’s duty to implement the laws required that “he 
should select those who were to act for him under his direction” 
and that he must also have the “power of removing those for 
whom he cannot continue to be responsible.”107 Based on this 
precedent, FDR seemed on safe ground. 
On the same day that it decided Schechter Poultry, May 27, 
1935, the Court substantially revised its removal jurisprudence. 
With Justice Sutherland writing, the majority held that the FTC 
“cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or 
an eye of the executive.”108 Creating a wholly new category of 
100 Robert E. Freer, The Work of the Federal Trade Commission, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (Mar. 23, 1936), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_ 
statements/675261/19360323_freer_the_work_of_the_ftc.pdf. 
101 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935). 
102 Id. at 619. 
103 See generally id.
104 Yoo, Calabresi & Nee, supra note 97, at 85. 
105 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926). 
106 Id. at 117. 
107 Id.
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government, Sutherland described the FTC’s functions as “quasi 
legislative or quasi judicial” because it investigated and reported 
to Congress and conducted initial adjudications on claims of anti-
competitive violations before a case went to federal court.109 The 
FTC acted “as an agency of the legislative or judicial 
departments,” and was “wholly disconnected from the executive 
department[.]”110 Myers, and the president’s discretionary 
removal authority, only applied to “purely executive” officers 
such as the Secretary of State or a postmaster.111
The decision has long been puzzling, especially its 
recognition of a fourth branch of government that falls outside 
the three mentioned in the Constitution. Further, the reasoning 
in Humphrey’s Executor has shriveled on the vine. Recent cases 
continue to recognize Congress’s authority to shield certain 
government agents (such as the independent counsel) from 
removal even when they fall within the executive branch, not 
because they perform quasi legislative or judicial functions, but 
because their independence is critical to their functions.112
Another oddity is that FDR’s loss in Humphrey’s Executor came 
at the hands of Justice Sutherland and the conservatives on the 
Court, who were (as we shall see), otherwise strong supporters of 
executive power, albeit in foreign affairs. 
As they demonstrated in other decisions, the Justices were 
concerned with the New Deal’s great expansion of federal power. 
They may have believed that one way to blunt the progressive 
centralization of power in the national government was to force 
the executive to disperse that power once at the federal level.113
Not surprisingly, Congress found the Court’s approach quite
congenial. It could delegate authority to the executive branch 
while preventing the president from exercising direct control 
over the agency. With the executive branch thus defanged, 
independent agencies naturally became more responsive to 
congressional wishes, which controlled their funding and held 
oversight hearings into their activities. And since the agencies 
were still formally within the executive branch, Congress could 
have its cake and eat it too, disclaiming any official responsibility 
for unpopular regulatory decisions. After Humphrey’s Executor,
Congress added “for cause” limitations on removal for members 
108 Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 628. 
109 Id. at 628–29. 
110 Id. at 628. 
111 Id. at 632. 
112 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361 (1989). 
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of the National Labor Relations Board, the Civil Aeronautics 
Board, and the Federal Reserve Board.114
Creation of the permanent administrative state strained the 
presidency. With the Supreme Court and Congress limiting the 
main constitutional tool of executive control, independent 
agencies might be able to pursue policies at odds with the 
president’s understanding of federal law. Or they might press 
policy mandates in a way that caused conflict with other 
agencies, created redundancies, or ran counter to other federal 
policies. A number of methods for taming the behemoth were 
possible. Presidents could impose order by forcing the menagerie 
of departments, commissions, and agencies to act according to a 
common plan, and thereby coordinate the activities of the 
government rationally; the administrative state could be freed of 
direct control by either the president or Congress, and instead be 
subject to a variety of checks and balances by all three branches; 
or the agencies could work closely with private business and 
interest groups, which would raise objections to agency action 
with the courts, Congress, and the White House.  
FDR rejected the idea that the administrative state should 
float outside the Constitution’s traditional structure, and he 
continued to fire the heads of agencies even when Congress had 
arguably limited his power of removal. FDR, for example, 
removed the chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority in 
1938, even though Congress had established that he could only 
be fired for applying political tests or any other standards but 
“merit and efficiency” in running the agency.115 The chairman 
had attacked his Tennessee Valley Authority colleagues and had 
declared that he took orders from Congress, not the president. 
FDR removed him on the ground that the Executive Power and 
Take Care Clauses of the Constitution required that he control 
his subordinates.116 FDR established various super-cabinet 
entities with names like the Executive Council, the National 
Emergency Council, and the Industrial Emergency Committee, 
composed of cabinet officers, commission heads, and White House 
114 Yoo, Calabresi & Nee, supra note 97, at 88–89. 
115 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Transmits to the Congress the Record of the 
Removal of the Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority (Mar. 23, 1938), in 7 THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 151–53, 162–63 (Samuel I. 
Rosenman ed., 1942). 
116 The federal courts upheld FDR’s decision, ultimately holding that Congress had 
failed to clearly prevent the President from firing on other grounds in addition to criteria 
it listed. See Morgan v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 28 F. Supp. 732, 737 (E.D. Tenn. 1939), aff’d,
115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940); see also Yoo, Calabresi & Nee, supra note 97, at 89–90. 
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staff.117 None of these improvisations provided a structural 
solution to the challenge posed by the administrative state, as 
these various bodies proved a poor forum for rational planning 
and control over the varied arms of the federal government. 
FDR’s last thrust to control the administrative state 
required the cooperation of Congress. In 1936, the President 
asked a commission, headed by administration expert Louis 
Brownlow, to recommend institutional changes for the improved 
governance of the administrative state.118 A year later, it 
reported: “the President needs help.”119 Its bottom line was clear. 
“[M]anagerial direction and control of all departments and 
agencies of the Executive Branch,” Brownlow wrote, “should be 
centered in the President[.]”120
According to Brownlow, the President’s political responsibilities 
dwarfed his formal authorities. “[W]hile he now has popular 
responsibility for this direction,” the committee reported, “he is 
not equipped with adequate legal authority or administrative 
machinery to enable him to exercise it[.]”121 Brownlow and FDR, 
who approved the report, held the usual concern that the 
administrative state was wasteful, redundant, and contradictory, 
but more importantly, they worried that it would become 
so independent as to lose touch with the people.122 The 
administrative state suffered from a democracy deficit. 
The Brownlow Committee concluded that Congress must 
give the president more management resources, while keeping 
the chief executive at the center of decision-making. It advised 
that to make “our Government an up-to-date, efficient, and 
effective instrument for carrying out the will of the Nation,” 
presidential control must be enhanced.123 It recommended the 
creation of a new entity, the Executive Office of the President 
(which would house the Bureau of the Budget), six new White 
House assistants to the president, centralization of the 
government’s budgets and planning, and the merger of 
independent agencies into the cabinet departments.124 Brownlow’s 
report did not call for a professional secretariat that would 
117 See Exec. Order No. 6202-A, Appointing the Executive Council (July 11, 1933); 
Exec. Order No. 6433-A, Creation of the National Emergency Council (Nov. 17, 1933); 
Exec. Order No. 6770, Creating the Industrial Emergency Committee (June 30, 1934). 
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supervise the activities of the government, as existed in Great 
Britain. Rather, the new assistants to the president and the 
Bureau of the Budget would provide information to the president 
and carry out his orders, with Roosevelt still making all critical 
policy decisions.125 By centralizing the administrative state under 
the presidency, it would become directly accountable to Congress 
and the American people. “Strong executive leadership is 
essential to democratic government today,” the report 
concluded.126 “Our choice is not between power and no power, but 
between responsible but capable popular government and 
irresponsible autocracy.”127
FDR had the report’s recommendations distilled into a bill he 
presented to the congressional leadership in January 1937. In a 
four-hour presentation, FDR personally laid out the plan and 
declared: “The President’s task has become impossible for me or 
any other man. A man in this position will not be able to survive 
White House service unless it is simplified. I need executive 
assistants with a ‘passion for anonymity’ to be my legs.”128 Even 
though the 75th Congress began with a two-thirds Democratic 
majority, it was wary of FDR’s plans and less than thrilled at the 
prospect of greater presidential influence over the New Deal 
state. Roosevelt’s plan undermined the benefits to Congress of 
delegation because it would weaken Congress’s influence over 
agency decisions while expanding the president’s authority over 
what was essentially lawmaking. 
Brownlow’s report landed before Congress at the same time 
as FDR’s court-packing plan. While the two plans addressed 
different problems, they fed the same fear of presidential 
aggrandizement at the expense of the other branches. Key 
congressional leaders had not been consulted or briefed on the 
reorganization plan, which they proceeded to attack as another 
step toward despotism, or a power grab by the university 
intellectuals who no doubt would run the new agencies. At a time 
when totalitarianism was raising its ugly head in Europe, fears 
of consolidated executive power were particularly salient. In 
1938, the bill failed in the House and was replaced by a more 
modest bill that gave FDR a limited ability to reorganize 
government.129 Under that authority, FDR still managed to 
125 See MATTHEW DICKINSON, BITTER HARVEST: FDR, PRESIDENTIAL POWER, AND THE 
GROWTH OF THE PRESIDENTIAL BRANCH 104–10 (1996). 
126 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 106 (Robert F. 
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locate the Bureau of the Budget within a new Executive Office of 
the President. As the Office of Management and Budget, it today 
exercises central review over the economic costs and benefits of 
all federal regulation, one of the president’s most powerful tools 
for rationalizing the activities of the administrative state.130
FDR also expanded the resources within the White House, 
an institution now separate from the Executive Office of the 
President, which enabled him to gain more information and 
control over the cabinet agencies. Still, the independent agencies 
remained outside the cabinet departments. FDR never 
successfully established any single entity to coordinate the 
activities of the entire administrative state, and his failed bill 
demonstrates the enduring constitutional checks on the 
presidency. Despite FDR’s growing power, only Congress could 
pass the laws needed to reorganize the cabinet departments, 
re-shape the jurisdiction and structure of the independent 
agencies, and provide the funds and positions in a new, 
revitalized White House.131
While FDR suffered defeats at the hands of Congress, he 
continued to claim and exercise inherent executive authority that 
went beyond mere control of personnel. He signed statements to 
object to riders inserted into needed spending bills, which he 
believed to be unconstitutional. Congress, for example, attempted 
to force the President to fire three bureaucrats it believed were 
“subversives” by specifically barring any federal funds to pay 
their salaries.132 Roosevelt signed the bill but objected to its 
unconstitutional end run around the president’s power over the 
removal of executive branch officials. Ultimately, the officials left 
within months, but they sued for their back pay all the way 
to the Supreme Court, which agreed that Congress had violated 
the Constitution.133
President Roosevelt also followed Lincoln’s example in using 
his executive power to fight racial discrimination. Although 
Lincoln had relied on his power as Commander-in-Chief to free 
130 See, e.g., Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of 
Agency Decisionmaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986); Alan B. Morrison, OMB
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the slaves, the southern states imposed racial segregation in the 
years after the Civil War, ultimately with the approval of the 
Supreme Court.134 While FDR did not take segregation head on, 
he issued an executive order in 1941 to prohibit racial 
discrimination in employment on federal defense contracts.135
Roosevelt had no statutory authority to order the federal 
government to provide fair treatment in employment to all, 
regardless of race. He could rely only upon his constitutional 
authority as president to oversee the management of federal 
programs. Once war began, President Roosevelt could clarify that 
his orders were taken under his power as both Chief Executive 
and Commander-in-Chief in wartime.136 FDR’s orders would 
not be the first time, nor the last time, that the cause of 
racial equality would depend on a broad understanding of 
presidential power. 
The New Deal depended upon broad theories of the 
presidency and the role of the federal government in national 
life. What remains less clear is whether FDR’s fundamental 
re-orientation of the government into a positive, active 
instrument of national policy was worthwhile. Contemporary 
critics of the modern presidency question whether chief 
executives, acting alone, have led the nation into disastrous 
wars.137 We need also ask, but rarely do, whether the expansion 
of executive power domestically has benefited the nation. To the 
extent we debate the desirability of the administrative state, 
most American scholars today bemoan the fact that the New 
Deal did not go far enough. They argue that the New Deal failed 
because it did not achieve a full-fledged European welfare state, 
or that FDR’s coalition fragmented and failed to follow through 
on the promise of liberal reform.138 These critics, often the most 
vocal detractors of the muscular executive action in foreign 
affairs, cry out for more executive power domestically. 
Vesting the president with more authority to control the 
government’s regulation of the economy may make sense during 
an emergency, but it did not work in solving the Great 
Depression. Economists recognize today that the New Deal 
134 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543, 548 (1896). 
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neither put an end to high rates of unemployment nor restored 
consistent economic growth.139 FDR’s monetary and fiscal policy 
were often counterproductive. Full employment would return 
only with American rearmament in the first years of World War 
II. Other New Deal policies were similarly confused, such as 
allowing industry to set production quotas, reduce production to 
raise prices, and restrict employment by raising minimum wages. 
Economists similarly doubt whether the creation of national 
regulation of the securities markets and other industries 
contributed to the eventual economic recovery, even though it 
was certainly valuable for postwar prosperity. If, as Milton 
Friedman argues, the Great Depression would have proven to be 
only a normal recession with some deft monetary policy from the 
Federal Reserve,140 it bears asking whether the expansive, 
permanent bureaucracy was needed at all. 
Decades later, American presidents would campaign against 
the burdensome regulations made possible by the New Deal. The 
administrative state we have today failed to end the Great 
Depression. There is little doubt that the explosion in the size 
and power of the administrative state has transformed the 
nature of American politics. Considering this, was the 
administrative state worth the price?  
The federal government has dramatically expanded the 
scope of regulation to include not only national economic activity, 
such as workplace conditions and minimum wages and hours, 
but also the environment and endangered species, educational 
standards, state and local corruption, consumer product safety, 
communications technology and ownership, illegal narcotics and 
gun crimes, and corporate governance. It has produced less 
deliberation in Congress, which now delegates sweeping powers 
to the agencies, and has placed the initial authority to issue 
federal law affecting private individuals in administrative 
agencies. Those agencies are not directly accountable to the 
people through elections, except for the thin layer of presidential 
appointees at the very top. Special-interest groups have come to 
play a significant role in influencing both congressional 
committees and agencies, gaining economic “rents” for their 
members at the expense of the broader public. 
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This is not a plea to return to the laissez-faire capitalism of 
the nineteenth century variety. The modern administrative state 
no doubt has produced social benefits, and there are important 
areas where the greater information and expertise held by the 
executive agencies improves government policy, but it remains 
an open question whether the centralization of economic and 
social regulation in the national government has been, on 
balance, a success. It is undeniable that the requirement of 
minimum national standards, most especially in the area of civil 
rights, was a necessary and long-overdue change. Equality under 
law should not have been a matter of legislative or executive 
discretion, but a requirement of the Reconstruction Amendments 
to the Constitution. National control of other economic and social 
issues, however, may not have been worth the cost in increased 
government spending, larger budget deficits, a permanent 
government apparatus of unprecedented size (at least in the 
American experience), the rise of interest-group politics, and 
interference with efficient market mechanisms. 
Federal agencies may impose uniform rules, but they may 
not impose the best rules. In the absence of broad national 
regulation, states could enact a diversity of policies on issues 
such as the economy, environment, education, crime, and social 
policy. People could vote with their feet by moving to states that 
adopt their preferred package of policies, while experimentation 
could identify the most effective solutions to economic and social 
problems. The New Deal’s concentration of regulatory authority 
in Washington, D.C. sapped the vitality of the states, whose 
powers are only a pale imitation of those they held in the 
nineteenth century.141 FDR certainly deserves credit for restoring 
Americans’ optimism and faith in government, and for alleviating 
the suffering inflicted by the Depression, but it remains doubtful 
whether the great wrenching in the fabric of our federal system 
of government and the expansion in the president’s constitutional 
powers in the domestic realm can be justified by any limited 
advance in triggering a recovery. Despite its revolution in 
domestic presidential power and government structure, the New 
Deal appears to have had little impact on ending the worst 
economic collapse in American history. 
141 For a more extensive discussion of the transformation of American politics 
wrought by the New Deal, see MILKIS, supra note 1, at 21–51, 149–83; and THEODORE J.
LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 273–74
(2d ed. 1979). 
2018] Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power 235 
II. THE GATHERING STORM
FDR’s claim to greatness lies not in the New Deal, but in his 
defeat of one of the greatest external threats our nation has 
faced: fascist Germany and imperial Japan. FDR exercised 
farsighted vision in preparing the nation for a necessary war 
unwanted by a large minority, and at times a majority, of 
Congress and the American people. In the process, the President 
skirted, stretched, and broke a series of neutrality laws designed 
to prevent American entry into World War II. Sometimes he went 
to Congress and the American people to seek support for his 
actions. Other times he did not. But, regardless of the where, or 
if, FDR sought support for his actions in the lead up to war, FDR 
firmly established that the power to make national security 
policy resided in the Oval Office.142
Debate has raged for decades over whether the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise, or whether FDR or the 
American government had advance knowledge of the attack. 
Some have suspected that FDR believed the only way to rouse a 
reluctant American public to war was for the United States to be 
attacked first. In this respect, FDR had the same instincts as 
Lincoln. The conventional wisdom today attributes more of the 
blame for Pearl Harbor to incompetence by the field commanders 
and complacency in Washington, and has put to rest the idea 
that FDR actually knew that the Japanese would attack 
Pearl Harbor.143
Recent scholarly work suggests that FDR managed events to 
maneuver the Japanese into a corner, with a strong possibility 
that the Japanese would attack American interests somewhere in 
the Pacific, most likely the Philippines. Roosevelt’s imposition of 
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an arms, steel, and oil embargo against the Japanese Empire was 
designed to force Tokyo to either withdraw from China or attack 
American, British, and Dutch possessions in Asia for natural 
resources.144 FDR pressed Japan in order to bring the United 
States to bear against the greater threat of Germany.145 FDR 
could not have walked the United States to the brink of war 
without an expansive interpretation of the president’s 
constitutional powers and the willingness to exercise them. 
Roosevelt had laid claim to sweeping executive authority in 
foreign affairs even before war with Germany and Japan looked 
certain. He was assisted, at times, from an unlikely source: 
Justice Sutherland. While Sutherland believed the New Deal 
state unconstitutionally trampled on the natural rights of 
individuals, as Hadley Arkes has argued, he still strongly 
supported presidential power in foreign affairs.146 This became 
clear in the case United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.147
In 1934, Congress had delegated to the president the 
authority to cut off all U.S. arms sales to Bolivia and Paraguay, 
which were fighting a nasty border war, if he found the ban 
would advance peace in the region.148 FDR proclaimed an arms 
embargo in effect on the same day Congress passed the law,149
and the next day the Justice Department prosecuted four 
executives of the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation for trying 
to sell fifteen machine guns to Bolivia.150 Curtiss-Wright, which 
traced its roots to the Wright brothers, would supply the engines 
for the DC-3 air transport and the B-17 Flying Fortress and 
build the P-40 fighter.151 Taking its case all the way to the 
Supreme Court, the company argued that the law had delegated 
unconstitutional authority over international commerce to the 
president.152 If Congress wanted to impose an arms embargo, it 
would have to do it itself, not just hand the authority to FDR. 
In a remarkable and controversial opinion, Justice 
Sutherland declared that the constitutional standards that ruled 
the government’s actions domestically did not apply in the same 
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way to foreign affairs.153 The Constitution’s careful limitation of 
the national government’s powers, so as to preserve the general 
authority of the states, did not extend beyond the water’s edge. 
In the arena of foreign affairs, Sutherland maintained, the 
American Revolution had directly transferred the full powers of 
national sovereignty from Great Britain to the Union. “The 
powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make 
treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other 
sovereignties,” Sutherland wrote, “if they had never been 
mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal 
government as necessary concomitants of nationality.”154 In 
words that could have been cribbed from Abraham Lincoln, the 
Court declared that the “Union existed before the Constitution,” 
and therefore the Union could exercise the same powers over war 
and peace as any other nation.155
An argument in favor of exclusive federal power over 
national security and international relations, however, does not 
dictate which branch should exercise it. Sutherland located that 
authority in the president for inherently practical considerations. 
The dangers posed by foreign nations required the structural 
ability to act swiftly and secretly, unique to the executive branch. 
“In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, 
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the 
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”156
Echoing Hamilton and Jefferson, and quoting then Congressman 
John Marshall, Sutherland declared, “The President is the sole 
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole 
representative with foreign nations.”157
Justice Sutherland notably eschewed the opportunity for a 
narrow holding in conferring wide latitude to the executive 
branch. It did not matter that, on the facts of Curtiss-Wright,
FDR was acting pursuant to congressional delegation. “We are 
here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President 
by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority 
plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the 
President,” which does not “require as a basis for its exercise an 
153 See id. at 315–22. 
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act of Congress.”158 Sutherland found great advantages to the 
United States in vesting these powers in the executive, rather 
than the legislature. The president, not Congress, “has the better 
opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign 
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has 
confidential sources of information.”159
Another case gave Justice Sutherland the opportunity to 
deliver a second blessing to FDR’s vigorous use of his presidential 
powers. In 1933, Roosevelt ended American efforts to isolate the 
Soviet Union and unilaterally recognized its communist 
government. As part of an executive agreement with the Soviets, 
the United States took on all rights and claims of the USSR 
against American citizens, such as those involving the 
expropriation of property.160 The federal government sued to 
recover money and property held by Russians in the United 
States, which were allegedly owed to the Soviet government.161
What made the recognition of the Soviet Union so remarkable 
was that FDR not only had set the policy of the United States 
and entered into an international agreement on his own, but the 
government used that unilateral agreement to set aside state 
property and contract rules previously considered sacrosanct—all 
without any action of Congress or the Senate. 
Property owners resisted. Augustus Belmont, a New York 
City banker, refused to turn over deposits held on behalf of the 
Petrograd Metal Works after the nationalization of all Russian 
corporations in 1918.162 FDR’s executive agreement with the 
Soviets required that legal ownership of the profits transferred to 
the United States government. Belmont’s estate refused to turn 
the money over because, it claimed, the property law of New York 
state protected it.163
In United States v. Belmont, the Supreme Court again sided 
with the executive. It found that the recognition of the USSR, the 
international agreement, and the pre-emption of state law all fell 
within the president’s constitutional powers to the exclusion of 
the states.164 “In respect of all international negotiations and 
compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state 
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lines disappear. As to such purposes the State of New York does 
not exist.”165 Presidents since have used this power to make 
literally thousands of international agreements with other 
countries without the Senate’s advice and consent—from 1939 
to 1989, the United States entered into 11,698 executive 
agreements and only 702 treaties.166 The courts have 
upheld sole executive agreements several times since, including 
an agreement ending the Iranian hostage crisis and another 
pre-empting the state law claims of Holocaust survivors against 
German companies.167
The Supreme Court did not grant the president these powers 
in foreign affairs; only the Constitution could do that. Presidents 
from Washington onward had interpreted the Constitution’s 
vesting of the executive and Commander-in-Chief authorities to 
give them the initiative to protect the national security, set 
foreign policy, and negotiate with other nations. Sutherland’s 
opinions gave judicial recognition to decades of presidential 
practice; what had been the product of presidential enterprise 
and congressional acquiescence became formal constitutional 
law. Roosevelt would draw on these authorities as he 
maneuvered to send aid to the Allies and bring the United States 
into the war against the fascist powers. 
Facing existential threats in the combination of a looming 
global conflict and domestic isolationism, FDR drew deeply from 
his well of presidential powers. As early as 1935, Roosevelt had 
concluded that Hitler’s Germany posed a threat to the United 
States.168 As the Axis powers increased the size, strength, and 
quality of their militaries while launching offensives against 
their neighbors, the President became convinced that military 
force would be necessary to protect American interests. 
Neutrality offered a false promise of safety. FDR’s approach 
represented something of a revolution in American strategic 
thought. No longer would American national security depend on 
the safety provided by two oceans and control of the Western 
Hemisphere, where it had felt no reluctance to launch wars of its 
own.169 A German defeat of Great Britain would remove a 
valuable buffer that had prevented European nations from naval 
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and air access to the Americas. And if Hitler succeeded in gaining 
complete control of the resources of the European continent, 
Germany would become a superpower with the means to 
threaten the United States.170 A central objective of American 
strategy was to maintain a balance of power in Europe and Asia 
to contain expansionist Germany and Japan, but if war came, 
FDR and his advisors identified Hitler as the primary threat.171
By December 1940, FDR could be relatively open with the 
public about his broader goals. In his famous “Arsenal of 
Democracy” speech, he accused the fascist powers of conquering 
Europe as a prelude to larger aims that threatened the United 
States. Never since “Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has our 
American civilization been in such danger as now,” FDR 
warned.172 “The Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear 
that they intend not only to dominate all life and thought in their 
own country,” FDR told the nation by radio, “but also to enslave 
the whole of Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to 
dominate the rest of the world.”173 He rejected the idea that the 
“broad expanse of the Atlantic and of the Pacific” would protect 
the United States.174 It was only the British navy that protected 
the oceans from the Nazis. The United States had to begin 
massive rearmament and provide arms and assistance to the free 
nations that were bearing the brunt of the fighting. FDR did not 
tell the public that he was already taking action to bring the 
nation closer to war, first against Europe to stop Hitler, while 
holding off Japanese expansion in Asia. 
FDR’s strategic vision required several elements to succeed. 
The United States had to send military and financial aid to 
Britain and France, help those supplies cross the Atlantic Ocean, 
and build up the United States military (especially the Navy and 
Army Air Corps). If the Allies’ fortunes fell far enough, the nation 
would have to be prepared to intervene militarily. Resistance to 
these steps was widespread. Many Americans believed that 
President Wilson had erred in entering World War I; they 
wanted to avoid American involvement in another internecine 
squabble in Europe. Between 1939 and 1941, a majority of 
Americans grew to support aid to the Allies, but that was as far 
as they would go. As late as May 1941, almost eighty percent of 
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the public wanted the United States to stay out of the conflict.175
Seventy percent felt that FDR had gone too far or had helped 
Britain enough.176 Isolationists blamed American entry into 
World War I on President Wilson’s use of his executive powers to 
tilt American neutrality toward Britain and France.177 Worried 
about a re-run, they pressed for strict limitations on presidential 
power to keep the United States out of the European war.178
Opposition to American intervention took more concrete 
form than public opinion polls. Congress enacted Neutrality Acts 
in 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939 to prevent the United States from 
aiding either side. Congress passed the 1935 Act after Germany 
repudiated the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of 
Versailles and Italy threatened to invade Ethiopia in defiance of 
the League of Nations. It required the president to proclaim, 
after the outbreak of war between two or more nations, an 
embargo of all arms, ammunition or “implements of war” against 
the belligerents.179 It gave FDR the authority to decide when to 
terminate the embargo, but it left him little choice as to when to 
begin one.
The Act prohibited the United States from helping a victim 
nation and punishing the aggressor, instead requiring a complete 
cut-off for both. FDR had privately opposed the law’s mandatory 
terms, fought to keep his discretionary control over foreign 
affairs, and in signing the bill predicted that its “inflexible 
provisions might drag us into war instead of keeping us out.”180
Later acts prohibited the extension of loans or financial 
assistance to belligerents,181 extended the embargo to civil 
wars,182 and allowed the ban to cover only arms and munitions, 
but not raw materials. In 1939, Congress enacted an even 
tougher prohibition that sought to prevent belligerents from 
“cash-and-carry” transactions for raw materials by prohibiting 
American vessels from transporting anything to nations at war.  
Domestic resistance required FDR to adopt an approach that 
gave the appearance that the United States was being dragged 
into the war. By 1941, with Hitler in control of Europe and Japan 
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occupying large parts of China, FDR wanted to find a way for the 
United States to enter the war on the side of Britain. In August 
1941, for example, FDR told Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
that he could not rely on Congress to declare war against 
Germany.183 Instead, FDR “would wage war, but not declare 
it.”184 According to Churchill’s account of their conversation at 
the Atlantic Conference, FDR said “he would become more and 
more provocative” and promised that “everything would be 
done to force an incident” that would “justify him in 
opening hostilities.”185
Roosevelt’s plans to move the United States toward war 
depended in part on Congress. The Constitution gives Congress 
control over international and domestic interstate commerce, as 
well as the money and property of the United States. FDR could 
lay little claim to constitutional authority to dictate arms-export 
policies or to provide financial and material aid to the Allies. 
FDR initially hoped that the United States could provide enough 
assistance to Britain and France—the United States would prove 
the “great Arsenal of Democracy,”186 in his famous words—to 
postpone the need for American military intervention in Europe. 
After the fall of France, FDR realized that Great Britain could 
not hold off the Nazis on its own, but he hoped to send enough 
aid to keep Britain alive while he prepared the American public 
for war. 
FDR pressed Congress for several changes to the Neutrality 
Acts that would send more help to the Allies. In the 1936 and 
1937 Acts, for example, the administration won more 
presidential discretion to determine when a foreign war had 
broken out.187 By 1939, it succeeded in changing the law to allow 
the president to put off a proclamation of neutrality if necessary 
to protect American peace and security.188 This effectively 
allowed Britain and France, which controlled the sea routes to 
the Americas, to continue to receive aid.  
FDR used this flexibility to continue supplying arms and 
money to China by declining to find a war to exist there, even 
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after Japan had attacked Beijing and Nanjing.189 Similarly, 
Roosevelt refused to invoke the Neutrality Acts when Germany 
invaded Czechoslovakia in 1939, or Russia in 1941, because a 
blanket embargo would have prevented American aid from 
flowing to the Allies.190 Manipulating the embargo rules to 
affirmatively support one side of various conflicts, FDR showed 
little respect for the spirit of the Neutrality Acts. But Congress 
would not allow him to go farther. FDR’s proposals throughout 
1939 and 1940 to reform the Neutrality Acts to allow for direct 
military aid to the Allies repeatedly failed. 
As his efforts to modify the Neutrality Acts flagged, FDR 
became more aggressive in invoking his inherent constitutional 
authority. He asked Attorney General Robert Jackson, “How far 
do you think I can go in ignoring the existing act—even though I 
did sign it?”191 Vice President John Nance Garner and Secretary 
of the Interior Harold Ickes argued that the President’s 
constitutional authority in foreign affairs allowed him to act 
beyond the Acts.192 Instead of overriding them, however, 
Roosevelt simply became more creative in interpreting them. On 
May 22, 1940, as German armies swept through France, FDR 
ordered the sale of World War I-era equipment to the Allies; on 
June 3rd, he ordered the transfer of $38 million in weapons to 
U.S. Steel, which promptly sold them at no profit to the British 
and French.193 The administration argued that these sales did 
not violate the Neutrality Acts because the arms were 
“surplus.”194 Three days later (just after the British had 
evacuated 300,000 soldiers from the German noose around 
Dunkirk), the Navy sold fifty Hell Diver bombers, which had 
been introduced to service only in 1938, to Britain because they 
were “temporarily in excess of requirements.”195 The sales 
occurred at a time when the United States army could field only 
80,000 combat troops in five divisions, while the German army in 
western Europe deployed two million men in 140 divisions.196 The 
U.S. Army Air Corps had only 160 fighter planes and fifty-two 
heavy bombers.197 Announcing the decision on June 8th, FDR 
told a news conference that “a plane can get out of date darned 
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fast.”198 Two days later, in a speech at the University of Virginia, 
FDR declared isolationism an “obvious delusion” and called for 
an allied victory over “the gods of force and hate” to prevent a 
world run by totalitarian governments.199
American aid came too little, too late; France requested an 
armistice on June 17, 1940.200 In the midst of a presidential 
campaign for an unprecedented third term, FDR sought 
bipartisan support for his policies and replaced isolationists in 
his cabinet with two internationalist Republicans: Henry 
Stimson as Secretary of War and Frank Knox as Secretary of the 
Navy.201 Both favored repealing the neutrality laws, boosting the 
U.S. military through a draft, and sending large amounts of aid 
to Great Britain.202 Britain’s destroyer fleet, which had suffered 
almost fifty percent losses, needed reinforcements to block a 
German invasion force and safeguard its trade lifelines.203
Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that acquiring American destroyers 
was “a matter of life and death.”204 FDR reacted by planning to 
send two-dozen PT-boats immediately, and said that Navy 
lawyers who thought the sale illegal should follow orders or go on 
vacation.205 After word of FDR’s plans leaked, Congress enacted a 
law forbidding the sale of any military equipment “essential to 
the defense of the United States” as certified by the Chief 
of Naval Operations or the Army Chief of Staff, and reasserted 
a World War I ban on sending any “vessel of war” to 
a belligerent.206
Congress’s tightening of neutrality delayed FDR for two 
months. While the Battle of Britain raged in the skies, Churchill 
begged FDR for additional destroyers. “The whole fate of the 
war,” the Prime Minister wrote in July, “may be decided by this 
minor and easily remediable factor,” and he urged that “this is 
the thing to do now.”207 FDR and his advisors planned a transfer 
to Britain of fifty World War I destroyers declared to be 
“surplus,” even though similar warships from the same era were 
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being activated for Navy service.208 In exchange, Britain would 
provide basing rights in its Western Hemisphere territories to 
the United States. In August, the President concluded an 
executive agreement with Britain, kept secret at first and 
without congressional approval, to make the trade.209
FDR’s advisors divided over the deal’s legality. One legal 
advisor believed it violated the June 28th statute and the 
Espionage Act of 1917, which forbade sending an armed vessel to 
any belligerent while the United States remained neutral; State 
Department and Justice Department lawyers agreed.210 But 
Dean Acheson, then Undersecretary of the Treasury, argued that 
the June 28th law implicitly recognized the president’s 
constitutional power to transfer any military asset in order to 
improve national security, while others recommended that the 
government first sell the destroyers to private companies that 
could then resell them to the British.211 Acheson even went 
further. He argued that the 1917 law applied only to ships that 
were built specifically on order for a belligerent and not to 
existing ships originally built or used for the Navy.212
Attorney General Jackson drew on these ideas in his legal 
opinion blessing the deal, but also relied on the president’s 
Commander-in-Chief power. “Happily there has been little 
occasion in our history for the interpretation of the powers of the 
President as Commander-in-Chief,” Jackson wrote to FDR.213 “I 
do not find it necessary to rest upon that power alone.”214
Nevertheless, “it will hardly be open to controversy that the 
vesting of such a function in the President also places upon him a 
responsibility to use all constitutional authority which he may 
possess to provide adequate bases and stations” for the most 
effective use of the armed forces.215 The perilous circumstances 
facing the United States reinforced the Commander-in-Chief’s 
power. “It seems equally beyond doubt that present world 
conditions forbid him to risk any delay that is constitutionally 
avoidable.”216 Any statutory effort by Congress to prevent the 
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president from transferring military equipment to help American 
national security would be of “questionable constitutionality.”217
Jackson defended the exclusion of Congress. He thought that 
the deal could take the form of an executive agreement because it 
required neither the appropriation of funds nor an obligation to 
act in the future.218 Justice Sutherland’s opinion in Curtiss-
Wright, which the Attorney General extensively quoted, 
supported the argument.219 Jackson had a more difficult time 
with the Neutrality Acts. He read the June 28th law to recognize 
the president’s authority to transfer naval vessels to Britain, 
subject only to the requirement that they be surplus or obsolete. 
It did not prohibit the transfer of property “merely because it is 
still used or usable or of possible value for future use,” but only if 
the transfer weakened the national defense.220 The “over-age” 
destroyers, as he called them, could be found to fall outside the 
statute and hence within the president’s authority, which must 
have derived from the Commander-in-Chief power, to exchange 
them for valuable military bases.221 Jackson, however, advised 
that transferring brand-new mosquito boats would violate 
Congress’s ban on sending ships to a belligerent. 
Jackson issued an even broader reading of the Commander-
in-Chief power in May 1941, when FDR allowed British pilots to 
train in American military schools. Under the Commander-in-
Chief power, the president “has supreme command over the land 
and naval forces of the country and may order them to perform 
such military duties as, in his opinion, are necessary or 
appropriate for the defense of the United States.”222 The 
president could “command and direct the armed forces in their 
immediate movements and operations” and “dispose of troops 
and equipment” to promote the national security.223 Jackson read 
the passage of Lend-Lease as support for FDR’s judgment that 
helping Britain was important to the national defense.224 If the 
president had full constitutional authority to use the armed 
forces, even to use military force, to protect the nation by helping 
Britain, then he must also have the lesser power to train British 
airmen. “I have no doubt of the President’s lawful authority to 
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utilize forces under his command to instruct others in matters of 
defense which are vital to the security of the United States.”225 It 
“would be anomalous indeed,” Jackson observed, if the military 
could provide Britain with arms but could not train the British 
how to use them.226
Reaction to the destroyers-for-bases deal, announced in early 
August, attacked FDR’s methods more than his goals. Roosevelt 
worried that his energetic use of executive power would feed 
fears that he was becoming an autocrat, worries punctuated by 
his nomination that summer for an unprecedented third term as 
president. Leaks of secret Anglo-American staff talks and 
announcement of a joint U.S.–Canadian defense board already 
had isolationists attacking FDR for pushing the United States 
towards war.227 FDR predicted that revelation of the executive 
agreement would “raise hell with Congress” and lead to 
accusations he was a “warmonger” and “dictator,” and might 
torpedo his re-election hopes.228
FDR’s first two predictions quickly came true. His 
Republican opponent, Wendell Willkie, supported the policy but 
declared that FDR’s unilateral action was “the most dictatorial 
and arbitrary act of any president in the history of the United 
States.”229 Edwin Borchard, a Yale professor of international law, 
argued that Roosevelt had assumed dictatorial powers, placed 
himself above the law, and threatened to “break down 
constitutional safeguards.”230 The Constitution, Borchard wrote, 
“does not give the President carte blanche to do anything he 
pleases in foreign affairs.”231 The nation’s leading scholar of 
constitutional law, Edward Corwin of Princeton, attacked 
Jackson’s opinion as “an endorsement of unrestrained autocracy 
in the field of our foreign relations, neither more nor less.”232 In 
The New York Times, Corwin asked “why may not any and all of 
Congress’s specifically delegated powers be set aside by the 
President’s ‘executive power’ and the country be put on a 
totalitarian basis without further ado?”233
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Despite these ringing attacks on presidential power, the 
destroyers-for-bases deal proved remarkably popular—Gallup 
polls showed sixty-two percent in favor—encouraging even bolder 
steps.234 By October 1940, FDR asked for and received 
appropriations of $17.7 billion for national defense—his 
administration’s original estimate for the year had been $1.84 
billion—and defense spending doubled the following year.235 In 
June 1940, he called for the first peacetime draft in American 
history, which Congress enacted in September only after Willkie 
publicly agreed. A Wall Street lawyer and former Democrat, 
Willkie was a dark-horse candidate who had won the nomination 
without ever having occupied public office. His attacks on the 
New Deal had gained little traction during the campaign, so 
Willkie pivoted, painting FDR as a “warmonger” and dictator 
who had made “secret agreements” to enter a war that would kill 
thousands of young Americans. “If [Roosevelt’s] promise to keep 
our boys out of foreign wars is no better than his promise to 
balance the budget,” Willkie said on the stump, “they’re already 
almost on the transports.”236 By the end of October, Willkie came 
within four points of the President, and Roosevelt went on a 
speaking tour to reassure mothers in a speech at Boston Garden 
on October 30, 1940, that “[y]our boys are not going to be 
sent into any foreign wars.”237 Though the polls showed the 
election close, FDR prevailed by twenty-seven million to Willkie’s 
twenty-two million and an Electoral College majority of 449–82. 
After the election, FDR redoubled his efforts to send aid to 
Britain. He authorized secret staff talks between American and 
British military planners, who recommended a grand strategy of 
defeating Germany first while holding Japan to a stalemate.238 In 
November, FDR ordered the army to make B-17 bombers 
immediately available to the British, to be replaced by British 
planes on order in American factories, and he discussed making 
half of all American arms production available to the British. 
British finances collapsed in late November; the country could no 
longer pay for the material it needed to continue the war. 
Britain’s ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian, 
appealed to the American public on November 23rd by saying to 
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a group of journalists, “[w]ell, boys, Britain’s broke; it’s your 
money we want.”239
Lothian’s report of Britain’s functional bankruptcy shocked 
the White House into action. FDR approved the sale of $2.1 
billion in weapons that the British could not pay for, as well as 
the diversion of $700 million in Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation funds to underwrite the factory expansions needed 
for the increased arms sales.240 The President hit upon one of his 
most artful evasions of neutrality, Lend-Lease, which would “get 
away from the dollar sign,” as he told reporters at a December 
17, 1940, press conference.241 The United States would “lend” 
Britain weapons and munitions and, rather than demand 
immediate payment, would expect their return after the war’s 
end. Of course, the idea was a complete fiction; war would 
consume the arms. Ever canny in his presentations to the public, 
FDR deployed a homey analogy: If a house were on fire, a 
neighbor would lend a garden hose with the expectation that it 
would be returned later, rather than demanding $15 for the cost 
of the hose.242
Lend-Lease required congressional action. In his famous 
“Arsenal of Democracy” speech on December 29th, Roosevelt 
defended Lend-Lease and broader aid to the allies with his most 
stirring language.243 FDR declared that the Nazis posed the most 
direct threat to the security of the United States since its 
founding.244 To avoid war, the United States would have to 
become the great “arsenal of democracy” for the free nations 
carrying on the fight.245 The United States would be less likely to 
get into war “if we do all we can now to support the nations 
defending themselves against attack by the Axis,” rather than “if 
we acquiesce in their defeat.”246
Disclaiming any intention to send a new “American 
Expeditionary Force” outside the United States, FDR declared 
that “the people of Europe who are defending themselves do not 
ask us to do their fighting.”247 All they sought were “the 
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implements of war.”248 Increasing national defense production 
and sending it to Britain would “keep war away from our country 
and our people.”249 It was one of the most popular speeches of 
FDR’s presidency: roughly eighty percent of the public agreed.250
Congress waited until March 1941 to give its approval to 
Lend-Lease,251 but FDR decided to move forward during that 
critical time anyway. He authorized British purchase of 23,000 
airplanes in November 1940, and rifles and ammunition in 
February 1941. He ordered the U.S. military to purchase 
munitions factories but diverted the production to Britain.252
In spring 1941, FDR turned to the protection of the supplies 
that would begin to flow across the Atlantic, and took unilateral 
action that provoked the Nazis and drew the United States ever 
closer to war. In March, FDR moved to place Greenland under 
American military protection, and in April he gave orders to the 
Navy to extend its security zone as far as Greenland and the 
Azores, and to begin locating German submarines and reporting 
their positions to the Royal Navy. In May, he transferred 
one-quarter of the Pacific fleet to the Atlantic to deter any 
German effort to seize Atlantic islands for bases. He declared an 
“unlimited national emergency” at the end of the month and told 
the nation that helping Britain win the battle of the Atlantic was 
critical to keeping the Nazis out of the Western Hemisphere.253
“[I]t would be suicide to wait until they are in our front yard,” 
Roosevelt argued.254 He followed his speech with a June 
deployment of a Marine brigade to occupy Iceland (which is about 
1200 miles from London and 2800 miles from Washington, D.C.), 
which freed up a British division and extended the American 
security zone even further. In July, he announced that the 
Navy would begin escorting ships between the United States 
and Iceland. 
FDR did not seek or receive congressional approval for any of 
these deployments, which made clear, if earlier aid had not, that 
the United States was no longer a true neutral. Still, Congress 
retained ample checks on presidential power. FDR could send 
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only 4000 Marines to Iceland because of the small size of the 
regular armed forces, and he could not send any of the new 
draftees because Congress had attached a provision to the 
conscription act forbidding their deployment outside the Western 
Hemisphere.255 Congress had also limited the terms of service of 
the 900,000 draftees to one year, requiring FDR to go to Congress 
to win an extension.256 Even with America occupying Iceland and 
Greenland and escorting ships in the North Atlantic, only fifty-one 
percent of Americans supported the draft extension, and Congress 
narrowly approved it.257
Meanwhile, FDR pursued measures to check Japan’s 
expansion and perhaps provoke it into a conflict. Japan had been 
waging war in China since the 1931 Manchuria crisis and had 
launched an invasion to conquer the whole nation in 1937. 
Japanese military and civilian leaders sought to create a 
“Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” that would supply the 
raw materials for the Japanese economy and the war in China.258
In 1940, Japan had intensified its attacks in China and had 
moved into Indochina. In September 1940, it entered into the 
Axis agreement with Germany and Italy.259
Roosevelt launched a campaign of economic warfare, without 
reliance on legal authority. In July 1940, for example, FDR 
blocked aviation gasoline exports to Japan.260 Chiang Kai-shek 
had sent an urgent message to Roosevelt that without more aid, 
the Nationalist Chinese resistance to Japan would fail.261 FDR 
responded by banning the export of iron and steel to Japan. In 
November, he sent $100 million and 100 warplanes to the 
Chinese Nationalist government, and in the Spring he authorized 
volunteers—Colonel Chennault’s Flying Tigers—to fly fighters 
for China.262 FDR had never found China and Japan to be at war 
under the 1939 Neutrality Act, so he had no statutory authority 
to impose the materials embargo on Japan or to send money and 
arms to China.263 Roosevelt simply undertook the actions as 
president in order to protect the national security. 
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Japan’s expansion south toward Indochina and Thailand 
increased the potential for conflict. On July 26, 1941, FDR 
ordered a freeze of Japanese assets in the United States, reduced 
U.S. oil exports to pre-war levels, and prohibited the sale 
of high-octane aircraft gasoline to Japan.264 By mistake, 
administrators executed a complete oil embargo against Japan, 
which FDR did nothing to correct. FDR opened negotiations to 
reach a settlement with the Japanese government, though he 
knew because of American code-breaking success that Tokyo was, 
at the least, considering an attack on American, British, and 
Dutch possessions in Asia. 
Some historians believe that FDR’s goal was to hold off 
Japan while resources could be devoted against the dire 
challenge in Europe—a view held by many of his military and 
civilian advisors. Marc Trachtenberg, however, has convincingly 
argued that FDR deliberately painted the Japanese into a 
corner.265 In the course of negotiations, Roosevelt demanded that 
Tokyo end its war in China in exchange for a resumption of U.S. 
oil and steel exports, yet FDR and his advisors knew that Japan 
would not willingly give up its territorial gains in China. “[T]he 
United States had been waging preventive economic warfare 
against Imperial Japan for at least 18 months prior to Pearl 
Harbor,” Colin Gray writes.266 “U.S. measures of economic 
blockade left Japan with no alternative to war consistent with its 
sense of national honor. The oil embargo eventually would 
literally immobilize the Japanese Navy. So Washington 
confronted Tokyo with the unenviable choice between de facto 
complete political surrender of its ambitions in China, or war.”267
As FDR squeezed Japan, he expanded political and military 
assistance to the British. On August 9th, he met Churchill in 
Placentia Bay, off Newfoundland, where the two leaders issued 
the Atlantic Charter.268 It declared Anglo-American principles in 
the war to be: no Anglo-American aggrandizement, opposition to 
undemocratic changes in territory, self-government for all 
peoples, equal access to trade and natural resources, 
international economic cooperation, a guarantee of security and 
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freedom to all nations, freedom of the seas, disarmament of 
aggressors and reduction in armaments, and plans for a 
collective system of international security.269 During the 
discussions, FDR made clear to Churchill his desire to bring the 
United States into the war by forcing an incident with 
Germany,270 and set out to make his wish come true by ordering 
full naval escorts for British convoys between the United States 
and Iceland, which put the Germans in the position of either 
firing on U.S. warships or conceding the Battle of the Atlantic. 
Without input from Congress, FDR had joined together the fates 
of the United States and Britain.  
An undeclared shooting war soon broke out. On September 
4th, a German submarine fired on the destroyer USS Greer,
which FDR used to publicly justify “shoot-on-sight” orders for 
naval escorts in the Atlantic.271 Only later did Congress learn 
that the Greer had been hunting the submarine with British 
airplanes and had dropped depth charges on the Germans. FDR 
declared the Nazis to be the equivalent of modern-day pirates 
and compared German subs and commerce raiders to 
“rattlesnakes of the Atlantic.”272 As he put it, “when you see a 
rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck 
before you crush him.”273
FDR won broad support for the Navy’s new rules of 
engagement in the Atlantic, but at the price of deliberately 
deceiving the public about the facts.274 He followed with an 
October speech claiming that captured Nazi plans envisioned the 
division of North and South America into five dependent states 
and the abolition of the freedom of religion.275 The shooting war 
led to German submarine attacks on two American destroyers, 
the USS Kearny and the USS Reuben James, with the deaths of 
eleven and 115 sailors, respectively.276 FDR responded by seeking 
amendment of the neutrality laws to allow merchantmen to arm 
and carry goods directly to British ports. 
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The changes passed Congress by small majorities because 
about seventy percent of the public told pollsters they opposed 
American entry into the war.277 FDR concluded that the public, 
influenced by the memory of the way Wilson had led the country 
into World War I, would not rally behind a war waged in 
response to these isolated incidents. Rising tensions with Japan, 
however, provided other opportunities. After the Atlantic 
Conference, FDR informed the Japanese ambassador that any 
further expansion in Southeast Asia would force him to take any 
and all measures necessary “toward insuring the safety and 
security of the United States.”278 FDR’s attempts at a negotiated 
solution were, perhaps, less than genuine. He offered to 
undertake formal negotiations with Prince Konoye, the Japanese 
Prime Minister, only if Japan suspended its “expansionist 
activities” and openly declared its intentions in the Pacific.279
FDR asked that Japan terminate the Axis alliance, withdraw 
from China, and open up its trading system. He consciously 
demanded terms he knew that the Japanese were unlikely 
to accept. 
Japanese cabinet meetings on September 3rd through 6th 
concluded that unless the government reached a settlement with 
the United States by October, its military would attack 
American, British, and Dutch possessions in Asia.280 Tokyo 
decided its terms must include the freedom to conclude matters 
in China, an end to Anglo-American military action in the 
Pacific, and secure access to raw materials for the economy. FDR 
refused to negotiate on these conditions and instead ordered the 
reinforcement of the Philippines. By October 15th, FDR and his 
advisors believed that they needed more “diplomatic fencing” to 
create the image “that Japan was put into the wrong and made 
the first bad move—overt move.”281
Thanks to electronic intercepts of Japanese communications, 
FDR knew that the Japanese would attack if no settlement were 
reached, and he tried to string out negotiations to give the armed 
forces time to strengthen its position in the Philippines. On 
November 24, 1941, FDR discussed with his advisors the chances 
of a Japanese sneak attack and asked “how we should maneuver 
them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too 
much danger to ourselves.”282 He also told the British that he 
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would respond to any attack on their possessions in Asia. Still, 
FDR realized that without an enemy attack on the United States, 
his other measures would not convince the American people to 
support entry into World War II. 
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese solved FDR’s 
conundrum.283 No evidence supports the theories that FDR knew 
that Pearl Harbor was the target, nor that he willfully ignored 
the possibility of devastating losses to the Pacific Fleet. FDR did 
not consciously know about any specific attack on the United 
States—rather, he placed the Japanese in the position of 
choosing between war and giving up their imperial ambitions in 
China and the rest of the Pacific. The most that can be said is 
that if war were to come, FDR had tried for more than a year to 
maneuver the Axis powers into firing a first shot, while 
preparing the armed forces and American public for that 
eventuality. Pearl Harbor guaranteed the unity of the American 
people, just as Fort Sumter had eight decades before. As FDR 
told the American people the next day, December 7th was a “day 
which would live in infamy,” and he asked Congress for a 
declaration of war, which it promptly granted.284
Hitler further obliged by declaring war on the United States 
three days later. FDR exercised foresighted leadership in 
recognizing the Axis threat to the United States and the free 
nations of the West. But faced with a recalcitrant Congress and a 
reluctant public, FDR had to use his constitutional powers to 
move the nation into a war that he knew, as perhaps no one else 
did, was in the country’s best interests. If he had faithfully 
obeyed the Neutrality Acts, American entry into the war might 
have been delayed by months, if not years. A president who 
viewed his constitutional authorities as narrowed to executing 
the will of Congress might well have lost World War II. 
III. WARTIME CIVIL LIBERTIES
It is commonplace today to read the argument that war 
reduces civil liberties too much. We can gain a useful perspective 
on the question by examining Roosevelt’s wartime measures. 
FDR responded to the devastating Pearl Harbor attack with 
domestic policies, such as the use of military commissions, the 
internment of Japanese-Americans, and the widespread use of 
electronic surveillance. As in the Civil War, the federal courts 
deferred to the political branches until the war ended, and 
Congress went along with the president for the most part.  
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A. Military Commissions 
Military commissions are a form of tribunal used to try 
captured members of the enemy for violations of the laws of war. 
American generals have used them from the Revolutionary War 
through World War II, and, as we have seen, the Lincoln 
administration deployed them during the Civil War to try 
Confederate spies, irregular guerrillas, and sympathizers. 
Military commissions are neither created nor regulated by the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, which is enacted by Congress 
and governs courts-martial; instead, they were established by 
presidents as Commander-in-Chief and by military commanders 
in the field.285
World War II witnessed the use of military commissions on a 
par with the Civil War, but primarily for the administration of 
postwar justice. While the Nuremburg trials were the most well 
known, military commissions heard charges of war crimes 
against many former German and Japanese leaders at the end of 
the war. But the first commission was set up well before those, 
more famous examples, to hear the case of “The Nazi Saboteurs.” 
In June 1942, eight German agents covertly landed in Long 
Island and Florida with plans to attack factories, transportation 
facilities, and utility plants.286 All had lived in the United States 
before the war, and two were American citizens. One of them 
turned informer; after initially dismissing his story, the FBI 
arrested the plotters and revealed their capture by the end of 
June.287 Members of Congress and the media demanded the 
death penalty, even though no statutory provision established 
capital punishment for non-U.S. citizens.288
Roosevelt wanted a trial outside the civilian judicial system. 
On June 30th, he wrote to his Attorney General, Francis Biddle 
(Jackson having been elevated to the Supreme Court), supporting 
the idea of using military courts because “[t]he death penalty is 
called for by usage and by the extreme gravity of the war aim 
and the very existence of our American Government.”289
Roosevelt already thought they were guilty, and the punishment 
was not in doubt: “Surely they are just as guilty as it is possible 
to be . . . and it seems to me that the death penalty is almost 
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obligatory.”290 Two days earlier, Biddle and Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson had worried that the plot was not far enough 
along to win a conviction with a significant sentence—perhaps 
two years at most. Stimson was surprised that Biddle was “quite 
ready to turn them over to a military court” and learned 
that Justice Felix Frankfurter also believed a military 
court preferable.291
On June 30th, Biddle wrote to Roosevelt summarizing the 
advantages of a military commission.292 It would be speedier and 
easier to prove violations of the laws of war, and the death 
penalty would be available. Biddle also believed that using a 
military commission would prevent the defendants from seeking 
a writ of habeas corpus. “All the prisoners . . . can thus be denied 
access to our courts.”293 He did not commit to writing another 
important consideration: secrecy. According to Stimson, Biddle 
favored a military commission because the evidence would not 
become public, particularly that the Nazis had infiltrated U.S. 
lines with ease and had been captured only with the help of an 
informant.294 Biddle recommended that FDR issue executive 
orders establishing the commission, defining the crimes, 
appointing its members, and excluding judicial review.295
On July 2, 1942, Roosevelt issued two executive orders.296
The first created the commission and gave it the authority to try 
any “subjects, citizens, or residents of any nation at war with the 
United States,” who attempt to “enter the United States or any 
territory or possession thereof, through coastal or boundary 
defenses,” with an effort to “commit sabotage, espionage, hostile 
or warlike acts, or violations of the law or war.”297 The 
commission would try the defendants for violations of the laws of 
war, which mostly took the form of unwritten custom. FDR 
prohibited any appeals to the civilian courts, unless the Secretary 
of War and the Attorney General consented.298 His second order, 
in one paragraph, established the rules of procedure. The 
military judges were to hold a “full and fair trial” and could 
admit any evidence that would “have probative value to a 
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reasonable man.”299 The concurrence of two-thirds of the judges 
was required for sentencing, and any appeals had to run directly 
to the President himself.300
As structured by FDR, the commissions subjected the Nazi 
saboteurs to a form of justice very different from that normally 
applied in civilian courts. The most striking departure was the 
absence of a jury, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution. Neither civilian criminal procedure nor the normal 
rules of evidence applied, and FDR made no allowances for a 
right to legal counsel, a right to remain silent, or a right of 
appeal. Another important difference was that the laws of war, 
which at that time remained mostly unwritten, would define the 
crimes. Unlike the civilian system, which requires that the 
government prosecute defendants for crimes that are clearly 
defined and written, the saboteurs would be charged with war 
crimes upon which even legal experts would struggle to agree.  
FDR’s order was of uncertain constitutionality under the law 
of the day. At that time, the governing case was still Ex parte 
Milligan. Milligan held that the government had to use civilian 
courts when the defendant was not a member of the enemy 
armed forces and the courts were “open to hear criminal 
accusations and redress grievances.”301 FDR created military 
commissions to avoid Milligan, to charge the defendants with 
violations of the laws of war, and to preclude any form of judicial 
review. Military counsel for the Nazi saboteurs challenged the 
constitutionality of the trial on the ground that courts were open, 
the defendants were not in a war zone, violations of the laws of 
war were not subject to prosecution under federal law. Military 
commissions, they argued, violated the Articles of War enacted 
by Congress.302
FDR was undeterred when the Supreme Court agreed to 
hear the defendants’ case. As the Justices gathered in conference 
before oral argument, Justice Roberts reported that Biddle was 
worried that FDR would order the execution of the saboteurs 
regardless of the Court’s decision. Chief Justice Stone, whose son 
was working on the defense team, said “[t]hat would be 
a dreadful thing.”303 While Stone did not recuse himself, 
Justice Murphy—who was in uniform as a member of the army 
299 Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy: Appointment of a Military 
Commission, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 7, 1942). 
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reserve—did.304 Justice Byrnes, who had been serving as an 
informal advisor to the administration, did not. Biddle himself 
argued the case and urged the Court to overrule Milligan, but 
after two days of oral argument, the Justices decided to uphold 
the military commission.305 The great pressure on the Court is 
reflected in its decision to deliver a brief per curiam opinion the 
day after oral argument, with an opinion to follow months later. 
Commission proceedings began the day after the Supreme 
Court issued its order. The commission convicted and sentenced 
the defendants to death in three days.306 Five days later, FDR 
approved the verdict but commuted the sentences of two 
defendants.307 Roosevelt’s two executive orders remained the only 
guidance for the commission on the rules of procedures and the 
definition of the substantive crimes. There was no written 
explanation, for example, of the elements of the violations of the 
laws of war, nor were procedures given, aside from the votes 
required for conviction and the admission of evidence. 
When the Supreme Court finally issued its opinion, it 
carefully distinguished Milligan.308 Chief Justice Stone’s 
unanimous opinion for the Court found that Milligan applied to a 
civilian who had never associated himself with the enemy.309 The 
Nazi saboteurs, by contrast, had clearly joined the German 
armed forces. Neither the Bill of Rights nor the separation of 
powers barred FDR from using military courts during wartime 
to try enemy combatants. Congressional creation of the courts 
martial system and the absence of any criminal provisions 
to punish violations of the laws of war presented no 
serious obstacle. Chief Justice Stone read the Article of War 
recognizing the concurrent jurisdiction of military commissions 
as congressional blessing for their existence.310 The Justices 
decided not to address the issue that had divided them 
behind the scenes—whether Congress could require the president 
to provide the saboteurs with any trial at all, civilian or 
military—because they did not read any congressional enactment 
as prohibiting military commissions.311 If the United States was at 
war, and it captured members of the enemy armed forces, it could 
try the prisoners for war crimes outside the civilian or court 
martial systems. 
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B. Detention 
In the wake of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt ordered 
sweeping military detentions that, in absolute numbers, far 
eclipsed Lincoln’s policies in the Civil War. After the Japanese 
attack and the German and Italian declarations of war, FDR 
authorized the Departments of War and Justice to intern 
German, Japanese, and Italian citizens in the United States. In 
February 1942, for example, the government detained 
approximately 3000 Japanese aliens.312 Detention of the citizens 
of an enemy nation had long been a normal aspect of the rules of 
war, and was authorized by the Alien Enemies Act (on the books 
since 1798).313 That same month, FDR went even further and 
authorized the detention of American citizens suspected of 
disloyalty. On February 19, 1942, FDR signed Executive Order 
9066, allowing the Secretary of War to designate parts of the 
country as military zones “from which any or all persons may be 
excluded.”314 By the end of 1942, the government moved 110,000 
Japanese-Americans to ten internment camps because of the 
possibility that they might provide aid to the enemy.315 Recent 
historical work suggests that Roosevelt took a far more 
active role in the detention decision than has been 
commonly understood.316
There was substantial disagreement within the military and 
the administration on the internments.317 General John DeWitt, 
commander of the Fourth Army on the West Coast, initially 
opposed the mass evacuations of Japanese-Americans, as did 
officials in the Justice Department and several prominent White 
House aides, but by late January 1942, thinking had changed.318
A popular movement on the West Coast demanded removal of the 
Japanese-Americans to the nation’s interior. This sentiment 
gathered momentum as the United States suffered a string of 
military defeats in the Pacific. The precipitating factor in the 
eventual internment decision appears to be the release of the 
Roberts Commission report on the Pearl Harbor attacks.319 While 
the commission only briefly mentioned that some Japanese in the 
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Hawaiian Islands, along with Japanese consular officials, had 
provided intelligence on military installations before the attacks, 
the public response was tremendous. The Roberts Commission 
report “attracted national attention and transformed public 
opinion on Japanese Americans.”320 Newspapers, California 
political leaders, and military officials demanded that the 
Roosevelt administration intern Japanese-Americans out of fear 
of further sabotage and espionage.321 Some in the War 
Department discounted the effect of espionage on the West Coast, 
and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover dismissed claims of disloyalty. 
Cabinet members raised the issue twice with the President 
before the final executive order. Biddle met FDR for lunch in 
early February 1942 to express doubts about the need for 
internment. While FDR did not make a decision at that time, he 
concluded the lunch by saying he was “fully aware of the dreadful 
risk of Fifth Column retaliation in case of a raid.”322 A few days 
later, Stimson called Roosevelt after learning that General 
DeWitt would recommend removal of Japanese-Americans on the 
West Coast.323 News that Singapore had fallen arrived the 
day before Stimson’s call, making it unlikely that FDR would 
second-guess claims of military necessity. Nonetheless, 
Stimson—who had his own doubts about the necessity and 
legality of the evacuations—proposed three options: massive 
evacuation, evacuation from major cities, or evacuation from 
areas surrounding military facilities.324 Roosevelt responded that 
Stimson should do what he thought best, and that he would sign 
an executive order giving the War Department the authority to 
carry out the removals.325 DeWitt soon found the evacuations 
necessary on security grounds, and Stimson and Biddle agreed on 
a draft of the executive order based on Roosevelt’s constitutional 
authorities as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.326 It 
appears that FDR’s decision rested solely on the military’s claim 
of wartime necessity.  
Several scholars have observed that Roosevelt was not 
vigilant in protecting civil liberties, and in this case, according to 
one biographer, the decision was easy for him.327 FDR believed 
that the military “had primary direct responsibility for the 
achievement of war victory, the achievement of war victory had 
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top priority, and ‘victory’ had for him a single simple meaning” of 
defeating Germany and Japan; victory, for Roosevelt, “was 
prerequisite to all else.”328 There was no great outcry from liberal 
leaders, there was no cabinet meeting or forum for debate within 
the administration, and the Attorney General came to agree with 
the War Department that the measure was legal. Recent 
historical work argues that the internment decision did not arise 
solely because of misinformation about Japanese-Americans or 
the pressure of events early in the war.329 The internments 
happened, in part, because FDR was ready to believe the worst 
about the potential disloyalty of Japanese-Americans.330
Presidential consultation with Congress did not improve 
national security decision-making. Both Congress and the Court 
approved FDR’s actions. In March 1942, Congress passed a bill 
establishing criminal penalties for those who refused to obey the 
evacuation orders.331 Support for the law was so broad that it was 
approved in both the House and Senate by voice vote with only a 
single speech, by Republican Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, 
in opposition. 
The Supreme Court did not directly address the 
constitutionality of the detentions until Korematsu v. United 
States, decided on December 18, 1944.332 According to the Court, 
the mass evacuation triggered “strict” scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause because it discriminated on the basis of race.333
Nonetheless, the Court agreed that these wartime security 
measures advanced a compelling government interest, and the 
Court deferred to the military’s judgment of necessity. According 
to Justice Black’s 6–3 majority opinion, “[the court was] unable to 
conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the 
Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West 
Coast war area at the time they did.”334 While not disputing the 
deprivation of individual liberty involved, the majority 
recognized that “the military authorities, charged with the 
primary responsibility of defending our shores, concluded that 
curfew provided inadequate protection and ordered exclusion.”335
As with an earlier case upholding a nighttime curfew on 
Japanese-Americans in the western military region, the Court 
concluded, “we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the 
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military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal 
members of that population, whose number and strength could 
not be precisely and quickly ascertained.”336
The Court’s majority stressed that the Constitution afforded 
leeway to the executive branch during time of emergency.337
Justice Black agreed that while the government generally could 
not detain citizens based solely on their race, such motivation 
was not present in the instant case. The exclusion order was 
necessary, Black wrote, because “the properly constituted 
military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast,” and 
their judgment was that “the military urgency of the situation 
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated 
from the West Coast temporarily[.]”338 Although it observed that 
Congress supported the military’s power “as inevitably it must” 
during wartime, the Court attached no special importance to 
the authorization.339
The press of circumstances required deference to military 
judgment. “There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, 
the military authorities considered that the need for action was 
great, and time was short.”340 Perhaps most important, Justice 
Black concluded that decisions taken during the emergency itself 
had to be understood in light of the information known at the 
time. “We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective 
of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions 
were unjustified.”341
Korematsu remains one of the most criticized decisions in 
American history, considered second only to Dred Scott on the list 
of the Court’s biggest mistakes. The three dissenters believed 
that the Constitution clearly protected Japanese-American 
citizens from what we today would call racial profiling. The 
government, Justice Roberts wrote, was “convicting a citizen as a 
punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a 
concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely because of 
his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty 
and good disposition towards the United States.”342 The 
dissenters did not challenge the proposition that “sudden danger” 
might require the suspension of a citizen’s right to free 
movement, or that the Court owed the military broad deference 
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during wartime, but that the chosen hypothetical did not 
represent the true facts of the case. Any “immediate, imminent, 
and impending” threat to public safety was absent.343 Justice 
Murphy wrote in dissent that “this forced exclusion was the 
result in good measure of [an] erroneous assumption of racial 
guilt rather than bona fide military necessity.”344 The dissenters 
pointed out that the government presented no reliable evidence 
that Japanese-Americans were generally disloyal or had done 
anything that made them a threat to the national defense. 
The exclusion order relied simply on unproven racial and 
sociological stereotypes. 
Justice Jackson used his dissent to harmonize the role of the 
executive and the courts during wartime. “It would be 
impracticable and dangerous idealism to expect or insist that 
each specific military command in an area of probable operations 
will conform to conventional tests of constitutionality.”345 For a 
Commander-in-Chief and the military, “the paramount 
consideration is that its measures be successful, rather than 
legal.”346 In words that echoed Lincoln and Jefferson, Jackson 
declared that the “armed services must protect a society, not 
merely its Constitution,” and observed that “defense measures 
will not, and often should not, be held within the limits that bind 
civil authority in peace.”347 That said, Jackson did not want to 
provide constitutional legitimacy to the exclusion order. There 
might be no limit to what military necessity would allow when 
courts are institutionally incapable of second-guessing the 
decisions of military authorities. “But if we cannot confine 
military expedients by the Constitution, neither would I distort 
the Constitution to approve all that the military may deem 
expedient.”348 Upholding the Japanese-American internment 
would create a dangerous precedent for the future. “The principle 
then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any 
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent 
need.”349 A one-time-only action is only an “incident,” but once 
upheld by the Court, it becomes “the doctrine of the 
Constitution.”350 In a solution many have found unsatisfying, 
Jackson wanted the Court neither to bless nor block the 
military’s enforcement of the exclusion. 
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Historical research has revealed that some government 
officials doubted whether any real security threat justified the 
exclusion order. Nonetheless, the Justice Department chose in 
Korematsu to assert that military authorities believed the 
evacuations necessary because of an alleged threat against the 
West Coast. A companion case, Ex parte Endo, however, found 
that the government could not detain a Japanese-American 
citizen whom the government had conceded was “loyal and 
law-abiding.”351 To this day, the debate over the necessity of the 
measures continues, but regardless of which side one falls on in 
that debate, it seems clear that the internment of the Japanese-
Americans in Korematsu represents a far more serious 
infringement of civil liberties than that which occurred in the 
Civil War. The first and most obvious difference is one of 
magnitude. FDR interned—without trial—about 110,000 
Japanese-Americans on suspicion of disloyalty to the United 
States.352 Lincoln ordered the detention of about 12,600.353
The second difference is one of justification. FDR ordered the 
detention of the Japanese-Americans not because any had been 
found to be enemy combatants. They were interned because of 
their potential threat due to loyalty to an enemy nation imputed 
from their ethnic ancestry. FDR could have pursued a narrower 
policy that detained individuals based on their individual ties to 
a nation with which the United States was at war. The citizens of 
Japan, Germany, and Italy could be interned as a matter of 
course, and anyone fighting or working for the enemy, regardless 
of citizenship, could be detained. With regard to aliens, FDR 
could have relied upon the Alien Enemies Act to detain natives or 
citizens of a hostile nation during wartime.354 FDR’s internment 
policy did neither—instead, it presumed disloyalty, sweeping 
in 110,000 American’s of Japanese ancestry based solely on 
their ethnicity.  
C. Electronic Surveillance 
Roosevelt has been described by one historian as 
the president most interested in covert activity other than 
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Washington, who personally managed spies and directed the 
interception of British communications. During World War I, 
Roosevelt had served as assistant secretary of the Navy, with 
responsibility for intelligence. During World War II, his 
interest in covert operations led to the establishment of the 
Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.355
Less well known are Roosevelt’s actions with regard to the 
interception of electronic communications. The Administration 
initially had not engaged in any wiretapping for national 
security purposes, as Attorney General Jackson believed that 
electronic surveillance without a warrant violated the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934.356 In March 1940, he issued 
an order prohibiting the FBI from intercepting electronic 
communications without a warrant. As Europe plunged into war, 
however, J. Edgar Hoover grew increasingly concerned about the 
possibility of Axis spies within the United States. Aware of 
Jackson’s order, Hoover went to Treasury Secretary Henry 
Morgenthau and asked him to speak to Roosevelt to authorize 
the interception of the communications of potential foreign 
agents who might sympathize with Germany.357
Roosevelt had long been concerned with the potential threat 
of a “fifth column” inside the United States. The spectacular 1916 
sabotage of an American munitions plant remained vivid in his 
memory. As early as 1936, Roosevelt authorized the FBI to 
investigate “subversive activities in this country, including 
communism and fascism.”358 When World War II broke out, 
Roosevelt ordered the Bureau to “take charge of investigative 
work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of 
neutrality regulations,” and commanded state and local law 
enforcement officers to “promptly turn over” to the FBI any 
information “relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, 
subversive activities and violations of the neutrality laws.”359
What “subversive activities” meant was left undefined. 
France’s collapse in May 1940 had a profound effect. At the 
time, Germany’s smashing victory seemed inexplicable as a feat 
of arms alone, lending credence to the theory that collaborators 
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and spies were also responsible. Roosevelt increasingly spoke of 
his concern that the United States, too, might suffer from Axis 
sympathizers or covert agents’ intent on undermining its war 
preparations. Even before Hoover came to make his request, FDR 
had encouraged amateur surveillance efforts. His friend, 
publisher, and real estate developer, Vincent Astor, had set up a 
private group he had called “the Room,” which included leading 
figures in New York City.360 As a director of the Western Union 
Telegraph Company, Astor ordered the covert interception of 
telegrams.361 He and his friends also arranged for the monitoring 
of radio transmissions in New York. Using its connections, the 
group gathered the private banking records of companies 
connected to foreign nations to determine whether they were 
supporting espionage within the United States.362 While there is 
no direct record of a presidential order authorizing this 
surveillance, historical evidence suggests that the group was 
acting in response to a request by Roosevelt.363
Given his suspicions, Roosevelt quickly agreed with 
Morgenthau and Hoover that the wiretapping of suspected Axis 
agents or collaborators was necessary to protect national 
security. The next day, he issued a memorandum to Jackson to 
allow the FBI to wiretap individuals who posed a potential threat 
to the national security.364 After Pearl Harbor, FDR released the 
handbrake and authorized the interception of all international 
communications. Even though some Justices had criticized 
wiretapping, the Court held in 1928 in Olmstead v. United 
States, that the Fourth Amendment did not require a warrant to 
intercept electronic communications.365 It would not be until 
1967, in Katz v. United States, that the Supreme Court would 
hold that electronic communications were entitled to Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections.366
Congress, however, appeared to have prohibited the 
interception of electronic communications in the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934. It declared that “no person” who 
receives or transmits “any interstate or foreign communication 
by wire or radio” can “divulge or publish” its contents except 
through “authorized channels of transmission” or to the 
recipient.367 In United States v. Nardone, decided in 1937, the 
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Supreme Court interpreted this language to prohibit wiretapping 
by the government as well as by private individuals.368 In 
a second Nardone case, the Court made clear that the 
government could not introduce in court any evidence gathered 
from wiretapping.369
FDR recognized that his wiretapping order of May 1940 
violated the text of the statute, or at least the Supreme Court’s 
reading of it, but the President claimed that the Supreme Court 
could not have intended “any dictum in the particular case which 
it decided to apply to grave matters involving the defense of the 
nation.”370 Administration supporters in Congress introduced 
legislation to legalize wiretapping, but the House rejected the bill 
154–147.371 FDR continued the interception program throughout 
the war despite the Federal Communications Act and Nardone.
FDR’s pre-war interception order applied to anyone “suspected of 
subversive activities” against the U.S. government, which 
included individuals who might be sympathetic to, or even 
working for, Germany and Japan.372 At that time, however, the 
United States was not yet at war. While FDR wanted the FBI to 
limit the interceptions to the calls of aliens, his order did not 
exclude citizens. Most importantly, it was not limited only to 
international calls or telegrams, but included communications 
that took place wholly within the United States. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
War and emergency demand that presidents exercise their 
constitutional powers far more broadly than in peacetime. That 
was never more true than under President Franklin Roosevelt. 
FDR tackled the Great Depression by treating it as a domestic 
emergency that called for the centralization of power in the 
federal government and the presidency. But he could not act 
alone, because the Constitution gives Congress the authority to 
regulate the economy and create the federal agencies. Under 
Roosevelt’s direction, Congress enacted sweeping legislation 
vesting almost complete power over industry and agriculture in 
the executive branch, which repeatedly sought to centralize 
power over the plethora of New Deal agencies in the presidency. 
368 See United States v. Nardone, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937). 
369 Id. at 338. 
370 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 68–69 (2003). 
371  See Caplan & Katyal, supra note 357, at 1060. 
372 United States v. U.S. District Court, 444 F.2d 651, 670 (6th Cir. 1971). 
2018] Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power 269 
Roosevelt responded to the looming threat of fascism by 
bringing the United States into World War II, and he made all 
the significant decisions of foreign and domestic policy once the 
war began. Historians rarely, if ever, mention any role for 
Congress in the prosecution of the war against Germany and 
Japan, aside from the provision of money and arms. It was the 
President, for example, who decided that the United States 
would allocate its resources to seek victory in Europe first, and 
Roosevelt alone who declared that the Allies would demand 
unconditional surrender as the only way to end the war.  
FDR, not Congress, made the critical decisions about the 
shape of the postwar world. He wanted a world policed by four 
major countries: the United States, Great Britain, China, and the 
Soviet Union. He agreed with Great Britain and the Soviet Union 
to divide Germany—the “German question” was the fundamental 
strategic problem at the root of both World Wars. At Yalta, FDR 
agreed that the Soviet Union would control a sphere of influence 
extending over Eastern Europe, and in return, those nations 
would be allowed to hold democratic elections.  
While some believe that Stalin had hoodwinked him, FDR 
may have recognized the reality of the balance of power in 
Europe after the war. He may have hoped that his 
reasonableness in agreeing to Stalin’s demands would win, in 
exchange, Soviet support of the United Nations. Roosevelt also 
demanded that Britain and France give up their colonies. FDR 
wanted to forestall a return to both the isolationism and the 
international disorder of the interwar period. Historians argue 
today whether Roosevelt truly believed in collective security, or 
whether he was a realist who accepted the balance of power at 
the end of World War II. Either way, it was the President who 
took the initiative to set the policy, although it was one where he 
could not act alone. Without the Senate’s approval, the United 
Nations would have gone the way of the League of Nations. 
Too often, we focus on mistakes of commission—a 
decision to go to war gone bad, or a law that has unintended 
consequences—known as Type I errors. FDR showed that the 
presidency may be far more effective than the other branches in 
preventing a failure to take action—errors of omission, or Type II
errors. Left to its own devices, Congress would have blocked aid 
to the Allies and delayed American entry into World War II by 
several months, if not years. This may be a result of the internal 
structure of Congress, which suffers from, at times crippling, 
collective action problems. The passage of legislation through 
both Houses with many members is fraught with such difficulty 
that the Constitution can be understood to favor inaction and, 
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therefore, maintenance of the status quo. The status quo may be 
best for a nation when it enjoys peace and prosperity, where 
threats come more often from ill-advised efforts at reform or 
revolutionary change. But maintaining the status quo may harm 
the nation when long-term threats are approaching, or 
unanticipated opportunities present themselves and must be 
seized rapidly before vanishing. 
In the area of domestic affairs, whether the New Deal or 
internal security programs, Roosevelt worked hand-in-hand with 
Congress. He had to: the Great Depression’s economic nature 
brought it squarely within the enumerated powers of Congress. 
Nevertheless, the emergency of the Depression illuminated the 
natural advantages of presidential leadership in the legislative 
process. A complex economy beset by a mysterious, but 
dangerous, ailment required administrative expertise for a cure, 
and Congress willingly cooperated by transferring massive 
legislative authority to the agencies.
FDR deserves praised for trying every reasonable idea, 
including this transformation of executive-legislative relations, to 
reverse the sickening drop in economic activity. Crucially, 
neither he, nor anyone else, affirmatively knew how to end the 
Depression. Only now do we know that the New Deal, combined 
with the Federal Reserve’s tight monetary policy and the 
government’s restrictive fiscal policies, prolonged the Great 
Depression itself. Rather, it was World War II, not the New Deal, 
which ended the persistent unemployment levels of the 1930s. 
When the smoke cleared in 1945, the New Deal’s true legacy 
endured in the form of bloated, independent bureaucracies that 
future presidents would struggle to control. Plainly, presidential 
cooperation with Congress provides no guarantee of success, and, 
in fact, can prove quite malignant. 
Throughout FDR’s astounding presidency, a theme unites 
both his success in foreign policy and the appearance of such in 
domestic policy. FDR believed deeply in the independence of the 
presidency and a vigorous use of its constitutional authorities. He 
did not shrink from constitutional confrontations with the other 
branches. To pursue the policies he believed to be in the national 
interest such confrontation was often required. He openly 
disagreed with the Supreme Court’s limitations on the New Deal 
and publicly sought to manipulate its membership. He pushed 
his powers as Commander-in-Chief beyond their perceived limits, 
refusing to abide by the spirit, and sometimes the letter, of the 
Neutrality Acts in order to involve the United States in a war 
that neither Congress nor a clear majority of Americans favored. 
FDR correctly judged the threat to the nation’s existence posed 
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by the rise of fascism. The nation and the world are better off 
today because he pushed a reluctant nation into war. His broad 
understanding of his executive powers created the foundation for 
policies that secured freedom in the twentieth century. 
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